ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON VERFASSUNGSBLOG
(17 Jan 2019)
By Laurent Pech, and Patryk Wachowiec
…. 4. One missed opportunity: The ECJ ruling of 25 July 2018 concerning the European Arrest Warrant
The
knock-on effects of the deteriorating situation in Poland became notably
visible when an Irish High Court judge decided to delay the extradition of a
man to Poland over concerns about the rule of law there pending a preliminary
reference request sent to the ECJ.
This
was followed by a vicious press campaign against
the Irish judge, with Mr Marcin Warchoł, Poland’s Deputy Justice Minister (and
Poland’s member of the Venice Commission, no less…) deeming it appropriate to
question the professionalism and integrity of the Irish High Court
judge by claiming that she did not
know relevant rules or case law and that her analysis was inter alia ignorant, lacked common sense but also
partial and biased. In addition, the Deputy Justice Minister did not see any
problem with violating the principle of the presumption of innocence by publicly stating that the
Irish High Court was “delaying the punishment of a serious drug mafia
criminal”. As regards Justice Donnelly’s right to seek clarification from the
ECJ, Mr Warchoł said: “such requests
should be unbiased. It is regrettable your court is delaying this punishment
completely on biased arguments”.
In
its judgment of 25 July 2018 (LM, C-216/18 PPU), the ECJ
established a new two-step rule of law test based on one it developed regarding
potential exceptions for surrender on the basis of the prohibition of inhuman
or degrading treatment (Article 4 of the Charter). This new test stated that
(i) when confronted with the claim that a European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter:
EAW) request must not be granted due to systemic or generalised deficiencies
liable to affect the independence of the judiciary in the issuing Member State,
the executing judicial authority (Irish High Court in the present case), must,
as a first step, “assess whether there is a real risk that the individual
concerned will suffer a breach” of his fundamental right to an independent
tribunal/to a fair trial “when it is called upon to decide on his surrender to
the authorities of the issuing Member State”; and (ii) “that authority must, as
a second step, assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular
circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for believing that,
following his surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person will
run that risk”.
This
important ruling has been widely commented in particular by many eminent scholars on this blog.
To put it briefly here, we view this
ruling by the ECJ as a missed opportunity and certainly not as a breakthrough.
Despite overwhelming and damning evidence of a growing systemic threat to the
rule of law in Poland, the Court, rather than offering a systemic answer, opted
for an individualised test requiring a case-by-case assessment. In doing so, we
submit the ECJ ignored or refused to accept reality: in a situation of systemic
attacks targeting the whole judicial system, there is, by definition, already a “real risk” of a breach of the
fundamental rights to an independent tribunal and to a fair trial in every single case. One may view as particularly
unworkable any requirement imposing on a national court acting as executing
judicial authority the need to examine the extent to which systemic attacks on
the rule of law are liable to have an impact at the level of the courts with
jurisdiction over the requested person’s case. We are sorry to say that we also
find absurd to demand that such a national court request from the issuing
judicial authority any information that it considers necessary for assessing
whether there is such a risk. This is akin to asking a potentially compromised
court to confirm that it is not (or not yet) compromised in a context where
judges can be subject to kangaroo disciplinary proceedings just for daring
sending questions to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU (see section 6 for more
details).
In essence, the ECJ has created a test
which we find impossible to apply in practice and disconnected from the reality
of a judicial system which is in the process of being entirely captured by the
executive.
Anxious
to preserve the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition while
simultaneously affirming the cardinal importance of the principles of the rule
of law and judicial independence in the EU and in particular in Poland, the ECJ
has devised a test which has the potential of undermining them all. The refusal
to hold that the EAW mechanism cannot be suspended in respect of a Member State
outside of a unanimous determination by the European Council, pursuant to
Article 7(2) TEU, that this Member State has breached Article 2 TEU, is not
merely dangerous, it is also flawed.
Why?
Because it reflects a failure to read a piece of EU secondary legislation in
light of the EU primary law as it stands on the day of the ruling while
justifying this failure on the back of an out-of-date, non-binding recital
which merely does not take into account current Article 7(1) merely because it was not yet in force when the Framework
Decision on the EAW was adopted! Last but not least,
it means that even in a situation where judicial independence would have been
totally annihilated, a case-by-case assessment would still be required unless –
something which is simply politically unimaginable when you have more than one
“rogue state” in the EU – unanimity in the European Council had been previously
reached.
