The  European Union’s  Policies  on  Counter-Terrorism. Relevance,  Coherence and Effectiveness

FULL TEXT (226 pages) ACCESSIBLE HERE 

(*)This research paper was requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and was commissioned, overseen and published by the Policy Department for  Citizens’ Rights and  Constitutional  Affairs. (January 2017)

AUTHORS :
(PwC) : Wim  WENSINK, Bas WARMENHOVEN, Roos HAASNOOT, Rob  WESSELINK, Dr  Bibi   VAN  GINKEL,
 International  Centre for  Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)  – The  Hague:  Stef WITTENDORP,  Dr  Christophe  PAULUSSEN, Dr  Wybe  DOUMA, Dr  Bérénice  BOUTIN,  Onur  GÜVEN, Thomas  RIJKEN, With   research   assistance   from:   Olivier  VAN   GEEL,   Max   GEELEN,   Geneviève   GIRARD,   Stefan HARRIGAN, Lenneke  HUISMAN,  Sheila  JACOBS  and  Caroline TOUSSAINT.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (emphasis are added)

Background and aim

The series of recent terrorist attacks, as well as the various foiled and failed terrorist plots on European soil, have more than ever reinforced the popular awareness of the vulnerabilities that go hand-in-hand with the open democracies in the European Union (EU). The fact that these attacks followed each other with short intervals, but mostly due to the fact that they often did not fit the profile and modus operandi of previous attacks, have significantly contributed to the difficulty for security agencies to signal the threats as they are materialising. The modi operandi used showed a diversity of targets chosen, were committed by a variety of actors including foreign fighter returnees, home-grown jihadist extremists, and lone actors, and were executed with a variety of weapons or explosives. Furthermore, another complicating factor is the trend towards the weaponisation of ordinary life  in  which  a truck or  a kitchen  knife already  fulfils the purpose.

Governments, policy-makers, and politicians in most EU Member States feel the pressure of the population who call for adequate responses to these threats. Similarly, the various actors of the EU on their own accord, or the European Council driven by (some) Member States, have stressed the importance of effective responses to these increased threats, and have specifically underlined the importance of sharing of information and good cooperation. Very illustrating in this respect are the conclusions adopted during the European Council meeting of 15 December 2016, in which the European Council stressed the importance of the political agreement on the Counter-Terrorism Directive, emphasised the need to swiftly adopt the proposals on regulation of firearms and anti-money laundering, as well as the implementation of the new passenger name record (PNR) legislation.1 The European Council furthermore welcomed the agreement on the revised Schengen Borders Code, and stressed the importance of finding agreement on the Entry/Exit System and the European Travel   Information  and   Authorisation  System.2

Although the easy way to satisfy the call for action by the national populations seems to be to just take action for the sake of it, the responsibility lies with the relevant actors, in line with the objectives and principles of the EU Treaty and the values the EU represents 3, to actually assess the security situation, and implement, amend or suggest (new) policies that are adequate, legitimate, coherent and effective in the long run. It is with that objective in mind that this study, commissioned by the European Parliament, has made an assessment of the current policy architecture of the EU in combating terrorism, particularly looking into loopholes, gaps or overlap in policies in areas ranging from international and inter-agency cooperation, data exchange, external border security, access to firearms and explosives, limiting the financing of terrorist activities, criminalising terrorist behaviour and prevention of radicalisation. This study furthermore looks into the effectiveness of the implementation of  policies in Member States  and  the  legitimacy and coherence  of  the  policies.

Seven major policy themes were selected and addressed in depth by this study:

  • Measures and tools for operational cooperation and intelligence/law enforcement and judicial information exchange;
  • Data collection and database access and interoperability;
  • Measures to enhance external border security;
  • Measures to combat terrorist financing;
  • Measures to reduce terrorists’ access to weapons and explosives; . Criminal justice measures;
  • Measures to combat radicalisation and recruitment.

The research team has assessed the degree of implementation of EU counter-terrorism measures under these seven themes in a selection of seven Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain. This study sets out policy options for the future direction of EU counter-terrorism policy. The focus of policy options is on future threats and developments, and on developing creative yet feasible policy solutions.

Main findings Continue reading

Parliamentary tracker : echoes from LIBE meeting of January 30-3124, 2017

by Luigi LIMONE (*)

Summary :
– Information systems and interoperability
– 2009 Europol Data Breaches
– Europol-Danemark Agreement
– Amnesty Report on Hotspots in Italy
– Residence Permits for Third Country Nationals
– Trade framework Agreement with Turkey
– LIBE delegations to the UN Summit on migration (2016)
– Electorinc votes
– Draft Report on the Reception Directive
– Implementation PNR Directive
– Registration Ships Passengers
– EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward (migration)
– Study on criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants
– Implementation Directives on seasonal workers and intracorporate transfert

 
Point 1 – High-Level Expert Group on information systems and interoperability
Presentation of the state of play of the process towards the interoperability of information systems and first results of the High-Level Expert Group’s interim report of December 2016 by Julian King, Commissioner for the Security Union.
Julian King, Commissioner for the Security Union, opened his presentation highlighting the need for an effective information sharing system between Member States. In particular, he reported several repeating cases of people being registered under different identities within the  various EU information systems. Therefore, he underlined the importance of looking at how to improve the quality of the data which are put into the information systems, the access to that data by the national authorities as well as the way in which that data in processed.
He also mentioned the need to increasingly support Member States for the implementation of the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive and claimed that some progress was achieved in the way information is shared between national authorities, mentioning in particular Europol contribution to smart data information.
From his presentation, three priority actions have emerged:  Continue reading

Parliamentary tracker : echoes from LIBE meeting of January 23-24, 2017

by Luigi LIMONE (*)

Summary:
– Confirmation of Claude Moraes as Chairman of LIBE Committee
– State of Roma integration in the EU
– Collection of biometric data of illegally staying third-country nationals
– Structured dialogue with Commissioneer Vera Jourova
– Legal Service presentation of Tele2/SverigeAB ruling on data retention
– EASO assesment on Turkey and Balkan Countries as “safe countries”
– Danemark-Europol cooperation after May 1st 2017
– Structured dialogue with Commissioneer Avramopoulos
– EP report on “Fundamental rights implications of Big Data”
– Outcome of the LIBE delegation in Sweden (19-20 September 2016)

 

The Committee meeting of LIBE of 23 and 24 January opened with the confirmation of Claude Moraes (S&D, United Kingdom) as chairman of the LIBE Committee for the second half of the 8th legislature (2014-2019).

