Month: February 2016

BETTER…ADMINISTRATIVE MAKING AT EU LEVEL (when the European Parliament paves the way to an, almost reluctant, European Commission…).

Since years the European Parliament ask the European Commission to submit a formal legislative proposal framing the administrative activity of the European Union as foreseen by art 298 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

According to the former “In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration”.

Even more clearly the art 41 of the Charter (Right to good administration) states that :
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.
2.This right includes:
(a)the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken;
(b)the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;
(c)the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
3.Every person has the right to have the Union make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States.
4. Every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the Treaties and must have an answer in the same language.”

More than six year have past since the entry into force of the Treaty, in the meantime the EU administrative constellation has become even more complex with new agencies, authorities and networks but the European Commission has not yet considered that the time has come to bring some order in a domain which many have described as the “maquis” communautaire (instead of “aquis” communautaire..). This is even more appalling bearing in mind the increasing importance recognized also by the Court of Justice to the principle of good administration when assessing the legitimacy of the activity of the EU Member States or even of third countries. ..

It has then to be praised the fact that also in this legislature the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) of the European Parliament has decided to ask to a group of eminent experts in this domain to write a full fledged legislative text which can “inspire” the European Commission. The full study and the text are accessible here .

Below the text of the draft legislative proposal as well as the first part of the study “The context and legal elements of a Proposal for a Regulation on the Administrative Procedure of the European Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies” authored by Professors  Diana-Urania    Galetta,   Herwig   C.   H.   Hofmann,   Oriol  Mir Puigpelat and Jacques Ziller.

Emilio De Capitani

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Proposal for  a REGULATION OF THE   EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the  Administrative Procedure  of  the  European  Union’s  institutions, bodies,  offices  and  agencies

THE EUROPEAN   PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  COUNCIL OF  THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having    regard    to    the    Treaty    on    the    Functioning    of   the    European    Union,   and    in    particular Article  298   thereof,
Having  regard  to  the proposal  from  the European  Commission,
After  transmission of  the draft legislative act  to  the national  parliaments,
Acting in accordance with  the  ordinary  legislative procedure, Whereas:
(1) With the development of the competences of the European Union, citizens are increasingly confronted with the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, without  always having their procedural  rights adequately  protected.
(2) In a Union under the rule of law it is necessary to ensure that procedural rights and obligations are always adequately defined, developed and complied with. Citizens are entitled to expect a high level of transparency, efficiency, swift execution and responsiveness from the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Citizens are also entitled to receive adequate information regarding possibility to take any further  action  in the matter.
(3) The existing rules and principles on good administration are scattered across a wide variety of sources: primary law, secondary law, case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, soft law and unilateral commitments by the Union’s institutions.
(4) Over the years, the Union has developed an extensive number of sectoral administrative procedures, in the form of both binding provisions and soft law, without necessarily taking into account the overall coherence of the system. This complex variety of procedures has resulted in gaps and inconsistencies in these procedures.
(5) The fact that the Union lacks a coherent and comprehensive set of codified rules of administrative law makes it difficult for citizens to understand their administrative rights under  Union  law.
(6) In April 2000, the European Ombudsman proposed to the institutions a Code of Good Administrative Behaviour in the belief that the same code should apply to all Union institutions,  bodies,  offices   and   agencies.
(7) In its resolution of 6 September 2001, Parliament approved the European Ombudsman’s draft code with modifications and called on the Commission to submit a proposal for a regulation containing a Code of Good Administrative Behaviour based   on  Article  308  of the  Treaty establishing  the European Community.
(8) The existing internal codes of conduct subsequently adopted by the different institutions, mostly based on that Ombudsman’s Code, have a limited effect, differ from one   another  and  are  not   legally binding.
(9) The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has provided the Union with the legal basis for the adoption of an Administrative Procedure Regulation. Article 298 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for the adoption of regulations to assure that in carrying out their mission, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon also gave the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) the  same  legal   value  as  the  Treaties.
(10) Title V (“Citizens’ Rights”) of the Charter enshrines the right to good administration in Article 41, which provides that every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. Article 41 of the Charter further indicates, in a non-exhaustive way, some of the elements included in the definition of the right to good administration such as the right to be heard, the right of every person to have access to their file, the right to be given reasons for a decision of the administration and the possibility of claiming damages caused by the institutions and  its servants  in  the  performance  of their  duties,  and  language  rights.
(11) An efficient Union administration is essential for the public interest. An excess as well as a lack of rules and procedures can lead to maladministration, which may also result from the existence of contradictory, inconsistent or unclear rules and procedures.
(12) Properly structured and consistent administrative procedures support both an efficient administration and a proper enforcement of the right to good administration guaranteed  as a  general  principle  of  Union  law  and under Article  41 of  the Charter.
(13) In its Resolution of 15 January 2013 the European Parliament called for the adoption of a regulation on a European Law of Administrative Procedure to guarantee the right to good administration by means of an open, efficient and independent European administration. Establishing a common set of rules of administrative procedure at the level of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies should enhance legal certainty, fill gaps in the Union legal system and should thereby contribute to compliance  with  the  rule  of law.
(14) The purpose of this Regulation is to establish a set of procedural rules which the Union’s administration should comply with when carrying out its administrative activities. These procedural rules aim at assuring both an open, efficient and independent administration and a proper enforcement of the right to good administration.
(15) In line with Article 298 TFEU this Regulation should not apply to the Member States’ administrations.. Furthermore, this Regulation should not apply to legislative procedures, judicial proceedings and procedures leading to the adoption of non-legislative acts directly based on the Treaties, delegated acts or implementing  acts.
(16) This Regulation should apply to the Union’s administration without prejudice to other Union’s legal acts which provide for specific administrative procedural rules. However, sector-specific administrative procedures are not fully coherent and complete. With a view to ensuring overall coherence in the administrative activities of the Union’s administration and full respect of the right to a good administration, legal acts providing for specific administrative procedural rules should, therefore, be interpreted in compliance with this Regulation and their gaps should be filled by the relevant provisions of this Regulation. This Regulation establishes rights and obligations as a default rule for all administrative procedures under Union law and therefore reduces the fragmentation of applicable procedural rules, which result from  sector-specific  legislation.
(17) The procedural administrative rules laid down in this Regulation aim at implementing the principles on good administration established in a large variety of legal sources in light of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Those principles are set out here below and their formulation should inspire the  interpretation   of  the  provisions  of   this   Regulation.
(18) The principle of the rule of law, as recalled in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), is the heart and soul of the Union’s values. In accordance with that principle, any action of the Union has to be based on the Treaties in compliance with the principle of conferral. Furthermore, the principle of legality, as a corollary to the rule of law, requires that activities of the Union’s administration are carried out in full  accordance with the law.
(19) Any legal act of Union law has to comply with the principle of proportionality. This requires any measure of the Union’s administration to be appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the measure in question: where there is a choice among several potentially appropriate measures, the least burdensome option has to be taken and any charges imposed by the administration not  be  disproportionate  to  the  aims  pursued.
(20) The right to good administration requires that administrative acts be taken by the Union’s administration pursuant to administrative procedures which guarantee impartiality,  fairness  and   timeliness.
(21) The right to good administration requires that any decision to initiate an administrative procedure be notified to the parties and provide the necessary information enabling them to exercise their rights during the administrative procedure. In duly justified and exceptional cases where the public interest so requires,  the  Union’s   administration   may  delay   or  omit   the  notification.
(22) When the administrative procedure is initiated upon application by a party, the right to good administration imposes a duty on the Union’s administration to acknowledge receipt of the application in writing. The acknowledgment of receipt should indicate the necessary information enabling the party to exercise his or her rights of defence during the administrative procedure. However, the Union’s administration should be entitled to reject pointless or abusive applications as they might  jeopardize  administrative  efficiency.
(23) For the purposes of legal certainty an administrative procedure should be initiated within a reasonable time after the event has occurred. Therefore, this Regulation should  include   provisions   on   a  period  of  limitation.
(24) The right to good administration requires that the Union’s administration exercise a duty of care, which obliges the administration to establish and review in a careful and impartial manner all the relevant factual and legal elements of a case taking into account all pertinent interests, at every stage of the procedure. To that end, the Union’s administration should be empowered to hear the evidence of parties, witnesses and experts, request documents and records and carry out visits or inspections. When choosing experts, the Union’s administration should ensure that they  are  technically   competent  and  not  affected  by  a  conflict   of  interest.
(25) During the investigation carried out by the Union’s administration the parties should have a duty to cooperate by assisting the administration in ascertaining the facts and circumstances of the case. When requesting the parties to cooperate, the Union’s administration should give them a reasonable time-limit to reply and should remind them of the right against self-incrimination where the administrative procedure  may  lead  to  a  penalty.
(26) The right to be treated impartially by the Union’s administration is a corollary of the fundamental right to good administration and implies staff members’ duty to abstain   from   taking   part   in   an   administrative   procedure   where   they   have,   directly or indirectly,    a    personal    interest,    including,    in    particular,    any    family    or    financial interest,  such   as  to   impair  their  impartiality.
(27) The right to good administration might require that, under certain circumstances inspections be carried out by the administration, where this is necessary to fulfil a duty or achieve an objective under Union law. Those inspections should respect certain   conditions  and  procedures  in   order  to   safeguard   the   rights   of  the  parties.
(28) The right to be heard should be complied with in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to conclude in a measure adversely affecting that person. It should not be excluded or restricted by any legislative measure. The right to be heard requires that the person concerned receive an exact and complete statement of the claims or objections raised and is given the opportunity to submit comments on  the  truth   and  relevance  of  the   facts  and   on   the  documents  used.
(29) The right to good administration includes the right of a party to the administrative procedure to have access to its own file, which is also an essential requirement in order to enjoy the right to be heard. When the protection of the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy does not allow full access to a file, the party should at least be provided with an adequate summary of the content of the file. With a view to facilitating access to one’s files and thus ensuring transparent information management, the Union’s administration should keep records of its incoming and outgoing mail, of the documents it receives and measures it takes, and establish an index of the recorded   files.
(30) The Union’s administration should adopt administrative acts within a reasonable time-limit. Slow administration is bad administration. Any delay in adopting an administrative act should be justified and the party to the administrative procedure should be duly informed thereof and provided with an estimate of the expected date  of  the  adoption   of  the  administrative  act.
(31) The right to good administration imposes a duty on the Union’s administration to state clearly the reasons on which its administrative acts are based. The statement of reasons should indicate the legal basis of the act, the general situation which led to its adoption and the general objectives which it intends to achieve. It should disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the competent authority which adopted the act in such a way as to enable the parties concerned to decide if they wish   to  defend  their   rights  by  an  application   for  judicial   review.
(32) In accordance with the right to an effective remedy, neither the Union nor Member States can render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Union law. Instead, they are obliged to guarantee real and effective judicial protection and are barred from applying any rule or procedure which might prevent,   even   temporarily,  Union  law  from   having   full   force  and   effect.
(33) In accordance with the principles of transparency and legal certainty, parties to an administrative procedure should be able to clearly understand their rights and duties that derive from an administrative act addressed to them. For these purposes, the Union’s administration should ensure that its administrative acts are drafted in a clear, simple and understandable language and take effect upon notification to the parties. When carrying out that obligation it is necessary for the Union’s administration to make proper use of information and communication technologies and  to adapt  to their development.
(34) For the purposes of transparency and administrative efficiency, the Union’s administration should ensure that clerical, arithmetic or similar errors in its administrative  acts are corrected  by  the competent authority.
(35) The principle of legality, as a corollary to the rule of law, imposes a duty on the Union’s administration to rectify or withdraw unlawful administrative acts. However,   considering   that   any   rectification   or   withdrawal of   an   administrative   act may conflict with the protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of legal certainty, the Union’s administration should carefully and impartially assess the effects of the rectification or withdrawal on other parties and include the conclusions of such an assessment in the reasons of the rectifying or withdrawing act.
(36) Citizens of the Union have the right to write to the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in one of the languages of the Treaties and to have an answer in the same language. The Union’s administration should respect the language rights of the parties by ensuring that the administrative procedure is carried out in one of the languages of the Treaties chosen by the party. In the case of an administrative procedure initiated by the Union’s administration, the first notification should be drafted in one of the languages of the Treaty corresponding to  the  Member  State  in  which  the  party  is  located.
(37) The principle of transparency and the right of access to documents have a particular importance under an administrative procedure without prejudice of the legislative acts adopted under Article 15(3) TFEU. Any limitation of those principles should be narrowly construed to comply with the criteria set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter and therefore should be provided for by law and should respect the essence of the rights and freedoms and be subject to the principle of proportionality.
(38) The right to protection of personal data implies that without prejudice of the legislative acts adopted under Article 16 TFEU, data used by the Union’s administration   should  be  accurate,  up-to-date   and  lawfully   recorded.
(39) The principle of protection of legitimate expectations derives from the rule of law and implies that actions of public bodies should not interfere with vested rights and final legal situations except where it is imperatively necessary in the public interest. Legitimate expectations should be duly taken into account where an administrative act  is  rectified  or  withdrawn.
(40) The principle of legal certainty requires Union rules to be clear and precise. That principle aims at ensuring that situations and legal relationships governed by Union law remain foreseeable in that individuals should be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and be able to take steps accordingly. In accordance with the principle of legal certainty, retroactive measures should not be taken  except  in  legally justified circumstances.
(41) With a view to ensuring overall coherence in the activities of the Union’s administration, administrative acts of general scope should comply with the principles  of  good administration  referred  to  in  this  Regulation.
(42) In the interpretation of this Regulation, regard should be had especially to equal treatment and non-discrimination, which apply to administrative activities as a prominent corollary to the rule of law and the principles of an efficient and independent  European  administration,
 
HAVE  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION: 
 
CHAPTER I GENERAL   PROVISIONS
 
Article  1 Subject  matter and objective…
  Continue reading “BETTER…ADMINISTRATIVE MAKING AT EU LEVEL (when the European Parliament paves the way to an, almost reluctant, European Commission…).”