Be
that as it may, we now have several concrete examples of national courts
struggling when it comes to implementing the ECJ’s “Celmer test”. Wouter van
Ballegooij and Petra Bárd spoke of Herculean hurdles in a post published last July.
Recent examples have proved them right.
Just
to give a single example, a Dutch court recently held that
11 surrender cases must be stayed and more questions sent to the relevant
Polish issuing judicial authorities, as the initial answers provided by Polish
courts did not adequately answer its concerns regarding the independence of the
judiciary. This is not however
the first time we saw a non-Polish court sending a second set of questions to
Polish courts. Indeed, last September, we saw senior Polish judges openly
disagreeing “with each other in letters sent to the High Court in Dublin
about the independence of the Polish judiciary”, with the one judge finding no problem
with a court president appointed on the basis of an arguably unconstitutional
law which was referenced as a source of concern by the Commission in its
Article 7(1) TEU proposal…
We
remain deeply sceptical of the ECJ’s test as it is difficult to see how a
national court, no matter how many and well thought questions it is able to
produce and send under the preliminary reference procedure to the ECJ, may ever
be able to gather sufficient evidence to meet the ECJ’s threshold laid down in
the second prong of its EAW rule of law test, i.e., to specifically and precisely prove,
in the particular circumstances of each relevant case that there are substantial grounds for believing that, following
the surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person will run a real
risk of a breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal. For instance, the Irish High Court found
that the ECJ test cannot be met even
in a situation where a Deputy Justice Minister is recorded to have publicly
described the subject of the EAW as a dangerous criminal (presumption of
innocence, anyone?). More generally speaking, how on earth can one receive a
fair trial in a system without effective constitutional review; without an
independent National Council for the Judiciary (the Polish KRS was suspended from
the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary for
its lack of independence); but with a supreme court which now arguably includes
unlawfully appointed judges, and where each judge in Poland potentially faces
the threat at any point in time of kangaroo disciplinary proceedings (see below
section 6).
In
a recent and potentially significant development, the Irish High Court has asked Ireland’s highest judicial body to
clarify whether systemic and generalised deficiencies in the independence of
the relevant national judiciary are “sufficient, on their own [our
emphasis] and in the absence of evidence of deficiencies in other safeguards
for a fair trial, to establish substantial grounds that there is a real risk of
a breach of the essence of the requested person’s right to a fair trial”.
This is a question, however, which can only be authoritatively answered by the
ECJ and one would therefore expect the Irish Supreme Court to refer this point
to Luxembourg, providing the ECJ the needed impetus to fine-tune its test.
5. Several pending preliminary reference cases
Following
the activation of Article 7(1) TEU, a number of Polish courts, including the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, have submitted numerous
references to the ECJ on the basis of the preliminary ruling procedure laid
down in Article 267 TFEU.
In
August 2018, the Supreme Court sent several questions regarding
the forced retirement of its judges and the power to suspend domestic law
regarding the independence of the judiciary. The ECJ has since agreed to
expedite the case in light of the importance of the issues raised, the “serious
uncertainties” the disputed national provisions have created with respect to
“functioning of the referring court as highest national court” as well as
Article 267 TFEU, “the keystone of the EU judicial system” and one which could
not function without independent national courts according to the ECJ
(see order adopted on 26 September 2018 in Case C-522/18).
Broadly
similar questions than the ones submitted in Case C-522/18 have been
subsequently referred by the Polish Supreme Court last October in Case C-668/18
and similarly, the ECJ has agreed to expedite the procedure in
this case on 11 December 2018 for the same reasons given previously in the
order issued in Case C-522/18.
Other
preliminary reference proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court concern the
disciplinary regime put in place on the back of the so-called “judicial
reforms”, and in particular the new disciplinary chamber, with the question of
whether it may be considered a “court” within the meaning of EU law one of the
issues raised. It is worth recalling in
this respect that in its fourth rule of law recommendation of 20 December 2017,
the Commission underlined that Poland’s new disciplinary regime raises a number
of concerns in particular related to the autonomy of the new disciplinary
chamber in the Supreme Court; the removal of a set of procedural guarantees in
disciplinary proceedings conducted against ordinary courts and Supreme Court
judges; and the influence of President of the Republic and the Minister of
Justice on the disciplinary officers.
