Goodbye, cruel world: visas for holidays after Brexit?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (April 25, 2016)

by Steve Peers

Until yesterday, I have consistently argued that the prospect of British citizens being subject to visas for short-term visits to the EU after Brexit was highly remote. In fact, I even told off some ‘Remain’ supporters who suggested that this might happen. EU policy is consistently to waive short-term visa requirements for wealthy countries (like the USA, Canada and Japan) as long as those countries waived short-term visa requirements for all EU citizens in return. I couldn’t imagine that it was likely that anyone on the ‘Leave’ side would wish to advocate short-term visa requirements for EU citizens visiting the UK after Brexit, thus damaging the British tourist industry and leading to a reciprocal obligation for UK citizens to get visas for short visits to the EU.

Incredibly, I was wrong on this. Yesterday, Dominic Raab, a senior figure on the Leave side, suggested that the UK might want to introduce visas for EU citizens after Brexit, and accepted that UK citizens might be subject to visa requirements for visits to the remaining EU in turn. It can’t seriously now be suggested that it’s ‘scaremongering’ to consider that this might become UK policy after Brexit – unless there’s such a thing as ‘self-scaremongering’ by the Leave side.

Let’s be clear about this. The idea of short-term visa requirements after Brexit is utterly and profoundly stupid. It is by no means a necessary consequence of Brexit, and would cause the maximum possible damage to UK businesses and the ordinary lives of British citizens who seek to visit the EU after Brexit, with little or no security benefit in return.

Background: EU visa policy

As an EU Member State, the UK allows short-term entry to EU citizens without a visa, as well as longer-term free movement of people – although the latter issue is severable from short-term visas. The reverse is also true, of course: simplifying the leisure, family and business visits of millions of British citizens to the EU every year. While there is an earlier treaty from the Council of Europe (a body separate from the EU) which abolishes visa requirements between European states, the UK is not a party to that treaty – and presumably would not become one under Raab’s plans.

The EU has agreements on free movement of people with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, but it seems clear from official statements by the Leave side that the UK would not sign up to these after Brexit. But as I said, short-term visa waivers are a severable issue: the EU does have reciprocal short-term visa waiver treaties with a number of non-EU countries, as well as a unilateral policy of waiving short-term visa requirements for other wealthy countries who reciprocate. Therefore, all it would take for British citizens to retain the visa waiver for short-term visits to the EU after Brexit would be a British government policy not to impose short-term visa requirements on EU citizens, or a UK/EU treaty to this effect. This seemed highly likely – until Raab’s rant.

The EU decides visa policy as a bloc, so there is no possibility that the UK could do separate deals on short-term visas with individual EU countries. As an exception, Ireland (like the UK at present) has an opt-out from the EU’s visa policy, so the UK and Ireland could retain their separate Common Travel Area arrangements – if they wished to. It’s not clear if Raab also wants to impose visa requirements for Irish nationals (which might also then be reciprocated). If that happens, then border controls would have to be reimposed between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, as some on the Leave side have already called for (though others have taken a different view).

EU visas: the legal framework

The EU (apart from Ireland) has a standard short-term visa policy, which entails issuing ‘Schengen visas’ valid for all the Schengen states.  So in legal terms we know what the impact would be of the EU imposing visas on British citizens. The basic rules are set out in the EU visa code, although a few EU countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia) don’t apply that code yet as they are not yet fully part of Schengen. While the Schengen system currently has many well-known problems as regards border control, this has not affected Schengen visa policy, and there is no reason why it would do.

To get a Schengen visa, the visa code requires an application at a consulate, although in practice the applications are often made through a private service provider. Applications can be made up to three months before the date of travel, or six months for multiple-entry visas. Applicants need to provide fingerprints, except for children under twelve and some other limited exceptions. They must also provide documents supporting the reason for their travel, obtain medical insurance and pay a fee of €60 per applicant, along with an extra fee if the applicant uses a private service provider. The fee is reduced to €35 for children between six and twelve, and waived for younger children, as well as pupils and teachers on study trips, researchers and representatives of NGOs. It may be waived in a small number of other cases; but it is always payable for tourist or business trips.

Most applications for Schengen visas are accepted, but applications are scrutinised for subsistence and intention to return, so it may be more likely that unemployed or low-waged British citizens find their visa applications refused. Any rejections will be registered in the EU’s Visa Information System for five years, which may make it less likely for a future application to be accepted. Usually a visa is valid for a period of three months over the next six months, but it is possible to get a multiple-entry visa (valid for several trips over a five year period) if there is a proven need to travel frequently. Visas can’t usually be obtained at the border, so British citizens would have to apply for a visa at least several days in advance to be sure of being able to travel. Without a visa, they would be denied boarding planes, trains or ferries, due to the EU law on carrier sanctions.

Back in 2014, the Commission proposed amendments to the EU visa code. They would, for instance, simplify the rules on getting multiple-entry visas, and allow for earlier applications. But such visas would still not be standard. Recently, both the Council and the European Parliament adopted their positions on this proposal, and so it will likely be agreed later this year. I’ve blogged separately on the main changes that the Commission proposed, as well as the chance to add rules on humanitarian visas, and on the specific proposals affecting UK citizens’ non-EU family members. But if the new code ultimately applies to all British citizens, its impact will be obviously be much greater.

The EU has signed some treaties on visa facilitation with non-EU countries. These treaties don’t waive the visa requirement, but they reduce the application fee and simplify the process. Of course they are reciprocal – the UK would have to cut the fees and simplify the process for EU citizens applying for short-term visas to visit the UK too.

Practical consequences: the unbearable madness of visa requirements

There’s no doubt that visa requirements reduce travel for tourism, business and other purposes. There are detailed estimates of the scale of the economic impact in a reportdrawn up for the Commission before it proposed the revised visa code. Think of it at the individual level: if there’s no visa facilitation treaty, a British couple with two teenagers would have to pay an extra €240 for a family holiday in the EU in visa application fees, with fees often paid to service providers on top. Even with a visa facilitation treaty like the one with Ukraine, the family would pay €70 in fees (€35/adult, under-18s exempt from fees), and again possibly service providers.

Raab argues that all this is justified on security grounds. Is it? First of all, the vast majority of terrorist (or other) offences in the UK are committed by British citizens. But some foreign visitors do commit crimes. How best to screen them out? The basic problem is that imposing a visa requirement doesn’t, in itself, increase our capacity to determine if a particular individual is likely to pose a threat. It simply, in effect, moves the decision on entry in time (to a date before arrival) and space (away from the border to a consulate – although individuals will still be checked at the border to ensure that there is a visa in their passport). The best way of knowing if a particular individual is a threat is by checking the available data.

That information is easy to find if the visa applicant has previously committed a crime in the UK, because in that case there ought to be a criminal record accompanied by an entry ban. But in this scenario, the entry ban information should in principle not only be available to consulates considering a visa application, but also to border guards deciding on entry at the border. So the visa requirement adds nothing. Nor does it add anything as far as EU citizens are concerned: the EU citizens’ Directive allows the UK to impose an entry ban on EU citizens who have committed serious crimes; and the UK can (and does) refuse entry to EU citizens at the border.

What if the visa applicant has committed a crime in another country? Whether people have to apply for a visa or are checked at the border, there is no general access to other countries’ criminal records. However, the UK does have access to some relevant dataas an EU Member State. Last year, it gained access to the Schengen Information System, which includes information on wanted persons, including some terrorist suspects. From 2012, the EU system for exchange of information on criminal recordswas set up (known as ECRIS: the European Criminal Records Information System), and the EU Commission recently reported that it had greatly improved the flow of information on this issue. The ECRIS law provides for criminal records to be exchanged more easily as regards a country’s own citizens (so we now have more information on UK citizens who have committed crimes abroad). Furthermore, the UK opted into the newly adopted EU law on passenger name records.

These laws don’t provide perfect security, of course. Not all terrorist suspects’ names appear in the Schengen Information System, for instance. The passenger name records law is likely to be challenged on human rights grounds, since it gathers information on all passengers, not just suspects. The criminal records law was unable to stop a tragic killing two years ago, because British police unfortunately did not ask another Member State about the killer’s criminal record (on the basis of a separate EU law) when they had the opportunity. As I suggested at the time, it would be desirable to provide for automatic circulation of the criminal records of EU citizens who have been convicted of very serious crimes, if they have been released from prison, so that they can be stopped and validly rejected from entry at the border.  The upcoming amendments to the Schengen Information System would be an opportunity to do this.

But how would Brexit, with or without a visa requirement, improve this situation? It would not give the UK any more access to EU databases, or to other Member States’ criminal records systems; indeed, it might mean less access. The EU has not extended ECRIS to any non-EU countries; the Schengen Information System has only been extended to those (like Norway and Switzerland) that are fully part of Schengen. The EU has some treaties on exchange of passenger name data with non-EU countries, but this policy is being challenged on data protection grounds in the EU court.

More broadly, the EU court has ruled in the Schrems case that personal data can only be transferred to non-EU countries that have data protection law ‘essentially equivalent’ to EU law. The UK would have to commit to continue applying a law very similar to EU law, or risk disruptions in the flow of personal data – affecting digital industries as well as exchange of data between law enforcement authorities. This restriction can’t easily be negotiated away, since the case law is based on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has the same legal effect as the Treaties. The UK’s compliance with the EU rules would almost certainly be challenged in practice: see by analogy the Davis and Watson case already pending before the EU court. Outside the EU, the effect of a ruling that the UK did not comply with the rules would be a potential disruption of the flows of personal data.

One final point. Let’s remind ourselves that the UK already allows nationals of over fiftynon-EU countries to visit for a short period without a visa. So obviously we have found a way to reconcile the possible security threat this might pose with the needs of the UK economy. Why should that be so difficult to do as regards EU countries after Brexit? The mere existence of that policy anyway creates a loophole: any EU citizen with the dual nationality of one of those non-EU states (or perhaps Ireland) would be able to visit the UK without a visa anyway. Or is the intention to require a visa for everyone?

Of course, this loophole would work the other way around too. As a dual citizen of the UK and Canada, I could still visit the EU visa-free on a Canadian passport. So could any other British people who are also citizens of a Member State, or a non-EU country on the EU visa whitelist. But many others (including my family, for instance) could not. Let’s conclude on the utter absurdity of this: a British citizen contemplating the use of a Canadian passport to visit the European Union. Is this really the vision of an open, liberal, global United Kingdom after Brexit that the Leave side want people to vote for on June 23rd?

L’accord Union européenne avec la Turquie : l’heure de vérité ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE ON 28 AVRIL 2016. 

par Henri Labayle

L’indifférence relative avec laquelle l’opinion publique a accueilli l’annonce d’une nouvelle tragédie en Méditerranée ne doit pas tromper : celle-ci n’est vraisemblablement que l’un des épisodes d’une série à venir.