From Dublin to Athens: A Plea for a Radical Rethinking of the Allocation of Jurisdiction in Asylum Procedures 

Click to access IIHL-A-plea-for-the-reform-of-the-Dublin-system-policy-brief-def.pdf

FULL STUDY PUBLISHED HERE
by Marcello Di Filippo (1)
ABSTRACT (Policy Brief – January 2016) (2)
The so called refugee crisis of 2015 had several effects, among which the definitive demonstration of the unsustainability of the Dublin system and the need of a radical change in the modalities of allocation of the competence for the exam of asylum claims in the EU. 
The same credibility of the EU is at stake, as well as the capacities of national governments to manage the relevant flows reaching the Schengen area. 
This Policy Brief provides sound arguments both for supporting the demand for a new legal framework, and for the determination of new criteria which combines fairness, realism, solidarity, cooperation. 
A quota approach would be combined with a “genuine link” approach, thus trying to find a proper balance between the States’ interests and the point of view (and related behaviors) of asylum seekers, and also between the objections of human rights defenders and the concerns of European public opinion. 
The need to turn the page with the Dublin age warmly suggests to choose, for the new proposed regulation, a nick name which evokes the features of the current historical (and dramatic) passage of European integration and our deep sense of belonging to a place where much part of our way of thinking and of being a society is rooted: Athens. 
Having regard to the lessons learnt from decades of regulation of the determination of jurisdiction in civil, commercial and criminal matters, a first step to take is the adoption of a new conception for the role of the asylum seeker, who should be allocated to the State with which he/she holds a substantial link: the configuration of the relevant connecting factors (family relations; economic or social ties) should pay due regard to the empirical dimension of the phenomenon and to the need to avoid unnecessary sufferance and waste of public funds and time. 
If the asylum seeker has genuine links with more States, a certain relevance to his/her free choice should be awarded. 
Lacking any connection with a given country, the State with the lowest performance in fulfilling its reference quota should be the competent one. In the same time, an already overburdened country should be afforded the possibility to refuse responsibility, provided that some basic family ties are safeguarded. In such cases, a less connected country should be responsible, or the one less engaged in hosting asylum seekers and refugees, or as extrema ratio the country of first entrance or where the application is lodged. Whether an asylum seeker is allocated to a country where he/she does not have any substantial link and his/her asylum claim receives a positive outcome, the possibility of accepting a genuine job offer in another Member State should be admitted. This way, a partial freedom of circulation for work purposes could be recognized, but its exercise would relieve the first Member State by protection duties. As an accompanying measure, a system of financial incentives/disincentives for Member States should be conceived. 
Continue reading..
 1 Associate Professor of International Law (University of Pisa; marcello.difilippo@unipi.it), Member of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (http://www.iihl.org), Coordinator of the Observatory on European Migration Law (http://immigrazione.jus.unipi.it).
The author is grateful to G. Beruto, S. Baldini and to the whole IIHL staff for their precious support, and to A. Baldaccini, C. Hein, S. Marinai, and E. Papastavridis for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 Policy Brief elaborated with the support of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the International Cooperation (contribution awarded under Article 2 Law No. 948/82).

Click to access IIHL-A-plea-for-the-reform-of-the-Dublin-system-policy-brief-def.pdf

The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What could possibly go wrong?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Friday, 5 February 2016)

by Steve Peers* and Emanuela Roman, **

The key non-EU country in the EU’s ongoing refugee crisis is Turkey: the host ofover 2 million Syrian refugees, and a transit country for many asylum-seekers. An increasing number of them have been making the journey from Turkey to the Greek islands, leading to a significant rise in the number of would-be asylum-seekers in the EU over the last year. Tragically, many have died making this crossing.

To address these issues, the EU and Turkey reached a deal in November with a number of different elements. The main aim was to improve the position of Syrian refugees in Turkey (reducing the ‘push’ factor which results in more people planning to leave), and to return to Turkey those who did not need international protection. But, according to the latest Frontex statistics, most of the people arriving from Turkey do need international protection: about 90% of those arriving in Greece in December were from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, countries with high recognition rates for asylum claims.

It follows that returning to Turkey only those who don’t need international protection would only make a small dent in the numbers coming to the EU. Many politicians, in reaction to a portion of public opinion, would like to reduce those numbers far more. So last week, a further plan emerged: to return to Turkey those who do need international protection, on the grounds that they already had such protection in Turkey – or if not, they should seek it there. This would entail designating Turkey as a ‘safe third country’. The plan would entail a nearly immediate return to Turkey of any would-be asylum-seekers who reached the Greek islands.

The following analysis looks first of all at the main elements of the overall EU/Turkey deal on the refugee crisis, then in more detail at the new plan to return asylum-seekers to Turkey.

The EU/Turkey deal

The EU/Turkey deal contains concessions on both sides. The EU side has agreed: the opening of another chapter in the EU/Turkey accession process, and preparatory work by the Commission on further chapters; a proposal to lift Schengen visa requirements for Turkey by October 2016, if Turkey meets the requirements of the EU’s ‘roadmap’ on visa liberalisation; and a ‘Refugee Facility for Turkey’, totalling of €3 billion for Turkey. Subsequently, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on an EU ‘humanitarian admission scheme’ of Syrian refugees from Turkey (discussed in detail by Laura Robbins-Wright here).

In return, the Turkish side agreed: to readmit non-Turkish nationals to its territory, from June 2016; to apply a previously-agreed plan on the status of Syrian refugees in Turkey; and to prevent non-EU citizens from leaving.

There are also agreements in both sides’ mutual interest: to hold regular summits (at least twice a year); and to ‘upgrade’ the EU/Turkey customs union, to include services and investment, with negotiations to start before the end of 2016.

Several elements of the deal should be clarified further. It’s sometimes claimed that the deal has ‘fast-tracked’ Turkish membership of the EU. This is clearly not the case. Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987, and negotiation talks opened 18 years later, in 2005. In the eleven years since, the EU and Turkey have agreed only one of the 35 ‘chapters’ of issues being discussed in the negotiation. Before last year’s deal, they had opened another 13 chapters; the deal raised that number to 14. There is no date to open talks on the remaining 20 chapters; the deal is expressly without prejudice to EU Member States’ position on the planned ‘preparatory work’. Overall, the deal means that the enlargement negotiations will now move at the pace of a turtle, instead of a snail.

The prospect of Turkish accession to the EU also faces a number of obstacles on the EU side: objections by many Member States (including possible referendums), and misgivings by the European Parliament (which must approve accession treaties). Nor would accession lead immediately to free movement of Turkish citizens to the EU. Recent accession treaties have provided for waiting periods of seven years before workers from the new Member States can move to the older Member States, and the UK, which has a veto over accession treaties, insists that future enlargements must provide for even longer waiting periods.

As for the visa waiver, it should be noted that it will apply to (short-term) visas to visit the Schengen states. Therefore it will not ever apply to the UK and Ireland; and does not yet apply to Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia or Cyprus. It’s the EU’s usual practice to offer visa facilitation (fast-track issue of visas, with reduced fees) and then a full visa waiver to neighbouring States which have agreed a readmission treaty. As the text of the EU/Turkey deal points out, that waiver is dependent in each case upon the third State fulfilling a list of conditions set out by the EU (for the Commission’s most recent report on Turkey meeting those conditions, see here).

It’s the readmission deal – the quid pro quo for the visa waiver – that is central to the issue of the refugee crisis. The EU/Turkey readmission treaty has applied since October 2014. It applies to Turkish citizens straight away, but Turkey (like many other states signing up to readmission treaties) negotiated a delay before it applies to nationals of other countries. That’s a three year delay, so it was due to expire in October 2017. However, in light of the perceived migration and refugee crisis, the EU was not willing to wait that long until it called upon Turkey to accept third-state citizens back onto its territory.

Finally, the ‘Refugee Facility for Turkey’ aims to reduce the ‘push’ factor which leads to departures from Turkey to the EU. According to the Decision establishing the fund – which Member States finally agreed to recently – the Fund will assist refugees and host communities. No further details are given.

Before we look at the substance of the law on returning people to Turkey, it’s useful to make some general observations on EU policy in this area. Some critics of EU asylum policy argue that it should be more like the Australian policy. In fact, in some ways the EU is moving towards such a policy, as we’ll see. But – leaving aside for a moment the desirability of the EU adopting an ‘Australian’ asylum policy – there are legal, political, geographical and practical limits to doing so.

In a nutshell, Australia intercepts vessels of asylum-seekers on the high seas (international waters) and arranges for the asylum-seekers to be detained and their applications processed in other countries, which Australia considers to be ‘safe’. Furthermore, Australia resettles confirmed refugees directly from third countries (about 13,000 a year), as its contribution to sharing the burdens of the countries which host those refugees (the large majority of refugees live in developing countries).

There’s no legal obligation upon the countries which Australia considers ‘safe’ to take the asylum-seekers and process them. The UN Convention on Refugees (the ‘Geneva Convention’) imposes no such obligation (on the international law framework for ‘safe third country’ rules, see discussion here). Even if it did, some of the countries concerned haven’t ratified that treaty. So Australia has to talk those countries into accepting the people concerned. They won’t accept unless Australia pays most of the costs.

How does this compare with the EU? First of all, the numbers are hugely different:18,000 people arrived illegally by sea in Australia in 2012-13, whereas over a million potential asylum-seekers arrived in the EU last year. We’re comparing apples and orchards here. There are simply more people wanting to apply for protection in closer vicinity to the EU, as compared to Australia, and the distance to travel is shorter. Furthermore, there are no ‘high seas’ between Greece and Turkey, so interception raises different legal issues. Once would-be asylum-seekers reach Greek waters, EU law says they can apply for asylum, and Greece is also bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as regards them.

That brings us to the next distinction. The Australian constitution has weak human rights protection, and that country’s High Court has recently ruled in favour of the offshore detention policy. In contrast, EU countries are governed by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is open to individual complaints and can give binding rulings, often critical of national policies in this area. While Australia has signed up to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and allows individuals to make complaints to the United Nations Committee which interprets that Covenant, the Committee’s rulings aren’t binding. When the Committee rules against Australian policy on asylum-seekers – which it often does – Australian politicians in effect throw the ruling on the barbecue.

So given the large numbers concerned and the legal constraints, if the EU wants non-EU countries to take back non-citizens of those countries who have made their way to the EU, it needs to offer a lot to them to convince them to do so. At first sight, it may seem overly generous for the EU to offer money to Turkey, waive visa requirements and accelerate the accession process a little, in order to secure Turkey’s cooperation as regards refugees and migrants. But Turkey is under no obligation now to take back non-citizens or to restrain them from leaving. Even after it agrees to accept returns of non-citizens to its territory, it could end its obligations at any time by denouncing the readmission agreement – if it is willing to accept the re-imposition of visa requirements by the EU as a consequence. The financial assistance, if spent as intended, will also reduce the ‘push’ factor for migration of Syrian refugees towards the EU.

