Speaking of EU legislation and.. of sausages making. Still today there is no way of knowing how EU “Safe Countries” legislation was made ..

By Emilio De Capitani

Setting the ..table

“Laws are like sausages. It is best not to see them being made” is the most famous Otto Bismark’s quote, (even though, there’s no evidence, that Bismarck ever said it, much less coined it…). This statement may well come to mind when looking at the procedure followed by the EU legislators when preparing, negotiating and adopting the legislation on “Safe Countries”. The legislative act is Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union. It consolidates the first list of EU “Safe countries” established by Regulation (EU) 2026/464 as well as the new rules defining the concept of ‘safe country’ eg Regulation (EU) 2026/463

It is worth noting that these texts creates some “legal presumptions” whose main justification is to make easier to repatriate or expel both irregular migrants and people who have not been granted the right to asylum[1] These legal presumption which amounts to consider as unfounded most of the request for protection of the people trying to enter the EU from these third countries and because of this it significantly restricts the rights of people who are extradited, removed or turned back. It will be up to them to prove in very short deadlines that, in exceptional circumstances, the concept of a safe country of origin should not apply in their specific case (see paragraph 5 of Regulation 2026/464)[2] . Furthermore, the right to judicial protection, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, would be severely restricted, as judicial appeals must be lodged within very short time limits, would not automatically have suspensive effect and, in the event of a negative decision, the individual would not be permitted to remain legally within the territory of the EU.

On these aspects it is worth recalling the art.52.1 of the EU  Charter which states “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law (emphasis added) and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.  Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.limitations to fundamental rights may be adopted “

Has the principle of legislative transparency been respected in the Safe Countries case ?

In the following lines I will focus notably on some principles of the EU Legislation which in my opinion have been violated in this case.

It is self evident that these three Regulations have been adopted under the joint responsibility of the European Parliament and of the Council [3]following the so called “ordinary procedure” (art.294 TFEU) and are therefore EU “legislative acts” (art.289 TFEU). However it is worth recalling that since Lisbon art.15.2 TFEU has established the obligation of  legislative transparency which covers not only the votes (as it was the case before Lisbon) but also debates and negotiating preparatory documents. Unsurprisingly the CJEU has declared in 2018 that “transparency is inherent to legislative procedure” as legislative transparency is the main expression of EU democratic nature. As such, the co-legislator obligation of proactively publishing legislative preparatory documents shall not depend from the aleatory condition that citizens may submit a request for access to these documents. Proactive publication of legislative preparatory documents paves also the way for citizens’ timely participation to the EU decision making process as granted by art.10.3  11 of the TEU.

Building on the CJEU jurisprudence on Safe Countries ..

Furthermore in the case of the EU legislation defining the “safe countries” the general obligation of legislative transparency foreseen by art.15.2 TFEU has already been strengthened by the CJEU jurisprudence. According to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Alace and Canpelli (in joined cases C-758/24, paragraphs 86–87, and C-759/24), “ the information justifying the designation of a third country as ‘safe’ – and on which a legal presumption may be based – must be precise and accessible not only to the public but, in particular, to the person seeking asylum or being refused entry; and, above all, it must be verifiable by any court called upon to rule on the matter[4](emphasis added). This jurisprudence was referring to national legislation dealing with “safe countries” and in my opinion is transferrable also to EU legislation. Moreover Article 61 of the same ‘Procedures’ Regulation, provides for the use of ‘relevant and available’ sources in order to verify whether a country can be defined as safe.  In other words, the designation of a country as ‘safe’ cannot be the result of mere political discretion, as it affects the exercise of a fundamental right (the right to political asylum) and because it may limit the prohibition on expulsion laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Unfortunately, it is by no means clear from the text and the preparatory work on the European legislation concerning safe countries what information the legislator relied on in designating several third Countries as ‘safe’. This is notably the case of Regulation (EU) 2024/0464, which, despite affecting the exercise of fundamental rights, did not undergo an impact assessment, as required by the 2016 ‘Better Law-Making’ Interinstitutional Agreement. Instead it merely refers to information gathered by the European Asylum Agency (EUAA) which may be considered the real impact assesment in this case. As such, following the 2018 “ClientHeart” jurisprudence on the accessibility of legislative impact assessment  it should had been, at least partially disclosed.  No way: when in 2024 I submitted to the EUAA a request of access to that information I received a negative answer for procedural reasons. Then I challenged the refusal of disclosure before the General Court (case T-661/25).[5] On my side the history could had be ended here awaiting for the General Court Ruling but something, unexpected, happened and may now re-open the issue of legislative transparency of that EU legislation on Safe Countries even before the CJEU.

India is a “safe Country” ? No according to the association “Sikhs for Justice”

It is worth noting that the EU has declared, that INDIA is a “safe” Country  for all its territory and for all the categories of people living there notwithstanding Article 63 of the ‘Procedures’ Regulation would had permitted to exclude parts of the territory or specific categories of persons. The latter approach has been adopted, for example, by the legislation of the Netherlands, which states: “The designation of this country as a safe country of origin does not apply to: • people originating from the ‘union territory’ of Jammu and Kashmir; • religious minorities who have experienced problems because of belonging to that religious minority; • Dalit women and girls; • journalists; • persons who have been critical of the Indian government and government policy, and have experienced problems as a result (for example, human rights activists, academics and demonstrators).” ([6] )

However these reservations, which, if mirrored at EU level would allowed for greater protection of certain categories of people and citizens of certain Indian states, can no longer be invoked because the new EU-level general declaration ([7]) declaring India as safe takes precedence over national declarations. However, a number of questions may arise, such as: which of the two declarations more accurately reflects the reality on the ground in India? On what facts was the Netherlands’ decision based, and on what other elements the European legislator has decided that certain safeguards intended for specific categories of people and specific regions of India can no longer be invoked?

This may explain why a representative of the Sikhs for Justice association has recently submitted a request of access to documents to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union.

Both the EP and the Council have, at least as a first reaction, refused to disclose the EUAA information.

How EU legislative transparency may be granted by invoking “classified” information?

On one side it has been evoked the risk for EU external relations even though what is at stake is the autonomy of EU “internal” legislation and not international negotiations.

On the other side both the institutions have declared that the Asylum Agency has ‘classified’ these information as ‘RESTREINT’ and that the EP and the Council have retained that classification.

This is quite disturbing because first the only institutions which may “classify” EU information according to art.9 of Regulation 1049/01 are at very large extent the Commission, the EP and the Council which were the only institutions covered by art.255 TCE on which Regulation 1049/01 was founded. Moreover it emerges very clearly from the legislative preparatory work of Regulation 1049/01 that art.9 was as an exceptional regime for information covering only EU and MS defence policies ([8]) and clearly not information dealing with a Country general condition of “safety” as in the this case.

It is at least unfortunate that the this EUAA ‘classification’ has been  subsequently endorsed by the Commission when the legislative proposal and, later, by the Parliament and the Council in their capacity as legislators. However even if endorsed by the EP and the Council this choice  appears open to criticism, at the very least, in terms of both form and content. It is open to criticism in terms of form, insofar as the ‘RESTREINT’ level is not provided for in Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/01, the only European legislation dealing with ‘sensitive information’ that may be shared only with authorised persons (‘need to know’). But it is open to criticism above all on the merits, as two scenarios could be envisaged:

  1.  either this information proves that India is a safe country, in which case it is difficult to see what negative consequences a possible disclosure might have,
  2. or, conversely, it proves the opposite, in which case its ‘classification’ would violate European law on two counts.

Indeed, by declaring a country to be safe, despite independent information to the contrary, the European legislator would be exercising its remit in an arbitrary manner (which should instead be based on independent and objective information, precisely because it affects the exercise of a fundamental right such as the right to asylum and compliance with the prohibition on refoulement, as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights).

Above all, however, the ‘classification’ of the information used to justify the concept of a ‘safe country’ meant that its contents could not be debated publicly during the legislative negotiations, particularly in the European Parliament which denounced this situation in its resolution on access to documents.[9]  

Conclusion

Invoking classified information to justify the non disclosure of legislative preparatory documents seems to me a clear breach of the principle of legislative transparency laid down in Article 15(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and risks, unfortunately, of bringing the European legislator closer to that of North Korea[10] .

The procedure for access to documents, initiated by the Sikhs for Justice Association, is still ongoing, so it is not yet clear whether the European Court will be called upon to settle the matter, but in the meantime, the Sikhs for Justice association has taken steps to limit the damage caused by the new European regulations, including through ‘participatory’ channels, by publishing an open letter and by submitting a petition to the European Parliament calling for the suspension and amendment of India’s designation as a ‘safe country’ (as foreseen by Article 63 of the ‘Procedures’ Regulation)

It now remains to be seen whether the legality of designating India as a ‘safe’ country will be reviewed through the courts or following a legislative review process. Whatever the future of the European legislation may be, it is certainly commendable and noteworthy that representatives of civil society, such as the organisation Sikhs for Justice, are fighting so resolutely not only for the respect of their own fundamental rights, but also for better quality legislation and European democracy, in accordance with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of minorities, solidarity and non-discrimination, upon which the European Union is founded.

[1] Article 41(1)(e) and Article 3(a) concerning accelerated procedures

[2] see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600464

[3]  As required by see art 14 and 16 TEU.

[4] SEE: “(86 ) However, the effectiveness of judicial review regarding compliance with the substantive conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 2013/32 presupposes that the court before which the case is brought has access to the sources of information on the basis of which the competent national authority designated the third country in question as a safe country of origin. That requirement of effectiveness also implies that the court in question must be able to verify whether that designation complies with the substantive conditions set out in Annex I to that directive, taking into account any other information it may have gathered itself, whether from public sources or from sources which it has requested one of the parties to the proceedings before it to produce, provided that, on the one hand, the reliability of that information has been established and, on the other hand, in accordance with the principle of the right to be heard, those parties have the opportunity to submit their observations on that information. (87 ) It follows that Member States are required, under Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, to adapt their national law in such a way as to ensure sufficient and adequate access to the sources of information on which they have relied in designating safe countries of origin. Such access must enable an applicant for international protection originating from such a country, and the national court hearing an appeal against a decision concerning the application for international protection, to familiarise themselves effectively with those sources of information in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 78 of this judgment.”

[5] Even though the main issue at stake in this case is the fact that I have submitted my confirmatory application with two days delay that EUAA has considered mandatory and I consider only of ordinatory nature.  

[6] See Council document WK 8158/2025, pp. 23–24

[7]  According to Regulation (EU) “With regard to India, according to information from the Asylum Agency, nine Member States currently designate it as a safe country of origin at national level, and in 2024 the recognition rate at Union level for applicants from that country was 2 per cent. The country has ratified the main international human rights instruments. India is a constitutional republic with a parliamentary democracy. There is no evidence of expulsion, removal or extradition of Indian nationals to countries where they would be at risk of being subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment. In general, there is no real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347. Although India retains the death penalty in its criminal law and has not signed the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which aims to abolish the death penalty, in practice the death penalty has not been carried out since 2020. India has signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. There are no armed conflicts in India and, consequently, there are no threats arising from indiscriminate violence in situations of internal or international armed conflict. In general, there is no persecution in the country within the meaning of Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347.”

[8] Following the adoption of art.9 the European parliament accepted to withdraw a Court Case dealing with an agreement between the Council and NATO (so called “Solana agreement”)

[9] “..calls, in particular, on the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to grant the European Parliament timely access to its documents, in particular information and analysis on safe countries of origin and safe non-EU countries..” Par 16 of  European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2026 on public access to documents – report covering the years 2022 – 2024 (2025/2137(INI)) (C/2026/4005)

[10] As stated in plenary by Graham Watson, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, on May 2nd,2000 when voting on the Access to documents last compromise.

Hungarians have chosen Europe: time has come also for Europe to choose its citizens? 

by Emilio De Capitani and Virgilio Dastoli

(*) Original Italian soon to be published on “Libertà e Giustizia” Blog

 Viktor Orbán’s defeat was far more than a mere change of government: it was clear evidence of democratic resilience in the face of a populist policy that, for more than fifteen years, had seemed to have taken root in that country. A self-proclaimed example of ‘illiberal democracy’, this policy was founded on anti-elite, anti-migrant and anti-EU, rhetoric and was promoted daily by regime-controlled media, relying on both explicit and covert support from the MAGA majority in the United States and the Russian autocracy.

Needless to say, many of us were wondering whether European citizens – and not just Hungarians – were still capable of resisting the pressure of simplistic rhetoric, demagogic election promises and of misleading campaigns relayed by ‘social media’ platforms (more or less manipulated).

The Hungarian vote and, with due proportion, the recent vote in the Italian referendum on the justice reform, have instead confirmed that the manoeuvres and lies of populists can be defeated, that European values of solidarity still mobilise citizens despite the misrepresentations of their  governments. Thus, an alliance with authoritarian leaders may also become an electoral liability, and even European sanctions can be effective without penalising citizens (since the latter should not be punished for the faults of their rulers…).

Ultimately, the Hungarian citizens’ vote was not only a clear condemnation of Orbán’s corrupted administration but also a clear civic endorsement of those values of transparency and democracy that the new government too will have to promote (and not merely, as a means to an end, to recover European funds frozen due to the violation of European rule-of-law principles).

From this perspective, the Hungarian vote was also a strong call from European citizens who expect the European institutions to be consistent with the values and missions set out in the Treaties and the Charter.

Hungarian citizens have chosen Europe; it is now time for Europe to choose its own citizens by reorienting its policies and, above all, by overcoming the numerous ambiguities that still characterise its governance and its internal and external policies.

From this point of view, beyond rhetorical statements, unfortunately, much remains to be done because most of these ambiguities stem from the fact that at European Union level, despite the Treaty of Lisbon, citizens are not yet at the heart of the Union’s construction. Moreover, the EU still lacks the system of checks and balances which, in the Member States, aims to prevent possible abuses by this or that institution. Thus, despite the provision stating that ‘the functioning of the Union shall be based on representative democracy’ (Article 10(1) TEU), the Union continues to operate according to intergovernmental logic, prioritising the needs of administrations over those of its citizens.

It should therefore come as no surprise that national logic and priorities push supranational interests into the background, even when the Treaty itself with art. 7 TEU confers to European Council and to the Council  the responsibility of safeguarding  the proper functioning of the Union. The case of the surveillance procedure against Hungary under Article 7(1) of the Treaty is the clearest evidence of this failure.. It is, in fact, worth recalling that the monitoring procedure of Hungary was formally initiated by the European Parliament as early as 2018. Since then, however, despite dozens of formal meetings at Council level (with Parliament unduly kept out of the loop) over eight years, the governments of the Member States have not even been able to formulate ‘recommendations’ to urge Hungary to respect the values it had committed to upon accession. Worse still, in the second half of 2024, those same governments had no qualms about handing the helm of the ship – that is, the EU Presidency – to a Country still under a formal monitoring procedure for attempted violation of the values of the European Union, and this despite the European Parliament’s repeated and well-founded complaints!

Admittedly, measures had been taken to freeze funds for Hungary, but this was not the outcome of the intergovernmental procedure under Article 7, but rather of the Commission’s successful cases against Hungary before the Court of Justice and of the (troubled) implementation of a European Union regulation that makes the use of European funds conditional upon respect for fundamental rights (which have clearly been violated by that country on several occasions).

Point is that still today the Article 7.1 monitoring procedure against Hungary due to the risk of violation of the Union’s founding values is still pending and is due to be discussed next may at a meeting that the Cypriot Presidency had scheduled before the Hungarian elections.

We may be mistaken, but it is more than likely that, on that occasion  the procedure will be closed given the fact that, in the meantime,  the new Hungarian Prime Minister has already announced that He will bring the country back into line with European norms.

The precedent of Poland when the same Article 7 procedure was hastily closed for the same reasons will be cited and the “incident” will be closed. In the name of the so called ‘paix des ménages’, the European Parliament’s repeated complaints will thus be shelved, but, above all, a frank clarification will be avoided with those governments which still support the ‘Orbán’ line (such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Italy itself).

Last but not least, this opportunity will be missed to overhaul an intergovernmental monitoring procedure which, over the years, has proved not only useless and inconclusive as regards the proper functioning of the Union, but also as regards the protection of the rights of Hungarian citizens as EU citizens.

This would confirm that, unfortunately, the European Union, despite having transformed itself into a political entity under the Treaty of Lisbon, continues to underestimate the rights of its own citizens, even though the Court had already, as far back as 1963, considered them as formal  ‘subjects’ of the European legal order at the same level of the Member States themselves (see the Van Gend en Loos judgment, C-26/62).

Inevitably, by retaining its original intergovernmental inspiration and by failing to establish adequate checks and balances, the Union continues, in effect, to encourage the emergence and proliferation of ‘troublemakers’ within its own ranks.

It is perfectly understandable that governments may pursue their own national priorities even when operating within a supranational framework, but in doing so they, de facto, prevent the emergence of a genuine supranational ‘governance’ of EU policies. Furthermore they threaten  the implementation of the principle of solidarity when designing and implementing “common” policies such as migration or energy, for which, as the Court of Justice itself has recognised, solidarity is not a rethorical word but a binding legal principle.

Unfortunately, as things still stand, the overwhelming power of intergovernmental pressures finds no democratic counterweight in the European Parliament, since even there political forces with a genuinely supranational vision struggle to take shape. Here too, MEPs elected on the basis of electoral lists drawn up by hundreds of national parties and small parties are often more responsive to the demands of individual constituencies than to the needs of European citizens as a whole.

The reorganisation and rebalancing of powers at Union level is still in a transitional phase, and it should therefore come as no surprise that, given the persistent weakness of the system of checks and balances at Union level, the current deviations may arise.