To
summarise where we are, in addition to Case C-522/18 and Case C-668/18
mentioned above, an additional seven preliminary ruling requests are now
pending before the ECJ (it is not easy to keep track):
- Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18
(these two cases have been joined with the expedited procedure requests
submitted by the referring courts however rejected by the ECJ on 1 October
2018);
- Cases C-585/18, C-624/18,
C-625/18 (these three requests have been joined and expedited
procedure granted by the ECJ on
26 November 2018);
- Case C-623/18 (lodged on 3
October 2018);
- Case C-824/18 (lodged on 28
December 2018).
To
the best of our knowledge, kangaroo disciplinary proceedings have since been
initiated against the judges at the origin of Case C-588/18; Case C-563/18; and
Case C-623/18 (see section 6 below).
The
tactical retreat operated by Polish authorities following the ECJ interim order
regarding their attempted purge the Supreme Court also means that it is
unclear whether the questions submitted in Case C-522/18 and Case C-668/18
still ought to be answered by the ECJ. According to what was recently reported
in the Polish media, the Polish
government has requested that the two cases be dismissed in light of the latest
amendments to the Law on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court must now explain to the ECJ before
the end of the month why a preliminary ruling from the ECJ is still necessary
to enable it to give a judgment in these two cases.
In
any event, it is worth noting that in addition to the issue of the Supreme
Court’s new disciplinary chamber, some of these pending cases raise the issue
of the composition and appointment procedure of the ENCJ-suspended KRS, by
asking the ECJ that it interprets whether Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 CFR
preclude a body such as the KRS which the Commission has recently described as
follows in a document submitted to the Council before the third hearing
organised under Article 7(1) TEU last December:
The
new election regime of the judges-members of the National Council does not
comply with European standards requiring that judges-members of Councils for
the Judiciary are elected by their peers. No changes have been introduced in
that respect. No remedy is foreseen to address the premature termination of the
four-year mandates of the former judges-members of the National Council for the
Judiciary. The conditions under which the Sejm elected the new
judges-members, and the first meeting of the National Council for the Judiciary
illustrate its politicisation and lack of legitimacy.
If
you are not yet alarmed by the above and the sheer number of preliminary ruling
requests originating from Polish courts raising the issue of attacks on their
independence in the past few months, the section below should hopefully
convince you that it time to raise the alarm and for national governments,
parliaments and courts from other EU countries to step up to the plate.
6. Latest insidious developments
In
a nutshell, Polish authorities are now seeking to finalise their capture of the
judicial branch and prevent any further involvement of the ECJ via the systemic
– formal or otherwise – bullying and intimidation of any judge refusing to toe
the party line and the support of the captured Constitutional Tribunal. With
respect to the former, to quote the European Commission again (document dated
11 December 2018, on file with the authors),
disciplinary
officers appointed by the Minister of Justice continue to initiate preliminary
disciplinary investigations against judges who participated in public debates
or provided public statements about the ongoing reforms. Preliminary
disciplinary investigations concern also judges who referred requests for
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. In addition, disciplinary officers
appointed by the Minister of Justice exercised their power to take over
investigations carried out by disciplinary officers appointed at request of the
judiciary, including in cases where the judges concerned were found by the
latter not to have committed any disciplinary offence
The
goal here is quite obvious: due to the increasing number of referrals to the
ECJ, the ruling majority and bodies captured by it are seeking to send a
(chilling) message to all Polish judges by retaliating against those who dare
to involve the ECJ. Such state-sponsored bullying of judges making use of
Article 267 is proving to be a blueprint attractive to other
‘quasi-authoritarian’ Member States/ ‘rogue state’ and already seems to have
spread to Bulgaria.
A
particularly absurd example is the situation of the judge who is now subject to
kangaroo disciplinary proceedings for asking the ECJ (Case C-558/18) about the
compatibility of Poland’s new system of disciplinary system with EU law.
Unbelievably, this judge was then summoned by the disciplinary officer under
the control of the Minister of Justice for potential abuse of the Article 267
procedure…
Pursuant
to … You are hereby invited to submit within 14 days from the date of delivery
of this letter, a written statement regarding the possible judicial excess [our emphasis] which
resulted in the District Court in Łódź’s request for a preliminary ruling against [our emphasis] the requirements laid down
in Article 267 [TFEU] (translated excerpt from the summons sent on 29 November
2018 to Judge Ewa Maciejewska by the deputy disciplinary
commissioner)
As
noted by the Polish Association of Judges Themis,
“by instituting disciplinary proceedings against [two] judges, the
Deputy Commissioner, almost certainly unintentionally, confirmed the argument
contained in Judge Igor Tuleya’s question
requesting a preliminary ruling [Case C-563/18] that the new disciplinary procedure
has been politicized to such an extent that it can serve the purpose of
exerting unacceptable pressure on judges”. (An additional recent example of disciplinary
proceedings targeting the judge at the origin of Case C-623/18 is here).