  1. The first point on the agenda was about the ‘State of play of Roma integration in Member States’.

It has been opened by an intervention of  Ioannis Dimitrakopoulos, Head of Equality and Citizens’ Rights Department for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) who presented the findings of the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination (MIDIS) Survey on Roma inclusion.
This Survey build on the results of the first wave of the large-scale survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2008 and is particularly focused on the issue of Roma inclusion in order to fulfill both the EU global strategy for the next period and the UN Agenda for sustainable development..
The main emerging issues of the second survey based have been :
1) Education: this is the only area where some improvements have been registered, notably for young children. However, almost half of Roma children don’t follow secondary schools and almost 95% do not attend any form of post-secondary education.
2) Youth: on average, 63% of young Roma (aged 16-24) are neither working nor studying or following professional training (compared to 12% of their non-Roma peers of the same age in the EU).
3) Employment: fewer than one on three Roma have a paid job, and the situation is even worse for Roma women.
Most of Roma people are marginalized and not less than 41% of Roma living in Europe is discriminated in employment, education or when trying to reach health care centers or the public administration. Continue reading

The Dublin system: the ECJ Squares the Circle Between Mutual Trust and Human Rights Protection

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

By Cecilia Rizcallah, (*)

Introduction

On Thursday February 16th, the ECJ handed down a seminal judgment in the case of C.K. and others, C-578/16 PPU. This ruling was rendered on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of Slovenia asking, in substance, whether the risk faced by an asylum seeker of being a victim of inhuman and degrading treatment because of his/her individual situation, shall prevent his/her transfer to another Member State to consider his/her asylum claim on the basis of the Dublin system.

The Dublin System: Cooperation between Member States based on Mutual Trust

The Dublin system, initiated by a Convention signed in 1990 in the city whose name it bears, allocates responsibility for examining asylum applications lodged by third country nationals (TCNs) in the EU, in such a manner that, in principle, only one State has the task of examining each asylum request lodged on the European Union’s territory.  Pursuing harmonisation of Member states’ asylum policies, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the competence of the European Community (Article 63 EC; now Article 78 TFEU) to adopt additional measures in order to achieve a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). On that basis, the Dublin Convention was replaced by the “Dublin II” Regulation (Regulation n°343/2003) and then the “Dublin III” Regulation (Regulation 604/2013). Also, a number of directives were adopted in order to set up minimum standards on the qualification and status of refugees and persons with subsidiarity protection (Directive 2011/95/UE), on asylum procedures (currently Directive 2013/32/UE) and on reception conditions for asylum-seekers (currently Directive 2013/33/UE).

The Dublin system, which constitutes a fundamental part of the CEAS, has as its main goals to (i) ensure the access of TCNs to the asylum application procedure and to (ii) rationalise the treatment of asylum applications by avoiding forum shopping and the existence of multiple applications. It therefore establishes a set of criteria which determine which Member State is, in a particular situation, responsible for examining the application of an asylum-seeker. The general rule is that (in effect) the State of first entry into the European Union is the responsible Member State, but there are several exceptions. If another Member State is approached, that state can either, on the basis of the Dublin system, automatically transfer the asylum seeker lodging the application to the responsible state, but it can also – and it has a sovereign right to – decide to examine the application itself as it so wish (Article 17, Dublin III Regulation: the “sovereignty-clause”).

It is important to note that the Dublin system is underpinned by the fundamental idea of equivalence of Member States’ asylum systems, presuming, therefore, that asylum-seekers would not benefit from any advantage by having their application examined in a specific country.

Summary of Previous Case Law of the ECJ: Preserving Effectiveness of EU Cooperation, even at the Expense of Fundamental Rights

The automaticity of the transfer of asylum-seekers between Member States, founded on the premise of equivalence, quickly appeared problematic in terms of protection of asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights. Notably due to their geographic situation, some Member States were faced with a high number of arrivals that put their asylum-seekers’ reception infrastructures under pressure, and resulted in degradation of their national asylum systems.

It did not take long before challenges against transfer decisions were being introduced, because of the risks faced by asylum-seekers regarding their fundamental rights in the State which the Dublin system made responsible for examining their applications. One of the first landmark rulings on this issue was handed down by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in which Belgium was held liable for breaching the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by having transferred an asylum seeker back to Greece on the basis of the Dublin system, while this country, in its examination of asylum applications, was not fulfilling the obligations under the ECHR. The ECtHR noted, in the case of M.S.S c. Belgium and Greece (application n° 30696/09), that Belgium, being aware of, or having a duty to be aware of the poor detention and reception conditions of asylum-seekers in Greece, should have relied upon the “sovereignty-clause” of the Dublin II Regulation, to refrain from transferring this individual to a country where he faced a real risk of becoming a victim of inhuman and degrading treatment in accordance with Article 3 ECHR.

Less than a year later, the ECJ addressed the same issue with the additional difficulty of having the duty to safeguard the Dublin system’s effet utile. In the famous N.S. case (C-411/10), the Court was indeed asked whether “a State which should transfer the asylum seeker [to the responsible Member State according to the Dublin regulation] is obliged to assess the compliance, by that Member State, with the fundamental rights of the European Union”.  In addressing this challenge, the ECJ relied – for the first time in the field of asylum – upon the principle of mutual trust between Member States, founded on the presumption that “all participating States [to the Dublin system] observe fundamental rights”, to conclude that it was inconceivable that “any infringement of a fundamental right by the Member State responsible” would affect the obligations of other Member States to comply with the Dublin Regulation (§82).