Returning people to Turkey

Turkish citizens

Turkey is already obliged to accept back its own citizens under the readmission agreement with the EU. Turkish citizens in the EU might have rights to stay under the EU’s immigration and asylum legislation, or under the EU/Turkey associationagreement. But they have no general right of free movement to the EU, and there is no prospect of it being extended to them before (or indeed well after) EU membership. So those Turkish citizens in the EU without such a right to stay, including failed asylum-seekers, must be returned.

It should be noted that the EU Commission has proposed to list Turkey as a ‘safe country of origin’ for asylum purposes, meaning that asylum claims by Turks would be fast-tracked (but not rejected automatically). This is a rather dubious suggestion (for the reasons set out here), and it is not yet known whether it will be accepted.

Non-Turkish citizens: Irregular migrants

Turkey is not obliged to accept back any non-Turkish citizens until it brings forward the relevant obligations in the EU/Turkey plan – as it has agreed to do so. If someone has never applied for asylum, and has no other ground to stay, EU Member States will then be able to return them to Turkey, if the Member States can prove that the person was previously in Turkey. It should be sufficient to show that the person concerned crossed from Turkey to a Greek island.

This is equally the case for failed asylum-seekers, if the person concerned has failed on the merits. In other words, if the non-Turkish citizen has not convinced the Member State’s authorities (or the courts on appeal) that he or she faced persecution or serious harm, that person could be sent back to Turkey once that country extends the scope of the readmission deal.

The more difficult question – which is the subject of the new plan – is whether asylum-seekers who have come via Turkey can be rejected and returned to Turkey on the grounds that their applications are inadmissible. Let’s be clear what that means: those applications would not be rejected on the basis that the person wasn’t a genuine refugee, but that he or she either (a) could have applied for protection in Turkey or (b) already had protection there. The former is the ‘safe third country’ concept; the latter is the ‘first country of asylum’ concept. There are detailed definitions of each concept in EU law, in the Asylum Procedures Directive. We will consider those definitions in turn.

Is Turkey a ‘safe third country’?

On Thursday 28 January 2016, Diederik Samsom, leader of the Dutch Labour Party, announced in an interview with the newspaper De Volkskrant (followed by an interview on the nightly TV programme Niewsuur) a Dutch proposal for a new plan to radically reduce the number of migrants and asylum-seekers entering the EU from Turkey. The proposal was immediately baptised ‘the Samsom Plan’.

The plan would have the support of Dutch PM Mark Rutte and would also receive support by a number of EU Member States, among which Germany, Austria and Sweden. The idea is to offer Turkey the resettlement of 150,000 to 250,000 refugees per year from Turkey to the EU countries that voluntarily agree with the plan. This resettlement would presumably be on the basis of the Commission Recommendation on humanitarian admission from Turkey, referred to above. In exchange for this, Turkey would have to accept the return of all migrants and asylum-seekers who cross the Greek-Turkish border irregularly. According to Mr Samson, these people would have to be very rapidly returned from Greece to Turkey by ferry-boat, and it would be Turkey’s responsibility to deal with their reception and asylum application.

This new plan is based on the assumption that Turkey can be considered a ‘safe third country’ – a non-EU country where an asylum-seeker can apply for asylum and be granted access to asylum procedures and reception conditions in line with international and EU law.

The Samsom Plan, however, does not seem to come from Mr Samsom’s mind. The European Stability Initiative (ESI), a think tank specialised in Southeast Europe, presented a very similar proposal in October 2015. The original plan, based on the fundamental idea of considering Turkey a safe third country, was called ‘Merkel Plan’, because initially Germany alone would have the main role in the resettlement scheme with Turkey. The original plan was then further developed (becoming‘Merkel Plan 2.0’) and a ‘coalition of the willing’ (including the Netherlands) was gathered around Germany. From October 2015 to January 2016 the ESI presented this proposal in different countries across Europe, but it was only following Mr Samsom’s interview, that the now renamed Samsom Plan burst into the public debate.

What is the legal definition of a ‘safe third country’? Article 38(1) of the Asylum Procedures Directive sets out a series of legal requirements that need to be met in order for a third country to be considered ‘safe’ for asylum-seekers:

  1. a) life and liberty shall not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
  2. b) there shall be no risk of serious harm (consisting of: death penalty; torture or unhuman or degrading treatment; or a serious threat to the applicant’s life due to indiscriminate violence in situations of conflict, as defined by Article 15 of theQualification Directive, ie the concept of ‘subsidiary protection’);
  3. c) the principle of non-refoulement (non-return to an unsafe country) shall be respected; and
  4. d) the possibility shall exist for the applicant to claim refugee status and to receive protection in accordance with the  Geneva Convention.

Article 38(2) establishes also several procedural guarantees. The safety of a third country must be always assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to check whether the notion is applicable to the particular circumstances of the individual applicant concerned. Moreover, the applicant must be guaranteed the right to challenge the application of the safe third country concept to his or her case, based on the fact that that country may not be safe in his or her particular circumstances. The question is whether an extremely rapid procedure as the one envisaged by Mr Samsom, would allow for a case-by-case examination of the individual circumstances of each asylum-seeker arriving in Greece from Turkey.

A further, more practical, question concerns who would be responsible for these procedures. Considering the difficulties faced by the Greek authorities in managing the current migrant flow and the established deficiencies of the Greek asylum system, it is hard to believe that the Greek authorities (despite the assistance provided by Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office, EASO) would be able to implement a systematic readmission plan as far-reaching as the one foreseen by Mr Samsom. As mentioned above, such plan must indeed be based on the individual consideration of each asylum application, otherwise it could amount to  a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions entailed in Article 4 Protocol 4 of the ECHR. Such practice has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the famous Hirsi case, where the Grand Chamber found Italian authorities responsible for violating the ECHR, because they returned a group of Eritrean and Somali migrants intercepted on the high seas back to Libya without granting them the possibility to apply for asylum. The same rule obviously applies to asylum-seekers who enter the territorial waters or land on the territory of a Member State.

In addition, according to Article 46 of the Procedures Directive, asylum-seekers have the right to refer to a national court the decision to consider their application inadmissible pursuant to Article 33(2). They can stay on the territory during their initial application, and apply to a court to stay during this appeal. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR unanimously confirmed in Hirsi (and reiterated in following case law – see for instance, Sharifi and others v Italy and Greece and Khlaifia and others v Italy) that return is only possible after the asylum-seeker has been able to claim asylum before a national authority, and to stay on the territory at least until the first instance decision on the application was made. However, it is even more doubtful that the accelerated procedure proposed by Samsom would allow for asylum-seekers to challenge the decision to return them to Turkey in front of a judicial authority and in the respect of all due procedural safeguards under the Directive and the ECHR.

However, besides the procedural issues, the crucial question here is more substantive: can Turkey be considered as a safe third country? Does Turkey comply with the requirements established by the Procedures Directive?

First, Turkey ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, but maintains a geographical limitation for non-European asylum-seekers, thus recognising refugees originating only from Europe (i.e. from countries which are members of the Council of Europe). The geographical limitation provides the first barrier to accessing asylum in the country. Moreover, Syrians represent a particular case. They were at first received as ‘guests’ and then subject to a temporary protection regime, formalised by a Regulation on Temporary Protection only in October 2014 (for more details, see the updated AIDA Country Report on Turkey). The basic idea behind the temporary protection regime is to host Syrians until the conflict is over and then possibly let them return to their country of origin. As such, Syrians have a right to reside in the country but are denied the prospect of a long-term legal integration. They have access to limited rights compared to asylum-seekers in the ‘normal’ procedure, in particular as concerns access to education for children (on this point, see for instance, Human Rights Watch report) and access to employment. Although in January 2016, the Turkish government adopted adecision aimed at ensuring that Syrians can enter the labour market, the effects of this new regulation are yet to be seen in practice. Most importantly, Syrians in Turkey do not have access to refugee protection in its full sense, as enshrined in the Geneva Convention. For the reasons set out in more detail in the annex to this blog post, it is arguable that the ‘safe third country’ clause can only be interpreted as applying to countries which have ratified and fully apply the Geneva Convention.

Secondly, Turkey should respect the principle of non-refoulement, a prohibition on returning a person to a place where he or she faces a risk of persecution, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment. However, several reports suggest that Turkey has engaged in refoulement and push-back practices throughout the years 1990s and 2000s. In particular, in November and December 2015, Human Rights Watch andAmnesty International denounced an increase in deportations, push-backs, arbitrary detentions and physical violence against asylum-seekers trying to cross the Turkish southern border coming from Syria or Iraq, or trying to enter Greece from Turkey, either by land or sea. This increase would coincide with the period leading up to and after the signing of the above-mentioned EU/Turkey deal.

Thirdly, in Turkey asylum-seekers and migrants in general, face a number of obstacles which may increase their risk of serious harm. In particular, Turkey has a record of treating asylum-seekers and refugees harshly in detention: episodes of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment have been reported by NGOs (Global Detention Project and Amnesty International among others) and condemned by the ECtHR in a series of judgments (see for instance, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey and the recent SA v Turkey, judgement of 15 December 2015). Furthermore, with reference to serious harm due to indiscriminate violence in a situation of conflict, the internal conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish rebels, which has escalated during the last year, may pose threats to the lives of asylum-seekers and refugees in the southeast of the country.

Therefore, it seems that Turkey does not fulfil many of the requirements for designation as a safe third country under the Procedures Directive. Even though the Samsom Plan does not mention this option, it seems now interesting to consider whether a similar policy could theoretically be implemented based on two different concepts entailed in the Procedures Directive, the concepts of ‘European safe third country’ and ‘first country of asylum’. The latter will be examined more in detail.

Is Turkey a ‘super-safe’ third country?

This wasn’t mentioned above, but the Asylum Procedures Directive also provides for a special category of ‘European safe third country’, which has been dubbed (sarcastically) the ‘super-safe’ third country concept. In this case, a Member State could have ‘no, or no full’ consideration of an asylum application – as foreseen by the Samsom Plan. The legal requirements for a country to be considered a ‘European safe third country’ are set out in Article 39(2) of the Directive:

  1. a) the ratification and full implementation of the Geneva Convention without any geographical limitation;
  2. b) the existence of an asylum procedure prescribed by law; and
  3. c) the ratification and full implementation of the ECHR.

Even though Turkey has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law (Law on Foreigners and International Protection adopted in April 2013 is Turkey’s first-ever national legislation on asylum), is a party to the ECHR (even though one of the parties with the highest number of condemnations by the ECtHR for violations of this treaty) and has ratified the Geneva Convention, as mentioned above, it maintains a geographical limitation to the application of the Geneva Convention, excluding non-European asylum-seekers from the refugee status. For this reason Turkey could not even be considered a ‘European safe third country’.

Could Turkey be considered a ‘first country of asylum’?

Could then the notion of ‘first country of asylum’ apply to Turkey? Could asylum-seekers possibly be returned from Greece to Turkey based on the fact that Turkey is their first country of asylum?

Article 33(2)(b) of the Procedures Directive foresees the possibility for a Member State to deem an asylum application inadmissible if it considers a non-EU country to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant. Article 35 establishes that a third country can be a first country of asylum in two cases:

  1. a) if the applicant has been recognised as a refugee in that country and can still avail himself or herself of that protection; or
  2. b) if the applicant otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement.

Article 35 further specifies that in applying this concept Member States may take into account the legal requirements provided for by Article 38(1) – i.e. those used to establish whether a country is a safe third country. It also states that asylum-seekers ‘shall be allowed’ to argue that the principle cannot apply to their particular circumstances. Furthermore, they also have the right to appeal pursuant to Article 46 of the Procedures Directive (and stay on the territory during the application and at least at the outset of the appeal), as discussed above.

For the reasons set out in the annex to this blog post, option (a) arguably refers only to obtaining status under the Geneva Convention. Therefore Turkey cannot be considered a first country of asylum for a non-European asylum seeker, due to its geographical limitation on that Convention. On the other hand, option (b) might apply. In Turkey, indeed, non-European asylum seekers can, at least theoretically, have access to an alternative form of protection: the so-called ‘conditional refugee status’ (for applicants who would qualify as refugees under the Geneva Convention but who come from a non-European country) or the EU-inspired subsidiary protection. Moreover, as mentioned above, asylum seekers originating from Syria have access to a different form of temporary protection.