In this context, the notion of sincere cooperation between Member States and institutions (Article 4 TEU) and between institutions (Article 13 TEU) becomes a fundamental issue.

Just a few days ago, CONTEXTE published an interview with European Council President Antonio Costa, in which he accused Orban of having broken his word and brazenly violated the obligation of ‘loyal cooperation’ with the other members of the European Council; yet Costa himself admitted that he did not know how to react and had sought clarification from the Council’s legal service.

The fact is that even the Treaty of Lisbon continues to be based on the principle of mutual trust and on an ‘angelic’ vision whereby it is assumed that Member States are ‘todos caballeros’. At most, it was thought, that the so-called “mutual scrutiny” (the so-called “peer evaluation”) would suffice, both at the level of governments (see Article 7 of the Treaty) and of administrations (see the case of agency management bodies or the procedures for defining and scrutinising delegated acts and implementing measures).

Nothing could be more naive: mutual monitoring does not prevent abuses; on the contrary, it encourages the code of silence whereby “I won’t denounce you if you don’t denounces me”. Thus, even the Member States’ power to bring another country before the Court in the event of a breach of Union law (Article 259 TFEU) has remained virtually a dead letter.

Orban, Kaczynski, Jansa, Babis (though one could add other heads of government who are simply more adept at concealing their Euroscepticism…) have amply demonstrated that Member States are by no means ‘todos caballeros’ and that it is all too easy for some to throw a spanner in the works and block the progress of European integration (perhaps even thanks to strong pressure from Washington, Moscow or Beijing…) .

The Hungarian and Italian citizens who voted in the recent referendum have sounded the alarm for European leaders and the MEPs in Strasbourg themselves.

We must repair the leaks in the European ship as soon as possible and steer it clear of the shoals of its ambiguities – and this, if possible, before the next elections in 2029.

Of course, it is unthinkable to achieve this in the next three years through a radical Treaties’s  Reform, but one could attempt to correct the most glaring inconsistencies through ‘adjustments’ to the functioning of the Union within the framework of the forthcoming accession treaties, which are planned to be concluded before the end of this parliamentary term. It is no coincidence that these negotiations will take place by taking in account measures which shall prevent the risk of ‘Hungarian-style’ deviations by candidate countries.

The Commission itself has already floated the questionable idea of a ‘gradual’ accession for candidate countries, thereby paving the way for some member states to be treated as more ‘equal’ than others. The issue is, however, now on the table, and Ursula von der Leyen will once again have to propose to the European Council, as soon as possible, possible corrective measures for the functioning of an EU with 30 or more members.

The scope of Treaties’ adjustments is open to debate, but Article 49 of the EU Treaty concerning accession treaties could allow for ‘adjustments’ that go beyond simply lengthening the table and adding a few chairs.

Pending more ambitious reforms, these “adjustments” could facilitate at least an “evolutionary” application of the existing Treaties and the Charter.

By way of example, these “adjustments” may concern:

– a more stringent formulation of the principles of loyal cooperation and solidarity between Member States and between institutions. These principles are already enshrined in Articles 4, 13 and 42 of the TEU and Article 80 of the TFEU, and the Court has ruled that Institutional balance shall be respected and that when the Treaty refers to ‘principles’ and not merely to ‘values’, the former must take on legally binding forms and not be limited to vague declarations. From this perspective, notably the role of the European Parliament, the only institution directly elected by the EU Citizens shall be strengthened. It is disheartening, to say the least, to see that the European Parliament has recently had to turn to the Court of Justice to defend its role following the Council’s adoption of ‘SAFE’ funding for European defence industrial policy (Case C-560/25) or against the Commission, which undermined its role as co-legislator by withdrawing, without justification, legislative proposals it was negotiating with the Council (Case C-727/25);

– the strengthening of the protection of fundamental rights, which is currently pursued in a fragmented and haphazard manner by the European institutions. Thus a possible step forward may be transforming the Vienna Agency into a genuine European Authority based on the Treaty. The European Authority, on a par with national authorities and in a manner more independent of the Commission, shall assists those invoking the protection of a fundamental right recognised by the European Charter. In the same vein, a form of European ‘EURO-Amparo’ should be promoted by amending Article 267 of the TFEU, revising the so-called ‘Plaumann’ case law and allowing, if not individuals, then at least civil society organisations to bring cases directly before the Court of Justice. This should be done not only in the interest of the EU Citizens but also for the credibility of the implementation of the rule of law in the EU (art.19 TEU and art.47 of the Charter). As a matter of fact the Plauman doctrine does not adequately adress the problem of national courts which overlook the protection of fundamental rights by lack of will, means or independence (think to the situation of certain Hungarian or Polish judges…) nor it make easier for the EU Citizens to challenge EU Union institutions, agencies and bodies violations of the Traties and of the Charter (think of how many years it took before Frontex’s shared responsibility in the Union’s pushback policies was recognised);

– the strengthening of the main institution of democratic systems, namely the ..electorate (c. Valerio Onida). It is simply inexplicable to European citizens that, for fifty years, since the 1976 agreement, ahead of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, a genuine European electoral law has still not been adopted, and this is due to the disagreement between the Council and the Parliament. How can we hope for a supranational political vision to take shape when over 200 national political parties have contributed to the drawing up of electoral lists for 2024, whilst European parties and foundations (Article 21 TEU) are still little more than amoebas? How can we call for dialogue with civil society (Article 11 TEU) when the very same governments that promote the so-called 28th supranational regime for commercial companies oppose the creation of a similar supranational regime for civil society organisations seeking to contribute to European integration?

– the imposition of effective legislative transparency, particularly during the decisive phase of negotiations between institutions (so-called ‘trilogues’), which the Parliament and the Council persist in keeping confidential despite the provisions of Article 15(2) of the Treaty. Administrative transparency must also be imposed not only at the level of the Union’s institutions, agencies and bodies, but also on the Member States themselves in all policies where they operate within the framework of an integrated administration (composite administration). Thinking about the Hungarian vote against a corrupted Government, it would be sensible to address similar risks at EU level. Again Member States have until now prevented the European Parliament from exercising an effective right of enquiry, have imposed a powerless Statute for the European Ombudsman and limited to simple not binding recommendation the powers of the Court of Auditors. Hungarian citizens have fought for this at national level, and it is frustrating, to say the least, to find that the European Union is not addressing this at EU level as it ought to and could, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter and Article 298 of the TFEU.

– overcoming the now artificial distinctions in certain policies, such as that between internal and external security policies, and transforming the Union into a true  area of freedom, security and justice as provided for in Article 3 of the Treaty. In this context, it is necessary, in particular, to revitalise policies promoting mobility, dignity and ‘human’ security, which have been effectively entrusted solely to the ministers of the interior. From this perspective, the Union’s approach to migration policies has been one of the EU’s most rightly criticised policies. Whilst, on the one hand, the EU has been able to ‘manage’ the movement of over four million Ukrainians across EU territory for several years in a dignified, coordinated manner (and without major security issues), on the other hand, with the infamous ‘Migration and Asylum Pact’ the EU has established, for one and a half million of so-called ‘irregular’ migrants, a system amounting to a veritable ‘outsourcing’ of the right to asylum, if not outright forms of expulsion (disguised as ‘returns’), in violation of Article 19 of the Charter. Now, the very existence of two different regimes regarding the same mobility needs of third-country nationals shows that the EU is blatantly violating the principle of equal treatment and lacking a coherent and humane governance of the mobility of persons at EU level, and this is in breach of the provisions of the Charter and of Title V of the TFEU;

– Promoting economic development and creating a genuine borderless market, whilst fostering synergies between complementary policies such as energy and the environment (though here it would suffice to take account of Draghi and Letta’s ‘white papers’);

– Last but not least, claiming to implement interventionist policies without adequate financial backing is a pure deception of citizens. From this perspective, the first step should be to recognise the European Parliament’s role as a budgetary authority, including when defining the multiannual financial framework, and aligning it (with the necessary adjustments) with the duration of parliamentary terms. Suffice it to say that the current procedure will cover the entire next parliamentary term (2029–2034), thereby excluding the European Parliament that will emerge from the 2029 elections (a further institutional ‘snatch’ by EU governments at the expense of the EP).

These are just a few points for reflection, and many others could be developed, taking into account the recent report adopted by the European Parliament regarding adjustments to the Treaties in view of enlargement (the Gozi report).

In the author’s view, even these simple ‘adjustments’ to the founding Treaties would make it possible to overcome certain inconsistencies and make European integration more credible by bringing it closer to European citizens, and not just those in Budapest.

The results of the Italian referendum on justice and these Hungarian elections confirm citizens’ attachment to the European project and perhaps show that the tide of populism is turning, but let us not harbour too many illusions. Next year there will be elections in France, Spain and Italy, where anti-European forces still seem to be on the rise (and the same can be said of Germany itself, where Chancellor Merz does not know how to stem the rise of the AfD…).

In short, let us enjoy this Hungarian vote, but let us not forget that we are still in rough waters, that the European ship is in urgent need of repairs, and that we must… get to work.

Speaking of another EU’s “Magritte-like” international Agreement …(The EU-US “Joint Statement” on Trade negotiated in Turnberry ) 

(Reuters Photo)

by Emilio De Capitani

The European Parliament’s recent stance on freezing the implementation of the EU-US trade agreement until the threats of new US tariffs against eight EU countries that have sided with Greenland are withdrawn has caused quite a stir. The position of the Strasbourg assembly certainly contributed, along with other factors, to President Trump’s surprising about-turn on this issue during his speech at the Davos Conference.There is now talk of a resumption of parliamentary work, and the press is referring inappropriately to the “ratification” of the agreement concluded on 21 August 2025 by Commission President Von Der Leyen and President Trump. I say “inappropriately” because the aforementioned “Framework Agreement”, like Magritte’s famous surreal painting, is not a real “agreement” within the meaning of the Treaty on European Union. If it were, it would have had to be negotiated in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: the Commission would have had to obtain a formal mandate from the Council, the Parliament would have had to be promptly and fully informed (Article 218(10) TFEU) and, above all, it would have had to approve its contents before its conclusion.

None of this happened, and the so-called “framework agreement” is nothing more than a statement signed by the President of the Commission on behalf of the Union, without the involvement of the Council and Parliament. It is likely that von der Leyen therefore acted only after informal consultation with Council members such as Germany, but she certainly did not inform the European Parliament, which, although not involved in defining its content, should now not so much “ratify” the Agreement as adopt the European legislation implementing it.


On other occasions, President Von Der Leyen has already accustomed us to her casual interpretation of the Treaties, in particular by making use and abuse of Article 122 of the Treaty, which excludes the European Parliament from fundamental decisions such as those concerning industrial defence policy. That said, one would have expected at least a minimum of respect for the institutional balance in a policy such as trade, which falls within the exclusive competence of the Union.
But that is how it is. As long as the European Parliament avoids defending its institutional prerogatives by challenging, as it should have done, an “agreement” that is not really an agreement but ties its hands, this drift is likely to widen and worsen.
To what extent, then, can Parliament now at least influence the implementation of the so-called “Framework Agreement”?  The answer is simple: by conscientiously performing its role as co-legislator, in particular by appropriately amending the draft Regulation currently under consideration by the Parliamentary Committee on International Trade (INTA) on the adjustment of customs duties on imports of certain goods originating in the United States of America and the opening of quotas (2025/0261(COD)). (see below the link to the recent EP press release on this issue) 
The rapporteur is German socialist Bernd Lange. In his draft report, he has proposed several amendments that substantially modify the Commission’s original proposal and has meticulously clarified the content and conditions of application of the duties and quotas, as well as the possible safeguard and suspension measures. Above all, he has provided for the measures to monitor implementation to be adopted by the Commission by delegation and not as simple executive measures on which Parliament would not be able to intervene, if necessary.

We will now wait to see the reactions of the right and the EPP to see if they confirm this role for Parliament in the implementation phase of this policy, but in the meantime, the other co-legislator, the Council, has also defined its position. This is, of course, much less ambitious than that of the Parliamentary rapporteur; indeed, the Member States agree with the Commission in recognising a subordinate role for the EP, while taking care to ensure that their “experts” have step-by-step control over the implementation of the Regulation.


It is therefore easy to predict that, once the EP’s position has been voted on, there will be rather intense negotiations between the two institutions in the following weeks through the so-called “trilogue”, which will take place behind closed doors as usual.
It is equally obvious that the Commission will do everything in its power to avoid being controlled by the EP and that, above all, the US administration will try to influence the text of the future regulation in its favour. À suivre…

EP PRESS RELEASE :  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/it/press-room/20260204IPR33305/eu-us-trade-legislation-meps-to-resume-work-on-turnberry-proposals

Why the European Parliament should reject (or substantially amend)  the  Commission’s proposal on EU Information Security (“INFOSEC”). (1) The issue of “classified information”

By Emilio De Capitani

1.Setting the scene of EU legal framework on access to documents and to confidential information before the Lisbon Treaty

To better understand why the Commission “INFOSEC” draft legislative proposal (2022/0084(COD) on information security shall be substantially amended, let’s recall what was before the Lisbon Treaty and of the Charter, the EU legal framework on access to documents, and notably of EU classified information. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on May 1999 the EP and the Council have been under the obligation (art.255 TCE) of adopting in two years time new EU rules framing the individual  right of access to documents by establishing at the same time “the general principles and limits of public interests” which may limit such right of access.(emphasis added).

Notwithstanding a rather prudent Commission’s legislative proposal the EP strongly advocated a stronger legal framework for access to documents, for legislative transparency and even for the treatment at EU level of information which, because of their content, should be treated confidentially (so called ,“sensitive” or “classified information”). 

Needless to say  “Sensitive” or “classified information” at Member States level, are deemed to protect “essential interests”  of the State and, by law, are subject to a special parliamentary and judicial oversight regime.[1] As a consequence, at EU level, even after Lisbon, national classified information are considered an essential aspect of national security which “.. remains the sole responsibility of each Member State” (art. 4.2 TEU) and “..no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;”(art 346.1(a)TFEU.

However, if national classified information is shared at EU level as it is the case for EU internal or external security policies it shall be treated as for any other EU policy by complying with EU rules. Point is on what legal basis these rules should be founded. This issue came to the fore already in 2000 when the newly appointed Council Secretary General Xavier SOLANA negotiated with NATO a first interim agreement on the exchange of classified information. The agreement which mirrored at EU level the NATO Classification standards (“Confidential”, “Secret” and “Top Secret”) was founded  on the Council internal organizational power  but this “administrative” approach was immediately challenged before the Court of Justice by the a Member State (NL) [2]and by the European Parliament itself [3] which considered that the correct legal basis should had been the new legislation on access to documents foreseen by art 255 of TEC which was at the time under negotiation.  The Council, at last, acknowledged that art.255 TEC on access to documents was right legal basis and a specific article (art.9[4]) was inserted in in Regulation 1049/01 implementing art.255 TEC and the EP and NL withdrew their applications before the CJEU[5].

Point is that Art.9 of Regulation 1049/01 still covers only the possible access by EU citizens and such access may be vetoed by the “originator” of the classified information. Unlike national legislation on classified information art.9 didn’t solved, unfortunately, for the lack of time, the issue of the democratic and judicial control by the European Parliament and by the Court of Justice to the EUCI. Art.9(7) of Regulation 1049/01 makes only a generic reference to the fact that “The Commission and the Council shall inform the European Parliament regarding sensitive documents in accordance with arrangements agreed between the institutions.” A transitional and partial solution has then been founded by negotiating Interinstitutional Agreements between the Council and the EP in 2002 [6]and in 2014 [7]and between the European Commission[8] in 2010.

Point is that interinstitutional agreements even if they may be binding (art.295 TFEU) they can only “facilitate” the implementation of EU law which, as described above,  in the case of democratic and judicial control of classified information still does not exists. Not surprisingly, both the Council and the Commission Interinstitutional agreements consider that the “originator” principle should also be binding for the other EU institutions such as the European Parliament  and the Court of Justice.

This situation is clearly unacceptable in an EU deemed to be democratic and bound by the rule of law as it create zones where not only the EU Citizens but also their Representatives may have no access because of “originator’s” veto. As result, in these situations the EU is no more governed by the rule of law but only by the “goodwill” of the former.

To make things even worse the Council established practice is to negotiate with third Countries and international organizations agreements [9]covering the exchange of confidential information by declaring that the other EU Institutions (such as the EP and the Court of Justice)  should be considered “third parties” subject then to the “originator” principle.

Such situation has become kafkianesque with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty which recognize now at primary law level the EP right to be “fully and timely” informed also on classified information exchanged during the negotiation of an international agreement[10]. Inexplicabily , fourtheen years since the entry into force of the Traty the European Parliament has not yet challenged before the Court of Justice these clearly unlawful agreements.

That Institutional problem kept apart, fact remains that until the presentation of the draft INFOSEC proposal none challenged the idea that in the EU the correct legal basis supporting the treatment also of classified information should be the same of access to documents which after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty is now art.15.3 of the TFEU[11].

2 Why the Commission choice of art 298 TFEU as the legal basis for the INFOSEC proposal is highly questionable [12]

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and of the Charter the relation between the fundamental right of access to documents and the corresponding obligation of the EU administration of granting administrative transparency and disclose or not its information/documents has now been strengthened also because of art.52 of the EU Charter.

In an EU bound by the rule of law and by democratic principles,  openness and the fundamental right of access should be the general rule and  “limits” to such rights should be an exception  framed only “by law”. As described above the correct legal basis for such “law” is art.15 of the TFEU which, as the former art.255 TEC, states that  “General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest..” may limit the right of access and the obligation of disclosing EU internal information / documents. Also from a systemic point of view  “limits” to disclosure and to access are now covered by the same Treaty article which frames (in much stronger words than art 255 before Lisbon) the principles of “good governance”(par 1), of legislative transparency  (par 2) and of administrative transparency (par 3).