To maintain the effectiveness of the Dublin Regulation despite the existence of flaws in national asylum systems, the ECJ innovated by introducing the “systemic deficiencies test”, entailing that a transfer should be prohibited “if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman and degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (corresponding to Article 3 ECHR), of asylum-seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible with that provision” (§86).

To secure a clear, effective and fast method for determining the Member State responsible for dealing with an asylum application, the ECJ thus opted for a presumption of compliance by Dublin States with fundamental rights which could be rebutted in the presence of a “systemic deficiency in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum-seekers” where Member States would be compelled to prevent the transfer (§89). This presumption of fundamental rights’ respect by Member States was subsequently applied by the ECJ in other judgements (C-4/11, Puid and C-394/12, Abdullahi).  In fact, the latter judgment expressly limited both the substantive and procedural grounds on which a Dublin transfer could be challenged.

Heavily criticized, this approach was condemned in Strasbourg with the Tarakhel case (application n°29217/12), in 2014 in which the ECtHR reaffirmed and specified its MSSjudgement by ruling that the Dublin system “does not exempt [national authorities] from carrying out a thorough and individualized examination of the situation of the person concerned and from suspending enforcement of the removal order should the risk of inhuman and degrading treatment be established”.

Stonewalling, one of the ECJ’s arguments against the draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the ECHR (Opinion 2/13) was the ECHR requirement that Member States “check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States” (Opinion 2/13, §194). The Court’s “systemic deficiencies” test was consolidated in the recast of the Dublin Regulation (Regulation 604/2013, Dublin III) whose Article 3(2) states that “where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible”.

A first move from this case law has recently been observed in another field of EU cooperation, namely in EU criminal law. The question asked to the ECJ was whether detention conditions incompatible with art. 4 of the Charter in a Member State issuing a EAW could allow or oblige the executing judicial authority of a requested Member State to refuse the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Once again, the ECJ was faced with the dilemma between securing a EU mechanism based on mutual trust or taking human rights considerations seriously. In its landmark ruling in the case Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C-404/15), the ECJ considered that in the event of “systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention” deficiencies, and only if “there are substantial grounds to believe that, following the surrender of that person to the issuing Member State, he or she will run a real risk of being subject in that Member State to inhuman and degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4” (§94), the executing authority will have to postpone the execution of the EAW.

Hence, a two-step analysis has to be carried out by the national judge who must first assess the existence of general or particular deficiencies in the detention system of the requesting state, before examining, in concreto, whether the requested person faces a real risk of being subject to inhuman and degrading treatment. It remained, however, unclear whether the exception to mutual trust provided in Aranyosi and Căldăraru was more or less protective of fundamental rights. Even though a second condition was added, the deficiency requirement seemed softened.

The ruling of the ECJ in C.K. and others: A Welcome Step Towards Reconciliation Between the Dublin system and Human Rights ?

Facts and Question referred to the ECJ

A couple with a newborn child lodged an asylum application in Slovenia whereas Croatia was, according to the Dublin criteria, responsible for examining their application. Noting the absence of systemic flaws in the Croatian asylum system but observing that the mother of the child was in a very bad state of health, the Slovene court asked the ECJ whether the reliance upon the sovereignty clause (Article 17 of Dublin III) could be mandatory for the purpose of ensuring the family an effective protection against risks of inhuman and degrading treatment. In other words, the national judge inquired whether Dublin transfers were only prohibited in case of the existence of systematic deficiencies in the responsible state, subjecting asylum-seekers to risks of violations of Article 4 of the Charter, or whether a transfer also had to be precluded when such a risk was faced due to the specific and individual situation of a particular asylum seeker.

The opinion of the Advocate General

Following the NS and Abdullahi approach, the opinion of Advocate General Tanchev argued that only systemic flaws in the responsible State could require the prevention of a Dublin transfer. Unsurprisingly, he justified his opinion on the principle of mutual trust between Member States and on the need to ensure the effectiveness of the CEAS (§51). He further acknowledged that his position did not meet ECtHR standards but stressed that the EU was not bound by it (§52). He moreover underlined that Article 17 of the Regulation constituted a “discretionary” clause which, by definition, could not be construed as imposing obligations on Member States (§ 67).

The judgment of the Court

The fifth Chamber of the ECJ – quite uncommonly – did not follow the Advocate General’s opinion. To the contrary, the ECJ stated that, besides situations where “systemic deficiencies” exist in the responsible state, any transfer of asylum-seekers shall be excluded where it gives rise to a real risk for the individual concerned to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.  Relying upon Article 52§3 of the Charter, the ECJ recalled that corresponding rights guaranteed both by the Charter and the ECHR should receive the same scope as those laid down by the Convention.

It then quoted Strasbourg’s recent ruling in Paposhvili v. Belgium (application n° 41738/10, § 175) according to which “illness may be covered by Article 3 [of the ECHR], where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can be held responsible”. Consequently, despite the absence of systemic deficiencies in the Croatian reception conditions of asylum-seekers (§7), Slovenia was required to suspend the transfer due to the fact that it could result, because of the particular medical condition of the immigrant, in a real risk of serious and irremediable deterioration of her health condition (§84). The suspension should, according to the judgement, be maintained as long as that risk exists. On the basis of its ruling in Aranyosi, the Court also stressed that national authorities were required to assess the risk before transferring an individual (§76).

The Court added that if the state of health of the migrant was not expected to improve, the relevant Member State had the possibility to itself examine the asylum application on the basis of the sovereignty clause contained in Article 17§1 of the Regulation (§96). However, this provision does not, according to the ECJ, oblige a Member State to examine any application lodged with it, even when read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter.

The ECJ finally concluded that this holding “fully respected the principle of mutual trust since, far from affecting the presumption of respect of fundamental rights by Member States, it ensures that exceptional situations are duly taken into consideration by Member States” and furthermore, that “if a Member State proceeded to the transfer of an asylum-seeker in such circumstances, the resulting inhuman and degrading treatment would not be attributable, neither directly or indirectly, to the authorities of the responsible Member State, but solely to the first Member State”.

