Parliamentary Tracker: Revision of Dublin, Qualification Directive, Refugees situation in Greece, EASO reform.. (LIBE debates on March 9,2017)

by Luigi LIMONE (Free-Group Trainee)

Main Points on the Agenda
MEETING DOCUMENTS ARE ACCESSIBLE HERE

REVISION OF DUBLIN REGULATION (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) – Presentation of the draft report by rapporteur Cecilia Wikström.

According to the EP Rapporteur Cecilia Wikström (ALDE – Sweden), the Dublin system has collapsed and the current reform gives the European Parliament the possibility to have a rethinking of the whole system. She underlined four main points to accomplish such a reform:
a) every member state has to participate in the system;
b) the management of external borders has to be reformed;
c) applicants’ secondary movement has to be reduced;
d) the system needs to earn applicants’ trust, with regard to information and access to fair asylum procedures in particular.

Cecilia Wikström said that the proposal should be based on solidarity and not on ad-hoc  emergency measures. The European Union needs a pragmatic and practical mechanism to relocate applicants in Europe, as well as the introduction of the principle of shared responsibilities among Member States.
One of the key points of her draft report deals with admissibility in the first country of arrival:  admissibility check procedures prior to the establishment of the Member State responsible, as proposed by the Commission, would imply introducing an unreasonable new additional burden on frontline Member States.
She also proposed simplified procedures for family reunification and the possibility for applicants to be registered as a group in case there are some connections, for example language, ethnic origin and so on.  The latter provision would enable Member States to relocate those people as a group, thus reducing the costs for translation, simplifying the procedures for relocation and limiting secondary movement.
She also proposed a transitional system as far as the distribution quotas are concerned: for the first period, those Member States who are new to the migratory phenomenon will receive less migrants, in order to become familiar with refugee reception and asylum applications.
She then highlighted the importance of a strong link between the relocation system and the protection of external borders. An efficient relocation system would reduce the burden on frontline Member States. With this respect, she proposed the introduction of sanctions, such as an interruption of structural funds, for those Member States which do not respect their obligations.
The fight against secondary movement is the key element of the proposal.
For this reason, applicants’ registration in Eurodac is necessary, in order to establish an efficient relocation system capable of limiting secondary movements. Member States must therefore register applicants and respect the rules concerning the reception of asylum seekers. This would create a predictable system capable of making people feel safe in the first country of arrival. In this way, secondary movements would be discouraged and migrants would stop relying on smugglers in order to reach the Member State they wish to live in.
Among the issues which require further attention, Cecilia Wikström mentioned the situation of unaccompanied minors: thousands of migrants still go missing today and the EU has to provide them with protection, so that they receive appropriate care and they do not fall into the hands of smugglers or criminal networks. She therefore proposed some provisions regarding the quick appointment of guardians and the creation of teams for the assessment of the situation of child asylum seekers. Specifically, every single Member State should be able to offer an appropriate system for the reception of unaccompanied minors.

According to Alessandra Mussolini (shadow rapporteur for EPP – Italy), the draft report is very decisive and ambitious and many of the innovations introduced will be able to increase the flexibility of the Dublin system. The key elements for the reform of the Dublin system are greater solidarity and a greater sense of shared responsibility among Member States. To reach this solidarity, mutual recognition between Member States and their full participation in the Dublin system are required. With regard to admissibility, she stated that the reform proposed by the rapporteur would make the definition of admissibility criteria faster, while reducing the burden on frontline Member States. She also appreciated the wider flexibility family reunification criteria and the possibility to consider groups of people who share the same language or the same ethnic origin, since it would make registration and relocation procedures faster. On unaccompanied minors, she said that in order to prevent them from disappearing or falling into the hands criminal networks, Member States should need greater specialisation and greater solidarity as well as more responsibility and safety.

According to Elly Schlein (shadow rapporteur for S&D – Italy), the main problem is that while the European Parliament is discussing the reform of the Dublin system for the fourth time, the Council is not even looking at the proposal of the Commission. For her, one of the major obstacles of the current Dublin system is the management of EU external borders.
On admissibility, she confirmed that the introduction of systematic admissibility checks before the application of the Dublin criteria would imply a significant additional burden on frontline Member States, thus reducing their incentives to properly register applicants and promoting secondary movements.
She also said that an automatic relocation mechanism would help the system move forward. On reception, she said that EU Member States should provide decent reception conditions, instead of applying coercive measures. In her opinion, the EU should be able to find a balance between the duties of Member States and the responsibilities of applicants.
She appreciated the reforms on guardianship for unaccompanied children and the flexibility on family reunification- For her, Member States have in fact to respect the family links applicants may have with a Member State different from the country of first arrival.
Elly Schlein was quite critical on the proposal for a transitional period for countries who are less accustomed to receiving refugees. For her, this “exception” would create different responsibilities among Member States and it might therefore weaken solidarity.

Daniel Dalton (shadow rapporteur for ECR – UK) was quite disappointed regarding the proposal for the introduction of the automatic and mandatory relocation system proposed by Commission. In his opinion, Member States cannot be forced to take people if they do not want or they are not ready to do so. He also criticised the conditionality between participation of Member States in mandatory relocation and suspension of EU financial support:  for him, it is completely unacceptable to link the two things, since imposing sanctions on Member States could undermine solidarity and mutual trust. According to him, the EU should reinforce its control procedures in order to fight secondary movement and prevent migrants from absconding. Migrants should be discouraged to take journeys, by giving them the impression that they could not choose the Member State they want to live in.

For Cornelia Ernst (shadow rapporteur for GUE/NGL – Germany), the Dublin system is dead and anyone who says anything else is a dreamer. The system has totally failed and if the Member States wants to get something out of it, they should start thinking not only about their own interests but also about the interests of asylum seekers. She welcomed the proposal to extend family reunification conditions, since in her opinion family goes beyond the mother/father/child relationship. She also welcomed the positive changes concerning guardianship for unaccompanied minors. She found the proposal to register migrants in groups quite positive and she agreed that Member States should be more flexible when dealing with reception of migrants.
On the other hand, she was very critical about the differences in the application of the legislation among Member States. She said, in particular, that the problem of secondary movement would continue to exist as long as refugees were locked up by some Member States, such as Hungary. In her opinion, the European Parliament should make pressure on Member States, so that they all respect the system in the same way. Adopting exceptional measures in order to avoid secondary movements is not the solution, since the real problem is the approach chosen by some Member States. As far as external boundaries are concerned, she said that the proposal of the Commission was too theoretical and it did not take into account the concrete situation that frontline Member States were facing.

For Jean Lamber (shadow rapporteur for Greens/EFA – UK), the key point of the Dublin system is to ensure that the application for asylum is examined and that Member States respect their obligations to do so. She was quite satisfied with the innovations regarding children and unaccompanied minors. On relocation, she found the idea of collective registration and transfer very interesting. However, according to her, today one of the main obstacles to relocation is integration. It is therefore fundamental to reduce barriers to integration in the European societies.

According to Laura Ferrara (shadow rapporteur for EFDD – Italy), the proposal of the Commission is highly critical of the Dublin reform and nothing seems to have changed over the years. The main point of the proposal appears to be the need to block secondary movement. However, in her opinion this should not be considered the priority, since the main issue is that frontline Member States will continue to be overburdened. People can’t be forced  to stay in bad conditions and, as a consequence, they try to reach other countries where reception conditions are better. The key aspect of the reform of the Dublin system is solidarity. Therefore, the EU needs to put into place an automatic relocation mechanism, which should always be applied and not only for emergency situations. On family reunification, she said that the Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum application should always be that in which the applicant has some family connections. As a result, the applicant should be transferred to that Member State as fast as possible.

MEPs interventions:
According to Tomáš Zdechovský  (Czech Republic – PPE), the Dublin system cannot be based on penalties. Member States who do not respect their obligations should not be sanctioned and coercive conditionality between participation of Member States and financial support cannot be accepted.
According to Jussi Halla-Aho (ECR – Finland), Member States should not forget that most of the people who arrive in Italy or Greece hope to travel across Europe and not to stay in the county of first arrival. The EU therefore needs to discourage people to take journeys, making it clear that applicants cannot choose where they want to go. For him, Italy and Greece are called on to put into practice measures of return and readmissions of migrants driven by socio-economic causes as soon as possible.
For Kristina Winberg (EFDD – Sweden), the reform under discussion will collapse soon,  since Member States will start experiencing some problems relating to its implementation.
Ana Gomes (S&D – Portugal) proposed the introduction of new solutions based on the creation of safe and legal pathways for asylum seekers. On relocation, she said that the introduction of an automatic mandatory relocation mechanism would be a very good element.   In her opinion, the use of structural funds needs to be reconsidered: the EU should stimulate  Member States’ solidarity through structural funds. She also raised some concerns on how to reinforce the role of EASO within the relocation mechanism.
In conclusion, the Rapporteur Cecilia Wikström (ALDE – Sweden) stated again that the EU should stop adopting ad-hoc solutions and should make more concrete efforts to reform the Dublin system, in order to reinforce the stability of the system itself. She reiterated the importance of helping overburdened countries, Italy and Greece in particular, in a spirit of solidarity and equal responsibilities. According to her, the EU needs, however, to establish a system that is able to function not only for Italy and Greece, but which can prevent from having a similar situation in other parts of Europe in the future. Member States should therefore act in solidarity and remember that they are dealing with people who are in need of international protection.