These three alternative forms of protection differ in terms of the level of rights their holders benefit from, which in all cases (and in particular in the case of Syrians benefiting from temporary protection) is lesser than the one recognised to ‘European refugees’ (for details on the content of these three alternative forms of protection, see the AIDA Country Report on Turkey). The question is: could these forms of protection be considered as ‘sufficient protection’? How can a Member State establish when protection is ‘sufficient’?

Article 35 provides two reference points, one being strictly mandatory, the other one being optional. The first one is the respect of the non-refoulement principle. Turkey is formally bound to the principle of non-refoulement, being a party to the ECHR and having incorporated the principle into Article 4 of its Law on Foreigners and International Protection as well as in Article 6 of its Temporary Protection Regulation. However, as mentioned above, the country has a historical record ofrefoulement practices and there are allegations of a recent intensification of push-backs and deportations of Syrians and other asylum-seekers. Therefore, Turkey does not seem to be fully compliant with the principle of non-refoulement in practice. But, in light of the fact that each asylum application must be examined individually based on the specific circumstances of the case, Member States might argue that the risk of non-refoulement could be assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to establish if that particular applicant enjoys sufficient protection in Turkey.

The second reference point mentioned by Article 35 is Article 38(1). In deciding whether a third country can be considered a first country of asylum, Member States may apply the same criteria they use for determining whether that country could be a safe third country. As discussed above, Turkey does not seem to comply with most of the safe third country legal requirements and, on this basis, it might be argued that in general it should not be considered a first country of asylum. However, because this is a ‘may’ clause, Member States have no obligation to apply Article 38(1) requirements to Article 35 cases and can simply ignore the possible link between the two concepts.

Therefore, although the possible application of the concept of first country of asylum to Turkey seems in general rather controversial, Member States might apply it on an individual basis, based on option (b). However, if they decide to do so, Member States’ authorities would have to conduct a case-by-case assessment, taking into due consideration the particular circumstances of each individual applicant in order to determine whether he or she enjoys sufficient protection in Turkey and does not risk being refoulé(e). As discussed above, an individual examination of all asylum claims (including the applicant’s right to appeal against a negative decision) is incompatible with the extremely rapid procedure and systematic readmission mechanism envisaged by the Samsom Plan.

A change in EU law?

The above discussion is based on current EU legislation. It is, of course, possible in principle for the EU to amend that legislation via the usual process, or arguably via means of an ‘emergency’ measure on asylum pursuant to Article 78(3) TFEU. The previous use of Article 78(3), for a ‘relocation’ system, is being challenged byHungary and Slovakia. (On the latter challenge, see discussion here; and on the general legal issues concerning that provision, see discussion here.) There might be some specific procedural issues about the use of Article 78(3) to establish the Samsom Plan, but the underlying issue is substantive: could EU law be changed (by either means) to set up a ‘return ferries’ process?

The answer is clearly: No. All EU asylum measures are subject to the general rules in Article 78(1) TFEU: ‘compliance with the principle of non-refoulement’, and acting ‘in accordance with the Geneva Convention…and other relevant treaties’. Also, all EU measures are subject to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which must be interpreted consistently with the ECHR (Article 52(3) of the Charter).

It must follow that at the very least, the ECHR case law minimum standards discussed above must apply. So no revised EU law can provide for return of people coming from Turkey without some proper individual consideration of their claim that Turkey would not be a safe country for them; and there must be a right to appeal and stay in the country at least until the first-instance decision is made on this issue. To the extent that the Samsom Plan does not respect this irreducible core of human rights protection, it would be illegal.

Conclusion

Although it is remarkable that Turkey adopted a new comprehensive EU-inspired asylum legislation and is a state party to major human rights conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture, the way it has so far implemented its international human rights obligations appears to be still faulty. In particular, the right to asylum in Turkey cannot be considered as ‘fully established’, especially because of the still largely dysfunctional asylum system and the existing inequalities in access to protection and content of protection, which at the present moment are affecting Syrian refugees in particular.

For these reasons, the Samsom Plan proposing the systematic return of all asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey in exchange for increased refugee resettlement in Europe, appears to be not only very difficult to implement (due to both legal and practical obstacles), but also based on the doubtful presumption that Turkey may be (soon) considered a safe third country for refugees and asylum-seekers.

Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the EU and Turkey did not agree to fully apply the Geneva Convention for Turkey, and that there are no mechanisms of accountability in place for the EU institutions to report either in general upon Turkey’s compliance with international human rights standards or in particular to explain exactly how the EU’s money is being spent.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I:5

Photo credit: insidethegames.biz

**Emanuela Roman is a PhD candidate in Human Rights at the University of Palermo and junior researcher at the Forum of International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI). This article was written during the period she is spending as a visiting researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculty of Law, Migration Law Section. Emanuela would like to thank all her colleagues at the VU Migration Law Section, in particular Theodore Baird, Evelien Brouwer, Thomas Spijkerboer and Hemme Batijes for their precious comments and advise. The sole responsibility for the content of this article lies with the authors.

Annex I

Interpreting the ‘safe third country’ clause in the Procedures DirectiveAs noted above, Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive says that in a safe third country it must be possible for the applicant ‘to request refugee status and … to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’. In my view, this can only refer to States which have ratified and fully apply the Convention; therefore it cannot apply to Turkey. I am grateful for a discussion with Daniel Thym on this issue – although I should note that he holds the opposite opinion.

First of all, this interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the text, which is set out in detail in Annex II. The original draft in 2002 made expressly clear that the clause could apply even if a State had not ratified the Convention. During negotiations that text was revised so that the final wording states that it must be possible to get status ‘in accordance with’ the Convention. Attempts by several Member States to make it clear that alternative types of protection besides full Convention refugee status could also trigger the clause were not successful.

Secondly, the ordinary meaning of the words ‘in accordance with’ in English is ‘in compliance with’, although the other language versions are equally valid. This is confirmed by the words ‘refugee status’: the full title of the Geneva Convention is the ‘Convention on the Status of Refugees’. How can one apply for ‘refugee status…in accordance with the Geneva Convention’ if the state concerned has not ratified, or does not fully apply, the ‘[Geneva] Convention on the Status of Refugees’? While the definitions clause refers to Member States as regards the definitions of ‘refugee’ and ‘refugee status’, this logically cannot be intended to apply to Article 38, since that Article only refers to applications made in non-EU states.

Thirdly, the a contrario rule supports this interpretation. Where the drafters of the Directive wanted to refer to the possibility of applying for an alternative form of protection, they did so expressly, as in Article 35(b) of the Directive. Admittedly Article 39, which refers more clearly to the geographical reservation of Turkey as a (failed) condition for the ‘super-safe’ countries rule to apply, points in the opposite direction. But to the extent that these two a contrario analyses simply cancel each other out, the interpretation in line with the legislative history and ordinary meaning should apply.

Similarly ‘recognised as a refugee’ under Article 35(a) of the Directive should be interpreted to refer to the Convention refugee status, in the absence of any indication that any alternative meaning is intended. However, Article 35(b) does clearly provide for an alternative option of designating a state as a ‘first country of asylum’ due to the existence of other forms of protection.

Annex II: Legislative history of the ‘safe third country’ clause

  • Commission proposal, 2002: explicitly provides in an Annex that a ‘safe third country’ can be a country which has not ratified the Geneva Convention
  • Council doc 6929/03 – a note indicates that the Council will start work looking at ‘safe’ country concepts. This plan is soon dropped; the Council looks first at Arts 1-22 instead.
  • Council doc 7214/03 – Annex unchanged at this point, no MS comments
  • Council docs 10064/03 and 10456/03 – ditto
  • Council doc 10722/03 – minor amendment to annex to state that Cartagena declaration countries must have a procedure compliant with the principles of the Geneva Convention
  • Council doc 11108/03 – no change
  • Council doc 11575/03 – annex shortened a little
  • Council doc 12281/03 – annex shortened significantly
  • Council doc 12734/03 – annex is simplified, but still provides for rules (same as in previous text) on when a ‘safe third country’ can be a country which has not ratified the Geneva Convention
  • Council doc 13369/03 – same text, but Germany now has a reservation linked to the ‘super-safe’ country clause, and Finland says the relevant clause could be deleted
  • Council doc 13901/03 – unchanged
  • Council doc 13902/03 – unchanged. The Presidency notes that delegations have inflexible positions on these provisions.
  • Council doc 14020/03 – ditto
  • Council doc 14182/03 – issue sent to the Council
  • Council doc 14330/03 – text unchanged
  • Council doc 14686/03 – text unchanged. But Spain suggests deleting the annex and having a short description of ‘safe third country’ in the main text, which is vague as to whether the state in question must have ratified the Convention
  • Council doc 14686/03 add 1 – Presidency proposes to delete the annex and have a short description of ‘safe third country’ in the main text, which only mentions the Convention as regards non-refoulement
  • Council doc 15153/03 – clause now in the main text, annex deleted. No change re Convention issue. DE still has reservation linked to ‘super-safe’ clause
  • Council docs 15153/03 rev 1 and 2 – amended to refer to ‘request recognition and be granted protection by that country or by the UNHCR as a refugee’. Spain wants to delete ‘as a refugee’. BE, NL and FI want to add express clause requiring ratification of the Convention and/or observation of the Convention. DE reservation is gone.
  • Council doc 15198/03 – unchanged
  • Council doc 15198/03 add 1 – UK wants to delete the whole sub-para
  • Council doc 6871/04 – redraft adds clause separate from main criteria for ‘safe third country’: ‘…Member States shall have regard to whether the third country has ratified the Geneva Convention…’ when assessing the application of those criteria. The clause in the main criteria now reads ‘request and be granted protection as a refugee in that country’. This deletes the reference to the UNHCR and makes it clear that it must be the country which grants refugee status.
  • Council doc 6954/04 – unchanged, but UK joined by EL/ES/NL/AT want to add the words ‘or other forms of international protection’ to the criteria
  • Council doc 7183/04 – unchanged, NL no longer supporting the UK position
  • Council doc 7184/04 – unchanged
  • Council doc 7184/1/04 – unchanged. UK and ES now want to change to ‘or another form of status which otherwise offers sufficient protection’ to the criteria. This is similar to final ‘first country of asylum’ clause.
  • Council doc 7484/04 – due to deadlock, Presidency proposes dropping clause on ‘request and be granted protection as a refugee’ to get a deal.
  • Council doc 7729/04 – ditto
  • Council doc 8166/04 – redraft retains ‘request and be granted protection as a refugee’ clause, drops requirement to take into account whether third State has ratified Convention
  • Council doc 8158/04 – same text and reservation as in 7184/1/04
  • Council doc 8413/04 – text amended to read:  ‘the possibility exists to requestrefugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’. UK and Spanish proposal rejected – link to Geneva Convention in fact made explicit instead
  • Council doc 8415/04 – as before, except the UK seeks to amend to read ‘in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention’. This is clearly rejected in the final version.

    • Posted by Steve Peers 

Protecting civilians in armed conflict International framework and challenges

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERVICE BRIEFING (January 2016)

Author: Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig

SUMMARY

In today’s armed conflicts, whether international or intra-state, the vast majority of casualties are now civilians. Increasingly, civilians are victims of deliberate attacks and other serious violations by parties to a conflict – both states and non-state armed groups, despite the existence of strict legal rules intended to spare civilians from the effects of hostilities: the principles of international humanitarian law, of international human rights law and refugee law.
The lack of compliance with these norms, as well as the United Nations Security Council’s inability to take action to protect civilians in some specific cases, reflects the key concerns regarding the protection of civilians affected by armed conflicts worldwide. Moreover, specific protection concerns relate to the situation of women, children and displaced persons.
Besides this international legal framework, another related concept has garnered significant support internationally in the past decade: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), meant to apply only in cases of atrocity crimes. However, R2P remains controversial, given the challenge of adequate implementation, particularly with regard to its military intervention aspects.
Notwithstanding the many challenges with regard to protecting civilians in armed conflict, the European Union is a strong promoter of international humanitarian principles and of R2P, and other protection-related issues are consistently among its priorities.