Comments

The ruling of the fifth Chamber seems to introduce a crucial change in the case law of the ECJ regarding the relationship between the principle of mutual trust and the protection of individuals against inhuman and degrading treatment. Instead of putting these two imperatives in competition, the Court seems, for the first time, to obviously acknowledge their necessary interdependence.  By considering that the principle of mutual trust would be enhanced by an effective application of Article 4 of the Charter, the ECJ finally appears to take seriously the fact that this principle is precisely founded on the respect by Member States of EU values including, above all, the principle of human dignity to which the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment is closely linked (Article 2 TEU).

It is therefore not only in case of systemic or generalised flaws in the asylum system of a responsible Member State that a transfer may be prevented. Specific and individual considerations of asylum-seekers must be taken into account in order to assess whether he or she could suffer treatment incompatible with Article 4 of the Charter because of his/her transfer. The Court moreover endorses this requirement by holding that in case of failure in addressing this risk, the first Member State will shoulder responsibility for breach of the Charter.

It should however be stressed that, while the first judgements prioritising the principle of mutual trust were delivered by the ECJ Grand Chamber, the ruling in the case at hand was handed down by a Chamber of five judges whose authority could be considered as being weaker. Nevertheless, the ruling follows the general evolution of the case law of the ECJ which already underlined several times, following the last recast of the Dublin regulation, the fact that the changes of the system were “intended to make the necessary improvements, in the light of experience, not only to the effectiveness of the Dublin system but also to the protection afforded applicants under that system” (C-63/15, Ghezelbash, §52) The latter judgment (from June 2016) had already overturned the procedural aspects of the Abdullahi judgment; the CK ruling now overturns the substantive aspects.

This valuable step in favour of asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights protection nevertheless raises a number of practical questions. One could ask first – and this question was already put forward by other commentators – whether the risk of the violation of other fundamental rights than the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment must justify an exception to the Dublin distribution of responsibilities and, thereby, to the principle of mutual trust. We think that, given the emphasis put by the Court on the exceptional character of the situation, not any breach of any fundamental rights would prevent Member States to rely upon the principle of mutual trust in order to transfer an asylum-seeker. To the contrary, only very serious risks of violation of absolute fundamental rights (Chapter I of the Charter) would in our view justify a mandatory suspension of the transfer of asylum-seekers.

Additionally, the ruling raises questions as regards the consequences of a suspension. As pointed out by the Court, a Member State would never be obliged to itself assess, on the basis of the sovereignty clause (Article 17.1 Dublin III), an asylum application which falls within the responsibility of another State. What if, because of the individual situation of the asylum seeker, the transfer should be suspended in the long term? The finding of the ECJ could then result in the existence of “refugees in orbit”, asylum-seekers who lose the certainty of having their application examined by any Member State of the Union – something which the Dublin system especially seeks to prevent and that could, in itself, constitute an inhuman and degrading treatment.

Finally, the question of the applicability of this approach to EU criminal cooperation should also be raised. The Court seemed, until its holding in the Aranyosi case, very reluctant to acknowledge any exception to the principle of mutual trust in the framework of the European Arrest Warrant (see, among others, the cases C-396/11 Radu and C-399/11, Melloni). The ruling in C.K. should however, in our opinion, be seen as applicable also in the field of criminal cooperation if such exceptional circumstances are met since the ruling especially relies upon the judgment in Aranyosi and also due to the absolute character of the prohibition laid down in art. 4 of the Charter Now the two lines of case law have been brought together, but they raise parallel questions about the long-term consequences. Indeed, the Court of Justice has already been asked to elaborate on the Aranyosi ruling, in the pending Aranyosi II case. So its ruling in that case may be equally relevant to Dublin cases.

In any case, the change of position of the ECJ seems much more in compliance both with the ECHR and, also, with the constitutional requirements of certain national legal orders. Indeed, the German Constitutional Court did not hesitate, in its judgment of 15 December 2015, to make an exception to the principle of mutual trust, as implemented by the EAW system, in order to protect the right of human dignity, which, according to this ruling, forms part of German constitutional identity.

One can henceforth wonder whether the C.K. and Aranyosi rulings generally overturn the Opinion 2/13 argument based on the principle of mutual trust opposed, among others, by the ECJ against the EU’s draft accession agreement to the ECHR… Either way, this new setting should, without a doubt, have an important impact on today’s and future’s relationships between the EU legal order, on the one hand, with the ECHR and national legal orders, on the other.

(*)  Research Fellow at the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research affiliated to the Centre of Interdisciplinary Research in Constitutional Law of Saint-Louis University (USL-B) and the Centre of European Law of the Free University Brussels (ULB). The author wishes to thank the Professors E. Bribosia and S. Van Drooghenbroeck for their valuable advice.

 

The Marrakesh Treaty judgment: the ECJ clarifies EU external powers over copyright law

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Gesa Kübek, PhD candidate at the law faculty of the University of Passau.

On 14th February 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) concluded, in Opinion 3/15, that the European Union (EU) is exclusively competent to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (hereafter: Marrakesh Treaty). Its decision in Opinion 3/15 mirrors, at first sight, Advocate General (AG) Wahl’s Opinion, which equally argued that the EU has exclusive competence to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty. A closer look at Opinion 3/15, however, reveals that the Court opted for a much stricter interpretation of the scope of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) – ie the EU’s international trade powers – than the AG. Moreover, the Court’s answer to the question of exclusivity does not clarify the correct choice of legal basis.

The following blog post provides an overview of the Court’s Opinion 3/15 and a short analysis thereof. The first part describes the conflict at stake and the arguments of the parties. The second part outlines the Court’s position. The final section discusses some of the implications of Opinion 3/15 for EU treaty-making.