 

2) “Qualification Directive” : (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status of refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents – Presentation of the draft report by rapporteur.
Tanja Fajon (S&D – Slovenia), Rapporteur underlined the importance to reform the qualification system, by stating that around 1.5 million people have arrived in Europe over the last two years. According to her, the EU needs a step forward to reform a system which is still based on the principle of the first country of arrival. She also raised some concerns on the role played by cohesion funds. According to her, these funds, which mostly go to the EU Eastern countries should be used as a condition to stimulate Member States to respect their obligations. Her report has been drafted after several meetings with NGOs working in this domain.  According to her, the key elements for an efficient qualification system are a more equitable distribution of burdens among Member States and the introduction of new measures aiming at a rapid integration of refugees within the European societies.
Among the essential elements proposed in the report, she highlighted:
a) the adoption of efficient measures to encourage refugee integration and avoid secondary movement;
b) equal treatment for refugees and EU citizens and non-discrimination against minority groups;
c) the equation between asylum and subsidiary protection in terms of length of residence permits (5 years for both status).
As regards the revision of international protection, it should be optional and it needs to take into account the situation of the applicant’s country of origin. The introduction of a systematic revision of the status is not a good element and could represent an additional burden for the Member State responible.
The draft report also proposes to extend the criteria of eligibility to international protection to new categories, in particular to persons in need of protection due to a natural or a man-made disaster. The definition of family members should be broadened as well and it has to include brothers and sisters in order to encourage family reunification.

According to Alessandra Mussolini (shadow rapporteur for EPP – Italy), the EU needs  some common ground on the reform of the qualification directive. It is essential to simplify, streamline and speed up the procedures if the EU wants to fight illegal activities and reduce the burdens on Member States. She also found very important to harmonise the timeframe for residence permits of the two status of international protection. As regards family links, she said that the more the EU tried to define new categories eligible to international protection, the more the other categories are excluded, with possible negative impacts on vulnerable people. She also raised some concerns on married minors, for whom the situation could me more difficult to be examined.

According to Jussi Halla-Aho (shadow rapporteur for ECR – Finland), secondary movement and asylum shopping are the major threats to the Schengen area and to the credibility of the asylum system. He also recalled that many people in the world flee the general economic conditions of their countries and not for reasons of real persecution. This constitute an abuse of the asylum system. In his opinion, a regulation is the right instrument to harmonise measures within the EU. However, the liberal interpretation and the maximum standards of protection adopted in the draft report should be substituted by a conservative interpretation and minimum standards, since the objective of the system should be to discourage and not to encourage migration flows. He said that he could not accept the inclusion of environmental migrants as beneficiaries of international protection and he stated that international protection should be always temporary and that subsidiary protection should last no more than one year. He also reiterated the importance to asses the situation in the country of origin before the renewal of the status of international protection, while taking into consideration that the purpose of the system should always be to send people back home as soon as possible, in particular those who do not show a cooperative and open attitude towards the integration into the society of the host Member State.

Cecilia Wikström (on behalf of Angelika Mlinar, shadow rapporteur for ALDE) said that the draft report appeared to be very good and that the reform should be based on incentives instead of sanctions and on the extension of the scope of family reunification.

For Barbara Spinelli (shadow rapporteur for GUE/NGL – Italy), some points of the report need to be totally revisited, since the new regulation risks leading to a downward harmonisation. This holds especially true when it comes to the equation between subsidiary protection and refugee status, since the harmonisation can lead to less safeguards for people in need of protection compared to what some Member States, such as Italy, already grant. She also underlined that the respect of the non refoulement obligation should always be at the base of the reform. She also highlighted the importance of including environmental migrants among the beneficiaries of international protection. She made the example of land grabbing, a phenomenon which is forcing many people from Africa and other parts of the world to leave their countries. She also called for the extension of the residence permits as well as the inclusion of new family ties for family reunification. The spirit should be to include more and more categories as beneficiaries of international protection, and even though it is true that the definition of these categories can exclude other categories, that is the spirit under which subsidiary protection was introduced and the EU therefore needs to continue in that direction.

For Jean Lamber (shadow rapporteur for Greens/EFA – UK), the new regulation must not level down the situation. In particular, she said that the systematic examination of the status each year could become a nightmare for Member States and could have serious damages on integration. For example, in the case of integration in the labour market, employers would be discouraged to take people on, if they know that after one year they will not probably be there anymore. For her, the alignment between asylum and subsidiary protection is necessary. The definition of family should be extended as well, together with the scope of those in need of protection, including environmental refugees.

3) Refugees/Migrants issue in Greece: State of play and future scenarios. Exchange of views with Ioannis Mouzalas, Minister of Migration Policy of Greece.
Ioannis Mouzalas talked about the current migration situation in Greece. He said that there had been around 850,000 migrants in Greece in 2015 and that Greeks had showed great solidarity and friendship towards the migrants, with the exception perhaps of the people of the islands, where some populist responses and reflexes had aroused.
On the situation of reception centres and refugee camps in his country, he said that their conditions had not not been very good in the beginning, but the situation had improved over time. According to him, Greece has managed to build around many  new centres and has made concrete efforts to create new safe spaces inside the camps for unaccompanied minors. As far as the migration situation on the islands is concerned, conditions are worse than the mainland mostly because of overpopulation, and Greek people living on the islands are often afraid of these massive arrivals. However, the Greek government has planned to create 10,000 further housing slots in the islands and it wants to provide refugees and asylum seekers with cash payment as well as work permits in the cities where they live.
In his opinion, the EU needs an automatic procedure to provide overburdened countries, such as Greece, with the assistance they require. The EU cannot continue to manage migration flows through voluntary support. Solidarity cannot be voluntary, because such a voluntary clause would create a situation in which only some Member States would be willing to participate in solidarity actions and actually this is already the case in Europe with countries, such as Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden, which are facing alone the current migration crisis, while others are not participating in the system at all.

MEPs interventions:
Roberta Metsola (EPP – Malta) said that in Greece there had been a huge influx of migrants over the past years. For her, real solidarity needs to be improved and it should represent the starting point to deal with this situation. However, she asked for more clarity on the number of migrants who are currently entering Greece and those who are being returned under the EU-Turkey agreement. She also asked for more accuracy on the information regarding the financial aid Greece is receiving from the EU in order to manage the situation.
For Birgit Sippel (S&D – Germany), the situation Greece is facing clearly demonstrates that flexible solidarity is even more senseless if some Member States continue to do nothing.
Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL– Germany), asked about the functioning of the allocation system in Greece, in particular with regard to allocation of minors.
For Judith Sargentini (Greens/EFA – Netherlands), Greece is not relocating refugees as it should do, due to the fact that they do not fit the nationality criteria or as an effect of the EU-Turkey deal. According to her, relocation seems to have become a game in Europe.
Malin Björk (GUE/NGL – Sweden) talked about a letter from 160 NGOs concerning the need to change the course of the current EU migration policy. She criticised the stricter externalisation of borders in general and the institutionalisation of Greek islands camps in in particular. According to her, the European Parliament should put more and more pressure on the Council in order to close these camps. The Parliament should also ask for an elimination of the measures on refugee detention and introduce new measures on minor protection, since minors in Greece are now sent back to Turkey under the EU-Turkey agreement.
Monika Hohlmeier (EPP – Germany) asked about the relation between the islands and the mainland, since for her there is a lack of clear figures on the people who have been effectively  relocated form the islands to the mainland and on the people who have been sent back under the EU-Turkey agreement.
According to Elly Schlein (S&D – Italy) the admissibility/inadmissibility checks discussed under the reform of the Dublin system could end up being an additional burden for frontline states, and this can have negative impact on Greece. She also affirmed that minors and vulnerable groups should not be returned to Turkey, and that the Commission and the Council should include some obligations for Member States on that point.
Ana Gomes (S&D – Portugal) asked for concrete numbers on relocation from Greece, as well as for some clarification on the orientation Greece is adopting with regard to vulnerable people. According to her, vulnerable categories should have priority in relocation measures. She also said that unaccompanied minors should not be returned to countries like Afghanistan,  where terrorist attacks are the norm.

In reply, Minister Ioannis Mouzalas said that Greece was the second country in Europe in terms of number of asylum applications received and that the country therefore needed the help of the other Member States, some of which were not cooperating at all. He criticised for example those Member States which had failed to keep their promises in terms of relocation and providing staff for the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). He then stated again that Greece was making concrete efforts in order to improve the situation of refugees, under full respect of international obligations. In particular, he said that Greece was trying to manage vulnerable categories as efficiently as possible, but he called for the support of the EU and its agencies, especially EASO, in terms of resources and concrete assistance.

OTHER POINTS ON THE AGENDA

4) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union – Presentation of the draft opinion to the BUDG Committee  by rapporteur Daniele Viotti (S&D – Italy)

Birgit Sippel (S&D Germany) talked on behalf of Rapporteur Daniele Viotti. She said that, according to the rapporteur, the proposal of the Commission could be further improved. The rapporteur, in fact, asked for more transparency on the EU agencies and called for a standardisation of the agencies, while stating the importance of taking into account the specificity of each of them. On the revision of the financial regulation concerning the EU Trust Fund, the rapporteur said that the Trust Fund should be used only in exceptional circumstances, since it was not placed under the Parliament’s budget scrutiny.

MEPs’ interventions:
Tomáš Zdechovský (EPP – Czech Republic) said that the LIBE Committee should fight for sufficient flexibility of the EU budget and find a balance between flexibility and control. He completely disagreed with Daniele Viotti’s report and he called for a discussion to reach a new compromise.

 
5) EASO REVISION (Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Asylum – Presentation of the state of play of trilogue negotiations by rapporteur Péter Niedermüller.
Rapporteur Péter Niedermüller (S&D – Hungary) stated that the European Parliament wanted a strong independent agency capable of providing support to Member States. He said that there had been some conflicts during the trilogue negotiations, with regard to monitoring, training and power balances in particular, even though in the end negotiations had had some positive results.

MEPs’ interventions:
According to Carlos Coelho (EPP – Portugal), the legal basis for the European Union Agency for Asylum should be set up as soon as possible, since the role its role could be extremely important not only during crisis but also for crisis prevention.

6) UKRAINE VISAS (Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Ukraine) – Presentation of the state of play of trilogue negotiations by rapporteur Mariya Gabriel (EPP – Bulgaria)
Michal Boni (EPP – Poland) spoke on behalf of Rapporteur Mariya Gabriel. He said that excellent collaboration between the EP, the Commission and the Council had existed throughout the whole negotiation. He also said that Ukraine had achieved all the benchmark criteria necessary to obtain visa liberalisation and that the country had gone even further. According to the rapporteur, every country which respects the criteria should benefit from the liberalisation of visa for its citizens and Ukraine falls within this case.