Ce silence contraste avec l’autosatisfaction bruyante avec laquelle l’Union et ses membres se sont félicités, au même moment, des premières applications de l’accord passé avec la Turquie concernant le renvoi des migrants arrivés en Grèce vers cet Etat tiers. Comme si le problème était en passe d’être réglé, comme si le sérieux des inquiétudes exposées ici s’était dissipé, au point de voir les autorités italiennes proposer de s’en inspirer avec les Etats du bassin méditerranéen pour leur proposer un « pacte migratoire » …

En fait, et au delà des polémiques relatives à la bonne volonté du « partenaire » turc, l’examen attentif de la première évaluation qui vient d’être proposée par la Commission (1) semble présager exactement du contraire (2).

1. Une mise en œuvre opérationnelle sujette à caution

L’accord passé le 20 mars 2016 entre la Turquie et l’Union européenne s’était fixé pour date de mise en œuvre le 4 avril 2016. A cet instant, les premiers retours de la Grèce vers la Turquie et les premières réinstallations vers l’Union européenne devaient avoir lieu. Après une présentation toute médiatique laissant croire aux opinions publiques que la solution était désormais acquise, la Commission s’est livrée à une évaluation plus technique, le 20 avril, dans une Communication relative aux progrès réalisés dans l’application de l’accord du 18 mars ((COM 2016 (231) .

L’exercice devrait se répéter avec une périodicité mensuelle. Cette volonté louable de transparence depuis l’été dernier illustre sans doute à la fois la volonté de la Commission de rendre compte de son action mais aussi de pointer publiquement les responsabilités en cause. Aucun doute n’est permis, elles sont celles des Etats membres.

L’accord du 18 mars, on le sait et au delà des controverses quant à son contenu, avait pour principal objectif du point de vue de l’Union de tarir le flux des migrants en provenance de Turquie et réduire à néant l’attractivité du commerce des trafiquants et autres passeurs. Il espérait y parvenir à la fois en ouvrant un canal légal entre la Grèce et la Turquie et en cordonnant le contrôle de la frontière commune. Pour contrepartie, il impliquait du point de vue turc à la fois un appui financier et administratif mais aussi une relance du processus d’adhésion, en particulier en matière de visas.

Le contrôle de la frontière commune implique d’abord une coopération accrue des forces en présence. De ce point de vue, l’action conjointe de Frontex, de l’OTAN et des autorités turques a, apparemment produit de l’effet puisque le chiffre des arrivées en Grèce serait passé de plus de 25 mille durant les trois semaines précédant l’accord à moins de 6000 depuis. Plus précisément, la Commission fait état du retour forcé de 325 migrants irréguliers n’ayant pas demandé l’asile, entrés après le 20 mars : 240 Pakistanais, 42 Afghans, 10 Iraniens, 7 Indiens, 5 Bangladais, 5 Irakiens, 5 Congolais, 4 Sri Lankais, 2 Syriens, 1 Somalien, 1 Ivorien, 1 Marocain, 1 Egyptien, 1 Palestinien. Ces retours ont été opérés sous l’égide de l‘accord de réadmission Grèce/Turquie, avant que, le 1er juin, l’accord de réadmission entre l’Union et la Turquie ne prenne le relai, après approbation du Parlement turc.

Sans doute faut-il y voir aussi les premiers fruits des échanges avec les autorités turques concernant la lutte contre les passeurs, via la présence d’agents de liaison à Europol et à Frontex, et de la stratégie de communication en direction des migrants tendant à contrebalancer le discours sécurisant des passeurs.

Il reste que le gigantesque effort sollicitant à la fois l’Union et ses agences mais aussi les Etats membres demeure encore très largement à produire, au plan matériel et financier comme au plan opérationnel. L’exposé financier des efforts attendus est en effet parfaitement clair, les mécanismes actuels d’aide d’urgence à la Grèce ou de financement des efforts de Frontex et du Bureau européen d’asile n’étant pas à la hauteur suffisante. Fait peu fréquent dans ce registre, la Commission n’hésite pas à épingler explicitement 12 Etats membres à la fin de sa communication pour n’avoir encore versé aucune contribution à ce jour (l’Autriche, la Belgique, Chypre, la Croatie, l’Espagne, la Lituanie, Malte, la Pologne, la Roumanie, la Slovénie). En revanche, 16 États membres de l’UE ont désormais envoyé leurs certificats de contribution, pour un montant de 1,61 milliard d’euros sur les 2 milliards promis pour 2016-2017

Du point de vue opérationnel, les choses ne sont guère plus encourageantes. Si autour du coordonnateur nommé par la Commission et le comité de pilotage qu’elle conduit avec la Grèce, les agences intéressées et un certain nombre d’Etats membres, la mécanique s’est mise en place, il n’en est pas forcément de même du soutien attendu des Etats membres.

La Commission se félicite de ce que Frontex ait déployé dans les îles grecques près de 318 agents d’escorte et 21 experts en réadmission à l’appui des opérations de retour et que 25 officiers de liaison turcs soient déployés dans les centres de crise grecs et 5 officiers de liaison grecs aux points d’arrivée en Turquie. De même, une petite centaine d’agents du Bureau européen d’asile sont à l’oeuvre, pour une cinquantaine d’entretiens quotidiens avec pour objectif d’en mener 200 à la mi-mai. Au vu de l’ampleur de la tâche et de son sérieux indispensable, les doutes sont donc permis. Car, à vouloir réserver aux Etats membres le fonctionnement des agences de l’Union, ces derniers sont pris à leur propre piège lorsque l’on évalue leur degré d’implication. La Communication de la Commission et ses annexes et autres « fact sheet » (méprisant comme à l’ordinaire la langue officielle de trois Etats fondateurs de l’Union) fournissent à cet égard des tableaux éloquents quant à l’effort réel des Etats à la fois au vu des demandes effectuées et des réponses Etat par Etat.

Attentes

Bilan avril

L’autre volet de la contribution des Etats membres tient dans la réalisation des engagements pris il y a plusieurs mois et demeurés largement lettre morte depuis juillet 2015, bafouant ouvertement les obligations juridiques contractées. L’accueil par les Etats membres conditionne en effet le jeu du principe « 1 + 1 ». Si la Commission présente un schéma décisionnel où la Turquie saisirait le HCR d’une liste de candidats à la réinstallation, pour évaluation et avant une décision finale des Etats membres concernés, la réalité des chiffres est toute autre.

A ce jour et sur la base de l’accord, 103 Syriens seulement ont gagné l’Allemagne, la Finlande, la Suède et les Pays Bas depuis la Turquie … Initialement, 22 500 places offertes à la réinstallation avaient été arrêtées en 2015, et 5677 ont été pourvues, principalement pour soulager les Etats voisins tels que la Jordanie et le Liban et grâce à l’appui des Etats associés à l’Union, comme en témoigne les tableaux fournis par la Commission. Il reste donc 16.800 places disponibles…

Réinstallation UE

Reisntallation associés

Afin de donner un minimum de crédibilité à l’accord passé avec la Turquie, la Commission a donc proposéd’ajouter à ces chiffres, les 54 000 places de relocalisation prévues initialement pour soulager l’Italie et la Grèce, en modifiant la décision 2015/1601 du 22 septembre 2015. Ce faisant, cette approche strictement comptable permettrait d’aboutir au chiffre total de 70 800 places à mettre dans la balance des relations avec la Turquie. Elle ne masque pas la démission des Etats comme en témoignent les chiffres que la Commission fournit elle même, bien volontiers.

Relocalisation Italie 11 avrilRelocalisation Grece

Dans ces conditions, les tensions entourant l’application de l’accord du 18 mars se comprennent aisément. Outre les difficultés pratiques extrêmement délicates à régler, les arrières plans politiques et juridiques ne sont pas réglés, bien au contraire.

2. Une mise en œuvre juridique sujette à critiques

Dès la conclusion de l’accord, l’interprète le plus qualifié qui soit en matière d’application de la Convention de Genève, le Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés avait émis expressément ses réserves. Celles-ci sont généralement partagées tant par la doctrine que par l’essentiel des ONG et d’une part de la classe politique. Fait peu habituel, l’Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l’Europe a même exprimé ses critiques dans une résolution, le 20 avril.

Elles tiennent en un doute principal, celui de la crédibilité du partenaire turc et de la fiabilité de ses pratiques. Comment un tel contributeur aux jurisprudence les plus sévères de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme pourrait-il inspirer la confiance, faisant preuve d’une constance remarquable de ce point de vue : il est à ce jour l’Etat partie à la CEDH ayant fourni le contingent le plus important d’arrêts à Strasbourg (17,13 %) et la pente sur laquelle s’engagent ses nouveaux dirigeants mène à penser que le pire est à venir … En d‘autres termes, comment imaginer qu’un Etat tiers réticent à reconnaître effectivement des garanties fondamentales à ses propres ressortissants pourrait assurer, a priori, la protection efficace de ressortissants de pays tiers ?

Seul, l’aveuglement insondable du Président du Conseil européen peut lui permettre d’afficher sans vergogne dans ses conditions sa « fierté » quant à un tel partenariat …

Le principe même d’un transfert systématique en direction de la Turquie demeure donc au cœur du débat, tel que le HCR lui même en avait exposé les termes immédiatement après l’accord avec l’Union. Le concept de pays tiers sûr est évidemment admis par le droit de l’Union, comme indiqué précédemment, mais il continue à poser concrètement la question de son application au cas d’espèce.

Afin de considérer que la Turquie émargeait à cette catégorie, il fallait, d’une part, remplir des conditions juridiques dans le pays de départ, la Grèce, et dans le pays de retour, la Turquie, et, d’autre part, que des garanties effectives soient apportées. Sous peine, comme le soulignait le HCR, de justifier une saisine de la Cour de justice à titre préjudiciel, argument qui a d’ailleurs trouvé un écho au Parlement européen.

Pour ce qui est de la mise à niveau juridique, des règles spécifiques devaient d’abord être introduites dans la législation grecque, notamment afin d’offrir un accès réel aux procédures et à un recours effectif aux personnes concernées. Il en allait de même en ce qui concerne la portée des engagements de la Turquie au regard de la Convention de Genève. La Grèce a ainsi adopté le 3 avril une loi lui permettant d’appliquer les concepts de pays tiers sûr et pays sûr de premier asile ainsi que d’assurer des procédures accélérées pour l’examen des demandes d’asile, en matière d’appel. Malgré l’optimisme affiché par la Commission dans son rapport d’évaluation évoqué précédemment, la création d’une vingtaine de « comités d’appel » demandera confirmation quant à son efficacité. Pour ce qui est de la Turquie et après quelques réticences, a été adoptée début avril la législation permettant d’accorder une protection temporaire aux ressortissants syriens « remis », conformément à la Convention de Genève. De même auraient été fournies les assurances nécessaires concernant les non-Syriens réadmis. En bref, la couverture juridique exigée par l’Union parce que légitimant l’accord semblait avoir été obtenue.