The conflict at stake: Questions of exclusivity and the choice of legal basis

In June 2013, the World Organisation on Intellectual Property (WIPO) finalised the negotiations of the Marrakesh Treaty, which aims to facilitate access to published work for persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print disabled (hereafter: “beneficiary persons”). The Marrakesh Treaty stipulates two separate, but interrelated instruments to fulfil its objectives. First, it obliges its contracting parties to provide for an exception or limitation to the rights of reproduction, distribution and making available to the public in order to make format copies more readily available for beneficiary persons. Second, it facilitates the cross-border exchange of accessible format copies.

In April 2014, the EU Council decided to sign the Marrakesh Treaty for the European Union based on Article 207 TFEU (the EU’s CCP power) in conjuncture with Article 114 TFEU (the EU’s internal market power, which is the basis for harmonising copyright law within the EU, among other things). The subsequent Commission proposal for the conclusion of the agreement was, however, rejected by the Member States as represented in the Council, which caused fierce institutional debate over the choice of legal basis. According to the Commission, Arts. 207 and 114 TFEU were correctly selected. In the alternative, the Marrakesh Treaty may be based on the CCP alone, which the Lisbon Treaty confirms as an exclusive competence (Art. 3 (1) (e) TFEU). In any event, the Commission argued that the rights and obligations comprised by the Marrakesh Treaty were largely harmonized by EU internal legislation. As a result, it asserted that exclusive EU competence can be implied (Art. 3 (2) TFEU).

The eight intervening Member States rejected the assumption of EU exclusivity. Instead, in their view, the competences to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty ought to be shared, which may result in the conclusion of a “mixed agreement” that lists both the EU and the Member States as contracting parties. Given the persisting institutional conflicts, the Commission asked the Court to clarify whether the EU has the exclusive competence to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty.

As was stated above, AG Wahl supported the Commission’s quest for exclusive EU treaty-making powers. Somewhat surprisingly, the AG, however, determined that the Marrakesh Treaty should be concluded on the basis of Art. 207 TFEU on the CCP and – as contended by numerous Member States – Art. 19 (1) TFEU, the EU’s power to adopt many non-discrimination laws. The latter provision underlines the Marrakesh Treaty’s objective to promote non-discrimination, equal opportunity, accessibility and participation of disabled persons in the society. Despite the implication of exclusivity, the choice of Art. 19 (1) TFEU entails important procedural consequences: As the provision stipulates that the adoption of EU legislation requires unanimity in the Council, EU treaty-making under the anti-discrimination power equally grants the Member States veto powers in the Council (Art. 218 (8) TFEU).

The Court‘s position in Opinion 3/15

In order to answer the preliminary question, the Court, first, examined whether the Marrakesh Treaty, in full or in part, falls within the scope of the CCP. Thereafter, the ECJ analysed whether exclusivity can be implied within the meaning of Art. 3 (2) TFEU.

The reach of commercial aspects of intellectual property rights

To start with, the Court recalled that according to settled case-law, an EU act falls within the CCP “if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade” (Daiichi Sankyo). Conversely, the mere fact that an EU act is liable to have implications on international trade is not enough for it to be concluded under the CCP.

In its subsequent reasoning, the Court outlined that neither one of the aforementioned instruments of the Marrakesh Treaty intends to promote, facilitate or govern international trade. The Court’s Opinion is particularly striking with regard to the import and export of format copies, as “there is no doubt that those rules relate to the international trade of such copies” (para 87). Nevertheless, the Court stated that the cross-border exchange specified by the Marrakesh Treaty cannot be equated with international trade for commercial purposes. On the one hand, the objective of the circulation and exchange of format copies is non-commercial in nature. The Marrakesh Treaty solely uses cross-border transactions as a mean to improve access of beneficiary persons to accessible format copies and not to promote, govern or facilitate trade. On the other hand, the Marrakesh Treaty’s non-commercial character results from the fact that it does generally not stipulate trade for profit.

Indeed, the Marrakesh Treaty provides that trade in format copies covers only authorised entities, which operate on a non-profit basis and provide their service to beneficiary persons alone. According to AG Wahl, the non-profit basis of trade in format copies, is, however, irrelevant for the application of the CCP. To that extent, the AG proposed a very broad definition of commercial aspects of intellectual property rights (IPR), which Article 207 (1) TFEU expressly includes within the scope of the CCP. In his view, the CCP does not exclude from its ambit transactions or activities of a non-commercial nature as the mere exchange of goods and services implies that they are being traded. Instead, Art. 207 (1) TFEU excludes non-commercial aspects of IPR, i.e. issue areas that are not strictly or directly concerned with trade in their entirety, such as moral rights.

The Court, however, rejected the claim that commercial aspects of IPR carve out only those rules relating to moral rights. Such a broad interpretation would, in the eyes of the Court, “lead to an excessive extension of the field covered by the common commercial policy by bringing within that policy rules that have no specific link with international trade.” (para 85) Consequently, the ECJ concluded that the Marrakesh Treaty falls outside the ambit of the CCP.

Implied exclusivity and the “ERTA doctrine”

Subsequently, the Court analysed whether exclusivity can nevertheless be implied via the well-known “ERTA doctrine” (referring to the Court’s ERTA judgment), which is codified in Article 3 (2) TFEU. According to this doctrine, EU obtains exclusive treaty-making powers where the conclusion of an international agreement “may affect common rules or alter their scope”.  In its ERTA line of case law, the Court has developed a two-level test for establishing external Member State pre-emption: First, it conducts a “comprehensive and detailed analysis” to determine whether the provisions of the envisaged agreement are largely covered by common EU rules (Opinion 2/91). Second, it determines whether the conclusion of the international agreement affects the “uniform and consistent application” of these common EU rules “and the proper functioning of the system which they establish.” (Opinion 1/13, discussed here).