7) Electronic vote
During the meeting, MEPs were voted on:

a) the compromise text  on UKRAINE – VISA WAIVER agreed during the inter-institutional negotiations (Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement -Ukraine).

b) the draft report on the on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals.

8) European Commission Report on the implementation of Directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography (Presentation by the Commission of the report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures in order to comply with Directive 2011/93/EU and the report assessing the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 25 of Directive 2011/93/EU.  
According to the European Commission, Directive 2011/93/EU is an ambitious and comprehensive legal instrument that covers investigation, prosecution, prevention and assistance to victims of sexual abuse. The transposition of such a directive represents a big step in the right direction, but there are still a number of steps which need to be made, starting from the accomplishment of satisfactory levels of implementation.
There has been a lot of progress with regard to setting up cooperation schemes in order to improve cooperation among national actors. Member States have also made relevant steps forward with regard to blocking the dissemination of materials on child sexual abuse. However, prevention from sexual abuse remains the less developed area.
Further efforts are also required in the field of assistance and protection of child victims, including the family of the victim, as well as in the fields of investigation and prosecution. The European Commission is fully supporting Member States in the implementation of the directive and it is cooperating with Interpol for a stronger control of the Internet in order to protect children and prevent from child abuse and pornography.

MEPs’ interventions:
Anna Maria Corazza Bildt (EPP – Sweden), rapporteur for the session, said that Member States should do more in terms of how the directive could be put into practice. Member States have done great progress in implementing the directive and the civil society has played an important role in advocating as well as supporting Member States. However, crimes against children are still frequent in Europe and they need to be combated more concretely. In her opinion, stronger cooperation between Member States is required to fight against the cross-border criminal networks which exploit children. In particular, she said that the number of sex extortion and revenge pornography cases was increasing in Europe.  The EU should therefore make stronger and more concrete efforts to combat these phenomena. For her, a better identification of victims as well as of potential offenders is also needed, if Member States want to put into practice efficient prevention mechanisms.
Birgit Sippel (S&D – Germany) spoke on behalf of the shadow rapporteur for S&D. She said that the party welcomed the report on implementation prepared by the Commission, but she noticed that the two reports had shed light on the differences among Member States’ practices to protect children against sexual abuse. She also highlighted the importance of educational campaigns in order to raise awareness of the consequences of child sexual exploitation.
For Branislav Škripek (shadow rapporteur for ECR – Slovakia), the directive should be implemented in toto and Member States should make efforts to bring about a change in the behaviour of offenders.
According to Nathalie Griesbeck (shadow rapporteur for ALDE –  France), today child sexual abuse is a matter of great urgency in Europe. She clarified that it was not a question of freedom of the Internet, but a question of targeting specifically sexual abuse and other crimes against children. For her, the report of the Commission is very clear and it confirms that there is still much to be done.

9) Croatia preparation of Schengen operational phase.  (Proposal for a Council Decision on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the area of the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Croatia )– Presentation by the Commission and intervention by the Maltese Presidency.
According to the Commission, discussions for the integration of Croatia in the Schengen Information System (SIS) started in 2016 after they country had accepted to undergo this process in 2015. The objective of these evaluations is to allow Croatia to gradually participate  in the Schengen Information System. A wide range of domains were discussed and Croatia was found technically ready to be integrated into the system.
The Commission explained that Croatia had accomplished all the criteria required but that, since the Council had not take its final decision on the full Schengen evaluation process yet, there would be some restrictions applied to Croatia, with regard to entry alerts in particular.

The Council confirmed that a process of verifying the correct implementation of the Schengen acquis across different domains, in particular data protection, had been carried out and Croatia had met all the requirements. The country was therefore found technically ready to join the Schengen Information System. According to the Council, the integration of Croatia is important because it will increase cooperation in the areas of information collection and exchange as well as in the field of police cooperation.

MEPs’ interventions:
Nuno Melo (EPP – Portugal), rapporteur for the session, said that from a legal point of view the assessment of Croatia had been positive and that Croatia had met all the requirements. According to him, the evaluation of the country’s contribution to the Schengen Information System can only take place once Croatia has joined the system.
For Birgit Sippel (S&D – Germany), if Croatia has really fulfilled the criteria, further steps should be made in order to make the country part of the system as soon as possible. However, she raised some doubts as regards Croatia’s readiness to contribute to data protection.

Parliamentary Tracker: European and national parliaments debates on the (third) Reform of the Common European Asylum System (28-02-17)

3rdReformAsylum280217

NOTA BENE : THIS IS NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORDING  See the LIBE official page (with background documents – webstreaming) here                   

by Luigi LIMONE (FREE Group trainee)                                                                                                                                                                        

UP TO THE CHALLENGE

Opening remarks by Claude Moraes, Chair of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament :  According to Claude Moraes this meeting was taking place at very crucial moment of the reform which will  be needed to overcome the crisis which erupted at the EU external borders  in 2015 under the mass influx of migrants coming notably from the war zones in Syria and Iraq. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty it should be now a common parliamentary endeavor to succeed in reforming these sensitive policies.

FIRST SESSION: Challenges related to the Common European Asylum System – Chaired by Claude Moraes, LIBE Committee Chair

a) Intervention of Hon. Carmelo Abela, Minister for Home Affairs and National Security, Maltese Presidency Council.  According to Hon. Carmelo Abela, when it comes to asylum, the EU is facing significant challenges like the urgent need to define future approaches for the solution of the migration crisis. The current EU legislative framework does not address the problem as it should do. Several amendments have been proposed by the Commission in order to reform the package on asylum legislation. The December 2016 Council conclusions on solidarity within the Dublin system provided that the EU should create a system built on solidarity, equal responsibility and based on political legitimacy. Discussions on the proposals already started and the Maltese presidency has already done some important efforts, but the road is still long.  The Minister confirmed that the reform was a priority for the Maltese Presidency. For him, the EU and the Maltese Presidency itself are facing significant challenges which should be addressed decisively and conclusively. He stated that the Maltese presidency would make every effort to achieve its objectives. However, it is worth noting that the presidency cannot succeed alone, it needs the help of the national Parliaments in order to create a durable and successful system of asylum.

b) Intervention by Dimitris Avramopoulos, European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. Avramopoulos said that the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) remained a key priority of the EU. For this reform to be successful the EU needs to build a constructive dialogue between the Union and the representatives of the national Parliaments. According to him, purely national measures do not bring positive results, since nationalist approaches simply undermine the common strategy the EU wishes to adopt. A true spirit of solidarity and shared responsibility is required in order to: define a functioning system for asylum seekers; protect the EU external borders; dismantle the trafficking system; regulate irregular migration; manage return and readmission; accelerate the relocation process. The EU should face the challenge of the large amount of unaccompanied minors as well, together with the fight against secondary movement and asylum shopping. The renovated CEAS would help strengthen mutual trust among Member States, which is necessary not only for the efficiency of the system but also to provide asylum applicants with dignified treatment. The reform is therefore necessary to obtain a higher degree of harmonisation and greater convergence of measures, as well as an equal repartition of responsibilities among Member States.  The success of this reform depends on the implementation of solidarity mechanisms. A clear, predictable and efficient Dublin system is fundamental for the realization of a Union without internal borders. In this respect, sanctions for non-compliance with the rules are necessary, especially to fight secondary movement. Furthermore, resettlement and relocation should become compulsory for all Member States, especially with regard to unaccompanied minors. Ultimately, Avramopoulos proposed to have a Union resettlement framework for persons in need of international protection, which would enable to eliminate differences among national practices. Member States have to show their political willingness to work together and the EU needs to achieve a common understanding on how the future CEAS should function. This should happen through the support of the Maltese Presidency. It is the time to move on with this proposal and look at the migration phenomenon in a more strategic, comprehensive and positive manner. The sooner migrants and refugees are integrated in the host societies and in the labor markets, the more the Union can take advantage of their inclusion. In order to accomplish these goals, the EU needs the involvement of all stakeholders and EU citizens.

c) Interventions of National Parliaments representatives and of MEPs. Continue reading “Parliamentary Tracker: European and national parliaments debates on the (third) Reform of the Common European Asylum System (28-02-17)”

TERROR AND EXCLUSION IN EU ASYLUM LAW CASE – C-573/14 LOUNANI (GRAND CHAMBER, 31 JANUARY 2017)

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUROPEAN LAW BLOG  ON  MARCH 3, 2017 (NB: EMPHASIS ARE ADDED)

By Stephen Coutts

The on-going conflict in the Middle East has profound implications for the global legal order in two areas of law in particular: asylum law and anti-terrorist law.

The European Union and EU law have not been immune from this development and in many respects are closely affected by these geopolitical developments and their legal impact. After a fitful start, the EU has become a major actor in the area of criminal law, and in particular anti-terrorist law, on the one hand and in asylum law on the other.[1]

The two fields meet in Article 12(2)(c) of the Qualification Directive, itself reflecting Article 1F of the Geneva convention,[2] providing that an individual shall be excluded from eligibility for refugee status for acts contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, acts which have been held to include acts of terrorism.

Furthermore, Article 12(3) of the Qualification Directive extends that exclusion to ‘persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the commission of the crimes or acts’ mentioned in Article 12(2). The status of terrorist and refugee are legally incompatible and mutually exclusive; one simply cannot be a terrorist and also a refugee. What, however, constitutes a terrorist for the purposes of Article 12 of the Qualification Directive? That essentially is the question at stake in Lounani.

Facts and Background Context

Mr Lounani, a Moroccan national, arrived in Europe in 1991 and initially applied for asylum in Germany where his application was rejected. He moved to Belgium in 1997 and lived there illegally. In 2010 he was convicted of membership of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG), an organisation that has been listed by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist organisation. It appears he occupied a leading role in the MICG over many years and participated in various aspects of its organisation including fund-raising, forging of documents and arranging the travel of individuals to Iraq.

Crucially, however, he was never convicted of direct terrorist acts and there appears to be some dispute as to whether the MICG and/or individuals Mr Lounani aided in travelling to Iraq themselves participated directly in terrorist acts.