Au plan pratique, les choses se sont avérées beaucoup moins simples.

En Grèce d’abord, où se sont multipliées les accusations de déficiences à l’encontre de l’administration grecque. Avec tout de même et quelles que soient les positions des uns ou des autres, minimisant ou accentuant ces défaillances, une forte présomption de vraisemblance. Comment un Etat membre incapable depuis de nombreuses années d’accomplir ses obligations en matière de protection internationale, comme constaté à de multiples reprises par les juridictions européennes, au point de voir suspendre les transferts Dublin en sa direction, pourrait brusquement se transformer du tout au tout en quelques semaines ?

Au cœur du dispositif, la question de la rétention des demandeurs de protection et des conditions dans lesquelles celle-ci se déroule est incontestablement d’une gravité certaine. Non pas que la retenue des demandeurs de protection soit contraire à la législation de l’Union, ce qui n’est pas le cas, mais parce que les conditions matérielles et juridiques dans lesquelles ces privations de liberté sont réalisées posent manifestement problème, provoquant de ce fait la mise en retrait de nombre d’ONG. Le rapport de l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe mérite à cet égard une citation intégrale : « la capacité prévue des trois plus grands centres d’accueil et d’enregistrement (Lesbos, Chios et Samos) a été très rapidement saturée. Ces centres sont devenus surpeuplés et les conditions de vie se sont détériorées: nourriture de mauvaise qualité, abris précaires, conditions d’hygiène déplorables, accès insuffisant à des soins médicaux appropriés ».

Pour ce qui est de la Turquie, la situation faite aux ressortissants non-syriens pose évidemment problème au regard du principe de non-discrimination et quoi que l’on en dise à Bruxelles. De l’Afghanistan à l’Erythrée, la misère humaine dépasse la situation particulière de l’exode syrien. Aussi, les « assurances » données à l’Union par la Turquie les concernant sont loin d’être suffisantes quant à leur accès à une procédure d’asile. D’autant que se multiplient les rapports alarmants relatif à la situation réelle des demandeurs de protection dans le pays ou quant au respect du principe de non-refoulement.

D’où l‘accentuation des pressions politiques et une multiplication des contacts directs avec la Turquie, le dernier en date prenant la forme d’une visite sur le terrain d’Angela Merkel et de Donald Tusk. Visite d’un village Potemkine ou tentative de forcer les blocages en cours, l’interprétation exacte de cette venue est délicate, destinée à légitimer l’action en cours autant qu’à établir un rapport de force avec l’opinion publique, l’initiative étant vertement critiquée dans la presse allemande la qualifiant de « farce« .

Car s’est ouvert entretemps un autre front, celui du lien effectué par les autorités turques entre la pérennité de l’accord avec l’Union et la libéralisation des visas à l’égard des ressortissants turcs.

On saura au mois de juin si cette « promesse faite au peuple turc », selon le premier ministre turc, peut ou non être honorée. En l’état, la Commission, avec cet optimisme qui la prive souvent de crédibilité, produira une évaluation le 4 mai, rapport sur la base duquel on saura si les 72 critères à remplir par la partie turque sont satisfaits ou non et si une proposition législative en bonne et due forme concrétise cette mise à niveau. A ce stade et selon les informations fournies par la Commission, il semblerait qu’une cinquantaine de ces critères soient effectivement acceptés, ce qui suppose néanmoins qu’en un mois un progrès conséquent doive encore être fait. Ce à quoi invite la Commission, par l’intermédiaire de son premier vice-président devant le Parlement européen.

Co-législateur, ce dernier pourrait donner davantage de fil à retordre qu’on ne le croit aux Etats membres, accusant d’ores et déjà ces derniers de sacrifier leur sécurité sur l’autel de la collaboration avec la Turquie et au détriment des demandeurs de protection. Une première salve a ainsi été tirée le 14 avril à propos du rapport 2015 consacré à la Turquie, dans une résolution dont les huit paragraphes consacrés à l’accord passé avec l’Union méritent le détour. D’où les rumeurs récentes quant à une initiative franco-allemande liant l’accord sur la libéralisation des visas à l’introduction d’un mécanisme de sauvegarde, type « emergency break », qui permettrait une suspension de cet accord en cas de tensions migratoires ou de problème sécuritaire. Au vu du climat de la réunion de la Commission Libé, le 21 avril, la partie est loin d’être gagnée …

Au total donc, les semaines à venir seront lourdes de conséquences.

Pour les réfugiés d’abord et avant tout, peu convaincus par la pseudo-voie d’accès légal qui leur est ainsi ouverte et qui laisse en suspens le sort de dizaines de milliers d’entre eux, n’entrant pas dans le champ d’application du texte. La proximité de l’été et l’ampleur de la reprise des traversées de la Méditerranée donneront très rapidement la réponse de l’efficacité de l’accord avec la Turquie.

Pour l’Union ensuite et sa pitoyable tentative de sous-traitance de ses valeurs et de ses obligations à un partenaire retors. De Charybde en Scylla, le prochain partenariat de ce genre impliquera-t-il la Libye ?

Pour les Etats membres de cette Union, enfin, que nul renoncement ne rebute, en Autriche ou ailleurs, et dont la solidarité ne se vérifie qu’à l’instant de renier le contrat sur laquelle leur Union s’était fondée.

The balance between criminal law and international humanitarian law in terrorism cases

Intervention at the 10th ECLAN Conference, 26 April 2016 in Brussels

by Vaios KOUTROULIS (*)

On April 8 2016, in Anderlecht, the Belgian police arrested five people linked to the 22nd March bombings in the airport and metro station of Brussels. Among them was Mohamed Abrini who has admitted that he was one of the three persons that were filmed by security cameras in the Brussels airport. Among the persons arrested was also Osama Kareym, who is suspected to have taken part in the bombing on the Brussels subway. Both are also linked to the 13 November Paris attacks.

Can these participants in the 22nd March bombings in the airport and metro station of Brussels be criminally persecuted for terrorist crimes before Belgian courts?

In principle, the answer seems to be a straightforward YES.
The object of my presentation is to show that the question is much more complicated than it may appear at first sight.
This complication stems from the Belgian Criminal Code.
Indeed, in the section relating to terrorist offences of the Belgian Criminal Code, the penultimate article (article 141bis) excludes from the scope of application of the section the activities of armed forces in times of armed conflict as defined and regulated by international humanitarian law (IHL).

The origin of this article, which is a saving clause, is the last preambular paragraph of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combatting terrorism which reads as follows:
“Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by international humanitarian law within the meaning of these terms under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, actions by the armed forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties are not governed by this Framework Decision”.

This provision is reflected in several international conventions relating to the prohibition of terrorist acts.[1] As it is clear from the text of this article, the scope of application of the terrorist offences is defined / determined by the rules of IHL. So, under Belgian criminal law, IHL and terrorist offences are mutually exclusive legal regimes. Thus, in order to correctly appreciate which acts may be criminally prosecuted under Belgian law as terrorist acts, we need to go through the definition of the relevant IHL concepts.

I will make three points with respect to this provision, and this rule of mutual exclusion.

  1. First, I will briefly discuss the IHL notions of “armed forces” and “armed conflict” in order to give a clearer idea of what is excluded from the definition of terrorist offence.
  2. Second, I will briefly discuss how the savings clause has been applied in Belgian case-law
  3. Third, I will explain the purpose, la raison d’être, of the clause and why it is important to maintain it.

A. What is not a terrorist offence?

Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by international humanitarian law
Armed forces = both armed forces of a State, of an international organisation or of a non-State actor.

The argument is sometimes raised that the concept of “armed forces” should be limited only to State armed forces, in other words, that only activities by State armed forces are excluded from the scope of application of terrorist offences, while those of non-State actors are not. This interpretation is not supported by the text of the provision.

According to the ICRC, customary IHL defines armed forces as follows:
“The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.” (rule 4, source art. 43 AP I)
Armed forces of a State are quite clear to identify = regular forces of States (membership regulated by domestic law; members of irregular groups belonging to a party to the conflict)

Armed forces of a rebel group, a non-State actor are more difficult to identify.
Again according to the ICRC, “In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous combat function it is to take a direct part in hostilities.” (ICRC, Interpretative guidance on DPH, 2009)

  • Continuous combat function requires a lasting integration into an organised armed group acting as the armed force of a non-State party to an armed conflict;
  • Individuals whose function involves the preparation, execution, command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities have a continuous combat function;
  • Individuals recruited, trained and equipped by a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities have a CCF;
  • Recruiters, trainers, financiers, propagandists may continuously contribute to the general war effort of a non-State party but are not members of the armed forces of the group, unless their activities amount to DPH[2].
  1. Armed conflict = both international and non-international

IAC: conflict between states or between a State and an intl org.
NIAC: conflict between State and rebel group or between two or more rebel groups.
Two conditions: intensity of hostilities[3] and organisation of the parties[4].

Another factor that may come into play in determining whether an armed conflict exists relates to the geographical scope of application of an armed conflict. This is interesting since there have been some very extensive interpretations relating to the geographical scope of application of armed conflict that have been suggested. I am referring to the concept of the “global war on terror” put forth by the United States. According to this view, an armed conflict against a terrorist group basically knows no boundaries and exists wherever the terrorist is found. This theory has been invoked by the United States in order to allow them to invoke IHL as a justification for drone strikes against terrorists around the world. However, the drawback of such an extensive reading of IHL is that is the armed conflict follows the terrorist, then any act committed by him/her anywhere in the world will be considered as committed in the context of an armed conflict and therefore will not be qualified as a terrorist offence…

B. How have the Belgian Courts applied the saving clause in art. 141bis?

The answer is simple: very restrictively.
The defendants’ lawyers have invoked the clause in some cases but Belgian Courts have been up to now very reluctant in applying it. This has resulted in some very problematic interpretations of IHL concepts, since in order for the judges to reject the clause, they have interpreted the notions of “armed forces” and “armed conflict” very restrictively.

Thus, for example, in a case concerning the death of a Belgian national in Iraq in the context of an attack against the US armed forces present in Iraqi territory[5]. The relevant period was from January 2004 to November 2005. The 2008 judgment by the first instance tribunal[6] considered that there was no armed conflict in Iraq during the period in question. This classification was clearly unsupported by the facts in question, since even the US recognised that they were involved in an armed conflict and a belligerent occupation at least for the first months of the relevant period.