Armed Conflicts

 

Trends in armed conflicts and impact on civilians…

Continue reading “Protecting civilians in armed conflict International framework and challenges”

L’ELSJ à l’heure de l’état d’urgence : un effet collatéral du « syndrome shadok » de la lutte antiterroriste française ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE PAGE  (2 FÉVRIER 2016)

by Pierre Berthelet, CDRE

« Il vaut mieux pomper d’arrache-pied même s’il ne se passe rien que risquer qu’il se passe quelque chose de pire en ne pompant pas ». La devise des Shadoks n’aura nullement échappé à l’observateur du droit français de la lutte antiterroriste au moment où le gouvernement prolonge la loi sur l’état d’urgence, validée par le Conseil d’État dans une ordonnance du 27 janvier 2016. La France, en proie à une pulsion législative si bien évoquée dans l’ouvrage Un droit pénal postmoderne ?, empile les textes juridiques destinés à faire face à la menace terroriste. La France semble être atteinte du « syndrome Shadok » caractérisé par une inflation législative constante.

Ce « syndrome Shadok » évoqué par Yves Trintignon de l’Université du Québec met en évidence le fait que le gouvernement français, confronté aux attaques terroristes de janvier et de novembre 2015, s’est empressé de renforcer les capacités des services de renseignement sans réellement s’interroger sur les difficultés rencontrées en matière d’organisation, sur les défaillances de leurs méthodes, ou encore sur les lacunes de leurs pratiques opérationnelles. Pis, il aggrave la situation en répondant promptement à la demande de ces services, et à l’inquiétude de l’opinion publique, sans véritablement faire preuve de distanciation à l’égard des effets pervers à plus long terme.

 

Une telle vision à court-termiste consistant à « pomper » sans relâche, c’est-à-dire à renforcer constamment le dispositif antiterroriste, est constatée à l’échelon national, mais aussi à l’échelon européen. D’emblée, la construction européenne dans ce domaine connaît des progrès sensibles. Ces avancées, observables concernant particulièrement l’ELSJ, s’expliquent notamment par l’implication de la France dans le processus décisionnel, désireuse que l’Union soit pleinement associée à la lutte qu’elle mène (1).

 

Cependant, à y regarder de près, la construction européenne risque d’être davantage victime que bénéficiaire de l’engagement de la France dans l’intégration européenne. En effet, son implication est avant tout dictée par une logique en vertu de laquelle le gouvernement entend obtenir un crédit politique à travers une réaffirmation de son autorité. L’État cherche à se légitimer à travers les lois qu’il prend, peu importe d’ailleurs leur efficacité. Il est d’ailleurs à noter que la France réclame une plus grande implication de l’Union dans la lutte antiterroriste, mais elle se garde bien de demander une évaluation globale de l’efficacité des politiques menées par les différents États membres.

 

Le « syndrôme Shadok » de la lutte antiterroriste française, qui consiste à pomper toujours plus même si cela ne sert à rien, a un impact néfaste sur l’édification de l’ELSJ à long terme (2).

 

Toute tentative de vouloir ralentir cette course effrénée est susceptible de constituer un obstacle inadmissible à l’égard d’un État membre désireux de se défendre face à une menace d’une gravité extrême. Qui plus est, les valeurs sur lesquelles l’Union est fondée, la préservation de l’État de droit et le respect des droits de l’homme pourraient faire les frais d’une telle course aveugle. On voit dès lors l’importance du juge européen, comme rempart face au cercle vicieux sécuritaire traduit en langage shadok par « je pompe donc je suis ».

 

  1. Le rôle moteur dans la lutte antiterroriste d’une France aux allures pro-européenne

 

La France apparaît comme l’aiguillon, désireuse de progresser dans l’intégration européenne, et ce, pour ce qui est de l’ELSJ. Un document du Conseil indique ainsi que la délégation française souhaite élargir le champ de la proposition de directive présentée par la Commission européenne le 2 décembre 2012.

Pour mémoire, ce texte, remplaçant la décision-cadre 2002/475/JAI du Conseil relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme, entend harmoniser la législation nationale concernant l’incrimination des « combattants étrangers », de même que l’aide apportée à la sortie du territoire. La décision-cadre a fait l’objet d’une modification en 2008 pour rendre punissable la provocation publique à commettre une infraction terroriste, ainsi que la diffusion sur Internet de la propagande terroriste.

De son côté, la France estime qu’il convient d’aller au-delà de cette actualisation de la législation européenne au regard des textes internationaux ayant trait à ce phénomène des « combattants étrangers » (la résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (RCSNU) 2178 (2014)) et le protocole additionnel à la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe pour la prévention du terrorisme de mai 2015).

Elle considère notamment qu’il importe de rendre punissable dans tous les États membres le trafic d’œuvres d’art en provenance de zones sous contrôle terroriste et de supprimer les pages internet incitant au terrorisme ou d’en bloquer l’accès.

Les ajouts de la France dans la proposition de directive s’inscrivent dans un contexte où ces questions font l’objet d’une attention particulière en droit interne.

Ainsi, concernant le trafic d’œuvres d’art, la répression du commerce illicite de biens culturels figure dans le projet de loi contre le crime organisé et le terrorisme, qui doit être présenté courant février 2016.

Pour ce qui est de la suppression des pages internet faisant l’apologie du terrorisme, le Sénat avait adopté le 1er avril 2015 une résolution européenne réclamant l’extension des compétences du Centre européen de lutte contre la cybercriminalité (EC3) en lui donnant la possibilité de supprimer des contenus terroristes ou extrémistes.

Peu avant, le 5 février 2015, un décret a été adopté fixant les modalités permettant aux internautes d’avoir accès à des pages web faisant cette apologie.

La force de proposition de la France concernant ce projet de directive est le reflet d’une volonté politique affichée concernant l’ELSJ : dans une déclaration après le Conseil JAI à Amsterdam du 25 janvier 2016, le ministre de l’Intérieur, Bernard Cazeneuve, fixe les demandes françaises, entendues comme des priorités « essentielles » figurant dans un agenda qui « n’est pas négociable ». Il énumère également les mesures sur lesquelles la France a obtenu satisfaction, en prenant le soin d’ajouter que bon nombre de ces mesures ont été initiées sous son impulsion : la directive PNR, la modification de l’article 7-2 du code frontières Schengen visant à instaurer des contrôles approfondis sur les ressortissants européens quittant l’espace Schengen, ou encore la révision de la directive de 1991 relative au contrôle des armes à feu.

 

  1. La stratégie de fuite en avant sécuritaire d’une France tentée par le repli national

 

La déclaration du ministre de l’Intérieur à l’issue du Conseil JAI du 25 janvier 2016 démontre l’intention de la France de continuer « son travail de persuasion » avec « beaucoup de volontarisme », pour reprendre les termes du texte. Elle fait office également de satisfecit, à la fois au sujet de l’efficacité de l’implication de la France dans la sphère institutionnelle et concernant l’action de l’Union européenne menée sous sa houlette, en matière de lutte antiterroriste.

 

La France s’est engagée depuis de nombreuses années dans une logique de renforcement continuel de l’arsenal répressif au nom de ce que le président de la République a qualifié de « guerre contre le terrorisme ». La fuite en avant sécuritaire se traduit par l’adoption de nombreux textes en 2014 et en 2015 : plan d’avril 2014 contre la radicalisation violente et les filières terroristes, loi du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme et décrets d’application du 14 janvier 2015 destinés à mettre en place l’interdiction administrative de sortie du territoire des ressortissants français, décret précité du 5 février 2015, décret du 4 mars 2015 relatif au déréférencement des sites, plan d’action du 18 mars 2015 pour lutter contre le financement du terrorisme, loi du 24 juin 2015 sur le renseignement et ses multiples décrets d’application, et décret du 14 novembre 2015 instaurant le régime de l’état d’urgence, prorogé par la loi du 20 novembre 2015.

 

D’autres projets sont en cours : projet de loi précité contre le crime organisé et le terrorisme, proposition de loi relative à la sécurité dans les transports, projet de loi constitutionnelle « de protection de la nation » comprenant deux volets, à savoir la déchéance de la nationalité d’un binational devenu français et l’inscription dans la Constitution des conditions de déclenchement de l’état d’urgence.

 

Cette fuite en avant est inquiétante, car s’il est possible de comprendre la stratégie de la France dans une perspective purement nationale, notamment à l’aune des manœuvres déployées par le gouvernement à l’égard du Front national, il est aussi possible d’inscrire le renforcement de l’arsenal répressif dans un contexte de dérive autoritaire que connaissent bon nombre de gouvernements européens, la Pologne au premier chef, vis-à-vis de laquelle la Commission a engagé une procédure de dialogue sur la base de l’article 7.1 TUE.

 

Une telle fuite en avant se traduit, sur le plan européen, par davantage de fermeté de la part de la France : fermeté vis-à-vis d’un Parlement européen réticent à adopter la directive PNR, fermeté à l’égard des délégations nationales enclines à tergiverser au Conseil sur les propositions d’actes en instance d’adoption, fermeté à l’encontre de la Commission désireuse de vérifier la conformité de la décision française de rétablir les contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

 

L’ultimatum lancé à celle-ci par le gouvernement français concernant le rétablissement de ces contrôles en vertu de l’art. 25 du Code Frontières Schengen, aussi longtemps que perdurerait la menace terroriste, est significatif de sa volonté d’afficher, sur tous les fronts, une détermination sans faille. Or, lerétablissement temporaire prolongé en dehors des délais prévus par le Code pose problème du point de vue de la légalité européenne, en particulier au regard des art. 23, 23bis et 25 du code.

L’attitude de la France consistant à faire preuve de fermeté tous azimuts lui permet de faire illusion sur le plan politique. Celle-ci se pare des atours d’une nation leader de la construction européenne pour mieux dissimuler les tentations de repli national. En effet, les efforts menés pour se trouver à la pointe de la lutte antiterroriste masquent la prévalence des intérêts nationaux érigés, en matière sécuritaire, au rang de principes absolus, insusceptibles de limitation.

 

D’ailleurs, pour s’en convaincre, il suffit de constater que, quel que soit le gouvernement, de droite ou de gauche, la France n’hésite pas à remettre en cause publiquement l’acquis de Schengen si celui-ci lui porte préjudice. Une telle attitude se révèle problématique d’un point de vue politique, car elle menace de détricoter cet acquis, faisant, par la même occasion, le jeu de certains gouvernements situés à l’Est de l’Europe.

 

Une telle attitude, prompte par ailleurs à désigner Schengen comme bouc émissaire, et à pointer les défaillances de l’ELSJ, se révèle problématique d’un point de vue juridique, car le droit français adopté dans le contexte de la lutte antiterroriste pose la délicate question de sa conformité du point de vue du droit européen. Ainsi, une France sous état d’urgence prolongé aurait-elle pu adhérer à l’Union européenne conformément aux critères insérés aux art. 6 et 49 TUE ? De manière générale, la législation française est-elle conforme à l’art. 2 TUE ainsi qu’aux dispositions de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux ?

 

La question est d’autant plus pertinente que le forcing français à l’égard de la directive PNR pourrait conduire à une annulation de ladite directive et ce, au regard de la jurisprudence Digital Rights. À ce propos, les juges européens se montrent sévères à l’égard de la dérive sécuritaire observée dans les États membres.

 

Prenant appui sur cette jurisprudence Digital Rights, la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, dans un arrêt du 12 janvier 2016, Szabo et Vissy c. Hongrie (voir l’analyse de Sylvie Peyrou), s’est montrée très ferme à l’égard des mesures nationales prises dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, en l’occurrence les opérations secrètes de surveillance antiterroriste.

 

Le rôle du juge européen n’a jamais été aussi important, non seulement comme défenseur du droit, mais aussi comme gardien des valeurs européennes. Il s’érige comme l’ultime recours face à cette fuite en avant sécuritaire préoccupante pour l’Europe et pour la France. Les mots de la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH) dans sa déclaration du 16 janvier 2015 sur l’état d’urgence et ses suites sonnent particulièrement juste : « la France ne doit pas, sous l’emprise de la sidération, sacrifier ses valeurs, au contraire, elle doit renforcer la démocratie ».

 

Free at last? Detention, the European Arrest Warrant and Julian Assange

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Friday, 5 February 2016)

by Steve Peers

“Bianca Jagger is here!”

I had just arrived at a meeting in the House of Lords, to give a talk on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and human rights. I thought that having the famous human rights activist in the audience when I spoke would be the most exciting thing that could happen to me that day. But I was wrong.