Mr Lounani subsequently claimed asylum in Belgium on the grounds that, following his conviction for terrorist related offences, he would be persecuted upon return to Morocco. An initial decision excluding him from refugee status on the basis of Article 12(2)(c) of the Qualification directive was overturned on review. That decision was in turn appealed to the Conseil d’Etat which stayed the case and referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice asking essentially if the exclusion clause operated only in relation to terrorist acts as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (FDCT)[4] or if ancillary acts of participation in terrorist organisation and facilitating the commission of terrorist acts could be considered contrary to the principles and values of the UN as referred to in Articles 12(2)(c) and 12(3)[5] of the Qualification Directive.

Finally, if so, the Conseil d’Etat queried if a criminal conviction would automatically lead to the application of the exclusion clause.

Opinion of AG Sharpston[6]  Continue reading “TERROR AND EXCLUSION IN EU ASYLUM LAW CASE – C-573/14 LOUNANI (GRAND CHAMBER, 31 JANUARY 2017)”

Parliamentary tracker : echoes from LIBE meeting of January 30-3124, 2017

by Luigi LIMONE (*)

Summary :
– Information systems and interoperability
– 2009 Europol Data Breaches
– Europol-Danemark Agreement
– Amnesty Report on Hotspots in Italy
– Residence Permits for Third Country Nationals
– Trade framework Agreement with Turkey
– LIBE delegations to the UN Summit on migration (2016)
– Electorinc votes
– Draft Report on the Reception Directive
– Implementation PNR Directive
– Registration Ships Passengers
– EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward (migration)
– Study on criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants
– Implementation Directives on seasonal workers and intracorporate transfert

 
Point 1 – High-Level Expert Group on information systems and interoperability
Presentation of the state of play of the process towards the interoperability of information systems and first results of the High-Level Expert Group’s interim report of December 2016 by Julian King, Commissioner for the Security Union.
Julian King, Commissioner for the Security Union, opened his presentation highlighting the need for an effective information sharing system between Member States. In particular, he reported several repeating cases of people being registered under different identities within the  various EU information systems. Therefore, he underlined the importance of looking at how to improve the quality of the data which are put into the information systems, the access to that data by the national authorities as well as the way in which that data in processed.
He also mentioned the need to increasingly support Member States for the implementation of the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive and claimed that some progress was achieved in the way information is shared between national authorities, mentioning in particular Europol contribution to smart data information.
From his presentation, three priority actions have emerged:  Continue reading “Parliamentary tracker : echoes from LIBE meeting of January 30-3124, 2017”

Parliamentary tracker : echoes from LIBE meeting of January 23-24, 2017

by Luigi LIMONE (*)

Summary:
– Confirmation of Claude Moraes as Chairman of LIBE Committee
– State of Roma integration in the EU
– Collection of biometric data of illegally staying third-country nationals
– Structured dialogue with Commissioneer Vera Jourova
– Legal Service presentation of Tele2/SverigeAB ruling on data retention
– EASO assesment on Turkey and Balkan Countries as “safe countries”
– Danemark-Europol cooperation after May 1st 2017
– Structured dialogue with Commissioneer Avramopoulos
– EP report on “Fundamental rights implications of Big Data”
– Outcome of the LIBE delegation in Sweden (19-20 September 2016)

 

The Committee meeting of LIBE of 23 and 24 January opened with the confirmation of Claude Moraes (S&D, United Kingdom) as chairman of the LIBE Committee for the second half of the 8th legislature (2014-2019).

  1. The first point on the agenda was about the ‘State of play of Roma integration in Member States’.

It has been opened by an intervention of  Ioannis Dimitrakopoulos, Head of Equality and Citizens’ Rights Department for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) who presented the findings of the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination (MIDIS) Survey on Roma inclusion.
This Survey build on the results of the first wave of the large-scale survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2008 and is particularly focused on the issue of Roma inclusion in order to fulfill both the EU global strategy for the next period and the UN Agenda for sustainable development..
The main emerging issues of the second survey based have been :
1) Education: this is the only area where some improvements have been registered, notably for young children. However, almost half of Roma children don’t follow secondary schools and almost 95% do not attend any form of post-secondary education.
2) Youth: on average, 63% of young Roma (aged 16-24) are neither working nor studying or following professional training (compared to 12% of their non-Roma peers of the same age in the EU).
3) Employment: fewer than one on three Roma have a paid job, and the situation is even worse for Roma women.
Most of Roma people are marginalized and not less than 41% of Roma living in Europe is discriminated in employment, education or when trying to reach health care centers or the public administration. Continue reading “Parliamentary tracker : echoes from LIBE meeting of January 23-24, 2017”

Worth reading: The EP legislative initiative on Robotics

The European Parliament has just adopted on Thursday 16 February  by 396 votes in favor, 123 against and 85 abstentions a legislative initiative in compliance with the art. 225 of the TFEU. It deals with Robotics and has been adopted  following a report of  Mady Delvaux (S&D, Luxembourg) on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI).

This report follows an important study on the ‘Ethical aspects of cyber-physical systems‘, recently conducted for the European Parliament’s STOA (Science and Technology Options Assessment) Panel. (see the animated infographic highlighting the range of concerns that require legal and ethical reflection, by linking different entry points – areas, concerns, and committees-  with each other).

The text adopted by the plenary is still very ambitious but some important suggestions of the JURI committee did’nt found the required majority in plenary. The most innovative ones would had been the introduction of basic universal income and of a tax on work done by robots as measures which can partially compensate the loss of working opportunities for “humans”.  The proposal to be able to put together collective redress against a robotic company was not retained either.

All that having been said the main point is: will it be followed by a formal Commission proposal and become a legal reality?

By reading the position taken by the Commission representatives during the debates (see below) it does not look like. Let’s hope that this time the Commission will not take the same position it took for the EP legislative proposal to establish an European Code of Good administration when it declared that it was …too early. Not being followed by the Commission should be extremely frustrating for an institution which is the only one directly elected by the EU Citizens  and which should in principle know what has to done but unlike the national parliaments is still lacking a true power of legislative initiative …

Quite rightly such power has been envisaged  this week by another Parliamentary report (Verofhstadt) on the possible changes to the current Treaties (Proposes, moreover, that in line with the common practice in a number of Member States, both chambers of the EU legislature, the Council and, in particular, the Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by citizens, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the basic legislative prerogative of the Commission; ).

Wishful thinking ?  Quite probably but “Spes Ultima Dea) ….

EDC

” EP DEBATES : …Carlos Moedas, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, on behalf of my colleague Věra Jourová let me start by thanking the rapporteur, Ms Delvaux, and all the MEPs involved. This is a crucial report on all the legal questions related to development of robotics and artificial intelligence. This House, to my knowledge, will be one of the first to have a clear and comprehensive position on robotics and artificial intelligence, a topic that is getting great public attention, and rightly so. Your text highlights the challenges and opportunities of this sector, and points towards a clear need for a coherent European approach. You are also calling for Europe to have a strong presence and investment in its technology in order to maintain leadership. In the European Commission, we have long recognised the importance and the potential of robotics and artificial intelligence, and the need for significant investment in these areas. We have set an ambitious public and private partnership for robotics in Europe: Sparc. This partnership not only brings the academic and research institutions, industry and business together, but also looks into questions related to ethics and law. Sparc is by far the biggest civilian research programme in this area in the world, with EUR 700 million from EU funding from Horizon 2020 to be leveraged up to EUR 2.8 billion by private investment…..()… Let me now comment in particular on your request for the Commission to come forward with a legislative proposal on civil liability for damage caused by robots. First, as you know, we already have EU legislation applying to robots. The Machinery Directive, the General Product Safety Directive, the proposed legislation on medical devices, and the regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation currently under revision also includes concrete measures to ensure the safe operation of civil drones. And the new General Data Protection Regulation that will also be fully applicable to any kind of processing of personal data, which includes artificial intelligence and robots.

Second, we are obviously looking at any need for adjustment of the current legislation. And third we are well aware that legal certainty on liability is of paramount importance for innovators, investors and consumers, providing them with the legal certainty they need. But the complexity of digital technologies makes it particularly difficult to determine who is liable and to what extent in case of failure. That is why the Commission has put in its communication and presented a communication last month on building up a European data economy. We are consulting with a wide range of stakeholders on the new challenges in this field, covering the liability questions relating to autonomous systems. Simultaneously, we are evaluating the Product Liabilities Directive with regard to emerging technologies.

Fourth, testing and experimenting will be important as will gathering data and gaining experience. This in turn will then help us with designing a suitable legal framework. On the communication on building a new European data economy, we included plans for cross-border corridors to test connected automated driving.
My fifth and final point on the question of legislation is to underline the importance of smart legislation, technologically neutral and future proof when dealing with technologies and jobs. As Ms Delvaux said, we cannot even imagine what they will be in the future.

” Honourable Members, I agree with you that the impact of digitalisation on our societies and our labour market needs to be closely monitored and anticipated, and we have to improve our understanding of this phenomenon. The different studies that have assessed that evolution reached diverging conclusions from catastrophic predictions on the labour market to a positive impact on job creation. In 2015, the Fraunhofer Institute indicated that EU companies which are intensive users of robotics are less likely to offshore production to low-cost regions because robots improve their cost production so much that they can stay in high-wage regions and create other jobs. We all know that technological change will not only replace or change existing tasks, but it will, as Mr Mayer said, create new jobs in services, it will complement human skills. Robots are also used in many areas with labour shortages such as healthcare, farming and even manufacturing. Many robots do tasks that are repetitive and dangerous for humans, such as inspecting oil tanks or welding metal parts. Far from replacing humans, robots allow the workforce to focus on other more economically useful, creative or social activities where robots cannot and will never replace us.
The Commission is fully aware of the challenges ahead and has already launched concrete measures to address them. We adopted a New Skills Agenda for Europe, the Digitising European Industry blueprint and, last December, we launched a Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, which aims at equipping the workforce at large with the necessary digital skills to thrive in a digital workplace.
Ladies and gentlemen once again, I would like to thank the European Parliament for this timely and comprehensive report and for the support for our activities. The issues raised and the measures proposed will need broader consultation and an in-depth analysis of their impact and consequences before we can draw conclusions, including on the possible legislative needs. Thank you for attention and I’m looking forward to our discussion.”