Such general “Transparency” rule is worded as following:    “1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.(..) Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph.”

Bizarrely, the European Commission has chosen for the INFOSEC regulation art.298 TFEU on an open, independent and efficient EU administration by simply ignoring art.15 TFEU and by making an ambiguous reference to the fact that INFOSEC should be implemented “without prejudice” of the pre-Lisbon Regulation 1049/01 dealing with access to documents and administrative transparency.  How a “prejudice” may not exist when both Regulations are overlapping and INFOSEC Regulation is upgrading the Council Internal Security rules at legislative level is a challenging question.

It is indeed  self evident that both the INFOSEC Regulation and Regulation 1049/01 deal with the authorized/unauthorised “disclosure” of EU internal information/documents.

Such overlapping of the two Regulations is even more striking for the treatment  EU Classified information (EUCI) as these information are covered both by art. 9 of Regulation 1049/01 and now  by articles 18 to 58 and annexes II to VI of the INFOSEC Regulation.

As described above, Art 255 TCE has since Lisbon been replaced and strengthened by art 15 TFEU so that the Commission proposal of replacing it with art.298 TFEU looks like a “detournement de procedure” which may be challenged before the Court for almost the same reasons already raised in 2000 by the EP and by NL.  It would then been sensible to relaunch the negotiations on the revision of Regulation 1049 in the new post-Lisbon perspective but the Commission has decided this year to withdraw the relevant legislative procedure. Submitting a legislative proposal such INFOSEC promoting overall confidentiality and withdrawing at the same time a legislative proposal promoting transparency seems a rather Commission’s strong message to the public.

3 Does the INFOSEC proposal grant a true security for EU internal information?

Point is that European administrative transparency is now a fundamental right of the individual enshrined in the Charter (Article 42).The protection of administrative data is one of the aspects of the “duty” of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter which stipulates that every person has the right of access to their file, “with due regard for the legitimate interests of confidentiality and professional and business secrecy.”  

However Art.298 TFEU is not the legal basis framing professional secrecy. It is only a provision on the functioning of the institutions and bodies which, “in carrying out their tasks … [must be based] on an “open” European administration”[13] and is not an article intended to ensure the protection of administrative documents.

This objective is better served by other legal basis of the Treaties.

First of all, protecting the archives of EU institutions and bodies from outside interference is, even before being a legitimate interest, an imperative condition laid down by the Treatiesand the related 1965 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Union adopted on the basis of the current Article 343 TFEU. Articles 1 and 2 of that Protocol stipulate that the premises and buildings of the Union, as well as its archives, “shall be inviolable.”

Furthermore, in order to ensure that, in the performance of their duties, officials are obliged to protect the documents of their institutions, Article 17 of the Staff Regulations stipulates that

1. Officials shall refrain from any unauthorized disclosure of information coming to their knowledge in the course of their duties, unless such information has already been made public or is accessible to the public.

Again, (as for Regulation 1049/01), the INFOSEC regulation  reinstate that it should be applied “without prejudice” of the Staff Regulation by so mirroring the second paragraph of art.298 TFEU which states that itself states that it should be implemented  “in accordance with the Staff Regulations and the rules adopted on the basis of Article 336.” So, also from this second perspective, the correct legal basis for INFOSEC could be the Article 339 (on professional secrecy) and 336 TFEU, with the consequent amendment of the Staff Regulations by means of a legislative regulation of the Parliament and the Council.

By proposing a legislative regulation on the basis of Article 298, the Commission therefore circumvents both the obligation imposed by Article  336, art 339 (on professional secrecy)  and, more importantly  of Article 15(3) TFEU, according to which each institution or body “..shall ensure (i.e., must ensure) the transparency of its proceedings [and therefore also their protection from external interference] and shall lay down in its rules of procedure specific provisions concerning access to its documents [and therefore also concerning their protection], in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph.”(NDR currently Regulation 1049/01)

The objectives set out in Article 298 cannot therefore override the requirements of protecting the fundamental right of access to documents, nor those of Article 15 TFEU which could be considered the “center of gravity”when several legal basis are competing [14].

The same applies to compliance with the regulation establishing the Statute and, in particular, compliance with Article 17 thereof, cited above.

Ultimately, the provisions on the legislative procedure for Union legislative acts are not at the disposal of the Commission, given that administrative transparency is a fundamental right and the protection of documents is a corollary thereof and not a means of functioning of the institutions. Administrative transparency is a fundamental right of every person; the protection of administrative data is a legitimate interest of every administration.

A ”public” interest that can certainly limit the right of access, but only under the conditions established by the legislator of art 15 TFEU and only by the latter.

4. Conclusions

If a recommendation may be made now to the co-legislators is to avoid illusionary shortcuts such as the current Commission proposal whose real impact on the EU administrative “bubble” is far to be clear[15] . The EU Legislator, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty more than fourteen years ago is faced to much more pressing problems.

What is mostly needed is not inventing several layers of illusionary “protection” of the EU information but framing the administrative procedures by law as suggested several times by the European Parliament and by the multiannual endeavor of brilliant scholars focusing on the EU Administrative law[16].

What matters is that the management and the access to EU information should be framed by law and not depend from the goodwill of the administrative author or the receiver as proposed by the INFOSEC Regulation. Nor information security is strengthened transforming each one of the 64 EU “entities” covered by the INFOSEC Regulation [17] in sand-boxes where the information is shared only with the people who, according to the “originator” has a “need to know” and not a “right to know”.

Moreover the EU should limit and not generalize the power for each one of the 64 EU entities of create “classified” information (EUCI). In this perspective art.9 of Regulation 1049/01 needs indeed a true revision but in view of the new EU Constitutional framework and of the new institutional balance arising from the Lisbon treaty and of the Charter.

Fourtheen years after Lisbon the democratic oversight of the European Parliament and the judicial control of the Court of Justice on classified documents , shall be granted by EU law as it is the case in most of the EU Countriesand not by interinstitutional agreements which maintain the “Originator” against these institutions in violation of the rule of law principle as well as of the EU institutional balance.

Could still be acceptable fourteen years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty that the European Parliament and the Court of justice are not taken in account in the dozens of international agreements by which the Council frame the exchange of EUCI with third countries and international organizations?

Instead of dealing with these fundamental issues the European Commission in its 67 pages proposal makes no reference to 24 years of experience in the treatment of classified information and prefer dragging the co-legislators in Kafkian debates dealing with “sensitive but not classified information”  or on the strange idea by which documents should marked “public” by purpose and not by their nature (by so crossing the line separating public transparency from public propaganda).

But all that been said, it is not the Commission which will be responsible before the Citizens (and the European Court) for badly drafted legislation. It will be the European Parliament and the Council which shall now take their responsibility. They can’t hide behind the Commission unwillingness to deal with substantive issues (as well as with other aspects of legislative and administrative transparency) ; if the Council also prefer maintain the things as they were before Lisbon it is up to the European Parliament to take the lead and establish a frank discussion with the other co-legislator and verify if there is the will of fixing the real growing shortcomings in the EU administrative “Bubble”.

Continuing with the negotiations on the current version of the INFOSEC proposal notably on the complex issue of classified information paves the way to even bigger problems which (better soon than later) risk to  be brought as in 2000 on the CJEU table.

[1] According to the Venice Commission “.. at International and national level access to classified documents is restricted by law to a particular group of persons. A formal security clearance is required to handle classified documents or access classified data. Such restrictions on the fundamental right of access to information are permissible only when disclosure will result in substantial harm to a protected interest and the resulting harm is greater than the public interest in disclosure.  Danger is that if authorities engage in human rights violations and declare those activities state secrets and thus avoid any judicial oversight and accountability. Giving bureaucrats new powers to classify even more information will have a chilling effect on freedom of information – the touchstone freedom for all other rights and democracy – and it may also hinder the strive towards transparent and democratic governance as foreseen since Lisbon by art.15.1 of TFEU (emphasis added) The basic fear is that secrecy bills will be abused by authorities and that they lead to wide classification of information which ought to be publicly accessible for the sake of democratic accountability.  Unreasonable secrecy is thus seen as acting against national security as “it shields incompetence and inaction, at a time that competence and action are both badly needed”. (…) Authorities must provide reasons for any refusal to provide access to information.  The ways the laws are crafted and applied must be in a manner that conforms to the strict requirements provided for in the restriction clauses of the freedom of information provisions in the ECHR and the ICCPR.” 

[2] Action brought on 9 October 2000 by the Kingdom of the Netherlands against the Council of the European Union (Case C-369/00) (2000/C 316/37)

[3] Action brought on 23 October 2000 by the European Parliament against the Council of the European Union (Case C-387/00) (2000/C 355/31) LINK chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:C2000/355/31

[4] Regulation 1049/01 Article 9”Treatment of sensitive documents

1. Sensitive documents are documents originating from the institutions or the agencies established by them, from Member States, third countries or International Organisations, classified as “TRÈS SECRET/TOP SECRET”, “SECRET” or “CONFIDENTIEL” in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned, which protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States in the areas covered by Article 4(1)(a), notably public security, defence and military matters.

2. Applications for access to sensitive documents under the procedures laid down in Articles 7 and 8 shall be handled only by those persons who have a right to acquaint themselves with those documents. These persons shall also, without prejudice to Article 11(2), assess which references to sensitive documents could be made in the public register.

3. Sensitive documents shall be recorded in the register or released only with the consent of the originator.

4. An institution which decides to refuse access to a sensitive document shall give the reasons for its decision in a manner which does not harm the interests protected in Article 4.

5. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that when handling applications for sensitive documents the principles in this Article and Article 4 are respected.

6. The rules of the institutions concerning sensitive documents shall be made public.

7. The Commission and the Council shall inform the European Parliament regarding sensitive documents in accordance with arrangements agreed between the institutions.

[5] Notice for the OJ.Removal from the register of Case C-387/001By order of 22 March 2002 the President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities ordered the removal from the register of Case C-387/00: European Parliament v Council of the European Union. OJ C 355 of 09.12.2000.

[6] Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy (OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 1).

[7] According to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 12 March 2014 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy (OJ C 95, 1.4.2014, pp. 1–7) “4.   The Council may grant the European Parliament access to classified information which originates in other Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, or in Member States, third States or international organisations only with the prior written consent of the originator.”

[8] According to annex III point 5 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, pp. 47–62) In the case of international agreements the conclusion of which requires Parliament’s consent, the Commission shall provide to Parliament during the negotiation process all relevant information that it also provides to the Council (or to the special committee appointed by the Council). This shall include draft amendments to adopted negotiating directives, draft negotiating texts, agreed articles, the agreed date for initialling the agreement and the text of the agreement to be initialled. The Commission shall also transmit to Parliament, as it does to the Council (or to the special committee appointed by the Council), any relevant documents received from third parties, subject to the originator’s consent. The Commission shall keep the responsible parliamentary committee informed about developments in the negotiations and, in particular, explain how Parliament’s views have been taken into account.”

[9] SEE : Agreements on the security of classified information Link : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/agreements-on-the-security-of-classified-information.html

[10] Article 218.10 TFUE states clearly that “The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” when the EU is negotiating international agreements even when the agreements “relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy,” (art.218.3 TFUE).

[11] Interestingly reference to art.15 of the TFEU is also made in the EP-Council 2014 Interinstitutional Agreement on access to classified information (not dealing with External Defence) See point 15 :  This Agreement is without prejudice to existing and future rules on access to documents adopted in accordance with Article 15(3) TFEU; rules on the protection of personal data adopted in accordance with Article 16(2) TFEU; rules on the European Parliament’s right of inquiry adopted in accordance with third paragraph of Article 226 TFEU; and relevant provisions relating to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

[12] However this legal basis was fit for another legislative proposal, of a more technical nature, which  has now become EU Regulation 2023/2841 layng  down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity for the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. This Regulation apply at EU administrative level the principles established for the EU Member States by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (2)  improving the cyber resilience and incident response capacities of public and private entities. It created an Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board ( IICB) and a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which operationalizes the standards defined by the IICB and interact with the other EU Agencies (such as the EU Agency dealing with informatic security, Enisa), the corresponding structures in the EU Member States and even the NATO structures. It may be too early to evaluate if the Regulation is fit for its purpose ([12]) but the general impression is that its new common and cooperative system of alert and mutual support between the EU Institutions, Agencies and bodies may comply with the letter and spirit of art.298 of the TFEU

[13] Quite bizarrely this “open” attribute is not cited in the INFOSEC proposal and, even more strangely, none of the EU institutions has until now consulted the EU Ombudsman and/or the Fundamental Rights Agency.

[14] See Case C-338/01 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union(Directive 2001/44/EC – Choice of legal basis)“The choice of the legal basis for a Community measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include in particular the aim and the content of the measure. If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of these is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component. By way of exception, if it is established that the measure simultaneously pursues several objectives which are inseparably linked without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, the measure must be founded on the corresponding legal bases…”

[15]  Suffice to cite the following legal disclaimer :”This Regulation is without prejudice to Regulation (Euratom) No 3/1958 17 , Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community 18 , Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council 19 , Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council 20 , Council Regulation (EEC, EURATOM) No 354/83 21 , Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council 22 , Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council 23 , Regulation (EU) [2023/2841] of the European Parliament and of the Council 24 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.

[16]  See ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure. ReNEUAL working groups have developed a set of model rules designed as a draft proposal for  binding legislation identifying – on the basis of comparative research – best practices in different specific policies of the EU, in order to reinforce general principles of EU law

https://www.reneual.eu/projects-and-publications/reneual-1-0

[17] The Council has listed not less than 64 EU entities (EU Institutions Agencies and Bodies – EUIBAs) in document WK8535/2023

Come ridurre il deficit democratico della politica di difesa europea ?

di Emilio DE CAPITANI *

(* Articolo già pubblicato sulla rivista EUROJUS – EDC già segretario della Commissione Libertà civili (LIBE) del Parlamento Europeo 1998-2011)

1. Verso un salto qualitativo sul piano finanziario e normativo della difesa europea

Da settimane si discute di strategie europee per rilanciare la politica di difesa europea. Facendo seguito a ripetute richieste del Consiglio Europeo la Commissione ha, infatti, recentemente presentato, nel quadro della strategia “Rearm Europe” ora trasfusa nel  “Libro bianco sulla Difesa Europea Readiness 2030”, una serie di proposte tanto finanziarie che legislative e operative che concorrono nel perseguimento dell’obbiettivo comune di rafforzare una politica industriale europea in materia di armamenti.

Per quanto riguarda la mobilitazione di risorse finanziarie lo strumento principale è stato il riconoscimento agli Stati membri della facoltà di attivare a livello nazionale, sull’arco di quattro anni, la clausola di salvaguardia del patto di stabilità e crescita aumentando sino all’1,5% la spesa pubblica nazionale per la difesa. In teoria tale misura potrebbe permettere di mobilitare sino a 650 miliardi di euro [1].

Altri 150 miliardi di euro potrebbero poi essere raccolti sui mercati finanziari attraverso la proposta di decisione del Consiglio che istituisce lo strumento di azione per la sicurezza dell’Europa mediante il rafforzamento dell’industria europea della difesa (SAFE)[2], ma come indicato nel seguito di questo articolo, lo strumento ha, giustamente,  già sollevato forti riserve in seno al Parlamento europeo[3].

Sempre in campo finanziario la Commissione ha inoltre previsto che in occasione del riesame intermedio della Strategia di Coesione 2021-27 gli Stati membri possano riallocare i finanziamenti non utilizzati riorientandoli su altre priorità e, in particolare, quelle collegate alla difesa[4].  A complemento di queste fonti la Commissione ha anche indicato la disponibilità della Banca Europea per gli Investimenti a finanziare anche spese per infrastrutture utilizzabili nel campo della difesa (dalle reti di satelliti agli interventi per la cybersicurezza). [5]

Sul piano normativo già la prima  Strategia Industriale (per la) Difesa Europea  (EDIS) del Marzo 2024 mirava non solo ad aumentare la spesa per la difesa, ma anche a favorire appalti congiunti di più paesi, garantire la prevedibilità degli investimenti per l’industria della difesa e rafforzare l’interoperabilità tra le forze armate europee, migliorando anche la cooperazione con le industrie della difesa dell’Ucraina.

In una prima fase, l’UE ha quindi adottato, seppure su base temporanea due misure legislative: la prima, il Regolamento ASAP[6], fondata sull’art.173 TFUE (politica industriale) riguardava la produzione di munizioni di artiglieria e di missili (i cd «prodotti per la difesa pertinenti») e la seconda, il Regolamento EDIRPA[7], fondato sull’art.114 (mercato interno) che promuoveva il coordinamento di appalti congiunti per la produzione di armamenti. Queste misure legislative sono state riprese, portate a regime ed estese dal progetto di regolamento che istituisce un Programma Europeo di Investimenti per la Difesa (EDIP) [8] , attualmente all’esame del Parlamento europeo[9].

2. Affrontare la sfida di una governance più democratica della politica di difesa UE

Tutte queste iniziative sono state precedute e accompagnate da diverse prese di posizione del Consiglio europeo [10]da risoluzioni, non vincolanti [11] del Parlamento Europeo[12] e da sempre più numerosi contributi tecnici di alto livello come i Rapporti Draghi e Letta, la relazione Niinsto e da contributi originali della società civile e di centri di ricerca come il Centro Bruegel che ha recentemente proposto  l’European Defence Mechanism (MED)[13] .