Another example, in a more recent case, deals with Sharia4Belgium, a group founded in 2010 having played an active role in the departure of combatants in Syria in order to join armed groups Jahbat Al-Nusra and Majlis Shura Al Mujahidin (affiliated with Al-Qaeda).

In the First instance judgment, handed down in 2015[7], the Tribunal held that there was an armed conflict in Syria to which the groups in question was involved. It also clarified that the armed conflict did not extend to Belgium. The consequence of that was that, in any case, the saving clause could not be invoked for acts which took place in Belgium. However, turning to the notion of “armed forces” the Tribunal refused to recognise that the two groups in question are “armed forces” within the meaning of IHL. This goes against the classification of the UN Commission of Enquiry on Syria. It also goes against well-established IHL rules. Indeed, the Tribunal, in order to reject to the two groups their character as “armed forces” defines “armed forces” very restrictively and imposes the respect of many conditions for a group to be classified as an “armed force”, conditions which have no legal basis in IHL.[8]

C. Why does the saving clause exist and why should it be maintained?

The reason for the saving clause is the recognition of the specificity of IHL as the legal regime which is best adapted in dealing with situations of armed conflict.

The need to preserve this specificity.

Firstly, IHL has its own list of crimes (war crimes) => the fact that an act does not constitute a terrorist offence does not mean that it is not a crime under international and national law or that its authors will remain unpunished.
Terrorism as a method of warfare is prohibited under IHL, both in international and non-international conflicts (Art. 33 4th GC; art. 51§2 AP I; art. 4§2(d) and 13§2 AP II).
It is also a war crime (ICTR Statute; SCSL Statute).

Secondly, the difficulty in finding common ground with respect to a definition of terrorism in international law, entails the risk of abuse of the notion of terrorism. This risk is particularly high in situations of armed conflict, especially in NIACs since the government always considers that the rebels are terrorists.

NOTES

[1] 1997 International Convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings, art. 19§2:
“The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.”
2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 4§2:
“The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.”
2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, art. 26 §5:
“The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a Party in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention. »
1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art 12
“In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims or the Protocols Additional to those Conventions are applicable to a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so far as States parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, the present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocls thereto (including IACs of AP I)”
1999, International Convention for the suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 2:

  1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:

(…)
(b) Anyotheractintendedtocausedeathorseriousbodilyinjurytoacivilian,orto any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
[2] DPH condition – direct causation = one causal step between activity and the harm to the adversary:

  • although recruitment and training of personnel is crucial to the military capacity of a party to the conflict, the causal link with the harm inflicted on the adversary will generally remain indirect. Only where persons are specifically recruited and trained for the execution of a predetermined hostile act can such activities be regarded as an integral part of that act and thus as DPH.
  • General war effort and war sustaining activities (design, production, shipment of weapons, propaganda, financial support) are not DPH.
  • Purchase, smuggling of the components of an explosive device, assembly of the device, storage of the device are connected with the resulting harm but are not DPH; only planting and detonating the device are DPH.
  • General preparatory acts do not constitute DPH: purchase, roduction, smuggling, hiding of weapons, general recruitment and training of personnel, financial administrative or political support.

[3] For the intensity of the conflict, these factors include ‘the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict’; ICTY, Haradinaj 2008 Trial Judgment, supra note 26, para. 49. For further references, see ICTY, Boškoski and Tarčulovski 2008 Trial Judgment, supra note 26, paras. 177-178.
[4] As to the organisation of the parties, relevant for dissident armed groups, the indicative factors identified by the ICTY, include ‘the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the existence of headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords’; ICTY, Haradinaj 2008 Trial Judgment, supra note 26, para. 60. For further references, see ICTY, Boškoski and Tarčulovski 2008 Trial Judgment, supra note 26, paras. 199-203.
[5] Case of the “fillières iraquiennes”, Muriel Degauque.
[6] Tribunal correctionnel de Bruxelles, 10 janvier 2008.
[7] Tribunal correctionnel d’Anvers, 11 février 2015.
[8] Such as the obligation to respect rules of IHL.

Data retention and national law: whatever the CJEU rules, data retention may still survive!

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Matthew White, Ph.D candidate, Sheffield Hallam University

Should governments be able to retain data on everyone’s use of the Internet and their phones – because it might arguably aid the fight against terrorism and serious crime? This ‘data retention’ issue raises fundamental questions about the balance between privacy and security, at both national and EU level. Initially, in the electronic privacy (e-Privacy)Directive, EU legislation set out an option for Member States to adopt data retention rules, as a derogation from the normal rule of confidentiality of communications in that Directive. Subsequently, in 2006, at the urging of the UK government in particular, the EU went a step further. It adopted the Data Retention Directive (DRD), which requiredtelecom and Internet access providers to keep data on all use of the Internet and phones in case law enforcement authorities requested it.

However, on 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the latter Directive went too far. In its Digital Rights Ireland judgment (discussed here), that Court said that the EU’s Data Retention Directive (DRD) was invalid in light of a lack of compliance with the rights to privacy and data protection set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (para 69 and 73). This left open an important question: what happens to national data retention laws? Can they also be challenged for breach of the EU Charter rights, on the grounds that they are linked to EU law (the derogation in the e-Privacy Directive)? If so, do the standards in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment apply by analogy?

Instead of addressing this matter urgently, the United Kingdom government sat on its hands for a while and then unprecedentedly rushed through the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014). DRIPA 2014 was intended to be a reactionto the Digital Rights Ireland ruling, giving the UK as a matter of national law the power to retain data that had been struck down by the CJEU as a matter of EU law.

In 2015, Tom Watson (now the deputy leader of the UK Labour Party), David Davis (a Conservative party backbencher) and others challenged s.1 of DRIPA 2014 arguing that the powers to obligate data retention on public telecommunication operators set out in that section of DRIPA did not sufficiently reflect what the CJEU ruled in Digital Rights Ireland. Although that CJEU ruling only applied to EU legislation, they argued that it also applied by analogy to national legislation on data retention, since such legislation fell within the scope of the option to retain communications data set out in the derogation in the e-Privacy Directive, and so was linked to EU law (and therefore covered by the Charter). Even though the e-Privacy Directive only related to publicly available electronic communications services (Article 3(1)), it is submitted that any extension of the definition of public telecommunications operator would fall within the Data Protection Directive, and thus the CFR would still apply. The High Court (HC) ruled in the claimants’ favour inDavis where an order was made for s.1 of DRIPA to be disapplied by the 31st of March 2016, insofar as it is incompatible with Digital Rights Ireland (para 122). This was in the hopes that it would give Parliament sufficient time to come up with a CFR compliant data retention law (para 121).

The government appealed to the Court of Appeal (CoA) which took a radically different approach maintaining that ‘the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland was not laying down definitive mandatory requirements in relation to retained communications data’ (para 106). But for the sake of caution, the CoA made a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking:

(1) Did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to lay down mandatory requirements of EU law with which the national legislation of Member States must comply?

(2) Did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to expand the effect of Articles 7 and/or 8, EU Charter beyond the effect of Article 8 ECHR as established in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR?

The CoA was not the only national court to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU on matters regarding data retention and the reach of Digital Rights Ireland. On the 4th May 2015, the Force was with Kammarrätten i Stockholm when it asked the CJEU:

Is a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime (as described [below under points 1-6]) compatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC [the electronic privacy Directive], 1 taking account of Articles 7, 8 and 15(1) of the Charter?

If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, may the retention nevertheless be permitted where:

access by the national authorities to the retained data is determined as [described below under paragraphs 7-24], and

security requirements are regulated as [described below under paragraphs 26-31],

and all relevant data are to be retained for six months, calculated as from the day the communication is ended, and subsequently deleted as [described below under paragraphs 25]?

The way in which the first question in Davis and Watson is asked doesn’t specify whether the general obligation applies to every service provider under the state’s jurisdiction or specific service providers to retain what they individually process. The assumption is the former as ‘all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions’ implies a catch all to the relevant services. The Home Secretary (and indeed the government) may argue that if the CJEU rules in the negative (note that Article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive only applies to publically available electronic communications services, thus the justification for retaining data from other services would have to be found in the Data Protection Directive (DPD)) it would mostly have affected cl.78 of theInvestigatory Powers Bill (IPB) (currently before Parliament) which would grant the Secretary of State the power to issue retention notices on a telecommunications or any number of operators to retain for e.g. any or all data for 12 if the power in cl.1 of the draft Communications Data Bill (dCDB) had been replicated. The dCDB was a legislative measure introduced in 2012 to allow public authorities to keep up to date with the sophistication of e-Crime. Clause 1 maintained that:

1 Power to ensure or facilitate availability of data

(1) The Secretary of State may by order—

(a) ensure that communications data is available to be obtained from telecommunications operators by relevant public authorities in accordance with Part 2, or

(b) otherwise facilitate the availability of communications data to be so obtained from telecommunications operators.

(2) An order under this section may, in particular—

(a) provide for—

(i) the obtaining (whether by collection, generation or otherwise) by telecommunications operators of communications data,

(ii) the processing, retention or destruction by such operators of data so obtained or other data held by such operators.

This measure was, however abandoned because the Liberal Democrats (in the then Coalition Government) did not approve of the far reaching nature of the proposal. In regards to cl.1, it clearly was a general power, as no distinction was made on who the obligation to retain may fall upon, and thus it is submitted that this power is analogous to the power which is the subject of the question being asked of the CJEU. Clause 78(1) of the IPB on the other hand, makes the distinction that a data retention notice may require a telecommunications operator to retain relevant communications data. Though there are two possible conflicts, the first, based on the assumption that the CJEU rules in the negative (to the first question) is cl.78(2)(a) and (b). This gives the Secretary of State the discretion to issue retention notices on any description of operators to retain all or any description of data. This could be considered a general obligation because it could affect all telecommunications operators and then be classed as a general obligation.

Secondly, retention ‘without distinction’ or ‘exceptions’ may be important when it comes to traffic data pertaining to journalists, politicians, and the medical and legal professions. But because the reference doesn’t mention specific service providers it cannot be said with certainty how much this would affect cl.78(1) which doesn’t make distinctions or exceptions.

When it comes to limitations on data retention, there is at least one, which was first noted in s.1(5) of DRIPA 2014 which allowed for a 12 month maximum period of retention. This is replicated in cl.78(3) and takes on board the recommendation of the Advocate General’s opinion (AG) in Digital Rights Ireland (para 149).