 

 

European Parliament (8th Legislature 2014-2019)
TEXTS ADOPTED Provisional edition
P8_TA-PROV(2017)0051

European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Council Directive 85/374/EEC1,
– having regard to the study on Ethical Aspects of Cyber-Physical Systems carried out on behalf of the Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel and managed by the Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), European Parliamentary Research Service;
– having regard to Rules 46 and 52 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A8-0005/2017),

Introduction

A. whereas from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein’s Monster to the classical myth of Pygmalion, through the story of Prague’s Golem to the robot of Karel ?apek, who coined the word, people have fantasised about the possibility of building intelligent machines, more often than not androids with human features;

B. whereas now that humankind stands on the threshold of an era when ever more sophisticated robots, bots, androids and other manifestations of artificial intelligence (“AI”) seem to be poised to unleash a new industrial revolution, which is likely to leave no stratum of society untouched, it is vitally important for the legislature to consider its legal and ethical implications and effects, without stifling innovation;

C. whereas there is a need to create a generally accepted definition of robot and AI that is flexible and is not hindering innovation;

D. whereas between 2010 and 2014 the average increase in sales of robots stood at 17% per year and in 2014 sales rose by 29%, the highest year-on-year increase ever, with automotive parts suppliers and the electrical/electronics industry being the main drivers of the growth; whereas annual patent filings for robotics technology have tripled over the last decade;

E. whereas, over the past 200 years employment figures had persistently increased due to the technological development; whereas the development of robotics and AI may have the potential to transform lives and work practices, raise efficiency, savings, and safety levels, provide enhanced level of services; whereas in the short to medium term robotics and AI promise to bring benefits of efficiency and savings, not only in production and commerce, but also in areas such as transport, medical care, rescue, education and farming, while making it possible to avoid exposing humans to dangerous conditions, such as those faced when cleaning up toxically polluted sites;

F. whereas ageing is the result of an increased life expectancy due to progress in living conditions and in modern medicine, and is one of the greatest political, social, and economic challenges of the 21st century for European societies; whereas by 2025 more than 20 % of Europeans will be 65 or older, with a particularly rapid increase in numbers of people who are in their 80s or older, which will lead to a fundamentally different balance between generations within our societies, and whereas it is in the interest of society that older people remain healthy and active for as long as possible;

G. whereas in the long-term, the current trend leans towards developing smart and autonomous machines, with the capacity to be trained and make decisions independently, holds not only economic advantages but also a variety of concerns regarding their direct and indirect effects on society as a whole;

H.whereas machine learning offers enormous economic and innovative benefits for society by vastly improving the ability to analyse data, while also raising challenges to ensure non-discrimination, due process, transparency and understandability in decision-making processes;

I. whereas similarly, assessments of economic shifts and the impact on employment as a result of robotics and machine learning need to be assessed; whereas, despite the undeniable advantages afforded by robotics, its implementation may entail a transformation of the labour market and a need to reflect on the future of education, employment, and social policies accordingly;

J. whereas the widespread use of robots might not automatically lead to job replacement, but lower skilled jobs in labour-intensive sectors are likely to be more vulnerable to automation; whereas this trend could bring production processes back to the EU; whereas research has demonstrated that employment grows significantly faster in occupations that use computers more; whereas the automation of jobs has the potential to liberate people from manual monotone labour allowing them to shift direction towards more creative and meaningful tasks; whereas automation requires governments to invest in education and other reforms in order to improve reallocation of the types of skills that the workers of tomorrow will need;

K. whereas in the face of increasing divisions in society, with a shrinking middle class, it is important to bear in mind that developing robotics may lead to a high concentration of wealth and influence in the hands of a minority;

L. whereas the development of robotics and AI will definitely influence the landscape of the workplace what may create new liability concerns and eliminate others; whereas the legal responsibility need to be clarified from both business sight model, as well as the workers design pattern, in case emergencies or problems occur;

M. whereas the trend towards automation requires that those involved in the development and commercialisation of AI applications build in security and ethics at the outset, thereby recognizing that they must be prepared to accept legal liability for the quality of the technology they produce;

N. whereas Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 (the General Data Protection Regulation) sets out a legal framework to protect personal data; whereas further aspects of data access and the protection of personal data and privacy might still need to be addressed, given that privacy concerns might still arise from applications and appliances communicating with each other and with databases without human intervention;

O. whereas the developments in robotics and AI can and should be designed in such a way that they preserve the dignity, autonomy and self-determination of the individual, especially in the fields of human care and companionship, and in the context of medical appliances, ‘repairing’ or enhancing human beings;

P. whereas ultimately there is a possibility that in the long-term, AI could surpass human intellectual capacity;

Q. whereas further development and increased use of automated and algorithmic decision-making undoubtedly has an impact on the choices that a private person (such as a business or an internet user) and an administrative, judicial or other public authority take in rendering their final decision of a consumer, business or authoritative nature; whereas safeguards and the possibility of human control and verification need to be built into the process of automated and algorithmic decision-making;

R. whereas several foreign jurisdictions, such as the US, Japan, China and South Korea,are considering, and to a certain extent have already taken, regulatory action with respect to robotics and AI, and whereas some Member States have also started to reflect on possibly drawing up legal standards or carrying out legislative changes in order to take account of emerging applications of such technologies;

S. whereas the European industry could benefit from an efficient, coherent and transparent approach to regulation at Union level, providing predictable and sufficiently clear conditions under which enterprises could develop applications and plan their business models on a European scale while ensuring that the Union and its Member States maintain control over the regulatory standards to be set, so as not to be forced to adopt and live with standards set by others, that is to say the third countries which are also at the forefront of the development of robotics and AI;

General principles Continue reading “Worth reading: The EP legislative initiative on Robotics”

Prison systems and conditions in the EU

by Luigi LIMONE (*)

Introduction

Living conditions in prisons are regulated by a variety laws and guidelines ranging from constitutional provisions to national criminal and penitentiary laws and international law principles. Relevant human rights provisions include, in particular, those protecting the right to personal liberty and clarifying the grounds on which it may be restricted (Article 5, ECHR and Article 6, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), and those prohibiting torture and other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3, ECHR and Article 4, EU Charter).

These rules, as interpreted by the competent courts, clarify the grounds on which deprivation of liberty may be based and the minimum standards that detention conditions must comply with. Both fundamental rights standards and broadly agreed criminal justice principles point to the conclusion that imprisonment should only be used as a measure of last resort in response to serious crimes, as it entails deprivation of the fundamental right to liberty.

EU legal framework

While prison conditions are mainly a responsibility of Member States, the European Union has already started to deal with them, (see the 1000 pages research on the subject  here) as clarified by the European Commission in its 2011 Green Paper and in the 2010 Stockholm Programme (under the pressure of the European Parliament…) as well as in many European Parliament specific Resolutions.

In order to promote mutual trust, judicial cooperation and the proper functioning of mutual recognition tools in the criminal law area (as foreseen by the EU Charter and by  Article 82, TFEU), it is essential to ensure that adequate detention conditions exist in all Member States.

Several mechanisms have been created in Europe in order to monitor detention conditions in prisons. Such mechanisms are meant as a tool to prevent torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and, more generally, to verify detention conditions at any given time. In particular, the 1987 Council of Europe’s Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) created a monitoring mechanism which is empowered to visit any place within the jurisdiction of the States parties where persons are deprived of their liberty by a public authority.

Such a mechanism is a preventive tool against torture and inhumane treatment which aims to monitor both the active behaviour of law enforcement authorities, collecting allegations of violence and abuses, and the factual conditions of prisons and other detention institutions, verifying whether they comply with the standards which the CPT itself has developed over time. All 28 EU Member States are parties to the Convention and therefore subject to the monitoring mechanism it establishes.

In line with international standards, rules concerning the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty have been developed in the European context.

The European Prison Rules, first adopted in 1987 and then amended in 2006, are a set of recommendations emanating from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. As such, they are not binding, but they have been endorsed politically by the Council of Europe, as well as in several EU documents. (see a previous FREE Group post here)

The starting point of these recommendations is that no one is to be deprived of liberty except from a measure of last resort and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, restrictions placed on prisoners must be limited to those strictly necessary and proportionate and detention is to be managed so as to facilitate prisoners’ reintegration.

The Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has also developed very detailed standards concerning detention conditions, as well as good practices that are meant to reduce the risk of detainees being subjected to torture or other degrading treatment. In particular, the CPT has defined specific guidelines addressing overcrowding, determining for instance the exact minimum amount of space that each prison inmate must be afforded in a cell. It has also published its general standards with regard to detention conditions and treatment of prisoners.

Last but not least, the European Court of Human Rights has developed its case-law on detention conditions mostly on the basis of Article 3 ECHR which prohibit degrading and inhumane treatment or punishment. According to the Court, violations of Article 3 may arise not only by positive acts of ill-treatment and violence by State authorities over prisoners, but also through the imposition of degrading detention conditions or through lack of action in the face of allegations of ill-treatment between prisoners.

The Court has affirmed that “prisoners in general continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, save for the right to liberty”. They therefore continue to enjoy the rights to family life, to marry, to freedom of expression, to practise their religion, to access to a lawyer or court, and to respect for correspondence. As a result, any restrictions on these rights must be justified.

EP Hearing on Prisons’ systems and conditions in the EU Continue reading “Prison systems and conditions in the EU”

AG MENGOZZI’S OPINION ON GRANTING VISAS TO SYRIANS FROM ALEPPO: WISHFUL THINKING?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUROPEAN LAW BLOG  HERE

By Margarite Zoeteweij-Turhan and Sarah Progin-Theuerkauf 

Introduction

The opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case of X and X v. Belgium, so far only available in French, has created quite a stir throughout the European Union. In a nutshell, the AG found that, when third country nationals apply for a visa with limited territorial validity (‘LTV’) under Article 25 of the Visa Code with the aim of applying for international protection once they have arrived in a Member State’s territory, the Member State’s immigration authority should take the circumstances of the applicant into account and assess whether a refusal would lead to an infringement of the applicant’s rights as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the AG makes an effort to cover all the arguments brought up by the parties, this blogpost focuses mainly on the issues directly related to the margin of discretion left to the Member States by Article 25(1) of the Visa Code.