While
these disciplinary proceedings have yet to conclude (to keep up to date: see
this website), their “chilling
effect” is obvious and so is the intent of the Polish government: to bully if
not scare judges into submission since there is no one left to defend them, the
ruling party having de facto captured
the Supreme Court’s new disciplinary chamber…
Not
to be undone by these scandalous proceedings and this frontal attack against
Article 267 TFEU, “the keystone of the EU judicial system”
according to the ECJ itself, the Prosecutor General/Minister of Justice has
submitted last October a request to the pseudo Constitutional Tribunal. In a
nutshell, the PG/MoJ is asking it to assess whether Article 267 TFEU is in line
with the Polish constitution (you know, the document Polish authorities are
complying with only when convenient), the key claim being that “issues relating to the system, form and organization of
the judiciary, as well as judicial procedures, have not been transferred to the
EU in the Accession Treaty”. Should the
“Constitutional Tribunal” happily oblige (and refuse to refer the case to the
ECJ prior to issuing judgment), this would be a direct challenge to the primacy
of EU law, its uniform application, and the rule of law as a foundational value
of the EU as we have never seen before. Should such a ruling materialise, we
would then expect the Commission to immediately initiate yet another
infringement action building on Case C-416/17.
Last
but not least, a new developing frontline must be paid attention to. The new
KRS – well known and widely mocked for its recent
interpretation of the judicial ethics code according to which judges cannot
wear “Constitution” t-shirts – has also brought
its own case to the so-called “Constitutional Tribunal”. On its own motion, the
(captured) Polish National Council of the Judiciary has requested that the
(captured) Constitutional Tribunal finds its composition compatible with the
Polish Constitution. Although it is up to the body which refers the case to the
“Constitutional Tribunal” to show that a disputed law is unconstitutional, it
clearly seems that the new KRS is not bothered with what it must view as only
legal niceties and is essentially urging the “Constitutional Tribunal” to
rubber-stamp its politicisation. Be that at it may, we are looking at the
staggering possibility that a captured body will come to the rescue of another
captured body so as offer the ENCJ-suspended
KRS some ammunition in case of any adverse ruling
from the ECJ or its eventual exclusion from the ENCJ.
7. Diagnosis and way forward
To
put it concisely, the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in
Poland, which led the Commission to finally and rightly activate Article 7(1)
TEU more than a year ago, has deteriorated further to the point of threatening
the functioning of the whole EU legal order and therefore, the future of the
EU’s internal market itself. This means that the ongoing Article 7(1) TEU
procedure must continue. It is however time for the Commission to accept that
stand-alone dialogue, still presented as its “preferred channel for resolving the systemic threat to
the rule of law in Poland”, will lead nowhere when
dealing with would-be autocrats acting in bad faith. The Commission should therefore
launch accelerated infringement proceedings regarding every single issue
mentioned in its Article 7(1) reasoned proposal not yet covered by any of the
pending infringement or preliminary reference actions.
Should
the Commission fail to do so, it is time for national governments which take
the rule of law seriously and are keen to protect the EU’s internal market,
to rediscover Article 259 TFEU and
bring their own infringement actions against Poland. They should also seek to
systemically intervene in every single ECJ action where the systemic threat to
the rule of law in Poland is the key issue.
As
for the Council, our key recommendation would be for it to ensure full
transparency of Article 7 proceedings by systematically publishing any
connected document it produces or receives from the EU Commission and national
governments.
National
courts have also a role to play. We would want to see as many of them refer as
many preliminary requests as possible to the ECJ should they be faced with
cases which, directly or indirectly, raise issues relating to the rule of law
situation in Poland, if only to prevent a situation where the ECJ is unable to
issue rulings because the Commission has withdrawn its infringement actions
and/or the Polish authorities have been able to “kill off” all requests via
formal and informal means.
Last
but not least, the ENCJ ought to face reality and accept that the KRS cannot be
saved and ought to therefore exclude it considering the disgraceful actions and
behaviour of its members since it was suspended last September.
Enough
is enough.