Elementi comuni a tutti questi documenti sono la valutazione della grave minaccia esterna cui sarebbe esposta l’Unione Europea, la valutazione delle esigenze sul piano militare e la necessità di mobilitare ingenti risorse finanziarie tanto pubbliche che private per coprire tali esigenze. Visto dall’esterno tutto questo attivismo sembra provare che l’Unione Europea “is flexing his muscles”, ma scarsi, se non nulli sono, purtroppo, i riferimenti alle riforme della governance che devono essere adottate per accompagnare la nuova fase della politica di difesa europea. In assenza di coraggiosi e coerenti correttivi politici e istituzionali si aggraverebbe infatti il deficit democratico che caratterizza fin dall’origine la politica di difesa europea.

Senza un credibile quadro di governance democratica sovranazionale sarebbero inevitabili le fughe in avanti e le tendenze centrifughe delle strategie di difesa nazionali che rischierebbero di perseguire obbiettivi politici diversi da paese a paese, di non rispettare gli standards di cui all’art.21 del TUE mettendo, in definitiva, a rischio la stessa coesione interna all’UE. Il caso Ungherese già prova che queste non sono ipotesi di scuola, ma se a seguito di finanziamenti nazionali il fenomeno si allargasse ad altri paesi membri non solo si tradirebbe lo spirito originario dell’Unione come progetto di pace tra i propri membri, ma anche la scelta originale di gestire in comune risorse essenziali come il carbone ed acciaio evitando così il risorgere all’interno dell’UE di spinte nazionaliste.

Una rinazionalizzazione delle politiche di difesa sarebbe tanto più paradossale nel momento in cui anche a livello dell’opinione pubblica sta emergendo una maggiore fiducia nell’Unione Europea come “security provider” e ciò anche grazie al successo ottenuto solo pochi anni fa nel fronteggiare insieme l’epidemia di Covid (e ciò pur in assenza di una competenza esplicita nei Trattati). Una nuova governance sovranazionale in materia di difesa sembra ormai essere attesa anche dalle stesse industrie nazionali degli armamenti, ormai disposte ad abbandonare le “protezioni” dell’art.346.1(b) TFUE che permette ad ogni Stato membro di adottare “…le misure che ritenga necessarie alla tutela degli interessi essenziali della propria sicurezza e che si riferiscano alla produzione o al commercio di armi, munizioni e materiale bellico;..”

Purtroppo, nonostante queste condizioni esterne favorevoli, quella che sembra mancare è, invece, la volontà politica di costruire una “Governance Democratica” sovranazionale che superi l’attuale gestione intergovernativa e garantisca nella nuova fase della politica di difesa europea il rispetto dei valori, dei poteri e delle garanzie che inquadrano le altre politiche “ordinarie” dell’Unione Europea.  

3. Inquadrare la sicurezza esterna UE alla stregua del processo seguito per la sicurezza interna   

Sarebbe infatti lecito sperare che per la politica di sicurezza esterna si avvii quel processo di “normalizzazione” costituzionale che ha segnato la strategia di sicurezza interna UE a partire dal  2001. Dopo gli attentati terroristici dell’11 settembre bastarono infatti meno di tre anni per convincere gli Stati membri dell’Unione che la sicurezza interna non poteva più essere trattata solo a livello nazionale e che esisteva anche a livello UE una “duty to protect” dei cittadini in uno spazio sovranazionale che assicurasse sicurezza, libertà e giustizia. Già in occasione dei negoziati sul progetto di trattato Costituzionale venne così deciso di abbandonare il voto all’unanimità in Consiglio, di riconoscere la codecisione al Parlamento europeo e la piena giurisdizione della Corte di Giustizia in materia di cooperazione di polizia e giudiziaria in campo penale[14].

Il precedente della “comunitarizzazione” della sicurezza interna non sembra, però, almeno per ora, valere per la “sicurezza esterna” dell’Unione e ciò nonostante siano passati ormai più di tre anni dall’invasione russa dell’Ucraina nel febbraio 2022.  Reticenti e evasive sono state, sinora, le risposte alla domanda principale: quali responsabilità sia sul piano interno che su quello internazionale gli Stati Membri intendono finalmente riconoscere all’Unione europea in questa nuova fase della “definizione progressiva di una politica di difesa comune che può condurre a una difesa comune” (art.24.1 TUE)?  

E’, infatti, a tutti noto che, allo stato attuale le responsabilità e le competenze dirette dell’Unione in materia di difesa, al di là, dei riferimenti altisonanti nell’art 21 TUE restano piuttosto limitate e, quando prendono forma, coinvolgono gli Stati membri soprattutto su base volontaria. Anche se definita come “politica comune” questa resta, quindi, una politica solo sussidiaria di quella condotta dai suoi Stati membri e resta ingabbiata da “norme e procedure specifiche” (art.24 TUE). Certo il Trattato evoca anche il principio di solidarietà (art.222 TFEU) e persino l’utilizzo di mezzi militari in caso di attacco terroristico, ma, almeno fino a pochi mesi fa, la maggior parte dei paesi UE contava più sui meccanismi di solidarietà previsti dal Trattato NATO che su quelli dell’Unione. La mutata posizione degli Stati Uniti in quella alleanza ha rimesso però in discussione tale certezza e spinge ora gli Stati Membri a rafforzare la propria solidarietà reciproca non solo come “pilastro europeo” in seno al trattato NATO, ma in una prospettiva più continentale che transatlantica. Questo spostamento del centro di gravità, tutt’altro che facile da realizzarsi, richiede però un quadro istituzionale che solo l’ UE può offrire instaurando fra gli Stati Membri quella solidarietà e fiducia reciproca che caratterizza, per esempio le politiche legate al mercato interno.

4. Superare progressivamente il deficit democratico promuovendo il ruolo del Parlamento europeo

Ma perché questo possa avvenire diventa indispensabile rendere compatibili le attuali norme in materia di difesa con i principi democratici proclamati agli artt 9-12 del TUE. Non si tratta, quindi, solo di eliminare il diritto di veto in seno al Consiglio, quanto di correggere l’attuale deficit democratico e promuovere il ruolo del Parlamento europeo[15] anche con formule “creative”, che anticipino le prossime riforme dei Trattati nel rispetto del principio secondo il quale “Il funzionamento dell’Unione si fonda sulla democrazia rappresentativa” e sulla partecipazione dei cittadini europei  (art.10 TUE).

Il riconoscimento del ruolo del Parlamento europeo aprirebbe la possibilità anche di adottare misure legislative in materia di difesa ponendo sullo stesso piano Consiglio e Parlamento le due istituzioni sulle quali si fonda la legittimità della costruzione europea[16].

A spingere per la revisione delle norme attuali in materia di governance della difesa europea è anche il fatto che il regime “eccezionale” previsto nei Trattati per la politica di difesa non solo è poco compatibile con i principi dello Stato di diritto (che l’Unione dovrebbe promuovere) ma si è anche rivelato anacronistico e, di fatto, ingestibile. Basti pensare alla fine ingloriosa della cosiddetta clausola detta del “mutual respect” (articolo 40 TUE) secondo la quale le istituzioni UE, ed in particolare il Consiglio europeo e il Consiglio, non possono ricorrere per la politica di difesa a basi giuridiche di politiche ordinarie e viceversa. Come era da aspettarselo, questo “isolamento” delle politiche di difesa rispetto alle altre è ormai, da tempo, superato nei fatti. E’, infatti quasi impossibile separare la sicurezza interna (alla quale si applica il regime “ordinario”) dalla sicurezza esterna, così come sono indissociabili le politiche commerciali e di sviluppo da quelle legate alla “human security”. Così, progressivamente, viene favorita l’ibridazione di regole e strumenti “interni” ripresi nell’ambito di politiche esterne (non ultimo anche il ruolo di Agenzie “interne” con compiti operativi in paesi terzi) e di politiche “esterne” riprese in strumenti di politica interna (come le stesse norme europee in materia di politica industriale di difesa o le norme in materia materiali double-use “militare/civile” o di esportazione di armi).

Ci si sarebbe potuti attendere che in questo processo di progressiva “ibridazione”[17] si sarebbero estese al regime “straordinario” della difesa, le regole e le garanzie di democraticità del regime ordinario, ma quello che è avvenuto almeno sinora è stato piuttosto l’opposto.

Sotto la pressione degli Stati Membri, nel quadro del Consiglio europeo e del Consiglio e con la partecipazione attiva della Commissione, le esigenze “securitarie” sono diventate prevalenti e le politiche “ordinarie” (mercato interno, fiscalità..) hanno svolto una funzione puramente ancillare. Questo approccio “security by design” è stato recentemente codificato nel libro bianco sulla difesa che prevede che gli aspetti relativi alla sicurezza esterna siano ormai da prendere in conto in tutte le politiche dell’Unione.

5. Prevenire l’emarginazione del Parlamento europeo nelle politiche in cui è co-legislatore

L’attuale approccio intergovernativo rischia così di estendersi alle politiche ordinarie violando così i principi di attribuzione e di equilibrio istituzionale a danno del Co-legislatore, il Parlamento europeo che anche in queste politiche si troverebbe a svolgere un ruolo sempre più residuale, o, al massimo, di autorità di bilancio.

Il caso più evidente di emarginazione del Parlamento Europeo in politiche per le quali il Trattato prevede la sua corresponsabilità come co-legislatore è la proposta di regolamento del Consiglio “SAFE” citata più sopra. Essa prevede di mobilitare ben 150 miliardi di Euro sui mercati finanziari a sostegno degli interventi nazionali in materia di difesa e a tal fine essa si fonda sull’art.122 del TFUE che permette interventi di emergenza in campo economico, ma escludendo l’intervento del Parlamento europeo. È solo il caso di ricordare che già nella scorsa legislatura il Parlamento Europeo, a fronte del moltiplicarsi di misure d’emergenza, con questa base giuridica[18] aveva tentato di limitare il ricorso abusivo a questa base giuridica nonostante il dilagare all’epoca della epidemia di Covid[19].

Come già riconosciuto nel 2020 dallo stesso Servizio Giuridico del Consiglio, il ricorso all’art.122 si giustifica infatti solo in situazioni di emergenza eccezionali e di natura temporanea e dovrebbe avvenire “fatta salva ogni altra procedura prevista dai Trattati”.  Ora, gli obiettivi del progetto SAFE sono praticamente gli stessi perseguiti dai Regolamenti ASAP, EDIRPA e dal programma EDIP in fase avanzata di negoziato e che si fondano sulle basi giuridiche 173 (politica industriale), 114 (mercato interno) e 212 TFUE che permettono l’adozione di provvedimenti legislativi in piena corresponsabilità del Parlamento Europeo come richiesto dall’art.289 del Trattato. La scelta dell’art.122 per lo strumento SAFE è ancora più incomprensibile e criticabile in quanto, un atto non formalmente legislativo non può modificare o sospendere misure di natura legislativa (come le norme sull’imposizione IVA) come proposto dalla Commissione.

Non deve quindi sorprendere che il Parlamento europeo con voto unanime della propria commissione giuridica il 23 aprile 2025 abbia contestato il ricorso all’art.122 per violazione delle proprie prerogative costituzionali[20]. Vi è solo da sperare che anche l’altro co-legislatore condivida l’analisi del PE e si possa rapidamente trasferire il contenuto dello strumento nel più generale programma EDIP che il Parlamento europeo sta già rafforzando trasferendo su EDIP venti miliardi dei 150 originariamente previsti per SAFE.

Il voto unanime della Commissione giuridica del PE deve essere salutato positivamente anche come primo segnale di un processo che dovrebbe portare, a termine a una revisione delle disposizioni dei Trattati in materia di politica di difesa. E’ però essenziale che il Parlamento europeo si attivi al più presto (durante il “trilogo” su EDIP ?)  per convincere l’altro co-legislatore con il quale condivide il potere legislativo e di bilancio (articoli 14.1 e 16.1 del TUE).

In attesa di una modifica formale del diritto primario, (magari in occasione del negoziato dei primi accordi di adesione di nuovi stati membri all’Unione), le istituzioni potrebbero ridurre l’attuale deficit democratico modificando almeno su base volontaria le proprie relazioni reciproche come avvenne, per esempio con la cd procedura Luns-Westerterp ripresa dalla dichiarazione di Stoccarda del 1984 [21]

Nella stessa prospettiva il Parlamento europeo che si è dotato ormai di una commissione parlamentare per la difesa (SEDE) dovrebbe formalizzare nelle proposte legislative che si appresta a votare come il programma EDIP un proprio ruolo decisionale e di controllo quotidiano come quello che si è assicurato per le politiche relative alla sicurezza interna. Proprio questa esperienza ha dimostrato che rimanere alla finestra sperando che gli altri concedano uno spazio politico è una loser strategy.

Non è un caso che altre istituzioni si stanno già da tempo muovendo per rafforzare il proprio ruolo una volta che la politica di difesa dell’UE evolva in una fase più matura[22]. Persino la Corte ha cercato di interpretare in modo evolutivo il proprio ruolo di controllo in caso di sanzioni adottate nel quadro della politica di difesa. Sarebbe finalmente arrivato il momento che anche il Parlamento europeo[23] rafforzasse il proprio ruolo anche in occasione della adozione di norme europee che, pur non ricadendo nella politica di difesa potrebbero, almeno indirettamente, condizionarla.

6. Ristabilire un dialogo paritario con il Consiglio europeo e con il Consiglio

Last but not least l’unica istituzione eletta direttamente dai cittadini non dovrebbe più limitarsi a scambiare solo messaggi protocollari nei confronti del Consiglio europeo, ma dovrebbe credere maggiormente in sé stessa e interagire con proposte e raccomandazioni formali in occasione della definizione di documenti strategici che richiederanno comunque l’intervento del legislatore per diventare realtà. Rimanere semplicemente spettatore quando il Consiglio europeo adotta l’Agenda Strategica per la legislatura [24] o adotta le linee guida in campo legislativo e operativo per trasformare in questo quinquennio l’Unione europea in Spazio di libertà sicurezza e giustizia [25] toglie, indirettamente, voce anche agli stessi cittadini.  

Vent’anni di negoziati interistituzionali in campo legislativo tra Parlamento e Consiglio dovrebbero avere dimostrato che solo una relazione paritaria fra queste due istituzioni garantisce la legittimità e l’efficienza dell’Unione.  In questo quadro la Commissione può e deve svolgere un ruolo determinante, ma non dovrebbe porsi come filtro o peggio ancora pretendere di escludere dai giochi, in assenza di una urgenza effettiva, come nel caso del progetto SAFE, l’unica istituzione eletta direttamente dai cittadini.

[1] Alla scadenza del 30 Aprile 12 paesi membri  hanno annunciato di voler attivare tale clausola e altri quattro si appresterebbero a farlo. Non rientrano fra questi paesi Italia, Francia, Spagna e Paesi Bassi. Esaminate le domande degli Stati Membri, la Commissione dovrebbe proporre ai primi di Giugno al Consiglio di autorizzare i piani nazionali. Vista l’attuale adesione alla proposta della Commissione non sarà quindi possibile mobilitare buona parte della somma di circa 650 miliardi preventivata in origine.

[2] Secondo la Commissione SAFE “è uno strumento temporaneo di emergenza inteso a fornire assistenza finanziaria dell’Unione agli Stati membri sotto forma di prestiti per consentire loro di realizzare gli urgenti e cospicui investimenti pubblici nella base industriale e tecnologica di difesa europea (EDTIB) richiesti dalla situazione eccezionale. Questo strumento mira a promuovere gli appalti comuni, in modo da permettere agli Stati membri di progredire verso una maggiore efficienza del mercato nel settore della difesa.

Lo strumento fornirà agli Stati membri fino a 150 miliardi di EUR in prestiti per investimenti nel settore della difesa, il che consentirà l’acquisizione di capacità di difesa negli ambiti d’azione prioritari individuati dal Consiglio europeo. Non solo darà visibilità all’industria della difesa dell’Unione, ma consentirà anche un rapido aumento della sua capacità di produzione, migliorerà la tempestiva disponibilità di prodotti per la difesa e accelererà lo sviluppo di nuovi prodotti per la difesa o l’ammodernamento di quelli esistenti. Tali ambiti d’azione prioritari sono la difesa aerea e missilistica, i sistemi di artiglieria, i missili e le munizioni, i droni e i sistemi antidrone, gli abilitanti strategici e la protezione di infrastrutture critiche, anche in relazione allo spazio, le soluzioni per la cibersicurezza, l’intelligenza artificiale e la guerra elettronica, e la mobilità militare.”

[3] Il futuro dell’iniziativa che avrebbe dovuto essere approvata entro Marzo sarà probabilmente deciso nel corso del mese di maggio o al più tardi in parallelo al summit NATO dei primi di giugno.

[4] Anche in questo ambito non è semplice anticipare quale sarà le reazione degli Stati membri e come si collocherà la difesa fra le priorità di sviluppo regionale.

[5] Superando così almeno indirettamente il divieto del finanziamento di acquisti di armi previsto dal proprio Statuto

[6]  Vedi il REGOLAMENTO (UE) 2023/1525  del 20 luglio 2023 sul sostegno alla produzione di munizioni (ASAP)

[7] Il regolamento per il rafforzamento dell’industria europea della difesa mediante appalti comuni (EDIRPA) sostiene la collaborazione tra Stati membri nella fase degli appalti per colmare le carenze più urgenti e critiche, specialmente quelle create dalla risposta alla guerra di aggressione russa nei confronti dell’Ucraina, in modo collaborativo. L’EDIRPA rafforza gli appalti comuni nel settore della difesa e, mediante il finanziamento dell’Unione rafforza le capacità industriali nel settore della difesa e l’adattamento dell’industria della difesa dell’Unione alle trasformazioni strutturali del mercato determinate da un aumento della domanda dovuto a nuove sfide, come il ritorno a un conflitto ad alta intensità.