Although an AG’s opinion is not binding on the Court, it is widely acknowledged and documented that opinions do indeed influence the Court’s decision in a majority of cases. If the Court were to follow the opinion of AG Mengozzi in this particular case, this could have a serious impact on the legal landscape and context of EU immigration and asylum law. Coming at a time in which migration and asylum are topics often used to manipulate the political opinion of the electorate both in Europe and in the world, the opinion could serve as a wake-up callas it recalibrates the EU’s migration and asylum policy on the fundamental values it is constructed on: respect for human rights and obligations stemming from international treaties.

However, in the light of the ongoing and already difficult negotiations on the future of the Common European Asylum System (‘CEAS’), this time it is more likely that the Court will find it opportune to come to a conclusion that diverges from the AG’s Opinion with regard to some of the legal aspects of the case.

Facts of the case legal framework and questions referred to the Court

On 12 October 2016, a Syrian family of 5 (two parents and three small children) living in Aleppo applied for a visa with limited territorial validity ex Article 25(1) of the EU Visa Code at the Belgian embassy in Beirut (Lebanon). On their application form, they state that the aim of their trip is to apply for asylum once in Belgium, as their situation was untenable as an Orthodox Christian family in a city occupied by ISIS. The family then returned to Aleppo and waited for the decision on their visa application. Shortly after their return, the Syrian border with Lebanon was closed; it remained closed during the procedure as described below.

On 18 October 2016, the Belgian Aliens’ Office (the ‘Office’) refused the visa application based on Article 32(1)(b) of the Visa Code. The Office held that the family clearly had the intention to stay on Belgium’s territory after the expiry of the visa they applied for since they had specified that they would apply for asylum once in Belgium. The visa application would therefore fall under Belgian national law, according to the Office. It further held that neither Article 3 ECHR nor Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees provides for an obligation to admit foreigners on the territory of the States party to the Convention, even if these foreigners live in ‘catastrophic circumstances’, but that these articles merely provide for a prohibition of ‘refoulement’. According to the principle of non-refoulement, States party to the Convention may not remove a person to another State if the person concerned faces a real risk of being persecuted or subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in the country to which he is returned. The Office argued that this principle only applies to persons that are already within the Belgian (territorial) jurisdiction. It also argued that Belgian law does not allow its diplomatic posts to accept applications for international protection from third country nationals, and that granting a visa to the applicants in order for them to apply for international protection once on Belgian soil would circumvent the limitation of the competences of the Belgian diplomatic posts.

The Syrian family appealed to the Belgian Asylum and Immigration Board (the ‘referring Court’), arguing that Article 18 of the Charter (Right to Asylum) obliges the Member States to ensure the right to asylum, and that granting international protection to the applicants is the only way in which the Belgian authorities can avoid the risk of an infringement of Article 3 of the ECHR which corresponds to Article 4 of the Charter. The applicants further argued that the Aliens’ Office had erroneously not taken Article 3 ECHR into account in the assessment of their visa application, and that if it had done so, it should have come to the conclusion that the conditions for a visa with limited territorial validity based on Article 25 of the Visa Code are met.

The referring Court considers that the application of Article 4 of the Charter, according to Article 51 of the Charter, solely depends on the application of EU law by Member States’ authorities, a condition that is fulfilled when they assess a visa application according to the Visa Code.

It is within this framework that the referring court asked for guidance as to the margin of discretion left to the Member States in their decisions based on Article 25(1) of the Visa Code, taking into account the article’s reference to international obligations and in the light of the Charter.

Opinion of AG Mengozzi

The main issue at stake

AG Mengozzi was thus confronted with the task to assist the CJEU in the interpretation of Article 25(1) of the Visa Code, and more specifically in answering the question of whether Member States’ immigration authorities may refuse an application for a visa with limited territorial validity under Article 25(1) of the Visa Code if this application is made in order to apply for asylum on arrival in the Member State.  The Belgian government, supported by the Commission and a number of Member States that joined the hearing on 30 January 2017, argued mainly that the visa application falls under Belgian national law, as the application should be regarded as having been made for a stay for more than three months – thereby excluding the application of the Visa Code. The argument is that the Belgian migration authorities are therefore not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Other relevant international treaties do not impose an obligation on States to allow foreigners to enter their territory in order to apply for international protection.  For the same reason, the Court is also not competent to look into the questions referred to it. In his Opinion, analyzed in detail below, the AG disagrees with the Belgian government, and concludes that because of the applicability of the Visa Code the applicants fall within the scope of the Charter. The Charter, according to the AG, does not allow Member States’ authorities to refuse an application for a visa with limited territorial validity if such a refusal would lead to the applicants’ running a substantial risk of having their rights, as guaranteed by the Charter, infringed upon in their country of residence.

Applicability of the Visa Code to visa applications that will lead to stays longer than 3 months

In his opinion of 7 February 2017, AG Mengozzi deals with the issues of the competence of the Court and the applicability of the Charter jointly. He first finds that X and X applied for a visa with limited territorial validity for a stay not exceeding three months in accordance with the Visa Code. The AG further points out that  during the whole of the application procedure the Belgian authorities assessed the application under the Visa Code, that the authorities based their decision on Article 32(1)(b) of the Visa Code and that their decision to refuse the application was composed according to their own ‘decision form for short stay visas’.  The AG concludes that it was therefore clear to all that the application was regarded as an application for a short stay visa in accordance with the Visa Code.

Contrary to what several Member States had argued before the Court, the AG highlights that nothing in the Visa Code justifies a conclusion that the applicants’ intention to apply for asylum once on Belgian territory could change either the nature or the subject of their application, or transform the application into an application for a stay longer than three months. For the same reason, the AG disagrees with the Belgian government that it is not possible to apply for a visa with limited territorial application, and he further underpins his position by pointing out that the standard application form annexed to the Code refers to ‘Schengen visa’ without making any distinction between the types of visa that can be applied for. Furthermore, the 21st question of the application form asks the applicant to specify the reasons for the journey. This question in principle allows for the applicant to motivate his application with a wish to apply for asylum in the Member State he intends to travel to. In any case, according to the AG, even if the Visa Code did not allow for an application for a visa with limited territorial application, the fact that the applicants applied for a visa that is regulated in the Visa Code automatically guarantees the application of the Charter.

Applicability of Article 25(1) of the Visa Code

With regard to the applicability of Article 25 of the Visa Code, the Belgian government also argued that this Article only allows Member States to derogate from the imperative reasons to refuse a visa as listed in Article 32(1)(a), and not if there are reasonable doubts as to the intention of the applicant to leave the territory of the Member State before the expiry of the visa applied for as stipulated in Article 32(1)(b). However, AG Mengozzi’s analysis of the wording of Article 25(1) of the Visa Code leads to the exact opposite conclusion, as he points out that this article allows the Member States, among others, to issue a new visa during the same six-month period to an applicant who has already used a visa allowing for a stay of three months during that six-month period. Therefore, Article 25(1) allows Member States’ authorities to issue a LTV, even if they have serious doubts as to whether the applicant will leave the territory after the expiry of the visa or if other reasons to refuse a visa as listed under Article 32 exist. This is also in line with the Commission’s Handbook the AG already referred to. The AG thus concludes that Member States must assess an applicant’s appeal to Article 25 of the Visa Code, even in cases in which they find reasons to refuse an application for a visa according to Article 32.

Furthermore, the applicants’ extended stay in Belgium would not be based on the initial visa that allowed them to enter Belgian territory, but on their status as applicants for international protection in accordance with Article 9(1) of Directive 2013/32. The applicants’ intentions to stay longer than three months could therefore at the very most be regarded as a reason to refuse a visa in accordance with the Visa Code, but it could certainly not be a reason for the non-application of the Code (and as a consequence thereof, the non-applicability of the Charter). The AG continues that this is exactly the question that lies at the heart of this case: Can Member States refuse visas with limited territorial application in cases such as the one at hand considering the reference Article 25 of the Visa Code makes to obligations under international law?

The scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

The AG thus turns to answering the questions referred to the Court. According to the AG, the ‘international obligations’ mentioned by Article 25 of the Visa Code do not include obligations stemming from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. However, due to Article 51 of the Charter Member States’ authorities are bound by the Charter when applying EU law, such as the Visa Code or Regulation 539/2001, which lists the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the EU. Therefore, the Belgian migration authorities were bound by the Charter when deciding on X and X’s application for a visa with limited territorial application under Article 25 of the Visa Code, even if this Article grants a margin of discretion to the said authorities. Here, the AG refers to the Court ruling in the case of N.S. and others, and the Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas, published by the Commission in 2010.

The AG also is of the opinion, contrary to what the Belgian government argued based on Article 52(3) of the Charter, that the territorial limitation of Article 1 of the ECHR should not be applicable to the Charter, as the aim of Article 52(3) of the Charter is to guarantee a minimum standard of protection by referring to the ECHR, whereas it also clearly states that this minimum standard does not prevent Union law from providing a more extensive protection. Furthermore, the AG repeats that Article 51 of the Charter clearly defines that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the EU and to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. Finally, the AG also argues that even if the Charter had a limited application in general, Article 4 of the Charter is drafted in such a way as to provide for a universal application. The AG therefore finds it unnecessary to delve further into the content of the ‘international obligations’ referred to by Article 25(1) of the Visa Code, and continues to analyze the discretion of the Member States under that Article in the light of the Charter.