“Bianca Jagger wants to ask you a question, before we start!”

My heart skipped a beat as the beautiful activist walked slowly, catwalkishly, across the room in my direction. Finally, she was right in front of me. My heart stopped beating entirely. And then she asked me her question:

“Will you be speaking for very long?”

Needless to say I subsequently gave one of my shortest talks ever – although I suspect that it seemed endless to Ms. Jagger. Indeed, I imagine that for her, listening to my talk was comparable to the lengthy periods of pre-trial detention which some people face on the basis of EAWs.

This brings me to Lanigan: a key judgment on lengthy pre-trial detention and EAWs, issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) last year. It seems only appropriate that I am discussing this case rather belatedly. On the other hand, though, it is very timely to take the opportunity to discuss also the relevance of this judgment to the UN opinion (released today) on the ‘arbitrary detention’ of Julian Assange – who is also facing an EAW. And just as I promised Ms. Jagger, I won’t detain my beautiful readers for very long.

The Lanigan judgment

Unfortunately EAWs are often issued for the most trivial reasons. A carpenter, removing a wardrobe door until he got paid. (What Would Jesus Do?) The theft of a piglet. And my personal favourite: the friend of a friend who came to a house party and took someone else’s can of beer. That last case makes me pine for the return of the death penalty.

Yet the Lanigan case usefully reminds us that EAWs are also issued for the most serious of crimes. Mr. Lanigan was wanted on murder charges in the UK, which issued an EAW to the Irish Republic. He was detained in Ireland while he fought the execution of the EAW. Finally, the Irish courts decided to ask the CJEU if the months he spent fighting the EAW were a breach of the deadlines to execute it – as set out in the EU Framework Decision which created it – or of human rights law. This was the first Irish reference to the CJEU on criminal issues, following the expiry on the limits of the CJEU’s criminal law jurisdiction in December 2014 (for more on that transitional issue, see here).

According to the CJEU, the continued detention of Mr. Lanigan pending the EAW did not invalidate the EAW itself. Nor was there an obligation to release him. First of all, the Court insisted that the time limits in the legislation (60 days to execute an EAW, with a possible 30 day extension) had to be complied with strictly. This followed its earlier ruling in the Forrest case, which concerned the British schoolteacher who had fled to France with an underage schoolgirl.

But then the Court ate its previous words. The problem was that in this case, strict compliance with the time limits conflicted with the underlying obligation to execute the EAW. The Court referred to its many previous rulings insisting on the limited exceptions to that latter obligation. So it gave preference to the underlying rule, ruling that the EAW remained valid once the deadline expired: the ‘time limit’ was not really a time limit at all. (I wouldn’t advise students, lawyers, journalists or many others to take the same approach to deadlines.)

It got worse for Mr. Lanigan. The CJEU ruled that the expiry of the deadlines did not mean that Ireland had to release him from prison either. It pointed out that the rules on detention in the Framework Decision were very vague: national judicial authorities have to decide on detention; the fugitive may be given bail, if the authorities take steps to stop him or her absconding; and the issue is basically subject to national law. The EU rules do say that fugitives must be released from custody after the execution of an EAW, if the deadlines to surrender the person to the State which issued the EAW are not complied with. But in contrast, there is no such obligation if a State misses the deadline to execute the EAW in the first place.

Yet if there’s no real deadline to execute an EAW, and no obligation to release a fugitive from jail because that ‘time limit’ is a legal fiction, people could effectively end up facing indefinite detention without trial. Rightly realising that this was unacceptable, the Court, for the first time, gave some grudging respect to the many references to human rights set out in the EAW law. In this case, that meant the rules on detention were subject to Article 6 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, which had to be applied consistently with the rules on detention set out in Article 5 ECHR. So the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights applied: fugitives can only be detained if the EAW procedure is being carried out with ‘due diligence’. The national court has to consider all the factors, including any lax behaviour by the Irish authorities, the conduct of the fugitive himself, the possible sentence (severe in this case), the risk of absconding and the huge overrun of the deadlines.

The Assange case

In Lanigan, the CJEU wasn’t called upon to deal with the two detention issues that most frequently arise in practice as regards EAWs: (a) the lengthy pre-trial detention that fugitives are often subject to in the issuing State after they are surrendered there, and (b) the poor detention conditions which they sometimes face there. The CJEU will shortly rule on the latter issue, in the cases of Aranyosiand Caldararu.

Nor, obviously, was it called upon to deal with the peculiar circumstances of Mr. Assange: fleeing into a third State’s embassy, to escape the execution of an EAW, because the charges which motivated the issuing of the EAW were allegedly politically motivated, and a further extradition request from the USA was looming. Today we have a new twist: the opinion of a UN body that his ‘detention’ in the embassy is ‘arbitrary’.

How does EU law apply to this issue? In fact, EU law issues were discussed in the earlier UK litigation, up until the Supreme Court judgment. At that point, the UK courts were, like the Irish courts, unable to ask the CJEU questions about EU criminal laws adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Now they can. So Assange could bring a fresh challenge in the UK courts to the execution of the EAW in light of the UN ruling. He could either (a) request the UK courts (at any level) to ask the CJEU questions about the EAW law (the CJEU will likely give an emergency ruling, within about three months), or (b) litigate back up to the Supreme Court, then go to the European Court of Human Rights to complain if he loses his case.

What’s the likely outcome? The European Court of Human Rights is usually keen to take into account the opinion of other human rights bodies (for an exception, see the RMT case); but the CJEU is not. In the Grant case, it rubbished the opinion of the UN Human Rights Committee, and in the well-known Kadi line of case law, it deemed that the UN Security Council had not provided enough legal protection when listing people as terrorist suspects.

Applying the Lanigan case to the facts of Assange, there is a strong obligation upon the UK to execute the EAW, which obviously remains valid. His continued ‘detention’ also remains valid, since he has the obvious intention to abscond. There are human rights arguments: the risk of an unfair trial in Sweden or the USA, and the ‘detention conditions’ in the embassy. As I noted above, the CJEU is usually dismissive of human rights arguments in the EAW context, although there was a nod to ECHR case law in Lanigan. On this issue, things should be clearer after the judgments in Aranyosi and Caldararu, which we can expect before Easter.

It might be better, from Assange’s perspective, to fight all the way again through the UK courts without asking for a CJEU reference, and then head to the ECtHR in Strasbourg. That’s not entirely up to him, though: the UK government could ask the courts to send questions to the CJEU. If he does get to Strasbourg, the ECtHR might be torn between its usual enthusiasm to endorse the work of international human rights bodies, and its traditional deference to the CJEU on human rights matters within the scope of EU law. The Assange saga might have awhile to run yet.

“EPPO and OLAF investigations:The judicial review and procedural guarantees”

Download the E-book: “EPPO and OLAF investigations:The judicial review and procedural guarantees”

Two years after the publication of “La protezione dei diritti fondamentali procedurali dalle esperienze investigative dell’OLAF all’istituzione del Procuratore europeo” (Protecting fundamental rights from the investigations of OLAF to the future EPPO), which contained reflections emerging from the international conference held in Rome from 12 to 14 June 2013, the Foundation Lelio and Lisli Basso – ISSOCO thought it was necessary, given the changes introduced, to stimulate a new debate on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

To this end, it organised an international conference on 21-22 May 2015, preceded by the drafting of a background paper on the current state of the debate on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. During the conference, speakers from EU institutions, the judiciary, and the legal profession and academia, presented their reflections on the issue, which have been collected in this book.

The first session focused on the current status and the main issues under discussion. In July 2013, the European Commission presented its proposal for a Regulation Establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office with the aim of creating a new prosecution system at EU level to address the shortcomings of the present system, based solely on criminal procedures undertaken by national judicial authorities, which have no jurisdiction over cross-border cases of fraud to the financial interests of the EU. The Commission proposal was questioned by the reasoned opinion of 14 national parliamentary assemblies, complaining that it did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Disagreeing with the objections raised, the Commission left the original proposal unchanged, but this underwent substantial changes during work undertaken by the Council. The negotiations that took place first under the Greek and Italian Presidencies, then under the Latvian Presidency, will probably extend into the next Presidencies (Luxembourg, Netherlands).

None of the speakers disputes the issue of “whether” the European Public Prosecutor should be established (fraud against the EU is in fact considered by everyone to be a criminal phenomenon of growing importance and gravity, which the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor should help to curb), but there is disagreement about “what” form it should take.

Two opposing views may be identified regarding the structure, the appointment and powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. On the one hand, the European Commission proposal envisages a vertical decentralized structure with exclusive competence for crimes affecting the financial interests of the EU (which are the subject of the proposal for a PIF directive 2012). On the other, the Council’s proposal is more horizontal in nature and much more intergovernmental, providing for joint jurisdiction with Member States. Many speakers complained that this second vision diminishes the European dimension of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and risks paralyzing its functions. Favorable to the Commission proposal is the European Parliament, which has called on the Council to take account of its position and to involve it in discussions, in line with the principle of sincere interinstitutional cooperation, in order to avoid problems at the time of the parliamentary vote on the final text.

Another element that some of the speakers at the Conference agree on, is the need to clarify and regulate the relations between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the existing bodies that contribute to the fight against fraud to the financial interests of the EU (OLAF, Eurojust). Attention has been focused on operational and functional cooperation and the importance of building on the experience gained, addressing any weaknesses.

The second session aimed to stimulate debate on judicial review. All the speakers highlighted the need for judicial review of EPPO actions and focused on “who” should carry out this review (a European court, national courts or both), “what” needs to be reviewed, and “when” this review should take place.

In the third session, dedicated to procedural guarantees, emphasis was placed on the fundamental importance of the level of protection of procedural rights and guarantees in OLAF investigations, which is not without weaknesses, and therefore in need of further clarification and strengthening. Legal issues concerning procedural safeguards emerging in OLAF investigations would also apply to EPPO investigations. Most speakers agreed that the added value represented by the institution of European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the powers conferred upon it should not come at the expense of fundamental rights.

The credibility of the European Public Prosecutor and the trust placed in it are based precisely on the strengthening of procedural guarantees. For this reason, too, according to some speakers, the Council’s proposal does not appear to be satisfactory. The compromise needed in order to reach an agreement on the Regulation Establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office should not lead to a lessening of guarantees.

The difficulties in reaching an agreed solution are known to all. The use of enhanced cooperation, provided in Article 86 TFEU, might seem a likely solution, but it would still leave open the question of relations with Member States that do not participate in it and it seems that the Luxembourg Presidency still wants to try and find a shared solution. The debate that animated the conference has certainly contributed to a better understanding of the complex and delicate issues discussed.

A heartfelt thanks goes to all those who, with their reflections and speculations, contributed to the success of the event and this publication

Live. Die. Repeat. The ‘Privacy Shield’ deal as ‘Groundhog Day’: endlessly making the same mistakes?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Wednesday, 3 February 2016)

by Steve Peers

Love it, hate it, or spend an academic career analysing it, the USA is the best-known country in the world. Yet some of its traditions still puzzle outsiders. One of them, celebrated yesterday, is ‘Groundhog Day’: the myth that the appearance, or non-appearance, of the shadow of an otherwise obscure rodent on February 2nd each year will determine whether or not there will be another six weeks of winter. Outside the USA, Groundhog Day is probably better known as a movie: grumpy Bill Murray keeps repeating the same day, trying to perfect it and woo the lovely Andie MacDowell. Others have borrowed this basic plot. In Edge of Tomorrow, sleazy Tom Cruise keeps repeating the same day, trying to kill aliens and woo the lovely Emily Blunt. In the Doctor Who episode Hell Bent, angry Peter Capaldi keeps repeating the same day, trying to cut through a diamond wall and resurrect the lovely Jenna Coleman.

The basic idea is summed up in the advertising slogan for Edge of Tomorrow: Live. Die. Repeat. Groundhog Day in particular has attracted many interpretations. Of these, the most convincing is that the film’s story is a Buddhist parable: repeated reincarnation until we reach the state of enlightenment, or nirvana.

How does this relate to the new EU/US privacy deal, dubbed ‘Privacy Shield’? Obviously the deal involves the USA, and it was reached yesterday, on Groundhog Day. And it’s a new incarnation of a prior deal: ‘Safe Harbor’, killed last October by the CJEU in the Schrems judgment (discussed here). While the text of the new agreement is not yet available, the initial indication is that it is bound to be killed in turn – unless the CJEU, admittedly an increasingly fickle judicial deity, is willing to go back on its own case law. Goodness knows how many further reincarnations will be necessary before the US and EU can reach enlightenment.