[8] L’EDIP mira a rafforzare la capacità di produzione della base industriale e tecnologica di difesa europea (EDTIB) contribuendo alla ripresa, alla ricostruzione e alla modernizzazione anche della base industriale della difesa ucraina. Il regolamento si basa pertanto su tre basi giuridiche diverse: l’articolo 173 TFUE (politica industriale) l’articolo 114 TFUE (mercato interno) e l’articolo 212 TFUE in relazione al rafforzamento della DTIB ucraina e l’articolo 322 TFUE (cooperazione finanziaria e tecnica con paesi terzi).

[9] Secondo la scheda informativa del PE l’EDIP fornirà un nuovo quadro giuridico (volontario), la struttura per il programma di armamento europeo (SEAP), per facilitare e aumentare la cooperazione degli Stati membri durante l’intero ciclo di vita delle attrezzature di difesa, dallo sviluppo alla manutenzione. La partecipazione richiederà tre o più Stati membri e sarà aperta anche all’Ucraina e ai Paesi associati. Le risorse militari acquistate attraverso il SEAP saranno di proprietà comune degli Stati membri, questi ultimi riceveranno un’esenzione dall’IVA. Un “regime modulare e graduale di sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti dell’UE” dovrebbe garantire un accesso continuo ai prodotti essenziali per la difesa in tutta Europa. Per garantire la coerenza dell’azione dell’UE nel settore della difesa, un Consiglio di preparazione industriale per la difesa riunirà i rappresentanti degli Stati membri, dell’Alto rappresentante dell’UE e della Commissione. Esso dovrebbe programmare gli acquisti tenendo conto dei diversi livelli di investimento a livello nazionale, assicurare l’attuazione della programmazione e “l’identificazione congiunta di possibili progetti di interesse comune per concentrare gli sforzi e i programmi di finanziamento dell’UE”. In queste attività potrà consultare un Gruppo europeo di alto livello per l’industria della difesa, che dovrebbe garantire un’efficiente cooperazione tra governi e industria.

[10] I capi di Stato o di governo dell’UE, riuniti a Versailles il 10 e l’11 marzo 2022, si sono impegnati a “rafforzare le capacità di difesa europee” alla luce dell’aggressione militare russa nei confronti dell’Ucraina. Gli stessi obiettivi sono stati ribaditi nella bussola strategica per la sicurezza e la difesa.

[11] VEDI https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-security-and-defence-sede/file-white-paper-on-eu-defence

[12] Vedi https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0034_IT.html

[13] Il Meccanismo Europeo di Difesa (MED) sarebbe una nuova istituzione intergovernativa aperta alle democrazie europee, non solo dell’Unione Europea. Sulla falsariga del MES per la solidarietà a fronte di possibili crisi del sistema bancario, i Paesi aderenti verserebbero il capitale e possiederebbero azioni in proporzione alle loro quote di capitale. Si impegnerebbero a non discriminare gli appaltatori della difesa di altri membri, a intraprendere appalti congiunti in aree prestabilite e a partecipare alla pianificazione, al finanziamento e alla gestione di beni di difesa comuni a beneficio di tutta l’Europa (come la difesa aerea europea o i satelliti di intelligence militare). L’EDM emetterebbe obbligazioni e utilizzerebbe i proventi per finanziare gli acquisti congiunti di difesa e i beni di difesa comuni. Potrebbe anche concedere prestiti ai suoi membri con una piccola maggiorazione rispetto ai costi di finanziamento. I membri pagherebbero le loro quote di beni per la difesa acquistati congiuntamente quando vengono consegnati, pagherebbero il servizio dei loro prestiti e pagherebbero una commissione di servizio per i beni di difesa comuni, in relazione alla loro quota di capitale dell’EDM.

[14] Paradossalmente a spingere per la “comunitarizzazione” di queste politiche poi codificata nel Trattato di Lisbona, furono proprio quei paesi come il Regno Unito e l’Irlanda che, fino ad allora avevano gelosamente difeso la competenza esclusiva degli Stati membri in queste materie.

[15] Come già per la sicurezza interna prima dell’11 settembre il controllo democratico sarebbe di competenza dei Parlamenti nazionali che non sono però strutturalmente in grado di valutare l’impatto sovranazionale delle iniziative prese in questi campi.

[15] Un ulteriore superamento della “eccezionalità” delle attuali norme in materia di difesa sarebbe la soppressione dei limiti alla competenza della Corte e superando l’anacronistica previsione nel trattato che affida al Consiglio e alla Commissione la verifica della coerenza fra la politica della difesa con le altre politiche dell’Unione.

[16] Anche formule creative come quella dell’Alto Rappresentante, con il doppio cappello di Vice-Presidente della Commissione e di Presidente del Consiglio difesa, o la creazione di corpi speciali come il Servizio Diplomatico Esterno composto tanto da funzionari ministeriali che dell’Unione europea sembrano giunti al proprio limite e possono essere all’origine di confusione soprattutto per il mondo esterno (do you remember the Sofagate ?).

[17] Anche formule creative come quella dell’Alto Rappresentante, con il doppio cappello di Vice-Presidente della Commissione e di Presidente del Consiglio difesa, o la creazione di corpi speciali come il Servizio Diplomatico Esterno composto tanto da funzionari ministeriali che dell’Unione europea sembrano giunti al proprio limite e possono essere all’origine di confusione soprattutto per il mondo esterno (do you remember the Sofagate ?). 

[18] Dal 2010, si é fatto ricorso all’ Article 122 TFEU per il Regolamento 2016/369 relativo al supporto di emergenza in caso di flussi migratori, in occasione dell’epidemia di Covid  (Regolamento 2020/521), per superare i problemi legati alla disoccupazione (Strumento SURE (Regolamento 2020/672) per fondare lo strumento “Next Generation EU”(Regolamento 2020/2094)  e per fronteggiare la crisi energetica (Regolamenti  2022/1369, 2022/1854, 2022/2576, 2022/2577, 2022/2578).

[19] S veda la dichiarazione congiunta  del 2020 del PE Consiglio e Commissione sul controllo di bilancio delle nuove misure fondate sull’art 122 TFEU che prevede la creazione di un gruppo di lavoro congiunto per l’esame delle implicazioni finanziarie, e l’art.138 del Regolamento interno del PE che stabilisce un dialogo diretto Commissione-Parlamento in caso di ricorso all’art.122

[20] Anche se un velato riferimento alla difesa di tali prerogative è citato nella lettera della Presidente del Parlamento che si dichiara disponibile a a partecipare al gruppo di lavoro sull’impatto finanziario delle misure fondate sull’art.122 TFUE.

[21] Questa riconobbe, ancor prima della revisione dei Trattati, il diritto del Parlamento europeo di essere consultato (seppur su base facoltativa) in occasione dei negoziati su accordi internazionali. 

[22] Il caso più evidente è quello della Commissione che si è proposta come security provider già lo scorso anno con le proposte ASAP e EDIRPA e in modo ancora più esplicito con il programma REARM Europe e, in particolare la proposta SAFE.

[23] Va ricordato però che il Parlamento europeo ha tentato fin dall’entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona di far applicare il regime e le garanzie del regime ordinario a iniziative prese anche a livello internazionale come in materia di sanzioni nei confronti di terroristi o in occasione dei negoziati con paesi terzi quali Mauritius, Tanzania, per la consegna di sospetti pirati perseguiti nel quadro dell’operazione Atalanta al largo della costa della Somalia. In tutte queste occasioni nonostante le misure in questione coprissero anche politiche “interne” quali la cooperazione giudiziaria in campo penale la Corte ha ritenuto preminente il collegamento con misure legate alla politica estera e di difesa. Si vedano i paragrafi 81 e 82 della Sentenza nella Causa C-130/10 PE v Consiglio del 19 luglio 2012 ( *1 )
“(81.) Certamente, la partecipazione del Parlamento alla procedura legislativa è il riflesso, sul piano dell’Unione, di un fondamentale principio di democrazia secondo il quale i popoli partecipano all’esercizio del potere per il tramite di un’assemblea rappresentativa (v., in tal senso, sentenze del 29 ottobre 1980, Roquette Frères/Consiglio, 138/79, Racc. pag. 3333, punto 33, e Biossido di titanio, cit., punto 20). (82) Tuttavia, la differenza tra gli articoli 75 TFUE e 215 TFUE quanto all’implicazione del Parlamento risulta dalla scelta, operata dagli autori del Trattato di Lisbona, di conferire un ruolo più limitato al Parlamento riguardo all’azione dell’Unione nel contesto della PESC.”(emphasis added)”

[24]  L’Agenda Strategica 2024/2029 è stata adottata dal Consiglio Europeo il 27 giugno 2024. E’stata elaborata senza alcun coinvolgimento del Parlamento europeo né prima né dopo l’adozione.

[25]  Le Linee guida sullo SLSG per il periodo 2024-29  sono state elaborate sotto Presidenza Ungherese nel secondo semestre del 2004, votate dal Consiglio Giustizia e affari interni  il 3 Dicembre 2024 e allegate alle conclusioni della riunione del Consiglio Europeo

Riarmare l’Europa: ovvero come rischiare di affondare la nave il giorno stesso del varo..

di Emilio DE CAPITANI (*)

Era il  10 agosto 1628 e la maggior parte dei cittadini di Stoccolma si era recata al porto per assistere al varo del Vasa, un magnifico Galeone da guerra che il Re Gustavo Adolfo di Svezia aveva fortemente voluto  per combattere contro Polonia e Lituania. Lungo una settantina di metri con ben due ordini di cannoni il Vasa era stato progettato come una delle navi da guerra più potenti dell’epoca, ma era anche pericolosamente instabile per il troppo peso nella struttura superiore dello scafo. Ma, come spesso avviene, nessuno se la sentì di avvertire il Re di possibili problemi di stabilità e la nave venne comunque posta in mare accompagnata dal tripudio della folla. Peccato però che dopo poco più di un chilometro cominciò ad inclinarsi a causa di un vento poco più forte di una brezza per poi affondare miseramente.

Fatti i debiti scongiuri, viene spontaneo pensare a questo episodio quando si guarda al susseguirsi di iniziative prese dall’Unione Europea nel corso delle ultime settimane nel quadro del cd “Riarmo Europeo” (comunque lo si voglia chiamare).

Come era da aspettarselo sono state sollevate molte critiche prima fra tutte quella secondo cui una simile strategia tradirebbe lo spirito e la lettera dei Trattati secondo i quali, scopo dell’Unione Europea è “ preservare la pace, prevenire i conflitti e rafforzare la sicurezza internazionale, conformemente agli obiettivi e ai principi della Carta delle Nazioni Unite, nonché ai principi dell’Atto finale di Helsinki e agli obiettivi della Carta di Parigi, compresi quelli relativi alle frontiere esterne;”(art 21.2 lett.C TUE).

In secondo luogo si è anche denunciato il fatto che, favorendo il riarmo degli Stati Membri venivano confermate politiche e “campioni” nazionali che perseguono priorità differenti, inevitabilmente scoordinate fra loro, e ciò non può essere una solida base per una politica di difesa comune e, ancor meno, in prospettiva, di un esercito sovranazionale.

Sono critiche fondate e delle quali si può discutere a lungo, ma il punto su cui vorrei attirare l’attenzione con queste righe è il fatto che ogni nuova politica deve rispettare il principio democratico e ciò soprattutto a livello europeo non fosse altro perché è il livello di governo più lontano dai cittadini.

Non è infatti un caso che, per colmare questo “deficit” democratico il Trattato abbia previsto che il “funzionamento” dell’Unione si “fonda” sulla democrazia rappresentativa (art.10.1 TUE). Detto ciò è però altrettanto vero che il Trattato non è stato coerente con questo principio proprio per le politiche in materia di sicurezza esterna e di difesa (artt.23-46 TUE) per le quali si applicano “norme e procedure specifiche” che riservano al Parlamento europeo il ruolo di spettatore. 

Molte e diverse sono le ragioni che possono avere giustificato, ancora una ventina di anni fa durante i negoziati del Trattato di Lisbona, questa “dislessia” costituzionale che esclude l’unica istituzione eletta dai cittadini proprio da una politica che incide più di ogni altra sulla loro sicurezza.

Va però notato che nel corso degli anni il confine fra politiche di difesa e politiche “ordinarie” (art.40 TUE sul “rispetto reciproco”) è diventato sempre più labile cosicché il Parlamento europeo ha avuto la possibilità di incidere, seppure indirettamente, sulle politiche di difesa attraverso politiche per le quali il Trattato gli riserva appieno il potere legislativo e di bilancio (che si tratti della politica industriale o di quella sul mercato interno).

Ci si poteva quindi aspettare che la Commissione nel proporre la nuova strategia europea per la difesa facendo ricorso, in particolare, a politiche “ordinarie” non si sarebbe solo ritagliata un ruolo nuovo, ma avrebbe almeno rispettato il principio del coinvolgimento del Parlamento europeo.

Niente di tutto ciò: per mettere a disposizione 1500 miliardi di crediti agli Stati membri per acquisti di armi, grazie al progetto di regolamento SAFE,  la Commissione ha fatto sì ricorso a politiche “ordinarie”, ma scegliendo una base giuridica di “emergenza”,  l’art.122 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea che esclude il Parlamento.

Come se non bastasse, gli articoli 17-21 di SAFE prevedono anche modifiche di norme europee adottate in codecisione dal Parlamento europeo con ciò sovvertendo la gerarchia delle norme e aprendo la strada a regimi di emergenza che giustamente il Trattato limita a situazioni eccezionali e per una durata di tempo limitata (come avviene a livello nazionale in situazioni di epidemie, terremoti, catastrofi o minacce di guerra..).

A livello europeo l’art.122 è già stato utilizzato, infatti, in particolare in occasione del Covid (quando grazie ad esso venne creato il sistema SURE a sostegno del mercato del lavoro) e quando, nel 2015 si rese necessario disporre d’urgenza (ai sensi dell’art.78.3 del TFUE) la ricollocazione in diversi paesi UE di un flusso massiccio di decine di migliaia di migranti sbarcati in Italia e in Grecia.

In quest’ultima occasione la Corte aveva anche riconosciuto che in situazioni eccezionali e limitate nel tempo si potesse soprassedere ad alcune norme ordinarie (all’epoca, il regolamento di Dublino). Ma puo’ il programma SAFE essere considerato una misura giustificata dall’urgenza e dalla impossibilità degli stati membri di far fronte a una pressione straordinaria ? C’è da dubitarne perché, se si guarda alle ragioni presentate a giustificazione dell’art.122 TFEU si scopre che alcune di queste rimontano a diversi anni fa mentre l’obbiettivo di superare la parcellizzazione del mercato e degli acquisti di armi è vecchio almeno quanto la creazione del cosiddetto “secondo pilastro” della difesa nel trattato di Maastricht del 1993.

Perché, quindi ricorrere a una base giuridica di emergenza ignorando in modo così plateale il ruolo del Parlamento europeo e mettendo così a repentaglio il cosiddetto “institutional balance” che, a livello europeo assicura un minimo di separazione dei poteri, e il principio di cooperazione leale fra istituzioni?

La risposta, machiavellica, a giustificazione del ricorso all’art.122 potrebbe essere che così si può sfuggire alla regola dell’unanimità, che vige nella politica di difesa impedendo così a paesi contrari (l’Ungheria? La Repubblica Ceca ?…) di boicottare l’iniziativa.

L’argomento però non convince per due ragioni :

  • innanzitutto perché la maggioranza qualificata si applica anche alle politiche ordinarie dove il Parlamento europeo agisce da co-legislatore e assicura quindi il controllo democratico (vedi, in materia di supporto alla politica di difesa la proposta EDIP );
  • in secondo luogo perché, se davvero vi fossero paesi contrari al progetto di Regolamento  SAFE, questi sarebbero inevitabilmente tentati di impugnare il provvedimento del Consiglio di fronte alla Corte. Ora, vista la debolezza delle argomentazioni a sostegno dell’art.122, il Consiglio rischia di vedersi annullato il provvedimento e tutto crollerebbe come un castello di carte…

Insistere con il ricorso all’art.122 TFEU come proposto dalla Commissione non solo é antidemocratico poiché si escluderebbe il Parlamento Europeo dalla partecipazione, anche indiretta, alla strategia europea di difesa, ma é anche porre una seria ipoteca sulla credibilità del progetto in caso di ricorso in Corte.

Al di là delle considerazioni giuridiche questa vicenda suscita quindi anche alcuni inquietanti  interrogativi politico-istituzionali:

  • a chi giova escludere il neo-eletto Parlamento e perché conta così poco agli occhi della Commissione e del Consiglio europeo tanto da spingerli a metterlo da parte anche in politiche così rilevanti per la vita dei cittadini ?
  • perché il Parlamento europeo, che nelle scorse legislature in più occasioni si era rivolto alla Corte di Giustizia, sia per difendere le proprie prerogative costituzionali che a tutela del principio dello Stato di diritto non ha ancora reagito? Se non si fa rispettare come puo’ pretendere che vengano rispettati i cittadini che lo hanno eletto ?
  • Last, but not least : il PE è davvero una vittima o vi è ormai una maggioranza politica al suo interno che è in qualche modo complice con quei governi che considerano la partecipazione democratica una noiosa formalità ?

Chiedo per un amico che ha partecipato alle elezioni europee dello scorso anno.