Member States’ margin of discretion under Article 25(1) of the Visa Code

AG Mengozzi then admits that Article 25 of the Visa Code leaves a certain margin of discretion to the Member States in their assessment of the arguments the applicant has brought forward in his appeal to Article 25. To the AG, it is clear that the applicants’ situation is one that justifies the issuance of a visa with limited territorial validity on humanitarian grounds. However, in case the Member State would not agree, the AG specifies that, since the Member States are applying EU law when assessing an appeal to Article 25 of the Visa Code, their discretion is limited by Union Law. Thus, according to the AG, a Member State has to assess whether the refusal to issue a visa under Article 25 of the Visa Code leads to an infringement of its obligations under the Charter. As the referring court has asked for guidance on the interpretation of Article 25 of the Visa Code in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, the AG then analyses the scope and content of Article 4 of the Charter in the light of the case law of the ECtHR on Article 3 ECHR (Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, El-Masri v. Macedonia and Nasr et Ghali c. Italie). This leads the AG to conclude that the Member States are under a positive obligation to take reasonable measures to prevent the materialization of a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment of which they know or of which they should have known. Therefore, Member States’ authorities must inform themselves with regard to the situation in the country of origin of an applicant before deciding to apply one of the reasons for refusal of a visa as listed under Article 32(1). The AG points in the direction of official EU sources such as the Commissions ECHO factsheet on the crisis in Syria and other countries that are in a dire situation, but also to reports published by NGOs working in the field as sources of information that need to be taken into account by the Member States’ authorities in taking a decision under the Visa Code.

Practical implications for the application of X and X

In this particular case, the AG finds that a refusal to issue a visa with limited territorial validity will expose the applicants to a substantial risk of having their rights as protected by Articles 1 (right to human dignity), 2 (right to life), 3 (right to the integrity of the person), 4 (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment), and 24(2) (the child’s best interest) of the Charter. He also points out that the Belgian authorities were aware of the apocalyptical or ‘catastrophic’ situation in Aleppo, according to the file sent in by the referring court. The argument of the Belgian authorities that the applicants could have applied for international protection in Lebanon is parred by the AG by referring to the decision of the Lebanese government to suspend the registration of newly arriving asylum seekers in the autumn of 2015 – a decision that was still in place when the Belgian authorities took their decision. Furthermore, the situation of asylum seekers or refugees living in the neighboring countries of Syria are reported to be disastrous and their standard of life far below the minimum standards foreseen in applicable international human rights law instruments. The AG therefore concludes that the refusal of the Belgian authorities to issue the applicants with a visa of limited territorial validity infringes Article 4 of the Charter.

Comment

To sum it up, AG Mengozzi argues that Member States’ immigration authorities’ discretion under Article 25(1) of the Visa Code is limited by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. If the authorities have substantial reasons to believe that the refusal of an LTV will expose an applicant to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, they are obliged to issue an LTV.

AG Mengozzi’s compelling Opinion, which he bases not only on standing case-law (not only of the ECtHR but also of the CJEU in recent cases like Koushkaki, Aranyosi and Căldăraru or Petruhhin), gives hope to those who live in truly untenable circumstances but who are unable to reach an EU Member State’s territory in order to file an application for international protection. At a time in which some of the Member States have a 98% recognition rate for Syrian asylum seekers from Aleppo, denying protection to those who would like to file an application for international protection but who are unable or unwilling to try and reach Europe’s shores by crossing the Mediterranean in a dinghy, any other conclusion would have raised serious doubts with regard to the EU’s commitment to refugee and human rights law.

This is not to say that it is probable that the Court will simply rule that because of the applicability of the Charter to visa applications made in accordance with the Visa Code, Member States are under an obligation to issue LTVs to third country nationals who want to come to any EU Member State to file an application for international protection. Not only would such a ruling in the current political climate be unfeasible, it would also be contrary to applicable EU asylum law, as the AG also mentions in his Opinion.

A decision of this nature would endanger the functioning of the Dublin system, as asylum seekers in desperate situations could simply file a visa application anywhere in the world, which would then have to be accepted if there is a risk of a violation of article 4 of the Charter. As, according to article 12(2) of the Dublin regulation, the possession of a valid visa triggers the respective State’s responsibility to treat the asylum claim, this means that ‘asylum shopping’ (i.e. choosing the country which suits you best) would become possible again. It is unlikely that the Court would expose the Common European Asylum System to the risk of a collapse – especially not at a time in which all of the EU’s efforts are directed at saving the already failing system, instead of trying to find an alternative that would work. Such an interpretation could further instigate EU Member States to close down their consulates and embassies in areas with a high risk of conflicts and persecutions.

However, it should be possible for the Court to strike a balance between the two interests. If it formulated its ruling in such a way as to highlight the exceptionality of the circumstances that would force Member States to apply Article 25(1) of the Visa Code to issue LTVs despite the fact that there might be reasons to refuse a visa according to Article 32 of the Visa Code, the EU would honor its obligations under international and European refugee and human rights law, without endangering the functioning of the CEAS. Such a ruling would boost the image of the EU as an advocate of human rights, an image that has been seriously battered by many of the recent EU actions in this policy field.

No doubt Member States will argue that such a ruling would ‘open the floodgates’ and paralyze the already strained asylum systems of the Member States. However, until the European Union has created effective legal pathways to Europe, as it has obliged itself to do, people in need of international protection will continue trying to use other ways to save themselves and their loved ones – whether the Member States like it or not.

 

Continue reading “AG MENGOZZI’S OPINION ON GRANTING VISAS TO SYRIANS FROM ALEPPO: WISHFUL THINKING?”

As Bad as it Gets: the White Paper on Brexit

Original from EU LAW ANALYSIS 

Professor Steve Peers

Yesterday (February 2,2017)  the UK government released its White Paper on Brexit. This tome was reluctantly extracted from the government after months of prompting, but is in the end enormously disappointing: the political equivalent of a cat coughing up a hairball.

As many had expected, the white paper is basically content-free. It’s essentially Theresa May’s recent speech (which I analysed here), in some cases word-for-word, with a few statistics and graphs added. But even this information refers back to the status quo, and in some cases is inaccurate (a graph suggested British workers get 14 weeks’ paid holiday a year, before it was corrected), out-of-date (the 2011 statistics on UK citizens resident in the EU), or only partial (the migration statistics omit Irish people in the UK, and vice versa).

There’s no proper analysis of different options relating to the UK’s post-Brexit future, with assessments of their relative pros and cons. But then there couldn’t be: the White Paper says little of substance about the very existence of those options. David Allen Green has pointed out that the initial version of the document was time-stamped at about 4am, giving the strong impression it was written overnight by an intern working to a deadline in a student-like coffee-fuelled flurry.

Detailed comments on the White Paper

The paper begins with a collection of sentence fragments from the Prime Minister, centring on the bizarre claim that 65 million people are “willing” Brexit, simply ignoring the 48% who voted against it. By and large, it goes downhill from there.

Having said that, there is a little bit of detail on plans for the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ (previously discussed here and here), which will convert existing EU law into UK law. This White Paper confirms that there will be a further White Paper on that Bill. The latter Bill will retain EU Regulations in UK law, not just EU Directives, which are referred to implicitly (as “all laws which have been made in the UK, in order to implement our obligations as a member of the EU”).

This is an important legal point because by their nature as defined by EU law, Directives have anyway been implemented as part of UK law already. Regulations usually have not, and so would vanish unless some steps were taken to retain them. (Regulations are more commonly used in areas which EU law has more fully harmonised, whereas Directives usually apply in areas where there is less harmonisation).

Interestingly, the White Paper says that the ex-EU law should be interpreted post-Brexit “in the same way as it is at the moment”. This suggests that the case-law of the EU courts will continue to be relevant, even though those courts are loathed by many Brexiteers. It remains to be seen exactly how this approach to interpretation will be secured outside the EU; the most obvious route is to insert language to this effect in the Great Repeal Act. There’s a weasel word which isn’t further explained (“Generally”), and two obvious questions aren’t answered: what about post-Brexit EU case law, and what about EU legislation which is amended after Brexit?

After Brexit, it will be up to the UK to amend ex-EU law. But who will have the power to do this? There’s a little bit of detail about this key question. Any “significant policy change” will be the subject of an Act of Parliament, which means that the House of Commons and the House of Lords will have a full debate and every chance to table amendments or block the government’s plans. There will be Bills on customs and immigration, “for example”.

But there is also a commitment to a “programme of secondary legislation”. This refers to various methods of the government making laws, with limited power of Parliament – usually only one chance to examine the draft law briefly, with no chance to amend it. The White Paper refers to this as “oversight”, but it’s not very substantial. By process of elimination this is how the government will make changes to other areas of ex-EU law, besides customs and immigration – environment and employment law, for example. The White Paper says it wants to remove “deficiencies” in the ex-EU laws; but one woman’s “deficiencies” are another woman’s clean beaches.

Next, the section on “taking control” of UK laws starts with the remarkable statement: “Whilst Parliament has remained sovereign throughout our membership of the EU, it has not always felt like that.” The Supreme Court’s Miller judgment indeed recently confirmed that Parliamentary sovereignty did not vanish while the UK was an EU member, since the effect of EU law in the UK was dependent on Parliament’s decision to keep the European Communities Act in force, Parliament could have insisted on blocking the domestic effect of any EU law by expressly deciding to keep Acts of Parliament conflicting with that EU law in force.

But let’s step back from the legal details. This is an astonishing statement. One of the best-known slogans of the ‘Leave’ side in the referendum was ‘take back control’. Yet it’s conceded here that we already had control. The problem is the feeling that we didn’t have it.

So…what prompted that feeling? Could it be the consistent lie that EU law is adopted by ‘unelected bureaucrats’, which is a simple falsehood about the nature of EU law-making? (As discussed here, EU laws are jointly adopted by national ministers and the elected European Parliament; the UK votes in favour of proposed laws over 90% of the time). Needless to say, the White Paper doesn’t refer to that fact. Rather it overstates the impact of EU law in the UK, by means of a dodgy statistic which includes ‘soft law’ (non-binding measures like Recommendations, Communications, Reports and Opinions) in the total number of EU documents sent to Parliament.

Next, the White Paper points out correctly that there is no need for the EU courts to have jurisdiction over agreements between the UK and the EU. Indeed, the EU rarely asks for this with other countries (although the EU courts do rule on how such treaties should be interpreted by the EU). I’ve always suspected this focus on the EU courts is a red herring – so that the UK government can declare a ‘victory’ by resisting something that the EU might not even ask for.