There was little disagreement between the parties that the Marrakesh Agreement had to be implemented within the framework of Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.  The Court, however, pointed out that “it is clear (..) that the EU legislature brought about only a partial harmonisation of copyright and related rights, given that the directive is not intended to remove or to prevent differences between national laws which do not adversely affect the functioning of the internal market.” (para 115) Indeed, Directive 2001/29 provides, within its harmonized legal framework, for considerable Member State discretion as regards the implementation of exceptions and limitations to distribution for the benefit of people with disabilities. Does such a residual Member State competence mean that the Marrakesh Treaty is not largely covered by common EU rules, and therefore prevent implied exclusivity?

The Court answered this question in the negative. Directive 2001/29 subjects the Member States’ remaining competence to a number of conditions. The Member States’ discretion can therefore only be exercised within the limits enjoined by EU law, so that the Member States “are not free to determine, in an un-harmonised manner, the overall boundaries of the exception or limitation for persons with a disability.” (para 122) Moreover, the Marrakesh Treaty – unlike Directive 2001/29 – imposes an obligation on the contracting parties to provide for an exception or limitation. The Member States are therefore mandated to comply with the restraints imposed by EU law. As a result, the Court concludes that independent external Member State action would affect common EU rules. The EU is therefore exclusively competent to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty.

Opinion 3/15 and EU treaty-making: A short analysis

As stated in the introduction, the Court’s finding of (implied) exclusivity does not come as a surprise to many observers. Neither does the broad interpretation of the “largely covered” part of the ERTA-test. After all, the Court already confirmed in Opinion 1/03 and, more recently, in Green Network, that considerable Member State discretion in the implementation of EU legislation does not rule out exclusivity. Nevertheless, as was pointed out by AG Wahl, the case law “begs the question: when is an area sufficiently covered by EU rules to exclude Member State competences to act externally?” (para 130 of the opinion) By inference, to what extent does the EU have to exercise its internal competence to trigger the “ERTA effect”?

Green Network and Opinion 3/15 suggest that the Court will place much greater emphasis on the effects of international agreements on common EU rules, rather than on the extent of their material overlap. Even if the EU law in place specifies residual Member State powers, and is therefore, arguably, not largely harmonised, (adverse) affects on the EU’s internal legal framework suffice to trigger implied exclusivity within the meaning of Art. 3 (2) TFEU. However, if the Member States may be pre-empted where an agreement is only partially covered by EU internal legislation, may they be also pre-empted where the EU cannot exercise its internal competence at all, provided always that the envisaged agreement clearly affects the EU law in force? The Court is expected to answer this question in its pending Opinion 2/15 on the conclusion of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (discussed here). Here, among other things, the Court is asked to determine whether the “ERTA effect” may exceptionally be triggered by EU primary law provisions.

The Court’s clarification of the scope of Art. 207 (1) TFEU, and in particular, “commercial aspects of IPR”, might also have some impact on future EU treaty-making. Opinion 3/15 shows that the mere exchange of goods or services cross-border is not enough to equate a measure with international trade for commercial purposes. Instead, a link with trade implies that the transaction or activity aims at fulfilling a commercial objective. By inference, using trade as a mean to fulfil non-commercial objectives is not enough to bring a measure within the scope of the CCP. While the Court did not entirely exclude that “commerce” may, on a case-by-case basis, include trade on a non-profit basis, it contrasted AG Wahl’s suggestion that Art. 207 TFEU generally encompasses transaction or activities of a non-commercial nature. In view of Opinion 2/15, which also raises this issue, it may be noted that the Court did not dispute the AG’s claim that moral rights fall outside the scope of the CCP.

When returning to the Marrakesh Treaty, Opinion 3/15 leaves another pressing question unanswered: What is the correct legal basis for the agreement’s conclusion? The Court only clarifies that the Council Decision on the signature of the Marrakesh Treaty was wrongfully based on Art. 207 TFEU, but does not further elaborate on the correct choice of legal basis. It is true that the Commission’s preliminary question is confined to the exclusive nature of the agreement. The choice of legal basis, nevertheless, qualifies the modus operandi of (exclusive) EU treaty-making. In particular, the Court refrains from discussing AG Wahl’s reference to Art.  19 (1) TFEU, and, more broadly, the effects of the non-discrimination principle on EU external action. Whilst clarifying the EU’s capacity to conclude the agreement alone, the choice of legal basis – and therefore the choice of procedure – is left to the discretion of the EU institutions. Throughout the proceedings, the Commission continued to assert that the Marrakesh Treaty should be based on Art. 114 TFEU instead of Art. 19 TFEU. Conversely, the majority of the intervening Member States sided with the AG. As the use of Art. 19 (1) TFEU would trigger unanimous Council voting, and therefore Member State veto powers in the Council, institutional debate over the conclusion of the Marrakesh Treaty might continue.

 

Worth reading: The EP legislative initiative on Robotics

The European Parliament has just adopted on Thursday 16 February  by 396 votes in favor, 123 against and 85 abstentions a legislative initiative in compliance with the art. 225 of the TFEU. It deals with Robotics and has been adopted  following a report of  Mady Delvaux (S&D, Luxembourg) on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI).

This report follows an important study on the ‘Ethical aspects of cyber-physical systems‘, recently conducted for the European Parliament’s STOA (Science and Technology Options Assessment) Panel. (see the animated infographic highlighting the range of concerns that require legal and ethical reflection, by linking different entry points – areas, concerns, and committees-  with each other).

The text adopted by the plenary is still very ambitious but some important suggestions of the JURI committee did’nt found the required majority in plenary. The most innovative ones would had been the introduction of basic universal income and of a tax on work done by robots as measures which can partially compensate the loss of working opportunities for “humans”.  The proposal to be able to put together collective redress against a robotic company was not retained either.

All that having been said the main point is: will it be followed by a formal Commission proposal and become a legal reality?