(*)già Segretario della Commissione Libertà civili (LIBE) del PE (1998-2011) . Affiliato alla Scuola Superiore S. Anna di PISA

AI liability rules: a blocked horizon?

By Michèle Dubrocard[1]

February 2025

Today, no one challenges the potential benefits offered by AI for individuals and society in general, but also the existence of serious risks, some of them already identified, others likely to emerge. Let’s have in mind the conclusions of the first International AI Safety Report[2] which, focusing on general-purpose AI, recognizes that ‘there is a wide range of possible outcomes even in the near future, including both very positive and very negative ones, as well as anything in between’. 

So, when the European Commission issued on 28 September 2022 its Proposal for a Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive- AILD), it raised a lot of hope among all those concerned about the potentially harmful consequences of the use of AI systems. These hopes were confirmed by the objective expressed in the explanatory memorandum of the Proposal, namely ‘ensuring victims of damage caused by AI obtain equivalent protection to victims of damage caused by products in general’[3].

More specifically, the Commission seemed determined to take into due consideration the imbalance between the providers and deployers on the one hand, and the affected persons on the other. Indeed, referring to Member States’ general fault-based liability rules, Recital 3 of the Proposal recognizes that ‘when AI is interposed between the act or omission of a person and the damage, the specific characteristics of certain AI systems, such as opacity, autonomous behaviour and complexity, may make it excessively difficult, if not impossible, for the injured person to meet this burden of proof’.

Alas, the rules proposed by the Commission did not meet the expectations raised by the announced objective (I). Even worse, the Commission seems to have definitively shelved its project (II), leaving the door open to what it itself had criticized: the co-existence within the EU of ‘27 different liability regimes, leading to different levels of protection and distorted competition among businesses from different Member States’[4].

I- A disappointing Proposal

The Proposal of the Commission did not challenge the choice of a fault-based regime, but instead mainly focused on two rules, aiming at alleviating the burden of proof, which remains on the victim. What are these two rules?

– The disclosure of evidence:

According to Article 3(1) of the Proposal, a court may order the disclosure of relevant evidence about specific high-risk AI systems that are suspected of having caused damage. However, the requests should be supported by ‘facts and evidence sufficient to establish the plausibility of the contemplated claim for damages’ and the requested evidence should be at the addressees’ disposal. Article 3(3) provides that the preservation of such evidence may also be ordered by the court.

However, the disclosure may be ordered by a court only to ‘that which is necessary and proportionate to support a potential claim or a claim for damages and the preservation to that which is necessary and proportionate to support such a claim for damages’. Article 3(4) specifies that ‘the legitimate interests of all parties’ must be considered by the court, when   determining whether an order for the disclosure or preservation of evidence is proportionate. Moreover, the person who has been ordered to disclose or to preserve the evidence must benefit appropriate procedural remedies in response to such orders.

Article 3(5) introduces a presumption of non-compliance with a duty of care: when, in a claim for damages, the defendant fails to comply with an order by a national court to disclose or to preserve evidence at its disposal, the national court shall presume the defendant’s non-compliance with a relevant duty of care. That presumption remains rebuttable.

– The presumption of causal link in the case of fault:

Article 4 of the Proposal provides, under certain conditions, a presumption of a causal link between the fault of the defendant and the output produced by the AI system or the failure of the AI system to produce an output, that gave rise to the relevant damage.

However, the claimant has to prove the fault of the defendant, consisting in the non-compliance with a duty of care laid down in Union or national law directly intended to protect against the damage that occurred. He/she also has to prove that the AI system gave rise to the damage. There is another condition, related to the likelihood, based on the circumstances of the case, of the fault’s influence on the output produced by the AI system or the failure of the AI system to produce an output.

Moreover, the presumption shall not be applied if the defendant demonstrates that sufficient evidence and expertise is reasonably accessible for the claimant to prove the causal link. At last, in the case of a claim for damages concerning an AI system that is not a high-risk AI system, the presumption shall only apply where the national court considers it excessively difficult for the claimant to prove the causal link. Here also, the presumption is rebuttable.

– The limitations of the rules:

It follows from these provisions that the impact of the two rules laid down in the Proposal is limited by numerous conditions. In particular, the new mechanism of disclosure of evidence would be limited only to high-risk AI systems. Similarly, the presumption of causal link would mainly apply to high-risk AI systems, except where, according to the national judges, it would be excessively difficult for the claimant to prove the causal link.

In any case, the Proposal is based on a fault-based liability regime, which means that victims would still have to prove the fault or negligence of the AI system provider, or deployer. As noted by the EDPS in its own-initiative opinion[5] of 11 October 2023, ‘meeting such a requirement may be particularly difficult in the context of AI systems, where risks of manipulation, discrimination, and arbitrary decisions will be certainly occurring’, even when the providers and deployers have prima facie complied with their duty of care as defined by the AI Act. 

In order to overcome these proof-related difficulties, several solutions have been proposed. BEUC, the European Consumer Organisation, has recommended introducing a reversal of the burden of proof[6], in order to allow the consumers to only have to prove the damage they suffered and the involvement of an AI system. A more nuanced approach has been suggested by an expert, aiming at differentiating between AI systems, whether they are high-risk or not, and general-purpose AI systems: providers and deployers of high-risk AI systems would be subjected to ‘truly strict liability’, while SMEs and non-high-risk AI systems should only be subjected to rebuttable presumptions of fault and causality[7]. In the same vein, the European Parliament considered in 2020 that it seemed ‘reasonable to set up a common strict liability regime for (…) high-risk autonomous AI-systems’. As regards other AI systems, the European Parliament also considered that ‘affected persons should nevertheless benefit from a presumption of fault on the part of the operator who should be able to exculpate itself by proving it has abided by its duty of care’[8].

The Commission itself has acknowledged, in its impact assessment report, that ‘the specific characteristics of the AI-system could make the victim’s burden of proof prohibitively difficult or even impossible to meet’, and has evoked different approaches, among which the reversal of the burden of proof. As a sign of its hesitation, the Commission has introduced in the Proposal the possibility to review the directive five years after the end of the transposition period, in particular in order to ‘evaluate the appropriateness of no-fault liability rules for claims against the operators of certain AI systems, as long as not already covered by other Union liability rules, and the need for insurance coverage, while taking into account the effect and impact on the roll-out and uptake of AI systems, especially for SMEs’[9].

II- The withdrawal of the Proposal

On 11 February 2025, the Commission decided to withdraw the Proposal, on the grounds that there was ‘no foreseeable agreement’, and that the Commission would ‘assess whether another proposal should be tabled or another type of approach should be chosen’[10].

This decision caught the European Parliament’s rapporteur on the Proposal, Axel Voss (PPE), by surprise, who stated that the scrapping of the rules would mean ‘legal uncertainty, corporate power imbalances, and a Wild West approach to AI liability that benefits only Big Tech’[11].

On the other hand, the decision of the Commission is reported to have satisfied both the Council and the private sector. In particular, France’s Permanent Representation would have indicated that it saw no reason to impose additional liability requirements on AI providers[12].

How can such a situation be explained?

It is true that the AI liability initiative launched by the Commission on 28 September 2022 was also composed of another Proposal, aiming at updating the Directive on liability for defective products (PLD). The new directive, which now includes software and digital manufacturing files within the definition of product, and expands the notion of compensable damage to include the destruction or corruption of data, came into force on 8 December 2024.

However, the scope of the revised PLD is limited: it only provides compensation for material losses resulting from death, personal injury, damages to property and loss or corruption of data (Article 6 PLD). In particular, damage stemming from a violation of a fundamental right without any material loss is not covered by this directive, but should have been covered by the AI liability directive. The draft AILD aimed at covering ‘national liability claims mainly based on the fault of any person with a view of compensating any type of damage and any type of victim’[13].

The loopholes of the PLD have also been underlined by the complementary impact assessment required by the JURI Committee, to which the file had been attributed in the European Parliament. The study[14], published on 19 September 2024, underlines: ‘However, the PLD presents notable gaps, especially in areas such as protection against discrimination, personality rights, and coverage for professionally used property. It also lacks measures for addressing pure economic loss and sustainability harms, as well as damage caused by consumers, which are contingent on Member State laws. These limitations underscore the necessity for adopting the AILD (…)’.

Thus, in the light of the complementary impact assessment, it appears that the recent adoption of the revised PLD cannot compensate the withdrawal of the proposed AILD. Moreover, as stressed by the first International AI Safety Report, the specific characteristics of general-purpose AI systems make legal liability hard to determine:

‘The fact that general-purpose AI systems can act in ways that were not explicitly programmed or intended by their developers or users raises questions about who should be held liable for resulting harm’[15] .

Conclusion:

Against this background, today the European citizens are left with a ‘fragmented patchwork of 27 different national legal systems’[16], most of them relying on a fault-based regime, which is not able to respond to all the challenges posed by AI systems, and in particular to general-purpose AI systems.

The withdrawal of the proposed AILD is only one element of the Commission’s plan aiming at ‘simplifying rules and effective implementation’[17], which enlists 37 withdrawn proposals in total.

The fact that the final 2025 work programme of the Commission -with the addition of the withdrawal of the AILD- was published just after the AI Act Summit, held in Paris on 10-11 February, may be a simple coincidence. However, it should be noted that the Statement[18] issued after the AI Summit does not refer to the issue of liability nor to the risks of AI systems, except in the context of information.

As observed by Anupriya Datta and Théophane Hartmann in Euractiv, ‘In this context, withdrawing the AI liability directive can be understood as a strategic manoeuvre by the EU to present an image of openness to capital and innovation, to show it prioritises competitiveness and show goodwill to the new US administration’[19].

The final word may not have been spoken, yet. On 18 February, the Members of the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) voted to keep working on liability rules for artificial intelligence products, despite the European Commission’s intention to withdraw the proposal[20].

[1] The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of the EDPS

[2] International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI January 2025

[3] COM(2022) 496 final, page 2

[4] COM(2022) 496 final, page 6

[5] EDPS Opinion 42/2023 on the Proposals for two Directives on AI liability rules, 11 October 2023, par. 33

[6] Proposal for an AI liability Directive, BEUC position paper, page 12.

[7] The European AI liability directives – Critique of a half-hearted approach and lessons for the future-Philipp Hacker, page 49.

[8] European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), par. 14 and 20.

[9] Article 5 of the Proposal.

[10] Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European, Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions- Commission work programme 2025, page 26.

[11] Euractiv ‘Commission plans to withdraw AI Liability Directive draw mixed reactions’, 12 February 2025.

[12] Ibidem.

[13] COM(2022) 496 final, page 3.

[14] Proposal for a directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence-Complementary impact assessment.

[15] International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI, page 179.

[16] Euractiv, ‘Commission plans to withdraw AI Liability Directive draw mixed reactions’, Anupriya Datta, 12 February 2025

[17] Commission work programme 2025, page 11

[18] Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet: ‘We will keep addressing the risks of AI to information integrity and continue the work on AI transparency.’

[19] Euractiv ‘Commission withdraws AI liability directive after Vance attack on regulation’, 11 February 2025

[20] Euronews ‘Lawmakers reject Commission decision to scrap planned AI liability rules’, Cynthia Kroet, 18/02/2025

“Re-arming” Europe without real democratic control?

by Emilio DE CAPITANI

The European Council Conclusions of March 6th extraordinary meeting mark an unexpected change of course towards an European Union defence policy. If confirmed at the next meeting on March 20th/21st, this would see the European ship leave a safe port – even if essentially intergovernmental – to set sail for a destination that, at least from these first steps, seems to be clearly drifting away from the main course that the Union’s institutions have always followed until now. The course is one that, over the last 70 years, has allowed an entire Continent to live in peace, without any need for rearmament, through the use of the “community method” and economic and civil integration. A continent that had previously been the scene of two world wars, both triggered by imperialistic ambitions and, in the second, also by the ethical baseness of a violence never before reached in the history of human civilization.

Returning to the theme of the drift of the Conclusions of March 6, it is worth saying that what caused the shift was not so much Putin’s aggression against Ukraine (already underway since 2014 following the invasion of Crimea) but rather US President Trump’s position making clear to the other NATO allies that, in the event of military aggression of a member state, the protection of the American umbrella will be no longer automatic nor the financial contribution to this North Atlantic defense pact by the United States. Following these messages  Ursula Von Der Leyen (VDL), President of the Commission, after, most probably having received the green light from the chancelleries of most EU member states, presented on March 5th a first plan, inappropriately called the “Re-arm Europe”, and whose objectives, as expected, have been, at least for the time being, unanimously approved by all the members of the European Council.

European public opinion has thus, suddenly, realized, that within the European Council, the highest political body of the European Union bringing together the Heads of State and Government, there is a great desire to take up arms, without any of them having consulted, beforehand, not even their parliaments in public session or, at least, the European Parliament. It looks that, once again, these leaders consider that it’s better to give this news to their citizens only after the fact, even though the same citizens, in the case of “rearmament” will not only put in their money but also the people necessary to ensure the increased defense measures. Moreover it will be easy, for these Heads of State and Government returning home from Brussels, to explain to the their national press that all the other colleagues pushed for it and “Brussel” has decided it. All for one (the Member States), and one for all (the Union), as usual….

Why is it “improperly” called a “Rearm Plan”?  First of all, because the word “rearmament” has been banned from the European political lexicon since the Schuman Declaration of 1950. Secondly, because the term “rearmament” – that is, a return to the use of weapons – does not evoke a defensive intention, and even less of peace, as it could be, for example: “the new EU Military Defense Plan”. If until now the Union, in order to achieve peace, has welcomed millions of displaced Ukrainians, deployed money and adopted restrictive measures against Russia, the time has come, after President Trump’s announcements, of launching an European Union diplomatic initiative,  according to the most authentic ” community method” and re-launch the role of the United Nations, rediscover the spirit of the Helsinki Accords that in 1975 contributed to overcoming the East-West divide on the European continent and try to bring the countries directly and indirectly involved around a table.

In any case, the plan proposed by President VDL, consisting of two distinct financial packages, raises serious reservations, not only political, but also parliamentary and legal.

The first package is the loosening of budgetary constraints up to 1.5% for defense spending by member states. Overall, this initiative should free up to 650 billion euros of national resources, to be spent not so much on the development of the defense industries already present in some Member States, but following a new European defense strategy. And this should happen through a mechanism of indebtedness that had not even been granted to the Member States for the achievement of fundamental objectives such as social protection or the fight against pollution….  From a European perspective, the choice may be questionable also due to the fact that, in March 2024, the Commission itself has already submitted to the European legislator an “EDIP” draft regulation (1) see below).

From a national perspective, however, it will be up to the parliaments of the Member States to decide whether or not to support the choices of their governments

Well, it’s clear that since this is a financial plan combined with the second basket of the VDL proposal engaging 150 billion euro on the EU Budget, all the national and European parliaments will wait until the next European Council on March 21st to find out if the Council, on the proposal of the Commission, will indeed adopt a new financial instrument in favor of Member States on art. 122 TFEU (2) as announced by the Commission President Von Der Leyen’s proposal to establish “a new EU instrument under Article 122 TFEU to provide Member States with loans backed by the EU budget.” According to the letter “ With up to EUR 150 billion, this instrument would strongly support EU efforts to achieve a rapid and significant increase in investments in Europe’s defence capabilities – now and over this decade. Such funding could be used for priority capabilities domains for which action is necessary at European level, in alignment with NATO:

  • air and missile defence;
  • artillery systems;
  • missiles and ammunition;
  • drones and anti-drone systems;
  • strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection, including in relation to space;
  • military mobility;
  • cyber, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare.

Further increasing the impact of this new instrument would be achieved by buying together, which would ensure interoperability and predictability, reduce costs, and create the scale needed to strengthen our European defence industrial base.” (emphasis added)

The “new instrument” proposed by the President of the Commission is therefore much more ambitious than the initiatives undertaken until now by the EU in this field. Moreover, it presupposes the definition, at a European level, of “priority capability areas where action is needed at the European level, in line with NATO”. Therefore prior consultation with NATO (where the US ambassador sits) is foreseen, while the European Parliament itself is not involved, even if not only European taxpayer/citizen money is at stake, but also the content of policies that affect its rights and vital interests.

But, with the current Treaty, who is authorized to make this kind of decision?

The answer is not simple because the Treaties, even after Lisbon, have provided a framework that is ambiguous to say the least, if not incomplete and contradictory. This is because, at least until recently, the majority of Member States relied on the NATO Treaty for the defense of the Union’s territory, in a sort of division of labor with the EU Treaties (see art. 42 TEU). However,following the recent positions taken on the other side of the Atlantic, this division of labor is now being questioned and various solutions are being studied, first and foremost that of the construction of a “European pillar” within NATO. However, the impression is that this too is a temporary solution and that, sooner or later, the European Union must finally assume responsibility for its own defense.
If this is the medium to long term perspective, it should be self evident that the European Union, even before a future formal amendment of the Treaties, must apply to this “European” rearmament plan the same fundamental democratic principles, as it does to the rest of European policies. It would indeed be paradoxical that in fields that are sensitive and essential for the security of citizens in the face of increasing external threats the EU will not abide to the principles  according to which “the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy” (art.10.1 TEU) or that according to which “Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. (art.10.3 TEU).

In such constitutional context, the Commission’s proposal to base the financing of 150 billion on the basis of art.122 TFEU, without the direct involvement of the European Parliament, is highly questionable, not to say contrary to Union law. It is worth noting that Article 122, has been already used in the past to try to stem the Greek Euro crisis, the COVID crisis and the energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but it is a legal basis suitable only for emergency measures in the economic domain, and therefore unusable in situations dealing with defence and that can last for years. Suffice it to remember that during the Euro crisis art.122 TFEU was abandoned by the same Member States who proposed it because they recognized that it was necessary, for a medium long perspective, to adopt a real Treaty, even though “complementing” the TEU (the European Stability Mechanism – ESM).