Problems with the deal

The point of the new deal is the same as the old one: to provide a legally secure set of rules for EU/US data transfers, for companies that subscribe to a set of data protection principles. Failing that, it is possible to argue that transfers can be justified by binding corporate rules, by individual consent or (as regards US government access to the data) by a third State’s public interest. But as I as I noted in my blog post on Schrems, these alternatives are untested yet in the CJEU, and are possibly subject to legal challenges of their own. Understandably, businesses would like to make a smooth transition to a new set of legally secure rules. Does the new deal fit the bill?

In the absence of a text, I can’t analyse the new deal much. But here are my first impressions.

According to the CJEU, the main problems with the previous deal were twofold: the extent of mass surveillance in the USA, and the limited judicial redress available to EU citizens as regards such government surveillance. It appears that the new agreement will address the latter issue, but not the former. There will be an ‘ombudsman’ empowered to consider complaints against the US government. While the details are unknown, it’s hard to see how this new institution could address the CJEU’s concerns completely, unless it is given the judicial power to order the blocking and erasure of data, for instance.

Furthermore, there’s no sign that the underlying mass surveillance will be changed. Here, the argument is that the Court of Justice simply misunderstood the US system, or that in any event many EU countries are just as wicked as the USA when it comes to mass surveillance. These arguments are eloquently set out in a barrister’s opinion, summarised in this (paywalled) Financial Times story.

Facebook and the US government disdained to get involved in the Schrems case, and have no doubt repented this at leisure. The assumption here appears to be that they would participate fully in new litigation, and convince the CJEU to see the error of its ways.

How likely is this? It’s undoubtedly true to say that the CJEU gives an increasing impression that it willing to bend the rules, or double up on its own case law, in order to ensure the survival of an increasingly beleaguered EU project. In Pringleand Gauweiler, it agreed with harshly criticized plans to keep monetary union afloat. In Dano and Alimanovic, it qualified its prior case law on EU citizens’ access to benefits, in an attempt to quell growing public concern about this issue. In Celaj, it gave a first indication that it would row back on its case law limiting the detention of irregular migrants, perhaps in light of the migration and refugee crisis. The drafters of the proposed deal on UK renegotiation appear to assume that the Court would back away from even more free movement case law, if it appears necessary to keep the UK from leaving the European Union.

Once the Court reminded legal observers of Rome: the imperial author of uniform codes that would bind a whole continent, upon which the sun would never set. Now it increasingly reminds me of Dunkirk: the centre of a brave and hastily improvised retreat from impending apocalypse, scouring for a beach to fight its last stand. The Court used to straighten every road; now it cuts every corner.

Since the ‘Privacy Shield’ deal faces many litigious critics, it seems virtually certain to end up before the Court before long. Time will tell where the judgment on the deal will fit within the broader sweep of EU jurisprudence.

The draft renegotiation deal: A genuine red card? Tusk’s proposal and national parliaments

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Wednesday, 3 February 2016)

Dr. Katarzyna Granat, (*)

The Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, ‘A New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union’, unveiled by Donald Tusk on February 2 2016 offers the first concrete vision of the changes to enhance the role of national parliaments under the UK’s renegotiation efforts. This note provides an analysis of the suggested changes by contrasting them with the mechanisms currently in force under the Lisbon Treaty.

Tusk’s proposal (Section C, points 2-3) envisions that reasoned opinions of national parliaments issued under Article 7.1 of Protocol No. 2 ‘on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’ should be ‘duly taken into account’ by all institutions participating in the EU decision-making procedures. In Tusk’s proposal national parliaments may submit reasoned opinions stating that an EU draft legislative act violates the principle of subsidiarity submitted within 12 weeks from the transmission of that draft. If these reasoned opinions represent more than 55% of votes allocated to national parliaments (i.e. at least 31 of the 56 available votes; two votes for each national parliament; in the case of a bicameral parliament, each of the two chambers has one vote; votes of parliaments of member states not participating in the adoption of the act at stake are not counted), the opinions will be ‘comprehensively discussed’ in the Council. If the EU draft legislative proposal is not changed in a way reflecting the concerns of national parliaments in their reasoned opinions, the Council will discontinue the consideration of that draft.

This proposal differs from the current ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card schemes of the Lisbon Treaty in a number of ways concerning in particular the timeframe, applicable thresholds and the effects of these procedures.

First, under the existing provisions of the Lisbon Treaty national parliaments may submit a reasoned opinion to the Commission, EP and Council within eight weeks from the transmission of the draft legislative act (Art. 6 of Protocol No.2). Tusk’s proposal hence gives national parliaments more time for the analysis of proposals and drafting reasoned opinions. The need to extend the submission deadline is often underlined by national parliaments and this would probably be welcomed by them. (See COSAC, 24th Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, 4.11.2015 at 22) Yet, it is unclear whether the extension to 12 weeks under Tusk’s proposal also applies to the ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card procedures.

Second, although the mechanism of assignment of votes to national parliaments does not change, Tusk’s proposal offers a different threshold of votes to be met by national parliaments. The ‘yellow card’ provision demands that the reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a Commission proposal with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to the national parliaments. For triggering of the ‘orange card’, applicable only in the ordinary legislative procedure, the reasoned opinions of national parliaments need to represent at least a simple majority of the total number of votes allocated to the national parliaments. In contrast, to activate the procedure proposed by Tusk the necessary threshold is 55% of the votes allocated to national parliaments. Hence out of 56 votes of national parliaments at least 19 are necessary for a ‘yellow card’; at least 29 for an ‘orange card’ and 31 to meet the ‘more than 55%’ threshold in Tusk’s proposal. The new procedure thus requires only slightly more votes than the existing ‘orange card’, which, thus far, has never been triggered successfully.

Third, the most substantial change concerns the consequences of activating the new procedure. The ‘yellow card’ involved consequences that were relatively limited: the Commission had to review the draft and then to decide on whether to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, giving reasons for its decision (Art. 7.2. of Protocol No. 2). For the ‘orange card’, the Commission had similar choices available, but a decision to maintain the proposal required the Commission to prepare its own reasoned opinion with arguments demonstrating compliance of the act with the subsidiarity principle. The EP and the Council would then decide on the fate of the proposal taking into account the arguments on the principle of subsidiarity expressed by the Commission and by national parliaments. If subsequently 55 % of the Council members or a majority of the votes cast in the EP finds a subsidiarity breach, ‘the legislative proposal shall not be given further consideration’. (Art. 7.3 of Protocol No. 2) By contrast, Tusk’s proposal seems to omit the phase in which the Commission can respond to national parliaments and instead moves directly to the Council, which may decide not to continue the consideration of the proposal, if that is not amended to accommodate the ‘concerns’ expressed by national parliaments. Tusk’s proposal binds stopping of the legislative procedure with whether the requests of national parliaments are met, while the ‘orange card’ provided for discontinuation only if the Council finds a subsidiarity breach.

It is worth noting that important details of the procedure such as who is responsible for amending the proposal and more importantly verifying whether the concerns of national parliaments were addressed are left unspecified. Recall that in its interaction with the national parliaments the Commission has often expressed itself satisfied that the concerns of the parliaments expressed in the reasoned opinions have been addressed by the original proposal. (See House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013-14, para 87) Nevertheless, Tusk’s proposal seems to demand a more active response from EU institutions than the ‘orange card’.

Moreover, one should note that Tusk’s proposal does not grant the national parliaments a veto power on any aspect of a Commission proposal. Tusk’s proposal mentions that the discontinuance of the legislative procedure is conditional on the non-accommodation of the ‘concerns’ expressed in the reasoned opinions, with the ultimate decision taken by the Council, and thereby away from the national parliaments.

One further interesting aspect of Tusk’s proposal is that it refers throughout to reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of proposals with the subsidiarity principle, even though in their exercise of subsidiarity scrutiny under Protocol No. 2 national parliaments often critique issues such as the legal basis, proportionality or the political merits of a proposal, thereby going beyond strict subsidiarity review (See F. Fabbrini, K Granat, ‘“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review, 115–143). The question is whether under Tusk’s proposal such a broad approach would also be adopted in the Council. If so, this might cause difficulties in amending a proposal in a way that properly takes account of all the different aspects raised by national parliaments and in consequence makes it also easier to stop the legislative procedure because of the lack of accommodation of the demands of the parliaments.

A broad reading of Tusk’s proposal would therefore probably be more in line with Cameron’s wish of strengthening national parliaments by allowing a threshold of national parliaments ‘to stop unwanted legislative proposals,’ although Cameron underlined also that the EU must commit to a full implementation of the subsidiarity principle. (Letter of D. Cameron to D. Tusk, 10. November 2015 at 4) A more specific answer to the latter issue might be the proposed draft declaration ‘on a subsidiarity implementation mechanism and a burden reduction implementation mechanism’ obliging the Commission to create a mechanism for the review of existing EU legislation for its compatibility with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles with an aim to provide ‘full implementation’ of subsidiarity. (EUCO 7/16)

Last point: the fact that the tabled proposal demands a discussion in the Council could also mean that depending on the relationship between parliaments and their governments represented in the Council, the ministers might show more or less flexibility with the ‘concerns’ of their national parliaments and whether a consensus on stopping or continuing with the legislative procedure could be achieved.

Finally, recall that the rejected ‘red card’ proposed in the Convention on the Future of Europe aimed at a two-third majority of national parliaments that would require the Commission to withdraw its proposal (CONV 540/03, 6.02.2003, p. 3). In comparison, Tusk’s proposal has a lower threshold and does not imply an immediate stopping of the legislative procedure. It could be hence described as a ‘red card light’ and as way of finding a compromise solution without threatening to disrupt the EU legislative procedure.

(*)  Junior Research Fellow & Marie Curie Fellow, Durham Law School 

(EU and UK) The draft renegotiation deal: EU immigration issues

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Tuesday, 2 February 2016)

by  Steve Peers

This is the first in a series of blog posts about the draft deal on the renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership, tabled earlier today. I am starting with the critical issue of free movement of EU citizens (often referred to as ‘EU immigration’). Subsequent posts will be on the other substantive issues (competitiveness, Eurozone relations, sovereignty) and on the legal form of the deal.

The draft deal takes the form of six draft legal texts: a Decision of the EU Member States’ Heads of State and Government (the ‘draft Decision’); a Statement of the Heads of State and Government (which consists of a draft Council Decision); a Declaration by the European Council (which consists of the EU Member States’ Heads of State and Government, although when acting collectively they are legally distinct from the European Council): and three declarations by the Commission. Of these, Section D of the draft Decision and two of the Commission declarations relate to immigration issues.

Having said that, the key feature of the draft deal on immigration is the intention to propose amendments to the three main current EU laws. These three laws are: (a) the EU citizens’ Directive, which sets out the main rules on most EU citizens moving to other Member States: (b) the EU Regulation on free movement of workers, which contains some specific rules on workers who move; and (c) theRegulation on social security, which sets out rules on coordination and equal treatment in social security for those who move between Member States.  The draft Decision

All three sets of amendments are to be proposed by the Commission as soon as the main draft Decision enters into force. That will happen (see Section E of the draft Decision) as soon as the UK announces that it will remain a member of the EU (that would only happen, of course, if the UK public vote to remain in the upcoming referendum). The draft deal includes a commitment from the Commission to make these proposals, and from the other Member States to support their adoption in the EU Council (oddly, the latter commitment does not apply to the proposed amendment to the citizens’ Directive, since that proposal is not referred to in the draft Decision).

However, all three proposals are subject to the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, meaning that they have to be agreed with the European Parliament. It is also possible that their legality would be challenged before the EU Court of Justice. I can’t appraise the political likelihood of the European Parliament approving the proposals, but I will offer some thoughts about possible challenges to their legality if they are agreed.

Unlike some other parts of the draft deal (on the position of non-Eurozone states, and the clarification of ‘ever closer union’), there is no mention of possible future Treaty amendments to give effect to any part of the text dealing with free movement (immigration) issues. It should be kept in mind that the texts are not final, and at least some amendments might be agreed before their formal adoption – which is planned for later in February.