By reading the position taken by the Commission representatives during the debates (see below) it does not look like. Let’s hope that this time the Commission will not take the same position it took for the EP legislative proposal to establish an European Code of Good administration when it declared that it was …too early. Not being followed by the Commission should be extremely frustrating for an institution which is the only one directly elected by the EU Citizens  and which should in principle know what has to done but unlike the national parliaments is still lacking a true power of legislative initiative …

Quite rightly such power has been envisaged  this week by another Parliamentary report (Verofhstadt) on the possible changes to the current Treaties (Proposes, moreover, that in line with the common practice in a number of Member States, both chambers of the EU legislature, the Council and, in particular, the Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by citizens, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the basic legislative prerogative of the Commission; ).

Wishful thinking ?  Quite probably but “Spes Ultima Dea) ….

EDC

” EP DEBATES : …Carlos Moedas, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, on behalf of my colleague Věra Jourová let me start by thanking the rapporteur, Ms Delvaux, and all the MEPs involved. This is a crucial report on all the legal questions related to development of robotics and artificial intelligence. This House, to my knowledge, will be one of the first to have a clear and comprehensive position on robotics and artificial intelligence, a topic that is getting great public attention, and rightly so. Your text highlights the challenges and opportunities of this sector, and points towards a clear need for a coherent European approach. You are also calling for Europe to have a strong presence and investment in its technology in order to maintain leadership. In the European Commission, we have long recognised the importance and the potential of robotics and artificial intelligence, and the need for significant investment in these areas. We have set an ambitious public and private partnership for robotics in Europe: Sparc. This partnership not only brings the academic and research institutions, industry and business together, but also looks into questions related to ethics and law. Sparc is by far the biggest civilian research programme in this area in the world, with EUR 700 million from EU funding from Horizon 2020 to be leveraged up to EUR 2.8 billion by private investment…..()… Let me now comment in particular on your request for the Commission to come forward with a legislative proposal on civil liability for damage caused by robots. First, as you know, we already have EU legislation applying to robots. The Machinery Directive, the General Product Safety Directive, the proposed legislation on medical devices, and the regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation currently under revision also includes concrete measures to ensure the safe operation of civil drones. And the new General Data Protection Regulation that will also be fully applicable to any kind of processing of personal data, which includes artificial intelligence and robots.

Second, we are obviously looking at any need for adjustment of the current legislation. And third we are well aware that legal certainty on liability is of paramount importance for innovators, investors and consumers, providing them with the legal certainty they need. But the complexity of digital technologies makes it particularly difficult to determine who is liable and to what extent in case of failure. That is why the Commission has put in its communication and presented a communication last month on building up a European data economy. We are consulting with a wide range of stakeholders on the new challenges in this field, covering the liability questions relating to autonomous systems. Simultaneously, we are evaluating the Product Liabilities Directive with regard to emerging technologies.

Fourth, testing and experimenting will be important as will gathering data and gaining experience. This in turn will then help us with designing a suitable legal framework. On the communication on building a new European data economy, we included plans for cross-border corridors to test connected automated driving.
My fifth and final point on the question of legislation is to underline the importance of smart legislation, technologically neutral and future proof when dealing with technologies and jobs. As Ms Delvaux said, we cannot even imagine what they will be in the future.

” Honourable Members, I agree with you that the impact of digitalisation on our societies and our labour market needs to be closely monitored and anticipated, and we have to improve our understanding of this phenomenon. The different studies that have assessed that evolution reached diverging conclusions from catastrophic predictions on the labour market to a positive impact on job creation. In 2015, the Fraunhofer Institute indicated that EU companies which are intensive users of robotics are less likely to offshore production to low-cost regions because robots improve their cost production so much that they can stay in high-wage regions and create other jobs. We all know that technological change will not only replace or change existing tasks, but it will, as Mr Mayer said, create new jobs in services, it will complement human skills. Robots are also used in many areas with labour shortages such as healthcare, farming and even manufacturing. Many robots do tasks that are repetitive and dangerous for humans, such as inspecting oil tanks or welding metal parts. Far from replacing humans, robots allow the workforce to focus on other more economically useful, creative or social activities where robots cannot and will never replace us.
The Commission is fully aware of the challenges ahead and has already launched concrete measures to address them. We adopted a New Skills Agenda for Europe, the Digitising European Industry blueprint and, last December, we launched a Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, which aims at equipping the workforce at large with the necessary digital skills to thrive in a digital workplace.
Ladies and gentlemen once again, I would like to thank the European Parliament for this timely and comprehensive report and for the support for our activities. The issues raised and the measures proposed will need broader consultation and an in-depth analysis of their impact and consequences before we can draw conclusions, including on the possible legislative needs. Thank you for attention and I’m looking forward to our discussion.”

 

 

European Parliament (8th Legislature 2014-2019)
TEXTS ADOPTED Provisional edition
P8_TA-PROV(2017)0051

European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Council Directive 85/374/EEC1,
– having regard to the study on Ethical Aspects of Cyber-Physical Systems carried out on behalf of the Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel and managed by the Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), European Parliamentary Research Service;
– having regard to Rules 46 and 52 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A8-0005/2017),

Introduction

A. whereas from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein’s Monster to the classical myth of Pygmalion, through the story of Prague’s Golem to the robot of Karel ?apek, who coined the word, people have fantasised about the possibility of building intelligent machines, more often than not androids with human features;

B. whereas now that humankind stands on the threshold of an era when ever more sophisticated robots, bots, androids and other manifestations of artificial intelligence (“AI”) seem to be poised to unleash a new industrial revolution, which is likely to leave no stratum of society untouched, it is vitally important for the legislature to consider its legal and ethical implications and effects, without stifling innovation;

C. whereas there is a need to create a generally accepted definition of robot and AI that is flexible and is not hindering innovation;

D. whereas between 2010 and 2014 the average increase in sales of robots stood at 17% per year and in 2014 sales rose by 29%, the highest year-on-year increase ever, with automotive parts suppliers and the electrical/electronics industry being the main drivers of the growth; whereas annual patent filings for robotics technology have tripled over the last decade;