So a first reason why art.122 TFEU, should be excluded as a legal basis justifying a Council measure aimed at defending the citizens of the Union, in the years to come is that it is a temporary measure, even though is intended, as President VDL herself admits in her letter, to be valid for at least the next decade. But, most importantly, art. 122 does not foresee the involvement of the European Parliament which, as it happened for the European Council conclusion on the Rearm Europe project, will be “informed” only after the fact. Democratic control, which in military matters and the recruitment of people to be entrusted with the use of arms, are the basis of the Constitution of every democratic state, must also be respected within the EU by involving the EP in these extremely important political decisions, and this through the identification of an appropriate legal basis that involves it. In this perspective President VDL proposal is in itself not only clearly anti-parliamentary, anti-democratic but it contradicts the assessment according to which we are facing historic times. So, why not take this occasion to set the basis for a true EU defence policy in the Treaty instead of prolonging the current anti-democratic regime set fifteen years ago for the EU Defense policy?

Let’s hope that the European Parliament will take this occasion to re-establish the EU institutional balance also in this domain and will formally reserve the right, starting with its next resolutions on defense, to challenge before the Court of Justice any type of measure or act taken without its prior and effective involvement. Moreover, since this matter also directly involves the national parliaments, the European Parliament should also call them together in the spirit and letter of Article 12 TEU, according to which they contribute to the European construction (thereby also strenghtening parliamentary democracy within the EU).

As for the merits, it is only necessary to remember that, according to articles 3 to 6 TFEU, the Union has no direct powers regarding rearmament, and it may be  questionable whether it has any regarding support for member states [i];

In this context and, as the Treaty currently stands, the only possible legal basis for such involvement of the Union and the association of the EP in the construction of a defense policy is that of art. 352.1 TFEU according to which ” If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. (emphasis added) It is worth recalling that previous amendments of the Treaties were anticipated by legislative measures adopted with this “implicit” powers legal basis.

That having been said it is quite likely that for different political and institutional reasons the EU will not be ready to use art.352 TFEU ( notably because it requires unanimity in the Council and we all know how slippery the situation is in the Council when Unanimity is at stake…) However, another alternative, even if less clean and straight, is to integrate the VDL Objectives and the 150 billion financing in the draft “EDIP” Regulation(3) currently under discussion at the EP and the Council which already foresee the adoption of an EU Defense Strategy.  It is worth mentioning that, despite all the limitations of this proposal already denounced by the European Court of Auditors , EDIP would follow an ordinary legislative procedure, thus guaranteeing the full co-responsibility of the European Parliament without requiring unanimity in the Council as provided for in Article 352 TFEU. Negotiations are proceeding swiftly in both the Council and the European Parliament and this should allow the inter-institutional negotiations (trilogue) to start as soon as possible.

As explained above there are therefore serious alternatives to recourse to Article 122 that the European Parliament may raise to protect its constitutional prerogatives in the face of an initiative by which the European Council, the Council and the Commission exclude it from the decision-making process. By appealing to the Court, against the choice of that legal basis (NDR : moreover emergency measures in the defence sector require art.222 TFUE and not 122 TFUE) the Parliament would not only defend its constitutional prerogatives, but also the fundamental need of respect democratic principles, the Rule of Law and, above all, the rights of the citizens who elected it, even in matters of defense. Then, who knows, the Council and the Commission could accept the fall back position of dealing with these matters in codecision with the EP through the EDIP legislative proposal…

NOTES
1  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the European Defence Industrial Program and a framework for measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (“EDIP”) (2024/0061(COD) Link https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024PC0150

2 Article 122 (ex Article 100 of the TEC) 1.Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy. 2.   Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned. The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decision taken.

(3) The legal bases for the draft EDIP Regulation aimed at ensuring the timely availability and supply of defense products are (1) Article 173 TFEU in relation to the competitiveness of the EDTIB; (2) Article 114 TFEU in relation to the European Defense Equipment Market (EDEM); (3) Article 212 TFEU in relation to strengthening Ukraine’s DTIB and (4) Article 322 TFEU in relation to financial provisions.

“Riarmare” l’Europa senza reale controllo democratico ?

di Emilio DE CAPITANI

Le Conclusioni del Consiglio Europeo del  6 marzo segnano un inatteso cambio di rotta dell’Unione Europea in materia di politica di difesa comune che, se confermate nella prossima riunione del 20/21 marzo, vedrebbero la nave europea lasciare un porto comunque sicuro – anche se essenzialmente intergovernativo -, per prendere il largo verso una destinazione che, almeno da queste prime mosse, sembra andare chiaramente alla deriva rispetto alla linea maestra fino ad ora sempre seguita dalle istituzioni dell’Unione.

La linea è quella per cui, nell’arco degli ultimi 70 anni, un intero Continente ha vissuto in pace, senza alcun bisogno di procedere ad un riarmo, attraverso l’utilizzo del metodo comunitario e dell’integrazione economica e civile. Un Continente che era stato in precedenza il teatro di due guerre mondiali, scatenate entrambe da ambizioni imperialistiche e, nella seconda, anche da bassezze etiche di una violenza mai raggiunta prima nella storia della civiltà umana.

Ritornando al tema della deriva delle Conclusioni del 6 marzo, è il caso di dire che a far rompere gli ormeggi non sia stata tanto l’aggressione di Putin all’Ucraina (in corso già dal 2014 a seguito dell’invasione della Crimea) quanto la posizione del Presidente Trump che ha fatto intendere agli altri alleati NATO che, in caso di aggressione militare di uno Stato membro, la protezione dell’ombrello americano non è più automatica  come neppure la contribuzione finanziaria a questo patto nord-atlantico di difesa da parte degli Stati Uniti.

A fronte di cio’ la Presidente della Commissione, dopo aver  molto probabilmente riscosso, in via riservata, il via libera dalle cancellerie di tutti gli Stati membri,ha presentato il 5 marzo un primo piano, impropriamente definito sul “Riarmo” dell’Europa e il cui testo, come c’era da aspettarsi, è stato per il momento approvato all’unanimità  da tutti i membri del Consiglio europeo. 

L’opinione pubblica europea si è accorta così, da un giorno all’altro, che in seno al Consiglio europeo, cioè l’istanza politica più alta dell’Unione europea che riunisce i Capi di Stato e di governo, c’è una gran voglia di correre alle armi, senza che nessuno di essi abbia tuttavia pensato, un solo secondo, di consultare, preventivamente, non dico i loro parlamenti in seduta pubblica ma almeno il Parlamento Europeo. 

Sembra che per questi leaders sia meglio dare queste notizie ai cittadini – che in caso di “Riarmo” non ci mettono solo i soldi ma anche le persone indispensabili per assicurare ogni giorno le aumentate misure di difesa solo a cose fatte perché, tornando a casa da Bruxelles, la spiegazione che ciascuno di loro, può dare alla stampa del suo paese è che tutti gli altri colleghi erano d’accordo.

Tutti per uno quindi (gli Stati membri), e uno per tutti (l’Unione), o quasi.

Perché “impropriamente” denominato “Piano di Riarmo”? Anzitutto, perché la parola “riarmo” è stata bandita dal lessico politico europeo già a far tempo dalla dichiarazione Schuman del 1950.

In secondo luogo, perché il termine “riarmo” – cioè il ritorno all’uso delle armi – non evoca un’intenzione difensiva, e ancor meno di pace, come potrebbe essere, ad esempio: “the new EU Military Defense Plan”.

Se fino ad oggi l’Unione, per il raggiungimento della pace, ha accolto milioni di sfollati Ucraini, messo in campo soldi e misure restrittive contro la Russia, dopo gli annunci del presidente Trump dovrebbe lanciare una iniziativa diplomatica secondo il più autentico “metodo comunitario”, rilanciando il ruolo delle Nazioni Unite,  riscoprendo lo spirito degli accordi di Helsinki che nel 1975 contribuirono a superare la contrapposizione tra est e ovest nel Continente europeo e cercare di portare intorno a un tavolo nei prossimi mesi i paesi direttamente e indirettamente coinvolti.

Comunque sia, il piano proposto dalla Presidente VDL, composto di due panieri finanziari distinti, solleva gravi riserve, non solo politiche, ma anche di ordine parlamentare e giuridico.

Il primo paniere è l’allentamento dei vincoli di bilancio sino all’1,5 % per le spese in materia di difesa da parte degli Stati membri. Nel complesso questa iniziativa dovrebbe liberare sino a 650 miliardi di euro di risorse nazionali, da spendere non tanto per lo sviluppo dell’industrie belliche già presenti in taluni Stati membri ma per una nuova strategia europea di difesa. E ciò attraverso un meccanismo d’indebitamento che non era stato concesso neppure per il raggiungimento di obiettivi fondamentali come la protezione sociale o la lotta all’Inquinamento.

In una prospettiva europea la scelta puo’ essere discutibile anche in ragione del fatto che, da marzo 2024, la stessa Commissione ha sottoposto al legislatore europeo    la  proposta del regolamento legislativo “EDIP” ( v., infra).

In una prospettiva nazionale saranno comunque i parlamenti degli Stati membri a decidere se sostenere o meno le scelte dei propri governi. Ebbene, è evidente che trattandosi di un piano finanziario combinato con il secondo paniere della proposta VDL (quello da 150 miliardi), tutti i parlamenti nazionali ed Europeo aspetteranno il prossimo Consiglio europeo del 21 marzo per sapere se il Consiglio dell’Unione avrà preso, su proposta della Commissione ma senza l’intervento del Parlamento europeo, la decisione di istituire, sulla base dell’art.122 TFUE, questo nuovo strumento finanziario a favore degli Stati membri

L’esigenza della partecipazione e controllo democratico a livello europeo si pone quindi – e in modo manifesto a tutti –  per la proposta della Presidente della Commissione Von Der Leyen di istituire “ un nuovo strumento dell’UE ai sensi dell’articolo 122 del TFUE per fornire agli Stati membri prestiti sostenuti dal bilancio dell’UE.”

Nella lettera inviata agli altri componenti del Consiglio Europeo, viene  precisato che “ Con un importo massimo di 150 miliardi di euro, questo strumento sosterrebbe fortemente gli sforzi dell’UE per ottenere un rapido e significativo aumento degli investimenti nelle capacità di difesa dell’Europa – ora e nel corso di questo decennio. Tali finanziamenti potrebbero essere utilizzati per i settori di capacità prioritari per i quali è necessaria un’azione a livello europeo, in linea con la NATO:

– difesa aerea e missilistica

– sistemi di artiglieria

– missili e munizioni

– droni e sistemi anti-drone;

– strumenti strategici e protezione delle infrastrutture critiche, anche in relazione allo spazio;

– mobilità militare;

– cyber, intelligenza artificiale e guerra elettronica.

Un ulteriore aumento dell’impatto di questo nuovo strumento si otterrebbe acquistando insieme, il che garantirebbe interoperabilità e prevedibilità, ridurrebbe i costi e creerebbe la scala necessaria per rafforzare la nostra base industriale di difesa europea.”

Il “nuovo strumento” proposto dalla Presidente della Commissione si colloca quindi in una prospettiva molto più ambiziosa rispetto alle iniziative sinora intraprese dalla UE in questo campo. Esso presuppone infatti la definizione, a livello europeo, di “settori di capacità prioritari per i quali è necessaria un’azione a livello europeo, in linea con la NATO”. Viene quindi prevista la consultazione preventiva della NATO (dove siede l’ambasciatore USA) mentre  non viene coinvolto lo stesso Parlamento europeo, e cio’ anche se sono in gioco non solo i soldi del contribuente/cittadino europeo, ma anche il contenuto di politiche che toccano i suoi diritti e i suoi interessi vitali. 

Ma, a Trattato vigente, chi è legittimato a fare questo tipo di scelte?

La risposta non è semplice perché i Trattati, anche dopo Lisbona, hanno previsto un quadro a dir poco ambiguo quando non lacunoso e contradditorio.

Ciò perché la maggioranza degli Stati Membri contava, almeno fino a poco tempo fa, per la difesa del territorio dell’Unione, sul Trattato NATO, in una sorta di divisione del lavoro con i Trattati UE (v. art.42 TUE).

A seguito delle recenti prese di posizione Oltreatlantico questa divisione del lavoro è ormai in discussione e diverse soluzioni sono allo studio, prima fra tutti quella della costruzione di un “Pilastro europeo” in seno alla Nato. Tuttavia,’impressione è che anche questa sia una soluzione transitoria e che, prima o poi, l’Unione Europea debba, finalmente, assumersi la responsabilità della propria difesa.[1]

Se questa è la prospettiva a medio, lungo termine, l’Unione Europea deve applicare a questo piano di riarmo « europeo » che prefigura una politica di difesa, gli stessi fondamentali principi democratici applicati al resto delle politiche europee. È infatti paradossale che ancora oggi, a livello UE e in campi sensibili ed essenziali per la sicurezza dei cittadini a fronte di minacce esterne, non si applichino principi come quello secondo cui “il funzionamento dell’Unione si fonda sulla democrazia rappresentativa.” (art.10.1 TUE) o quello secondo cui “Ogni cittadino ha il diritto di partecipare alla vita democratica dell’Unione. Le decisioni sono prese nella maniera il più possibile aperta e vicina ai cittadini.” (art.10.3 TUE). 

In questo contesto costituzionale, la proposta della Commissione di fondare il finanziamento di 150 miliardi sulla base dell’sull’art.122 TFUE [i],  e quindi senza il coinvolgimento diretto del Parlamento europeo, è altamente criticabile, per non dire contraria al diritto dell’Unione.

L’art. 122, già usato in passato per cercare di arginare la crisi greca dell’Euro, la crisi del COVID e la crisi energetica conseguente all’invasione russa dell’Ucraina, è una base giuridica idonea solo per misure d’emergenza, inutilizzabile quindi in situazioni che si possono protrarre per anni.

Basti pensare che in occasione della crisi dell’Euro tale strumento fu poi abbandonato dagli stessi Stati membri che riconobbero che era necessario, in quel caso, adottare un vero e proprio Trattato, quello che diede poi vita al MES.

A più forte ragione, tale articolo va escluso per giustificare una misura del Consiglio volta, non come in passato per difendere la gestione di competenze dell’Unione (l’euro, la salute, i rifornimenti energetici) ma per difendere i cittadini dell’Unione, negli anni a venire, dalle minacce di una guerra. In altri termini, è evidente che il paniere 122 del piano “riarmo” non è una misura temporanea, ma è destinato, come ammette la stessa Presidente VDL nella sua lettera, a valere almeno per il prossimo decennio.

Ora, l’art. 122 non prevede il coinvolgimento del Parlamento europeo che, come per la decisione sul Riarmo del Consiglio europeo, sarebbe informato solo a cose fatte.

Le prerogative del controllo democratico che, in materia militare e di reclutamento di persone cui affidare l’uso delle armi, sono alla base della Costituzione di ogni Stato democratico, devono essere rispettate anche in seno all’UE associando il PE a queste decisioni, politicamente importantissime, e cio’ attraverso l’individuazione di una base giuridica appropriata che lo coinvolga.

Sotto questo profilo, la proposta VDL si presenta, già di per sé, come manifestamente anti-parlamentare, anti-democratica e contraria al Trattato.

Il Parlamento europeo dovrebbe quindi formalmente riservarsi, fin dalle sue prossime risoluzioni in materia di difesa, di impugnare di fronte alla Corte di giustizia ogni tipo di misura o di atto preso senza il suo preventivo ed effettivo coinvolgimento.

Poiché, poi, questa materia coinvolge direttamente anche i Parlamenti nazionali  il Parlamento europeo dovrebbe anche chiamarli a raccolta nello spirito e lettera delll’art.12 TUE secondo il quale essi contribuiscono alla costruzione europea (con ciò riaffermando anche il primato della democrazia parlamentare in seno all’UE).

Quanto al merito, é solo il caso di ricordare che, ai sensi degli articoli 3 a 6 TFUE, l’Unione non ha alcuna poteri diretti in materia di riarmo, ed è discutibile ne abbia in materia di sostegno degli Stati membri[2];

In questo quadro e, allo stato attuale del Trattato la sola base giuridica possibile per un simile coinvolgimento dell’Unione e l’associazione del PE alla costruzione di una politica di difesa è quella dell’art. 352.1 TFUE secondo il quale “ Se un’azione dell’Unione appare necessaria, nel quadro delle politiche definite dai trattati, per realizzare uno degli obiettivi di cui ai trattati senza che questi ultimi abbiano previsto i poteri di azione richiesti a tal fine, il Consiglio, deliberando all’unanimità su proposta della Commissione e previa approvazione del Parlamento europeo, adotta le disposizioni appropriate.” (sottolineatura aggiunta):

Solo in via subordinata e,(nella speranza di non essere costretti a difendere questa scelta davanti alla Corte)  ci si può anche chiedere se gli obbiettivi indicati nella lettera della Presidente VDL e i relativi finanziamenti sino a 150 Miliardi potrebbero essere ripresi a integrazione delle misure del progetto di Regolamento “EDIP”[ ii] attualmente in discussione presso il PE e il Consiglio [iii ]E’ solo il caso di ricordare che, nonostante tutti i limiti di tale proposta già denunciati dalla Corte dei conti europea [v], EDIP sarebbe seguendo una procedura legislativa ordinaria garantendo cosi’ la corresponsabilità del Parlamento europeo senza richiedere l’unanimità in Consiglio come previsto dall’art. 352 TFUE. I negoziati stanno procedendo speditamente tanto in Consiglio che nel Parlamento europeo [vii] e ciò dovrebbe permettere quanto prima l’avvio dei negoziati interistituzionali (trilogo).