Moving on to devolution, the White Paper details various means of talking to the devolved administrations – ignoring the simple fact that the government has already ruled out following any of a number of options (discussed here) which the Scottish government presented in December.

There’s a special section on Northern Ireland, listing facts but not giving any idea of how reinstating border checks between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland can be avoided. I’ve referred before to Brexiteers’ apparent belief in a ‘Brexit Fairy’ who will magically solve all problems which Brexit might create. The Irish border issue seems to be a task for her culturally-appropriating cousin: the Brexit Leprechaun.

In passing, this section refers to the common belief that the status of Irish citizens in the UK is guaranteed by the Ireland Act 1949. As far as immigration status is concerned, this is questionable, as detailed here by Professor Bernard Ryan.

Next, the White Paper deals with immigration, referring to “public concern about pressure on public services, like schools and our infrastructure, especially housing, as well as placing downward pressure on wages for people on the lowest incomes.” There’s a mysterious absence of statistics to back up these claims, perhaps because they are shaky: see this recent summary of economic literature on migration, by Professor Jonathan Portes. But who needs evidence, when we can just poke a finger down Nigel Farage’s throat? And if public services are so badly affected by EU migration, why no mention of the famous £350 million/week which would be supposedly made available for the NHS?

It’s striking that this section refers to possible ‘phased implementation’ of new rules on immigration of EU citizens. This seems to be the euphemism for an interim agreement with the EU – which would presumably entail retaining a limited version of free movement of people for a time. The issue is likely to be a key bargaining point in negotiations.

The next section deals with existing UK/EU migrants. The government repeats its mantra that it wants to secure their status, but there are no specifics on what “securing status” means. The banality of political waffle could not be waived to suggest anything more concrete for millions of people worried about their future. (For detailed suggestions on this issue, see the recent British Future report, discussed here).

Moving on to employment rights, the White Paper repeats a government promise to retain EU employment protection. But as I noted above, there’s no mention of safeguarding those rights by means of needing an Act of Parliament to amend them. As others have pointed out, there are weasel words here: “strengthening rights when it is the right choice for UK workers” and “maintain the protections and standards that benefit workers” (emphases added). There’s a definite “fox in charge of the henhouse” vibe here – quite literally so, if we remind ourselves of cabinet minister Liam Fox’s attitude to EU employment regulation.

This section includes the usual assertions about UK employment law being better than the EU version. This is true in some ways, and there are some issues that EU law has nothing to do with (for instance, the minimum wage, which the White Paper rambles on about). Yet, as I discuss in detail here, there are a number of areas where EU case law extended workers’ rights in the UK: holiday pay for UK workers with fixed term contracts, who are on commission or have extra allowances, to take just one example.

Moving on, the section on trade and economic cooperation re-iterates the intention to sign a free trade deal without considering the relative advantages of staying part of the single market. There are wildly empty statements about future EU/UK cooperation. The government wants “civil judicial cooperation” to continue with EU. But in which areas? (There are general EU rules on civil and commercial judgments, but also specific rules on insolvency, recognition of divorce and child access rulings, and maintenance payments).

Similarly, the White Paper lists many EU economic laws, but which would the government like to remain part of: competition law? The EU trademark? The unitary patent? EU data protection law? (On the latter issue, where there is a particular risk of disruption to trade flows if the UK does not retain laws nearly identical to the EU’s, see my discussion here).

The discussion of Euratom, the atomic energy treaty linked to the EU, implicitly suggests that the UK energy industry would benefit from a cooperation agreement with Euratom post-Brexit (see further discussion here). But the government is unwilling to say so, due its general paranoia about revealing its intentions. Yet even Homer Simpson – the world’s most famous employee of the nuclear industry, but also the dumbest – could guess the UK’s negotiating plans here.

Equally, the White Paper supplies interesting statistics on the usefulness of EUcriminal and policing laws, and asserts the government’s continued interest in playing a role in EU foreign and defence policy. Yet again, there’s no detail on what the UK would like to participate in. (Some further comments on the criminal law and policing issues here).

Overall, the White Paper is largely devoid of content because the UK government’s concern about negotiating secrecy. While of course some of the government’s position needs to remain confidential, I have to point out that treaties aren’t negotiated with actual playing cards. They are negotiating by tabling draft texts – and so the EU is bound to see what the UK is asking for, once talks start.

The government may in fact be concerned about a different issue: being embarrassed in front of the British public, by asking for things it doesn’t get. But here, it’s being a little naïve. In my experience, officials from the EU and its Member States love to talk. And little birds leak a regular flow of EU documents to the Statewatch website. Even if UK officials keep as quiet as mice, the EU side will sing like canaries.

Finally, the “we can’t show our cards” argument reminds me of a rather relevant anecdote. Years ago, in the dying days of the Soviet Union, I went on a trip to Moscow as a member of the university debating club. After several days there, our stomachs were rumbling from the effect of central economic planning upon the supply of edible food. So some of us took refuge for the evening in the Canadian embassy, where there was decent grub and beer. (We’d drunk…enough vodka by that point).

Following a frenzied supper, we started to play cards. We’d never played cards with each other before, so didn’t know what to expect. One of my friends kept on asking the dumbest, most basic, questions about the rules of the game. At one point he even showed one of the cards in his hand to all of us, asking “So what should I do with this? Is it a good card?” Everyone laughed, and no one took him seriously as an opponent. At the end of the game, lo and behold, he had the best hand by far, and won easily. It turned out he knew the rules perfectly well, and his pretence of complete ignorance had been a perfect bluff.

Well…everyone in Britain had better hope that this is exactly the government’s real Brexit strategy. The horrifying alternative is that the government really is as dumb as it looks.

 

On recent developments of the Russian Constitutional Court and non execution of EctHR judgements

To execute or not to execute EctHR judgement should not be questioned… even before a  Constitutional Court.

by Katerina SEREDA 

Non – execution of the EctHR judgements is a worrisome trend, reinforced not only by the unreasonable delays in discharging the obligations under the art. 46 of the ECHR, but also by the  direct preventing the implementation of the EctHR judgements by the Contracting Parties.

«When a decision of an international body interpreting the provisions of an international treaty concerns fundamentals of the Constitution, Russia has an exceptional right to deviate from enforcement of this decision», stated the Constitutional Court of Russian Federation in its judgement on January 19, 2017. It also deemed that ECHR judgement from 31 July 2014 in the case of “OJSC” Oil Company “Yukos” vs Russia”  are “unenforceable”.

“No possibility to enforce” in Russian Federation, has become a new window of opportunity to avoid execution of the EctHR judgements. This window was opened by the 2015 amendments to the Federal Law on Constitutional Court of Russian Federation. Some countries like Azerbaijan started to follow the same path.  In Azerbaijan, a Draft Constitutional Law, along the lines of the Russian Constitutional Court law, has been presented to the parliament during the 2016 spring session of the National Assembly.  This worrisome trend is threatening the integrity and the effectiveness of the ECHR system,  by giving  the impression that the standards and rules can be followed and enforced at convenience and will.

On the matter

On 31 July 2014 in its final judgement in the case “OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia” (Application no. 14902/04) the ECtHR obliged Russia to pay the applicant company’s shareholders as they stood at the time of the company’s liquidation and, as the case may be, their legal successors and heirs the compensation for the pecuniary damage amounting to EUR 1.8 billion.

The ECtHR on the ground of its principal judgement on the case of 20 September 2011 concluded that the Applicant Company has suffered pecuniary damage as the result of violation of Article 1 of Protocol no.1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because of retrospective imposition of fines for tax offenses for 2000 and 2001 (EUR 1.3 billion), 7% of the enforcement fee (EUR 0.5 billion), disproportionate nature of the enforcement proceedings – which shall be compensated under Article 41 of the Convention.

Based on the amendments to Federal Constitutional Law from Dec. 2015 on Constitutional Court of Russian Federation,  the Ministry of Justice of Russian Federation excercised its right to challenge (question) the enforceability of the ECHR judgements before the Constitutional Court, and submitted its request dealing with the ECtHR judgment of 31 July 2014 with respect to the case “OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia” on two grounds:

a) the interpretation of the international treaty provided by the EctHR in this judgement, contradicts the norms and the principles of the Constitution of Russian Federation with the meaning of the interpretation of the Constitution of Russian Federation, provided by the Constitutional Court: the enforcement in respect of the compensation to the shareholders, liquidated in November 2007, results in violation of provisions of Articles 6 (Section 2), 17 (Section 3), 19 (Section 1), 35 (Sections 1 and 3), 46 (Section 3), 55, and 57 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation within the meaning of the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Judgments of 30 July 2001 No. 13-П, of 14 July 2005 No. 9-П and etc.), the constitutional principle of justice and equality, including applications to an international body for the protection of human rights;

b) awarding the compensation to unidentified number of persons in whose respect the ECtHR did not find any violations and who were not a party before the EctHR, violates the Convention, that limits awarding the compensation only to a victim party Articles 34, 35, 41 of the Convention.

The Venice Comission in its interim (adopted March, 2016) and final opinion (June, 2016) On the 2015 amendments to the Federal Law on Constitutional Court, clearly concluded that the execution of the EctHR judgements is an unequivocal, imperative legal obligation is not a matter of the choice of the State which decisions to be implemented and which not. The execution of ECtHR judgement is, primarily, the obligation of the Government of the political/administrative nature. And, the Constitutional Court, if being involved risks becoming “the political arbiter of all controversies surrounding international decisions”. In both opinions the Venice Commission underscored that the review of the decision by the Constitutional Court cannot challenge the validity of the EctHR judgement – it shall be executed in accordance with the Art. 46 ECHR. Only the modality of execution may be at a State’s discretion.  Individual measures of execution contained in judgments of the ECtHR, such as the payment of just satisfaction, may not be the object of an assessment of constitutionality.  Furthermore, The Venice Comission stated that the provisions on “no execution measure may be taken if the Constitutional Court finds that a judgment is non-enforceable” (Article 1044 paragraph 2 and Article 106 part 2) is in direct conflict with Russia’s international obligations under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 46 ECHR and should be removed.

Therefore, to execute or not to execute EctHR judgement is not the question… even if it was submitted before the Constitutional Court.