The President of the CJEU felt it was desirable to combine both preliminary references. The questions of access by both the Swedish and UK courts do not directly affect the cl.78 issuing of retention notices (insofar that it at least doesn’t involve everytelecommunications operator) nor does answering whether Article 7 and 8 was intended to extend beyond Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence. The security arrangements are dealt with by cl.81 (whether they are adequate is a different matter) and thus not relevant to the issuing of retention notices.

This, however, proceeds on the assumption that the CJEU will rule in the negative to the Swedish preliminary reference regarding retention being lawful for the purposes ofaccess, because if it does not, cl.78(2)(a) and (b) would not be affected at all. Moreover, the HC in Davis felt that the CJEU believed that data retention genuinely satisfied an objective of general interest (para 44) and that it must be understood to have held that a general retention regime is unlawful unless it is accompanied by an access regime which has sufficiently stringent safeguards to protect citizens’ rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR (para 70). The CoA was silent on this matter, and therefore for the mean time, it is understood that if the CJEU rules in the positive, cl.78 would not be affected as a matter of EU law.

On the matter of whether the HC or the CoA had interpreted Digital Rights Irelandcorrectly, it is important to highlight one of the justifications for the CoA conclusions. It maintained in relation to mandatory requirements, that in the opinion of the AG, he was at least, not looking for the Directive to provide detailed regulation (para 77). Yet the CoA failed to mention his conclusions, where it was stated that the DRD was invalid as a result of the absence of sufficient regulation of the guarantees governing access to (by limiting access, if not solely to judicial authorities, at least to independent authorities, or, failing that, by making any request for access subject to review by the judicial authorities or independent authorities and it should have required a case-by-case examination of requests for access in order to limit the data provided to what is strictly necessary (para 127)) the data collected/retained and that the DRD should be suspended until the EU legislature adopts measures necessary to remedy the invalidity, but such measures must be adopted within a reasonable period (para 157-158). So at least in this regard the AG actually supports the stance of the HC (even though no reference was made on this point) and may therefore have had implications for the IPB (which does not require judicial or independent authorisation/review) in relation to access to communications data without a word from the CJEU.

Many thanks to Steve Peers for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

An EU Institutions “Google Maps”? Six years after Lisbon Treaty still the quest for a common compass …

by Emilio DE CAPITANI (*)

As a preliminary disclaimer I have to say that the following observations could not be seen as neutral as I have been an official of the European Parliament for 26 years and it is more than likely that I have been influenced by that experience. That having been said what I will say echoes a direct experience in some crucial moments of the interinstitutional relations since the negotiation of the Single European Act until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. I have to say that the evolution of the role of the European Parliament has not been linear even if its importance was growing Treaty after Treaty but also with some stops, not to say, some regressions, as I am afraid it is happening, quite surprisingly, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

However it has been an exciting experience to see how that institution has been able to play a decisive role when the European Community first and the European Union later faced the challenge of establishing an internal market as a supranational area without borders, and, even more when after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Member States decided, albeit with several reservations to transform progressively the EU in a full-fledged supranational political organization.

It looks like ages ago, when, for instance, under the impulsion of Commissioner Sutherland the Institutions tried in ’87 to define their first common legislative programme.  Moreover it was an extraordinary experience to accompany the European Parliament in its transformation from a consultative body  to a co-legislator  by shaping its internal rules dealing with the legislative activity and the special relation with the Commission (also in the Comitology framework -see OJ L 197, 18.7.1987) or , after Maastricht when the first modus vivendi on codecision procedures was agreed.

The EU Freedom security and Justice area at the core of Member States and EU Institutions relations  

But probably the most interesting experience also from an interinstitutional perspective  has been when, before the entry into force of the Amsterdam treaty I had the chance to lead the secretariat of the Civil liberties Committee (LIBE) which was (and still is) in charge of almost all the freedom security and justice related policies. At that time LIBE was also the Committee in direct relation with the EU Member States notably when they played their role as initiators of EU legislation (which is still the case for judicial cooperation in criminal matters).

From 99 until 2009 (at the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) the legislative dialogue between the Member States meeting in the Coreper II, the various Council Presidencies  and LIBE was intense and fruitful notably in the domains already covered by the codecision procedure such as borders, migration and asylum as well as domains giving specific expression (to use a CJEU definition) to fundamental rights such as anti-discrimination measures, transparency and data protection.

To prove the seriousness of the relation between the EP and the Council reference can be made to the fact that it was LIBE who started in 2001 the practice of the so called “first reading agreements” in legislative procedures. It is more than unfortunate that since then this practice of informal trilogues has been progressively developed following the Council internal practice of closed doors by transforming legislative negotiations which should by definition be transparent it in a sort of Bermude’s triangle. I can only hope that the Court of Justice will draw to an end this practice which threatens the implementation of the democratic principle in the EU as well as the right to access foreseen by the Treaties and the European Charter.

Before entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty LIBE committee was also consulted on legislation dealing with judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters and it as more than clear that the Council wanted to maintain a full control and responsibility of these domain so that the only possibility for LIBE to influence the content of the EU legislation in third pillar was by indirect means through it codecision powers on community legislation which was complementary to third pillar measure (see the case of EU legislation on irregular migration,..). When this was not possible and the EP was convinced that the Council or Commission measure was infringing the Treaty or threatening its constitutional prerogatives the European Parliament also brought to the Court the Council and/or the Commission.

In this perspective of reaching an objective by indirect means a pivotal role was played by the legislation on protection of personal data where the European Parliament was co-legislator since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. As, according to the Treaties (and now the Charter) protection of personal data requires an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of a measure taken also in the security domain the LIBE committee took this occasion to assess also the content and the proportionality of EU security related policies such as the infamous PNR agreement with the US. We all know that the EU will also have soon its own “EU-PNR” which have now been agreed with the EP as co-legislator also in the judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters. Someone will think that this 13 years long saga is now drawing to an end. I am not sure. I will advise him to wait at least the incoming CJEU Opinion on the EU-Canada PNR agreement and maybe the first judicial cases on the new EU rules ..

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and of the Charter of fundamental rights the EP did no more need to use transversal tactics to reach the objectives he was searching before. Judicial and police cooperation was finally ordinary competence to be dealt with qualified majority and fall in the co-decision procedure. Moreover the Charter emphasis on the rights of the individual in all the EU policies and notably in  the freedom security and justice area was paving the way to what LIBE was asking for since its creation in 1992.

After Lisbon still need of a legal “Google Maps” ?

What is paradoxical is what happened at interinstitutional level after the entry into force of  that Treaty and of the Charter. The EU institutions have not all moved at the same pace towards the new constitutional legal framework order and this is a source of growing misunderstanding between them and ultimately of confusing messages for the EU citizens (what can explain why many of them are turning their back to the EU construction) .

If there was a Legal “Google Maps” I  would say that now the only institution which is strongly rooted in Lisbon is, no surprise, the CJEU (even if sometime it is also taken by the nostalgia of the previous world..).

Let me quote some statements in the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 where it is written that : “the founding treaties of the EU, unlike ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its own institutions, for the benefit of which the Member States thereof have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only those States but also their nationals… …These essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a ‘process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’…

This legal structure is based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected. Also at the heart of that legal structure are the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter (which, under Article 6(1) TEU, has the same legal value as the Treaties), respect for those rights being a condition of the lawfulness of EU acts, so that measures incompatible with those rights are not acceptable in the EU

The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to international law requires that the interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU… As regards the structure of the EU, it must be emphasised that not only are the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU required to respect the Charter but so too are the Member States when they are implementing EU law.

The pursuit of the EU’s objectives, as set out in Article 3 TEU, is entrusted to a series of fundamental provisions, such as those providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, citizenship of the Union, the area of freedom, security and justice, and competition policy. Those provisions, which are part of the framework of a system that is specific to the EU, are structured in such a way as to contribute — each within its specific field and with its own particular characteristics — to the implementation of the process of integration that is the raison d’être of the EU itself. Similarly, the Member States are obliged, by reason, inter alia, of the principle of sincere cooperation set out in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure, in their respective territories, the application of and respect for EU law. In addition, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, the Member States are to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the EU “

Are these ambitious concepts also shared by Member States or the Council or in our Google Maps is still trapped in the Maastricht interpillars games (with some Member States even dreaming to go back in the pre-Schengen era)?  The experience of the last six years and of notably of the last year on the Migration Border and Asylum Crisis shows that several Member States are going backward to the old good time  and do not change the former legal situation notably in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

The fact that even today

  • there is no real Internal Security Strategy adopted with the support of the European Parliament and in full knowledge of national Parliament (and this notwithstanding the art. 70 and 71 of the Treaty on functioning of the European Union requires a close parliamentary oversight of these policies);
  • that the “threats” EU impacting on the EU citizens are defined, measured and assessed only at bureaucratic level at national and european level within EU Agencies (such as EUROPOL, FRONTEX and EUROJUST ) whose oversight is almost virtual
  • that sharing security related information between EU MS is still mostly on voluntary basis
  • that the so called “policy cycle” bringing together (on a voluntary basis) the MS administrations is still managed without a credible connection with judicial authorities at EU and national level.

All this shows that notwithstanding 40 years of engagement (since Trevi in 1975) Member States are still far from sharing their experience and implement the principle of solidarity in the old latin meaning where faced to a common problem everyone is responsible “in solidum” with all the others.

As an EU citizen I am appalled to see that even after more than one year of successive terrorists attacks the EU has not yet decided:

  • to build an EU Anti-terrorism Enquiry Commission (as the US did decided immediately after 9/11)
  • to strengthen the powers of EUROJUST in terrorist domain (as required also by the 2005 decision) in preparation of a future EPPO competence as already foreseen by the Treaties. Let’s hope that the European Parliament unblock the Commission proposal and that the Ministers of interior will not wait for other terrorists attacks before launching a credible “lisbonised” Eurojust (if needed even in a form of enhanced cooperation) .

What is worrying is that instead of strengthening the operational cooperation on specific and measurable targets,  the measures adopted (or under negotiations) at EU level increase the impact on individual’s rights.

Under this perspective it is doubtful that the Council has followed its own internal guidelines according to which (quote) : The recent case law of the European Court of Justice[1] confirms that the Court will not satisfy itself with anything less than a strict assessment of the proportionality and necessity of measures that constitute serious restrictions to fundamental rights, however legitimate the objectives pursued by the EU legislature. It also indicates that such measures do not stand a serious chance of passing the legality test unless they are accompanied by adequate safeguards in order to ensure that any serious restriction of fundamental rights is circumscribed to what is strictly necessary and is decided in the framework of guarantees forming part of Union legislation instead of being left to the legislation of Member States.  (emphasis added)

And where may you find the European Parliament in a virtual Google Maps ?