Esistono quindi delle serie alternative al ricorso all’art.122 che il Parlamento europeo potrebbe sollevare a tutela delle proprie prerogative costituzionali a fronte di una iniziativa con la quale Consiglio europeo, Consiglio e Commissione lo escludessero dal processo decisionale. Ricorrendo alla Corte il Parlamento non difenderebbe solo, le proprie prerogative costituzionali, ma anche l’esigenza di rispettare anche in materia di difesa i principi democratici, la Rule of law e, soprattutto, i diritti dei cittadini che lo hanno eletto.

NOTE

[i] Articolo 122 (ex articolo 100 del TCE) 1. Fatta salva ogni altra procedura prevista dai trattati, il Consiglio, su proposta della Commis sione, può decidere, in uno spirito di solidarietà tra Stati membri, le misure adeguate alla situazione economica, in particolare qualora sorgano gravi difficoltà nell’approvvigionamento di determinati prodotti, in particolare nel settore dell’energia. 2. Qualora uno Stato membro si trovi in difficoltà o sia seriamente minacciato da gravi difficoltà a causa di calamità naturali o di circostanze eccezionali che sfuggono al suo controllo, il Consiglio, su proposta della Commissione, può concedere a determinate condizioni un’assistenza finanziaria del l’Unione allo Stato membro interessato. Il presidente del Consiglio informa il Parlamento europeo in merito alla decisione presa.

[ii] REGOLAMENTO DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO E DEL CONSIGLIO che istituisce il programma per l’industria europea della difesa e un quadro di misure per garantire la disponibilità e l’approvvigionamento tempestivi di prodotti per la difesa (“EDIP”) (2024/0061(COD) Link https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024PC0150

[iii] Le basi giuridiche del progetto di Regolamento EDIP inteso a garantire la disponibilità e l’approvvigionamento tempestivi di prodotti per la difesa sono  (1) l’articolo 173 TFUE in relazione alla competitività dell’EDTIB; (2) l’articolo 114 TFUE in relazione al mercato europeo dei materiali di difesa (EDEM); (3) l’articolo 212 TFUE in relazione al rafforzamento della DTIB ucraina e (4) l’articolo 322 TFUE in relazione alle disposizioni finanziarie.

[1] Peraltro, questa assunzione di responsabilità finanziaria da parte dell’Unione non sarebbe una novità visto che è già avvenuta all’indomani della fine dell’ultima guerra quando sei Stati europei crearono la CECA e poi la CEE proprio per andare più veloci dei tempi del piano Marshall e di quelli del Consiglio d’Europa. E ciò senza menzionare il trattato della Comunità europea di difesa, che aveva ottenuto l’accordo anche degli Stati Uniti.

[2] L’art. 42, § 7, TUE, dispone che se uno Stato membro dovesse subire un’aggressione armata nel suo territorio, “gli altri Stati membri sono tenuti a prestargli aiuto e assistenza con tutti i mezzi in loro possesso”, e non quindi con quelli in possesso dell’Unione, neppure con quelli finanziari che, in questo settore, l’Unione non può infatti avere, nel senso che è escluso che, sulla base delle attuali disposizioni del Trattato, essa possa iscrivere al suo bilancio questo tipo di spese.

When the tail wags the dog : the Commission proposal of withdrawing 37  EU pending legislative proposals

By Emilio De Capitani

On February 12th only few hours after the adoption by the Commission of the Work Programme for 2025 Vice President Sefcovich, presented it to the EP Plenary its . Even if most of the MEPs interventions covered several points the Commission’s work programme the debate was rather general and generic. A similar exercise took place on February 25th at the Council of General Affairs when, following the usual practice of individual members reading written texts, Ministers debated the same texts together with a more general draft conclusion text on the priorities for the new legislature.

According to the 2016 Interinstitutional agreement on Better Law Making after the presentation of the Commission Work Programme “…and drawing on it, the three Institutions will exchange views on initiatives for the coming year and agree on a joint declaration on annual interinstitutional programming (“joint declaration”), to be signed by the Presidents of the three Institutions. The joint declaration will set out broad objectives and priorities for the following year and will identify items of major political importance which, without prejudice to the powers conferred by the Treaties on the co-legislators, should receive priority treatment in the legislative process”. (emphasis added).

So, even though, looking from outside the two debates in Parliament and in the Council where not particularly exciting the Agreement of a Joint Declaration may have an impact also for the EU Citizens notably if the outcome will be that the Parliament and the Council will agree with the Commission proposal of ending negotiations on 37 legislative proposals on which the co-legislators have already worked (and in some cases even reached partial agreements) (see the list below).

On this issue par. 9 of the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement on better law making foresees that : “
In accordance with the principles of sincere cooperation and of institutional balance, when the Commission intends to withdraw a legislative proposal, whether or not such withdrawal is to be followed by a revised proposal, it will provide the reasons for such withdrawal, and, if applicable, an indication of the intended subsequent steps along with a precise timetable, and will conduct proper interinstitutional consultations on that basis. The Commission will take due account of, and respond to, the co-legislators’ positions.”

As it is currently formulated the text of the agreement cover two very different situation the first one when the Commission has the power of withdrawing a legislative pending proposal and the second one when the Commission is just proposing to the Co-legislator to abandon some legislative negotiations for political reasons or even for making some housekeeping if the pending proposals have become obsolete.

The first case of direct withdrawal the Commission’s faculty of withdrawing a legislative proposal when legislative negotiations are still pending, has been recognized but in rather strict terms by the Court of Justice only  ‘where an amendment planned by the Parliament and the Council distorts the proposal for a legislative act in a manner which prevents achievement of the objectives pursued by the proposal and which, therefore, deprives it of its raison d’être, the Commission is entitled to withdraw it’. It may however do so only after having had due regard to Parliament’s and Council’s concerns behind their wish to amend the proposal.” (C- C‑409/13, p.83). Framed in this way the Commission rights of withdrawing pending legislative procedures may be acceptable from an institutional balance perspective (at least until the Treaty will not recognize a full right of legislative initiative to the EP and to the Council and not the current “quasi petitionary” power foreseen by art 225 for the EP and 241 TFEU for the Council).

In all the other cases it is up to the Co-legislator (EP and Council) to decide if a legislative negotiation should be abandoned and the Commission may withdraw the relevant legislative proposal. Indeed, according to the Luxembourg Judges the Commission’s faculty of withdrawing a legislative text“..cannot, however, confer upon that institution a right of veto in the conduct of the legislative process, a right which would be contrary to the principles of conferral of powers and institutional balance.”(C- C‑409/13, p.75).

Let’s be clear notwithstanding the Commission’s ambition to be considered at the same level of the co-legislators, after Lisbon the “legislative triangle” is no more “equilateral” and the “Institutional balance” is not the same than in the pre-Lisbon era. Even though the Commission maintains a quasi-monopoly of legislative initiative, it is up only to the co-legislator to negotiate and finalize the EU legislative measures (art.289 and 294 of the TFEU) or to abandon them if they so wish. The proof ? Think about the case of legal challenges of an EU legislative text: only the EP and the Council will be responsible before the Court and not the Commission even when the co-legislators adopted the Commission Proposal without amending it.

Bearing in mind all these elements the Commission announcement in the 2025 work program of withdrawing not less than 37 legislative proposals seems in some cases highly questionable. As it has been presented in the Commission’s Work program the Citizen may consider that the Commission is only asking for an opinion from the co-legislators but this should not be the case and turn the respective Institutional roles upside down.

In a way, this is a tail which wags the dog.

But this procedure will also blurs the role of the co-legislator and threaten the principle of legislative transparency as required by the treaty (art. 15.2 TFEU). Ignoring why the EP and the Council want to abandon legislative negotiations does not fit very well with the principle according to which “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (art. 10.1 TEU). In this perspective none may contest that legislative activity is at the core of the EU “functioning” and should happen in full transparency (art. 15.2 TFEU) a condition which should be granted by the co-legislators and notably by the EP itself.  As a consequence the co-legislators should not abdicate to their political and Institutional responsibilities when they negotiate or even more when decide to abandon legislative negotiations on given legislative proposals by explaining why they intend to do so. Hiding behind few lines of justification and a pretended Commission right to withdraw legislative pending proposals is not the best you may expect from directly elected Members and by the Council.

Looking on the Council side some elements may arise from the Institution’s contribution to the Joint declaration which will debated (and adopted ?) on March 18th with a view to sign it on the margins of the March 2025 European Council.

But on the European Parliament side, in the absence of a Plenary resolution is not clear who will take the responsibility to express the position of the Institution on the proposed legislative withdrawals.

Maybe the position will be taken by the Conference of Presidents of Political Groups according to art 27.2 of the EP Rules of Procedures making reference to “legislative planning”. However, withdrawing 37 pending legislative proposals is not an organizational measure which may fall under the Conference of Presidents remit. Closing the possibility of further debating a legislative proposal is a decision on the content of a legislative procedure which can be taken only by the Plenary as it is the case for all the EU legislative votes. Moreover, in the absence of a specific provision in the Treaty (as foreseen by art 294 TFEU) closing a legislative negotiation require the agreement between the co-legislator and the case may well exist where only one of them agree for the withdrawal (see the case of the revision of the Transparency Regulation 1049/01 which is still valid for the EP but not for the Council..).  

Not surprisingly some Civil society organizations have already complained for some of these announced withdrawals (notably of anti-Discrimination Directive – point 26 of the list). In the Council  several member States have declared their interest in continuing the legislative work (SW, PT, IRL, NL, EST, FR, BE, SLO, IT and Malta) but what is the EP position ?

But other cases raise a similar questions. Why proposing to withdraw:

These are just few questions but other may be raised and it is up to the co-legislator to explain if they agree with the Commission proposals and why.

The List of legislative proposals deemed to be withdrawn

1 COM(2011)714 final 2011/0314 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States Obsolete – the scope of the proposal has been partly taken over by the Directive implementing the OECD Pillar 2 on minimum corporate taxation. The remaining issues the proposal intended to tackle will be addressed via an upcoming Omnibus act as a part of the simplification process.

2 COM(2011)827 final 2011/0391 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common rules for the allocation of slots at European Union airports Obsolete – the proposal is by now obsolete. The Commission has launched a fitness-check and will decide on the basis of its findings on the way forward.

3 COM(2012)336 final 2012/0164 (APP) Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION establishing a facility for providing financial assistance for Member States whose currency is not the euro Obsolete – the proposal needs to be updated as regards i.a. the funding modalities of the Balance of Payments Facility and to integrate the lessons to be drawn from the recent crises, as well as the institutional, economic and financial sector developments since 2009, and their possible implication for the design and implementation of the facility, in line with the Council Conclusions of 27 March 2024.

4 COM(2015)603 final 2015/0250 (NLE) Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION laying down measures in view of progressively establishing unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund No foreseeable agreement – in the context of the discussions on Europe’s economic and financial sovereignty, the Commission will assess whether another proposal should be tabled or another type of approach should be chosen.

5 COM(2017)276 final 2017/0115 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, as regards certain provisions on vehicle taxation No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked with no perspective of agreement.

6 COM(2017)647 final 2017/0288 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 on common rules for access to the international market for coach and bus services No foreseeable agreement – the proposal has not been taken up for discussion in the Council and is by now outdated.

7 COM(2017)827 final 2017/0333 (APP) Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund No foreseeable agreement – many of the changes proposed under this initiative have been incorporated into a separate revision of the European Stability Mechanism Treaty. 

8 COM(2018)135 final 2018/0063B (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely.

9 COM(2018)329 final  2018/0164(CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the introduction of the detailed technical measures for the operation of the definitive VAT system for the taxation of trade between Member States No foreseeable agreement – discussions are suspended since 2019 and further progress is unlikely.

10 COM(2018)339 final  2018/0171 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on sovereign bond-backed securities No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely.

11 COM(2018)387 final 2018/0212 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of a European Investment Stabilisation Function No foreseeable agreement – The proposal is outdated with the entry into force of NGEU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the withdrawal of the socalled Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness (BICC) in February 2021. 

12 COM(2019)38 final 2019/0017 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2015/757 in order to take appropriate account of the global data collection system for ship fuel oil consumption data Obsolete – changes contained in this proposal have been incorporated into the most recent EU ETS revision, adopted in 2023.

13 COM(2020)49 final  2020/0022 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (codification) Obsolete – since the adoption of this proposal in 2020, a number of significant amendments have been adopted, making this codification proposal obsolete. The Commission will propose a new codified proposal.

14 COM(2020)577 final 2020/0264 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 as regards the capacity of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency to act as Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky Obsolete – changes contained in this proposal have been incorporated into the Single European Sky (“SES II +”) Regulation.

15 COM(2021)769 final 2021/0400 (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the Union the maximum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum authorised weights in international traffic (codification) Obsolete – since the adoption of this proposal in 2021, a recent amendment has been proposed by the Commission, that will make this codification proposal obsolete. The Commission will propose a new codified proposal as soon as the new amendment will have been adopted.

16 COM(2022)222 final 2022/0160 (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency Obsolete – the changes suggested by this proposal were incorporated during the discussions on the revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive.

17. COM(2023)232 final 2023/0133(COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on standard essential patents and amending Regulation (EU)2017/1001 No foreseeable agreement – the Commission will assess whether another proposal should be tabled or another type of approach should be chosen.

18 COM(2018)634 final 2018/0329 (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (recast) A contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018 Obsolete – the Commission intends to present a new proposal in 2025 (referred to in annex 1 of this Commission Work Programme) in the context of which the current pending proposal will be effectively withdrawn.

19 COM(2021)890 final 2021/0427 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum Obsolete – the content of this proposal was merged into Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147.

20 COM(2021)752 final 2021/0401 (CNS)  Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on provisional emergency measures for the benefit of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland Obsolete – the proposal was blocked during the interinstitutional discussions and is now obsolete.

21 COM(2024)174 final 2024/0094 (NLE) Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION for the 2024/2025 Schengen Cycle Obsolete – no agreement was foreseeable. The Schengen Council agreed on a number of priority areas for action that are dealt with via other means than this proposal.

22 COM(2012)403 final 2012/0196 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (Recast) No foreseeable agreement – no agreement is expected. Furthermore, since 2012, developments took place that make this proposal obsolete. The Commission will assess whether another proposal should be tabled or another type of approach should be chosen to allow for a new start.

23 COM(2015)177 final 2015/0093 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of genetically modified food and feed on their territory No foreseeable agreement – any potential further amendment of the GMO legislation will depend on the outcome of the negotiations on the proposal for new genomic techniques, or the identification of issues to be addressed in the context of the biotechnology and biomanufacturing initiative.

24 COM(2022)563 final 2022/0348 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Area of the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) No foreseeable agreement – no agreement is expected between the European Parliament and the Council at first reading. The Commission intends to present a new proposal in 2025 in the context of which the current pending proposal will be effectively withdrawn. 

25 COM(2023)771 final 2023/0449 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) 2016/1139, (EU) 2018/973 and (EU) 2019/472 as regards the targets for fixing fishing opportunities No foreseeable agreement – no agreement is expected from the colegislators.

26 COM(2008)426 final 2008/0140 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely.

27 COM(2011)137 final 2011/0073 (COD)   COM(2008)229 final 2008/0090 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents  No foreseeable agreement – no progress has been made since 2011.

28 COM(2016)799 final 2016/0400B (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL adapting a number of legal acts providing for the use of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny to Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely. There is a legal obligation to put legal acts adopted prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in conformity with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. The Commission will therefore present to the colegislators a new proposal to that effect.

29  COM(2017)10 final 2017/0003 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications No foreseeable agreement – no agreement is expected from the colegislators. Furthermore, the proposal is outdated in view of some recent legislation in both the technological and the legislative landscape.

30 COM(2017)85 final 2017/0035 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely.

31 COM(2018)96 final 2018/0044 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims No foreseeable agreement – the proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely.

32. COM(2022)496 final 2022/0303 (COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability) No foreseeable agreement – the Commission will assess whether another proposal should be tabled or another type of approach should be chosen.

33. JOIN(2015)36 final 2015/0302 (NLE) Joint Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Obsolete – the ratification process of this agreement has been interrupted with the establishment of a Taliban appointed caretaker government that, to date, remains unrecognized by the international community, making the original agreement obsolete.

34. COM(2022)63 final 2022/0043 (NLE) Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the written procedure by the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits amending Annex IV Obsolete – the proposal was made in the negotiations on the modernisation of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, which were finalised in 2023. The content of this proposal was included in another Council decision making this one redundant.

35 COM(2022)184 final 2022/0125 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union Obsolete – the content of the proposal has been adopted end of September 2024 as part of the revision of the Financial Regulation (Recast).

36. COM(2024)301 final 2024/0059 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 as regards the financial envelope and the allocation for the thematic facility No foreseeable agreement – no agreement is expected. Furthermore, the MFF mid-term revision can be implemented without this legal proposal.

37. COM(2024)100 final 2024/0060 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 2021/522, Regulation (EU) No 2021/1057, Regulation (EU) No 2021/1060, Regulation (EU) No 2021/1139, Regulation (EU) No 2021/1229 and Regulation (EU) No 2021/1775 as regards the changes to the amounts of funds for certain programmes and funds No foreseeable agreement – no agreement is expected. The MFF mid-term revision can be implemented without this legal proposal. An amendment to the Regulation 2021/1755 establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR) to establish the legal basis for redistribution of the outstanding amounts between the Member States will be proposed by the C