E. whereas, over the past 200 years employment figures had persistently increased due to the technological development; whereas the development of robotics and AI may have the potential to transform lives and work practices, raise efficiency, savings, and safety levels, provide enhanced level of services; whereas in the short to medium term robotics and AI promise to bring benefits of efficiency and savings, not only in production and commerce, but also in areas such as transport, medical care, rescue, education and farming, while making it possible to avoid exposing humans to dangerous conditions, such as those faced when cleaning up toxically polluted sites;

F. whereas ageing is the result of an increased life expectancy due to progress in living conditions and in modern medicine, and is one of the greatest political, social, and economic challenges of the 21st century for European societies; whereas by 2025 more than 20 % of Europeans will be 65 or older, with a particularly rapid increase in numbers of people who are in their 80s or older, which will lead to a fundamentally different balance between generations within our societies, and whereas it is in the interest of society that older people remain healthy and active for as long as possible;

G. whereas in the long-term, the current trend leans towards developing smart and autonomous machines, with the capacity to be trained and make decisions independently, holds not only economic advantages but also a variety of concerns regarding their direct and indirect effects on society as a whole;

H.whereas machine learning offers enormous economic and innovative benefits for society by vastly improving the ability to analyse data, while also raising challenges to ensure non-discrimination, due process, transparency and understandability in decision-making processes;

I. whereas similarly, assessments of economic shifts and the impact on employment as a result of robotics and machine learning need to be assessed; whereas, despite the undeniable advantages afforded by robotics, its implementation may entail a transformation of the labour market and a need to reflect on the future of education, employment, and social policies accordingly;

J. whereas the widespread use of robots might not automatically lead to job replacement, but lower skilled jobs in labour-intensive sectors are likely to be more vulnerable to automation; whereas this trend could bring production processes back to the EU; whereas research has demonstrated that employment grows significantly faster in occupations that use computers more; whereas the automation of jobs has the potential to liberate people from manual monotone labour allowing them to shift direction towards more creative and meaningful tasks; whereas automation requires governments to invest in education and other reforms in order to improve reallocation of the types of skills that the workers of tomorrow will need;

K. whereas in the face of increasing divisions in society, with a shrinking middle class, it is important to bear in mind that developing robotics may lead to a high concentration of wealth and influence in the hands of a minority;

L. whereas the development of robotics and AI will definitely influence the landscape of the workplace what may create new liability concerns and eliminate others; whereas the legal responsibility need to be clarified from both business sight model, as well as the workers design pattern, in case emergencies or problems occur;

M. whereas the trend towards automation requires that those involved in the development and commercialisation of AI applications build in security and ethics at the outset, thereby recognizing that they must be prepared to accept legal liability for the quality of the technology they produce;

N. whereas Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 (the General Data Protection Regulation) sets out a legal framework to protect personal data; whereas further aspects of data access and the protection of personal data and privacy might still need to be addressed, given that privacy concerns might still arise from applications and appliances communicating with each other and with databases without human intervention;

O. whereas the developments in robotics and AI can and should be designed in such a way that they preserve the dignity, autonomy and self-determination of the individual, especially in the fields of human care and companionship, and in the context of medical appliances, ‘repairing’ or enhancing human beings;

P. whereas ultimately there is a possibility that in the long-term, AI could surpass human intellectual capacity;

Q. whereas further development and increased use of automated and algorithmic decision-making undoubtedly has an impact on the choices that a private person (such as a business or an internet user) and an administrative, judicial or other public authority take in rendering their final decision of a consumer, business or authoritative nature; whereas safeguards and the possibility of human control and verification need to be built into the process of automated and algorithmic decision-making;

R. whereas several foreign jurisdictions, such as the US, Japan, China and South Korea,are considering, and to a certain extent have already taken, regulatory action with respect to robotics and AI, and whereas some Member States have also started to reflect on possibly drawing up legal standards or carrying out legislative changes in order to take account of emerging applications of such technologies;

S. whereas the European industry could benefit from an efficient, coherent and transparent approach to regulation at Union level, providing predictable and sufficiently clear conditions under which enterprises could develop applications and plan their business models on a European scale while ensuring that the Union and its Member States maintain control over the regulatory standards to be set, so as not to be forced to adopt and live with standards set by others, that is to say the third countries which are also at the forefront of the development of robotics and AI;

General principles Continue reading

The Mejiers Committee on the inter-parliamentary scrutiny of Europol

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON THE MEJIERS COMMITTE (*) PAGE  HERE

  1. Introducton

Article 88 TFEU provides for a unique form of scrutiny on the functioning of Europol. It lays down that the [regulations on Europol] shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol’s activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments.

Such a procedure is now laid down in Article 51 of the Europol Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/794), which provides for the establishment of a “specialized Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG)”, which will play the central role in ensuring this scrutiny. The Europol Regulation shall apply from 1st of May 2017.

Article 51 of the Europol Regulation also closely relates to Protocol (1) of the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the EU. Article 9 of that protocol provides: “The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together determine the organization and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union.”

Article 51 (2) does not only lay down the basis for the political monitoring of Europol’s activities (the democratic perspective), but also stipulates that “in fulfilling its mission”, it should pay attention to the impact of the activities of Europol on the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons (the perspective of the rule of law).

The Meijers Committee takes the view that improving the inter-parliamentary scrutiny of Europol, with appropriate involvement of both the national and the European levels, will by itself enhance the attention being paid by Europol on the perspectives of democracy and the rule of law, and more in particular the fundamental rights protection. It will raise the alertness of Europol as concerns these perspectives.

Moreover, the scrutiny mechanism could pay specific attention to the fundamental rights protection within Europol. This is particularly important in view of the large amounts of – often sensitive – personal data processed by Europol and exchanged with national police authorities of Member States and also with authorities of third countries.

The implementation of Article 51 into practice is currently debated, e.g. in the inter-parliamentary committee of the European Parliament and national parliaments.1 As specified by Article 51 (1) of the Europol regulation, the organization and the rules of procedure of the JPSG shall be determined.

The Meijers Commitee wishes to engage in this debate and makes, in this note, recommendations on the organization and rules of procedure.

  1. Context

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