I think that you can find it  somewhere between Amsterdam and Lisbon as it looks more and more afraid to take position in domains which are clearly still unfamiliar to him and on which relevant background informations are not shared by the Commission or by the Member States (not to speak of the EU agencies and of the so called COSI). I don’t see other explanation to the fact that more and more frequently the EP start working on the most sensitive issues only after the Member States have agreed on something. So, one sensible way to help the EP in playing its co-legislative role would be to share with a credible picture of what is happening on the ground in the different Member States. It is quite promising that when this happens (as now in the framework of the new Shengen evaluation mecahnism)  the EP and the national parliaments feel much more confident than before. But when the same will happen in the framework of the mutual evaluation of  judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters as it is required by the art. 70 of the TFEU ? In the absence of this regular exchange of information how can be improved the mutual recognition of national measures?

This is today a rhetorical question because the Member States with the support of the Commission, which, as we all know, is the “guardian of the Treaties have just decided that the mutual evaluation should remain on a voluntary basis as framed in a Joint Action dating back to the Maastricht era.

Will the EP accept to be continuously be side-lined? I am afraid it will and this not for a legal or institutional reasons but for the very trivial reason that its current political majority is in a way or another mirrored in the main Member States governments so that it may feel uneasy in dealing with issues which can place these Governments in a wrong perspective. As a citizen I can’t but blame this situation because I consider that a weak Parliament could not protect my rights and fullfill the objectives outlined in the EU Charter. Any way what the European and national parliaments don’t dare to do is more and more done by national judges (see the NS and ARANYOSI Jurisprudence as well as the recent ruling of the BVG on the European Arrest Warrant).

Again as Citizen I would prefer to be protected by a clearly defined law and not depend from the appreciation of a judge but this is apparently more and more what we have expect from the EU legislation as the envisaged Directive on terrorism I have cited above.

And the Commission ? In a virtual Google maps the Commission is in a sort of Neverland still trying to re-build its pre-Santer role by trying to become at the same time the Guardian  of the Treaty as well as the true Government of the EU. Has this strategy any chance to succeed ? Could the President of the Commission pretend to have also a support of the EU citizens in alternative to the EP itself because of the Spitzencandidat invented in the very last days before the EU elections ? I am not sure even if are now countless the family’s photo bringing together the Presidents of the EP, of the European Council and of the Commission.

What I notice instead is that executive functions also in the Freedom Security Justice Area are more and more transferred to European Agencies where the Member States come back on the driving seat by becoming some pre-federal entities (which are deemed to be INDEPENDENT both from the Commission and of the Parliament which can play a light oversight). This “agencification” trend notably in the freedom security and justice area can now be further developed thanks to the ESMA ruling and will probably progressively change the institutional balance.

The case of Frontex is to my understanding a proof of this. It is unfortunate that until now the Member States have not found the same courage for the EPPO notwhistanding the explicit provisions in  the Treaty. In this perspective the Better Law Making agreement by which the Commission is trying to harness the legislative policy cycle looks more like a tail which pretend to move a dog ….  But even when the Commission has to play its role faces some difficulties . Look at the draft Directive on terrorism which has been presented without a credible impact evaluation of the existing legislation nor of the new rules. Guess how could had been the text if it was not proposed by the same Vice President of the Commission in charge of the Better Law making and of the implementation of the EU Charter..

I can’t end my short intervention without making reference to a new “Quasi-EU” Institution more and more proactive within the freedom security and justice area. We can call it the “Head of State and of Governement Group” which has recently agreed with Turkey a so-called Deal. The EP and also some scholars have raised questions about the legal nature of such a deal. The provisional answers given until now even the President of the European Council is that it is binding but it is not a formal EU agreement. This remind me the famous Magritte painting showing a pipe but stating “this is not a pipe”. Following the same logic the next question is;

“Is this still an European Union or are we already looking at in the new season of Games of Thrones ?

(*) NOTA BENE : this is a transcripition of an intervention at the ECLAN Seminar on : The Needed Balances of EU Criminal Law: Past, Present and Future  (Brussels 25-26 April 2016)

NOTES

[1]             See Judgment of 8 April 2014, Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland (information note by the Council Legal Service in doc. 9009/14)

La sécurité digitale à l’heure des crises migratoire et terroriste, le noeud gordien de l’interconnexion des fichiers

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE (20 AVRIL 2016)

par Pierre Berthelet, CDRE

La situation que connaît actuellement l’Union européenne n’aura échappé à personne. Qu’il s’agisse de la crise migratoire ou de la crise terroriste générée par les attentats à répétition en 2015 et en 2016, le remède préconisé par les États membres par la voix du Conseil et du Conseil européen, consiste à vouloir sécuriser davantage les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne.

La protection renforcée de celles-ci constitue l’enjeu majeur de la lutte menée contre le phénomène terroriste, dont l’agenda converge désormais clairement avec la politique européenne en matière migratoire, comme l’atteste la communication de la Commission du 6 avril 2016 intitulée « des systèmes d’information plus forts et plus intelligents pour les frontières et la sécurité ». Le texte affirme à cet égard très clairement une « interconnexion dynamique » entre police, migration et gestion des frontières.

La crainte actuelle est, en particulier, le phénomène des combattants de l’État islamique venant d’Irak et de Syrie. L’organe de coordination antiterroriste belge, l’OCAM, a d’ailleurs souligné, le 19 avril 2016, un risque considérable d’attentat de la part de ces combattants, des Européens partis faire le Jihad au Moyen-Orient et rentrant aguerris (phénomène dit des « returnees »).

Nouveaux défis, mais anciennes solutions donc. L’observateur ne peut qu’avoir une impression de déjà-vu : les choix de ces derniers mois formulés par les chefs d’État et de gouvernement, inspirant les orientations contenues dans cette communication, ressemblent, à bien des égards, à ceux des Conseils européens de Laeken de 2001, de Séville de 2002 ou encore de Thessalonique 2003. À l’époque, l’Union était déjà confrontée aux problématiques du terrorisme et d’échouage de migrants sur les côtes européennes. Les agendas antiterroriste et migratoire se mêlaient alors autour de la sécurisation des frontières extérieures pour éviter toute intrusion possible d’agents d’Al-Quaïda dans l’UE, dissimulés dans les colonnes de migrants, jetant ainsi les fondations du projet des frontières électroniques (smart borders).

Anciennes solutions, mais nouveaux défis néanmoins. La communication du 6 avril 2016, accompagnée d’une proposition de règlement instituant le « Système Entrée-Sortie » (correspondant à une révision du précédent projet présenté en 2013, jugé trop onéreux par les États membres), marque un nouvel épisode dans la création des frontières électroniques européennes. Elle s’inscrit dans le contexte d’enjeux très actuels : la protection des frontières extérieures au prisme de la lutte antiterroriste a trait à deux problèmes distincts, celui des « combattants étrangers » (1) et celui de la fraude documentaire (2).

Dans le premier cas, il s’agit de contrôler les flux de voyageurs sortants pour empêcher ces « combattants étrangers » (foreign fighters), c’est-à-dire les jeunes Européens désireux de partir faire le Jihad au Moyen-Orient. Dans le deuxième cas, il s’agit de contrôler les flux de population, pour la plupart fuyant la guerre dans cette région. En réalité, ces deux problématiques se recoupent car la fraude documentaire concerne le contrôle des titre de voyage dont sont porteurs les flux de voyageurs, y compris les migrants irréguliers rassemblés dans les hotspots. Elle a trait aussi à l’identification des « combattants étrangers » franchissant les frontières Schengen avec de faux papiers. Les solutions apportées concernent, dans un cas comme dans l’autre, un meilleur déploiement des fichiers et une plus grande interconnexion de ceux-ci (3).

Analyser la manière dont l’Union s’efforce de répondre à ces deux problématiques distinctes mais sécantes est instructif. Cette réponse s’exprime de façon commune, le recours à la sécurité digitale, c’est-à-dire l’utilisation accrue des systèmes d’information et de communication et ce, en écho au phénomène de digitalisation de la vie sociale observable dans d’autres secteurs à l’ère du Big Data, tels que la santé digitale. Les problématiques secondaires, fraude documentaire et combattants étrangers, se trouvent au cœur de la résolution des crises migratoire et terroriste, elles-mêmes étroitement imbriquées. Il s’opère à ce propos un phénomène d’intrication immigration-terrorisme dans un contexte où s’échafaudent des capacités de gestion de crise horizontale, c’est-à-dire de polycrises.

L’interopérabilité des systèmes d’information devient alors un enjeu central, crucial même, car de son succès dépend la protection effective de l’Union. La sécurité digitale, expression archétypale dusolutionnisme technologique, constitue un nœud gordien au sens où le sort de lutte antiterroriste dépend de la réussite de l’interopérabilité des systèmes d’informations, qu’ils soient à finalité sécuritaire ou migratoire, l’une et l’autre apparaissant désormais mêlées.

1. Verrouiller les frontières pour résoudre le problème des combattants étrangers 

Continue reading “La sécurité digitale à l’heure des crises migratoire et terroriste, le noeud gordien de l’interconnexion des fichiers”

(Legislative Alert) : The EU Directive on Passenger Name Record (PNR)

DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/… OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of … on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data  for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular point (d) of Article 82(1) and point (a) of Article 87(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee[1],

After consulting the Committee of the Regions,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure[2],

Whereas:

(1)          On 6 November 2007 the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes. However, upon entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the Commission proposal, which had not been adopted by the Council by that date, became obsolete. Continue reading “(Legislative Alert) : The EU Directive on Passenger Name Record (PNR)”

“MIGRATION COMPACT”: Contribution to an EU strategy for external action on migration

 (ITALIAN NON-PAPER) : ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE 

 

  1. INTRODUCTION

The unprecedented phenomenon of growing migratory flows towards Europe is expected to last for decades due to various geopolitical dynamics in the neighbourhood and beyond (mainly Middle East and North Africa, Sahel, Horn of Africa): security challenges and regional instability, deterioration of economic and social environment, poverty and unemployment, climate change, etc. The migratory challenge is seriously jeopardising the fundamental pillars of European integration (e.g. integrity of the Schengen area) and solidarity among Member States.

The complexity of such a challenge is linked to the mixed nature of the flows (both refugees and economic migrants). Actions taken in the Eastern route have to deal with mixed flows with a greater component of refugees due to the civil war in Syria. Flows through the Central/Western Mediterranean route are composed mainly by economic migrants and are expected to last in the medium-long term. The EU should be ready to cope with both challenges (the second is expected to last for decades) as well as with the opening of other possible routes (eg. north-east).

At the same time, if well managed, migration may represent an opportunity both for the EU and partner countries, in terms of economic growth and development, and for an ageing Europe in terms of sustainability of social security systems.

  1. LESSONS LEARNED

Most recently a number of initiatives and legislative proposals have been discussed at EU level to address the challenge, mainly focusing on the EU internal dimension, such as: the establishment of the European Border Guard; the reform of the Common European Asylum System which should feed into ambitious legislative proposals; the Decisions on relocation adopted in 2015; the intention of the Commission to not take into account the costs for the management of the current crisis under the Stability and Growth Pact; the Communication “Back to Schengen” and the recent proposals on “Smart Borders”.

However such measures only constitute components, even though important ones, of the more comprehensive response needed which so far does not yet directly address the external dimension of our migration policy. In order to be effective such internal measures need to be complemented with a stronger joint external action. The outburst of the migratory crisis highlighted the need to overcome fragmentation of available EU external action tools and to upgrade the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, revise the EU-ACP partnership, and further develop the pathways offered by the Valletta Action Plan, by the EU-Turkey agreement and by the existing Dialogues the EU is promoting at regional level (such as the Khartoum and Rabat Processes).

In order to design a reinforced external action strategy on migration it is urgent to carry out a comprehensive analysis of all existing instruments and actions with the aim to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the existing framework and consequently reorient the EU programming and planning.

The recent EU/Turkey agreement represents the first attempt to initiate a large-scale cooperation with a third country and has shown that it is possible to use existing tools and budget in an innovative way.

All existing initiatives and instruments in the field of external action should be directed (in a coherent way with the internal ones) to developing an active strategy, focussing first and foremost on African countries of origin and transit.

  1. THE WAY FORWARD: “THE FAIR GRAND BARGAIN”

The first step of the strategy should concern the identification of key partner countries to cooperate with on migratory issues and the definition of the kind of cooperation to develop with each of them. A matrix should be defined, on the basis of different migratory features of each country (origin, transit, origin and transit) and be adapted according to the characteristics of the country (e.g: economic and social trends, security, climate change, etc.). The Country Fiches prepared by the Commission and the EEAS are a good starting point and an example of interinstitutional cooperation which is much needed to improve our approach. Such a mapping should be accompanied by a thorough needs assessment to be carried out together with the third country, in a genuine spirit of co-ownership, and should become the basis for Country Specific Action Plans for an enhanced Partnership.

The EU should upgrade its commitment on priorities identified by the third country, while the latter should upgrade its commitment on priorities identified by the EU.

3.1 The EU may offer:

* Investment Projects with a high social and infrastructural impact to be identified together with the partner country as a crucial incentive for enhancing cooperation with the EU. To that end, programming of external action financial instruments (EDF, DCI, ENI, etc…) should be reoriented and a new EU Fund for Investments in third countries should be established.

* “EU-Africa bonds” to facilitate the access of African countries to capital markets (with a medium-to-long-term perspective in order to ensure capital availability for growth and sustainable prosperity schemes), as well as other innovative financing initiatives (facilitating remittances and their re-investment and blending mechanisms, etc.), in synergy with the EIB1 and other European and international financial organizations.

* Cooperation on security: mainstreaming migration (border management/control, customs, criminal justice, management of migrants and refugees in line with international standards) in the mandate of existing and future CSDP missions in Africa (Sahel; a reflection could also be conducted for the Horn of Africa). The logical next step in this process would be a regional grouping of missions to better manage a phenomenon that, by definition, has a “cross-border” dimension. Support should also be ensured to existing regional processes aimed at regional cooperation in security and migration domain (e.g. the G5 Sahel). This approach should go alongside the practical implementation of the Capacity Building for Security and Development concept (“CBSD”), coupling training with adequate equipment.

* Legal migration opportunities, building upon the pillars set out at the Tampere European Council in 1999, as an incentive that could include: entry quotas for workers, information on job opportunities in Europe for third countries nationals, pre-departure measures (including language and vocational training) in collaboration with European companies ready to employ manpower from third countries, matching of demand and supply of jobs, professional and social integration in the host Member States, Erasmus Plus programmes for students and researchers. Initiatives on circular migration as well as south-to-south migration opportunities should be further explored.

* Resettlement schemes as compensation for the burden on those countries that engage in establishing national asylum systems in line with international standards.

3.2 The EU may ask:

* Commitment on effective Border Control and reduction of flows towards Europe. The EU should help with “capacity building” initiatives and supply of equipment and technologies. Third countries should also engage in Search and Rescue activities. The European Border Guard, within its new mandate, has to step up the cooperation with third countries and have a coordinating role.

* Cooperation on returns/readmissions, focusing on operational agreements, reciprocal posting of liaison officers in third countries and Member States to speed up identification and issuing of travel documents. The EU should fund these secondments as well as reintegration programmes for returnees. The third country should accept repatriations also via charter flights organized by individual Member States or by the European Border Guard. The EU should provide assistance in the development of biometric databases and IT systems for civil registers. Development of readmission cooperation among third countries should be supported by the EU. The EU should promote a coherent revision of the EU-ACP partnership (post-Cotonou) in line with EU priorities on migration, including the full implementation of obligations under art. 13.5 of the Cotonou agreement.

* Management of migration and refugee flows: third countries should be supported in establishing a system of reception and management of migratory flows (including infrastructures and logistics), which should foresee careful on-site screening of refugees and economic migrants, coupled with resettlement measures to Europe for those in need of international protection and returns for irregular migrants.

* Establishment of asylum systems: the EU should support third countries in establishing national systems, in line with international standards, which offer on-site protection (“safe harbours”) to those in need. The experience of relevant international organizations such as UNHCR and IOM could be used to help third countries to establish reception centres for refugees, financed by the EU.

* To strengthen the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants also through joint police and judicial cooperation.

To implement this approach, the new European Border Guard (in particular the new Office for Returns) should develop a plan (already before the entry into force of the Regulation) for joint EU return operations to be financed with the EU budget and for supporting return operations from third countries of transit to countries of origin (where cooperation on readmission is in place). The possibility for Member States having privileged relations with specific third countries to lead and organize (with the support of the Agency) joint return operations should be explored. The EU should use in an effective way its network of Delegations, the new Border Guard and all Common Security Defense Policy instruments. This effort could be complemented by contributions from Member States.

All EU and MS existing security, foreign and development policy instruments should be strategically combined to maintain a constant European law enforcement presence in the Saharan belt with the objective of formally training, equipping, assisting and cooperating on security with countries in the region (border control, joint patrolling, irregular migration and trafficking, terrorism, drugs, organised crime, etc.), while informally improving our early warning and prevention mechanisms.

3.3 The “Migration Compact” approach should be financed through:

  • Reorienting of programming of external action financial instruments (EDF, DCI, ENI, etc…).
  • A new   financial   “Instrument   for   the   external   action   in   the   field   of   migration” (IEAM)2 to be established within the EU budget and operate in synergy with AMIF and ISF. In the meantime, the EU should increase resources available under the Emergency Africa Trust Fund in support of a EU-Africa Program for prosperity, security and migration, building on the Valletta Action Plan and make use of regional migration dialogues (such as the Khartoum and Rabat Processes) to ensure African ownership.
  • “Common EU Migration Bonds” to be issued to fund the migration management in Member States and to finance the “Migration Compact” goals.
  • A new EU Fund for Investments in third countries to finance sustainable investments in the region and attract European investors, including through blending structures and operations by the Commission and the EIB.

LIBYA

In this context, the stabilization of major transit countries, such as Libya, is a strategic priority of the first order also to cope with migration and refugee flows. At the EU level, we will need to step up our partnership with the Libyan government, while engaging in targeted capacity-building programs aimed at bolstering the Government’s control over its territory and law-enforcement capacity.

The EU should ensure the best possible use of EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and its capacity in contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Central Mediterranean, thus contributing to Libyan and regional security. When the necessary conditions will be met, different possible options and tasks can be included in the Operation’s mandate, moving it to new phases and tasks, including the training of the Libyan Coastguard.

In addition the EU should offer Libya security sector support, including advice and capacity building in the fields of police and criminal justice, through a civilian CSDP mission, focusing as well on border management and assisting Libyan authorities in their efforts to fight terrorism and improve management of migration flows.

To this end, UN and EU efforts should aim at supporting the management in Libyan territory of migratory flows, also through careful screening of refugees and economic migrants, coupled with resettlement measures for those in need of international protection and return for irregular migrants.

NOTES

  1. See European Council Conclusions, 17-18 March 2016, doc. 12/1/16.
  2. IEAM should cover potentially all geographic areas and could be used also for mobilising additional funding for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.

EU Justice Scoreboard 2016: learning from each other to improve the effectiveness of national justice systems

 

European Commission – Press release    Brussels, 11 April 2016

Today, the European Commission publishes the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard which gives a comparative overview of the efficiency, quality and independence of justice systems in the EU Member States. The aim of the Scoreboard is to assist national authorities in their efforts to improve their justice systems, by providing this comparative data.

For the first time, the Justice Scoreboard also includes the results of Eurobarometer surveys conducted to examine the perception of judicial independence in the EU among citizens and businesses in more detail. This edition of the Scoreboard also uses new indicators, in particular on judicial training, the use of surveys, the availability of legal aid and the existence of quality standards.

“The fourth EU Justice Scoreboard shows that Member States’ efforts to improve justice systems continue to bear fruit. The key role of national justice systems in upholding the rule of law, enforcing EU law and establishing an investment-friendly environment deserve these efforts” saidVĕra Jourová, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality. “The Scoreboard serves as a tool to learn from each other to render European justice systems more effective.”

Key findings from the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard include:

  • Shorter duration of litigious civil and commercial cases: While there is overall stability on pending cases, improvement can be observed in several Member States that faced particular challenges with a high number of pending cases.
  • Better accessibility of justice systems, in particular in matters like electronic submission of small claims or promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods. However, there is still room for improvement in online availability of judgements or electronic communication between courts and parties.
  • Further efforts are still needed to improve the training in judicial skills and the use of information and communication technologies (ICT)for case management systems.
  • Most Member States have standards covering similar aspects of their justice systems, but there are significant differences as regards their content. For example, less than half of Member States have standards on measures to reduce existing backlogs and even fewer define the maximum age that pending cases should have.
  • The Scoreboard incorporates the results of different surveys on the perception of judicial independence. For Member States where perceived independence is very low, the most notable reasons given included interference or pressure from government and politicians, and from economic or other specific interests.

Next steps

The findings of the 2016 Scoreboard are being taken into account for the ongoing country-specific assessment carried out in the context of the 2016 European Semester process. The country reports for 26 Member States were published on 26 February 2016 and include findings on the justice systems of a number Member States (BE, BG, HR, ES, HU, IE, IT, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI and SK) (see for latest reports on the 2016 European Semester, IP/16/332 and MEMO/16/334).

The Commission will continue to encourage the judicial networks to deepen their assessment of the effectiveness of legal safeguards aimed at protecting judicial independence.

Background

This is the fourth edition of the Justice Scoreboard. The 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard brings together data from various sources, in particular data provided by the Council of Europe Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), which collects data from Member States. It also uses information obtained from other sources, for example Eurostat, the group of contact persons on national justice systems, the European judicial networks such as the European Network of Councils of the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU or the European Judicial Training Network.

The Scoreboard focuses on three main aspects:

  • Efficiency of justice systems: indicators on the efficiency of proceedings: length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases.
  • Quality indicators: training, monitoring and evaluation of court activities, the use of satisfaction surveys, budget, and human resources.
  • Independence: the Scoreboard incorporates data from different surveys on the perceived judicial independence by companies and the general public.

The EU Justice Scoreboard contributes to the European Semester process by helping to identify justice related issues that deserve particular attention for an investment, business and citizen-friendly environment. It focuses on civil and commercial cases as well as administrative cases.

Together with the specific assessment of the situation in Member States, the 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard contributed to the proposal of the Commission the Council to address Country Specific Recommendations to four Member States (Croatia, Italy, Latvia and Slovenia) to render their justice system more effective. The Commission also closely monitors the efforts in this area in other Member States such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia (see factsheet).

The findings of the Scoreboard are also taken into account when deciding the funding priorities under the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) as regards justice reforms.

While the Scoreboard does not present an overall single ranking, it gives an overview of the functioning of all justice systems based on various indicators, which are of common interest for all Member States. It does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an equal footing. Whatever the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, timeliness, independence, affordability, and user-friendly access are some of the essential parameters of what constitutes an effective justice system.

For more information Press pack: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/effective-justice/news/160411_en.htm MEMO/16/1285

Press pack on DG Justice website Full document available: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/justice_scoreboard_2016_en.pdf

Summary of the Justice scoreboard: Factsheet

Annotated graphs with full figures

Questions and answers on the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard

European Semester: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.htm 

Eurobarometer: Flash 435 and Flash 436

 

Press contacts: Christian WIGAND (+32 2 296 22 53) Melanie VOIN (+ 32 2 295 86 59)

 

The Commission’s draft EU-US Privacy Shield adequacy decision: A Shield for Transatlantic Privacy or Nothing New under the Sun?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS 

by Dr. Maria Tzanou (Lecturer in Law, Keele University)

On 6 October 2015, in its judgment in Schrems, the CJEU invalidated the Commission’s decision finding that the US ensured an adequate level of protection for the transfer of personal data under the Safe Harbour framework on the basis that US mass electronic surveillance violated the essence of the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed in Article 7 EUCFR and the right to effective judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 EUCFR (for an analysis of the judgment, seehere).

On 2 February 2016, the Commission announced that a political agreement was reached on a new framework for transatlantic data flows, the EU-US Privacy Shield, which will replace the annulled Safe Harbour. On 29 February 2016, the Commission published a draft Privacy Shield adequacy decision followed by seven Annexes that contain the US government’s written commitments on the enforcement of the arrangement. The Annexes include the following assurances from the US:
Annex I, a letter from the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce, which administers the programme, describing the commitments that it has made to ensure that the Privacy Shield operates effectively;
Annex II, the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Principles;
Annex III, a letter from the US Department of State and accompanying memorandum describing the State Department’s commitment to establish a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson for submission of inquiries regarding the US’ intelligence practices;
Annex IV, a letter from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) describing its enforcement of the Privacy Shield;
Annex V, a letter from the Department of Transportation describing its enforcement of the Privacy Shield;
Annex VI, a letter prepared by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) regarding safeguards and limitations applicable to US national security authorities; and,
Annex VII, a letter prepared by the US Department of Justice regarding safeguards and limitations on US Government access for law enforcement and public interest purposes.

Similar to its predecessor, Privacy Shield is based on a system of self-certification by which US companies commit to a set of privacy principles. However, unlike Safe Harbour, the draft Privacy Shield decision includes a section on the ‘access and use of personal data transferred under the EU-US Privacy Shield by US public authorities’ (para 75). In this, the Commission concludes that ‘there are rules in place in the United States designed to limit any interference for national security purposes with the fundamental rights of the persons whose personal data are transferred from the Union to the US to what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective.’ This conclusion is based on the assurances provided by the Office of the Director of National Surveillance (ODNI) (Annex VI), the US Department of Justice (Annex VII) and the US Secretary of State (Annex III), which describe the current limitations, oversight and opportunities for judicial redress under the US surveillance programmes. In particular, the Commission employs four main arguments arising from these letters to reach its adequacy conclusion:

Firstly, US surveillance prioritises targeted collection of personal data, while bulk collection is limited to exceptional situations where targeted collection is not possible for technical or operational reasons (this captures the essence of the principles of necessity and proportionality, according to the Commission).

Secondly, US intelligence activities are subject to ‘extensive oversight from within the executive branch’ and to some extent from courts such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).

Thirdly, three main avenues of redress are available under US law to EU data subjects depending on the complaint they want to raise: interference under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); unlawful, intentional access to personal data by government officials; and access to information under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Fourthly, a new mechanism will be created under the Privacy Shield, namely the Privacy Shield Ombusdperson who will be a Senior Coordinator (at the level of Under-Secretary) in the State Department in order to guarantee that individual complaints are investigated and individuals receive independent confirmation that US laws have been complied with or, in case of a violation of such laws, the non-compliance has been remedied.

The draft Privacy Shield framework may have been hailed as providing an ‘essentially equivalent’ level of protection for personal data transferred from the EU to the US, but despite the plethora of privacy-friendly words (‘Privacy Shield’, ‘robust obligations’, ‘clear limitations and safeguards’) one cannot be very optimistic that the new regime will fully comply with the Court’s judgment in Schrems.

A first problematic aspect with the US assurances is that they merely describe the US surveillance legal framework and the relevant safeguards that already exist.

In fact, the only changes that were introduced in the US following the Snowden revelations was the issuance of Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) (in January 2014) which lays down a number of principles on the use of signal intelligence data for all people; and the passing of the USA Freedom Act which modified certain US surveillance programmes and put an end to the mass collection of Americans’ phone records by the NSA (in June 2015).

Finally, in February 2016, the US Congress passed the Judicial Redress Act which was signed into law by President Obama. Given that one can reasonably assume that the Court was aware of these developments when laying down its judgment in Schrems in October 2015, it seems that, with the exception of the Ombusdperson, Privacy Shield does not change much in US surveillance law. In fact, the Commission has entirely based its draft adequacy analysis on a mere detailed description of this law without any further commitment that this will improve in any way in order to comply with EU fundamental rights as interpreted by the CJEU.

While the assurance that US surveillance is mainly targeted and does not take place in bulk is important, there is no reference to the fact that US authorities access the content of the personal data that was deemed to violate the essence of the right to privacy in Schrems.

Furthermore, even if the US authorities engage only in targeted surveillance, the CJEU has held in Digital Rights Ireland that the mere retention of private-sector data for the purpose of making them available to national authorities affects Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR and might have a chilling effect on the use by subscribers of platforms of communication, such as Facebook or Google and, consequently, on their exercise of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 11 EUCFR.

Individuals, when faced with surveillance, cannot know when they are targeted; nevertheless, the possibility of being the object of surveillance has an effect on the way they behave. Insofar as Article 47 EUCFR and the right to effective judicial protection is concerned, the Commission itself notes in its draft adequacy decision that the avenues of redress provided to EU citizens do not cover all the legal bases that US intelligence authorities may use and the individuals’ opportunities to challenge FISA are very limited due to strict standing requirements.

The creation of the Ombusdperson with the important function of ensuring individual redress and independent oversight should be welcomed as the main addition of the draft Privacy Shield. Individuals will be able to access the Privacy Shield Ombusdperson without having to demonstrate that their personal data has in fact been accessed by the US intelligence activities and the Ombusdperson, who will be carrying out his functions independently from Instructions by the US Intelligence Community will be able to rely on the US oversight and review mechanisms.

However, there are several limitations to the function of the Privacy Shield Ombusdperson. First, the procedure for accessing the Ombudsperson is not as straightforward as lodging a complaint before a national Data Protection Authority (DPA). Individuals have to submit their requests initially to the Member States’ bodies competent for the oversight of national security services and, eventually a centralised EU individual complaint handling body that will channel them to the Privacy Shield Ombusdperson if they are deemed ‘complete’. In terms of the outcome of the Ombusdperson’s investigation, the Ombusdperson will provide a response to the submitting EU individual complaint handling body –who will then communicate with the individual- confirming (i) that the complaint has been properly investigated, and (ii) that the US law has been complied with, or, in the event of non-compliance, such non-compliance has been remedied. However, the Ombudsperson will neither confirm nor deny whether the individual has been the target of surveillance nor will the Ombudsperson confirm the specific remedy that was applied.

Finally, Annex III stipulates that commitments in the Ombudsperson’s Memorandum will not apply to general claims that the EU-US Privacy Shield is inconsistent with EU data protection requirements. In the light of the above, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson does not seem to provide the redress guarantees of a supervisory authority such as the DPAs as the AG had asked in his Opinion in Schrems.

Draft Privacy Shield is problematic for another reason as well: it puts together the regulative framework for commercial transactions with the regulation for law enforcement access to private sector data. These are, however, different issues and they should be dealt with separately. It is important to encourage and facilitate transborder trade, thus flexible mechanisms allowing for undertakings self-compliance with data protection principles should continue to apply. But, the challenges of online surveillance on fundamental rights are too serious to be covered by the same regime and some ‘assurances’ that essentially describe the current US law.

Two solutions could possibly deal with this problem: Either the US adheres to the Council of Europe Convention No. 108 and abandons the distinction between US and EU citizens regarding rights to redress or a transatlantic privacy and data protection framework that ensures a high level of protection of fundamental rights and the transparency and accountability of transnational counter-terrorism operations (the so-called ‘umbrella agreement’) is adopted. Regrettably, the current form of the umbrella agreement is very problematic as to its compatibility with EU data protection standards- or even human rights standards in general, and, therefore, does not seem to provide an effective solution to the issue.

A recently leaked document reveals that the Article 29 Working Party has difficulties in reaching an overall conclusion on the Commission’s draft adequacy decision and supports the view that Privacy Shield does not fully comply with the essential guarantees for the transfer of personal data from the EU to the US for intelligence activities.

Should the Commission nevertheless decide to proceed with the current draft, it is highly possible that the CJEU will be called in the future to judge the adequacy of Privacy Shield in aSchrems 2 line of cases.