Although the press discussion has focussed on the ‘emergency brake’ in in-work benefits, there are three categories of issues: benefits (including a couple of points besides that emergency brake); the family members of non-EU citizens; and EU citizens who commit criminal offences. I refer back to Cameron’s November 2014 speech on EU immigration issues (which I analysed here) where relevant.

It should be noted that there is no proposed text in the deal on two of the issues which Cameron had raised: removal of job-seekers if they do not find a job within six months, and a requirement to have a job offer before entry. Both these changes would have required a Treaty amendment, in light of the Antonissen judgment of the CJEU.

Benefits

There are three benefits issues in the draft deal: (a) the ‘emergency brake’ for in-work benefits; (b) the export of child benefit; and (c) benefits for those out of work.

‘Emergency brake’ on in-work benefits

Cameron had called for no access to tax credits, housing benefits and social housing for four years for EU citizens, but later signalled his willingness to compromise on this point. The position of non-workers and job-seekers is discussed below; but the position of workers is legally and politically difficult, since the Treaty guarantees them non-discrimination.

In the end, the draft deal suggests not permanent discrimination on this issue, but temporary discrimination on the basis of an ‘emergency brake’. The Commission will propose legislation on this issue, which will provide that the UK (or other Member States) can apply a four-year ban on in-work benefits, subject to substantive and procedural criteria. Procedurally, the rules will say that a Member State will apply to the Council to authorise the ban, which will approve it by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission (the European Parliament will have to approve the legislation, but would have no role on deciding if the brake should be pulled). A Commission declaration states the UK qualifies to pull this ban immediately; but there is nothing in the deal to suggest that Member States – who would have the final word – also agree. As I have already pointed out, there is no legal requirement in EU law that the legislation would have to give the final word to the Council, rather than the UK itself. The restrictions would only apply for a certain number of years (the exact number is not yet agreed), and would have to be phased out during that time. It’s not clear how much time would then have to pass before they could be applied again.

On what grounds could the brake be applied? According to the draft Decision, it would apply where: ‘an exceptional situation exists on a scale that affects essential aspects of [a Member State’s] social security system, including the primary purpose of its in-work benefits system, or which leads to difficulties which are serious and liable to persist in its employment market or are putting an excessive pressure on the proper functioning of its public services’.

There’s certainly a widespread perception that one of more of these problems exist in the UK and are caused by the large increase in the number of workers from other Member States in recent years. However, there are two serious problems with the proposed mechanism. Firstly, as Jonathan Portes has argued, objective evidence for this view is lacking. Secondly, while the CJEU has been willing to accept certain limits to free movement rights on the grounds of protecting health systems (see my prior blog post for details), this proposal would have a much more far-reaching impact on non-discrimination for workers. It’s certainly conceivable that by analogy from the Court’s obvious willingness to keep EU monetary union afloat, along with its endorsement of restrictions for non-workers in recent years (see below), it might accept that these plans do not violate the Treaties. But as EU currently stands, that is probably a long shot.

Export of child benefit

Cameron sought to end payment of child benefit to children living in other Member States. This payment is provided for in the EU social security coordination Regulation, which would have to be amended to change those rules. There was a strong argument that the plan would have breached the Treaties, since in the case of Pinna the CJEU struck down EU legislation that allowed Member States not to export such benefits at all as a breach of the rules on free movement of workers.

The draft deal does not go as far as Cameron wanted: instead child benefit can be limited by indexing it to the standard of living in the receiving State. It’s an open question whether this would breach the Treaties, since there is no case law on the point.

Benefits for those out of work

Cameron sought to end social assistance for job-seekers. The EU legislation already rules out social assistance for job-seekers, so this reflects the status quo. Although the CJEU has said that job-seekers have a right to access benefits linked to labour market participation, if they have a link already with the labour market in question, it took a narrow view of this rule in the judgment in Alimanovic. Pure benefit tourists (who have never had work in the host State) are not entitled to benefits, according to the judgment in Dano. So the draft Decision simply reiterates this case law, which has already satisfied Cameron’s main objectives in this field.

EU citizens’ family members

Under the EU citizens’ Directive, currently EU citizens can bring with them to another Member State their spouse or partner, the children of both (or either) who are under 21 or dependent, and the dependent parents of either. This applies regardless of whether the family members are EU citizens or not. No further conditions are possible, besides the prospect of a refusal of entry (or subsequent expulsion) on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (on which, see below).

In principle EU law does not apply to UK citizens who wish to bring non-EU family members to the UK, so the UK is free to put in place restrictive rules in those cases (which it has done, as regards income requirements and language rules). However, the CJEU has ruled that UK citizens can move to another Member State and be joined by non-EU family members there, under the more generous rules in the EU legislation. Then they can move back to the UK with their family members, now invoking the free movement rights in the Treaties. In 2014, the CJEU clarified two points about this scenario (as discussed by Chiara Berneri here): (a) it was necessary to spend at least three months in the host Member State exercising EU law rights and residing with the family member, before coming back; and (b) the EU citizens’ Directive applied by analogy to govern the situation of UK citizens who return with their family members.

In his 2014 speech, David Cameron announced his desire to end all distinction between EU citizens and UK citizens as regards admission of non-EU family members, by allowing the UK to impose upon the EU citizens the same strict conditions that apply to UK citizens. Since this would have deterred the free movement of those EU citizens who have non-EU family members, there is a good change that it would have required not just a legislative amendment but a Treaty change.  (Note that according to the CJEU, EU free movement law does not just require the abolition of discrimination between UK and other EU citizens, but also the abolition of non-discriminatory ‘obstacles’ to free movement).

However, the draft deal does not go this far. The main draft decision states that: ‘In accordance with Union law, Member States are able to take action to prevent abuse of rights or fraud, such as the presentation of forged documents, and address cases of contracting or maintaining of marriages of convenience with third country nationals for the purpose of making use of free movement as a route for regularising unlawful stay in a Member State or for bypassing national immigration rules applying to third country nationals.’

The Commission Declaration then states that it will make a proposal to amend the citizens’ Directive: ‘to exclude, from the scope of free movement rights, third country nationals who had no prior lawful residence in a Member State before marrying a Union citizen or who marry a Union citizen only after the Union citizen has established residence in the host Member State. Accordingly, in such cases, the host Member State’s immigration law will apply to the third country national.’

That Declaration also states that the Commission will clarify that: ‘Member States can address specific cases of abuse of free movement rights by Union citizens returning to their Member State of nationality with a non-EU family member where residence in the host Member State has not been sufficiently genuine to create or strengthen family life and had the purpose of evading the application of national immigration rules’; and ‘The concept of marriage of convenience – which is not protected under Union law – also covers a marriage which is maintained for the purpose of enjoying a right of residence by a family member who is not a national of a Member State.’

It seems clear that these ‘clarifications’ will not be included in the legislative proposal, since the declaration later concludes (emphasis added): ‘These clarifications will be developed in a Communication providing guidelines on the application of Union law on the free movement of Union citizens.’

Let’s examine the planned legislative amendments, then the ‘clarifications’.

The proposed amendments would exclude two separate categories of non-EU citizens from the scope of the citizens’ Directive: those who did not have prior lawful residence in a Member State before marrying an EU citizen who has moved to another Member State; and those who marry such an EU citizen after he or she has moved to a Member State. It’s possible to fall into both categories; the first category will exclusively apply to those who got married while an EU citizen lived in a non-EU state, or those who got married in an EU State even though the non-EU citizen was not lawfully resident there. For these people, national immigration law will apply.

The background to this proposal is CJEU case law. In 2003, in the judgment in Akrich, the CJEU ruled that Member States could insist that non-EU family members had previously been lawfully resident in the Member State concerned (previously no such rule appeared to exist). But in 2008, in Metock, the CJEU overturned this ruling and said that a prior legal residence requirement was not allowed.

Several points arise. First, the basic definition: what is lawful residence exactly? Presumably it means more than lawful presence, ie a stay of three months on the basis of a valid visa or visa waiver. But what about ambiguous cases, such as a pending asylum application or appeal? EU legislation says that asylum-seekers can usually stay until the application fails (if it fails), and then during the appeal (subject to some big exceptions). According to the CJEU, the EU’s main rules on irregular migrants therefore don’t apply to asylum-seekers whose application is pending.

Secondly, it’s odd to refer to national law alone, since sometimes EU law governs the admission of non-EU nationals. Even the UK (along with Ireland) is bound by the first-phase EU asylum law, and by the EU/Turkey association agreement.  Denmark is bound by the latter treaty. And all other Member States are bound by the second-phase asylum law, along with EU legislation on admission of students and researchers and some categories of labour migrants (the highly-skilled,seasonal workers and intra-corporate transferees).

Thirdly, it’s arguable that the EU principle of non-discrimination applies. That would mean, for instance, that if a German woman already in the UK married her American husband, the UK would have to treat her the same as a British woman in the same situation – but no worse. This would in fact be relevant to every Member State – there’s nothing in this part of the proposal that limits its application to the UK.

Finally, the consequences of the rule need to be clearer. Does the exclusion from the scope of the Directive mean that the family member is excluded forever from the scope of the citizens’ Directive – even if the person concerned is admitted pursuant to national immigration law? That would mean that national immigration law (or EU immigration legislation, in some cases) would continue to govern issues such as the family member’s access to employment or benefits, or subsequent permanent residence. It’s also not clear what happen to children such as the step-child of the EU citizen, or a child that was born to the EU and non-EU citizen couple while living in a third country.

Could this legislative amendment violate the EU Treaties? In its judgment in Metock, the Court referred almost entirely to the wording of the citizens’ Directive. It mainly referred to the Treaties when concluding that the EU had the competenceto regulate the status of EU citizens’ third-country national family members. But it also referred to the Treaty objective of creating an ‘internal market’, as well as the ‘serious obstruct[ion]’ to the exercise of freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, if EU citizens could not lead a ‘normal family life’. It must therefore be concluded that there is some possibility that the revised rules would be invalid for breach of EU free movement law.

Would the amendment violate the EU Charter right to family life? That’s unlikely. While the right to family life is often invoked to prevent expulsions of family members, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights gives great leeway to Member States to refuse admission of family members, on the grounds that the family could always live ‘elsewhere’ – as the CJEU has itself acknowledged (EP v Council). There is some possibility, though, that the CJEU would be reluctant to follow that case law (EP v Council concerns families entirely consisting of non-EU nationals) in the context of free movement: the idea that you could go away and enjoy your family life somewhere else is antithetical to the logic of free movement.

As for the ‘clarifications’ in future guidelines, they will of course not be binding. They first of all refer to cases where an EU citizen has moved to another Member State and come back to the home State (known in the UK as the Surinder Singh route). The definition of what constitutes a ‘sufficiently genuine’ move to another country is set out in the case law (three months’ stay with a family member) and mere guidelines cannot overturn this.

It should be noted that the Surinder Singh case law is in any event derived from the Treaty. This line of case law does not accept that such movement between Member States is an ‘evasion’ of national law – as long as free movement rights are genuinely exercised with a family member for a minimum time. The CJEU also usually assumes (see Metock, for instance) that a ‘marriage of convenience’ cannot apply to cases where there is a genuine relationship, even if an immigration advantage is gained. (The Commission has released guidelines already on the ‘marriage of convenience’ concept: see analysis by Alina Tryfonidou here).

Having said that, the planned legislative changes will complicate the plans of people who wish to move to another Member State with their non-EU family and then move back, since national immigration law will apply to their move to the first Member State. It will be important to see how the legislative amendments address the transitional issues of people who have already moved to a host Member State before the new rules apply. Can the home Member State say that those families must now obtain lawful residence in the host State for the non-EU family member, before the non-EU family member can come to the home State?

Criminality and free movement law

The Treaties allow for the refusal or entry or expulsion of EU citizens on ‘grounds of public policy, public security or public health’. The citizens’ Directive sets out detailed substantive and procedural rules on this issue, which has been the subject of considerable CJEU case law.

What would the renegotiation deal do? First of all, the draft decision states that: ‘Member States may also take the necessary restrictive measures to protect themselves against individuals whose personal conduct is likely to represent a genuine and serious threat to public policy or security. In determining whether the conduct of an individual poses a present threat to public policy or security, Member States may take into account past conduct of the individual concerned and the threat may not always need to be imminent. Even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, Member States may act on preventative grounds, so long as they are specific to the individual concerned.’

To this end, the Commission declaration states that it will: ‘also clarify that Member States may take into account past conduct of an individual in the determination of whether a Union citizen’s conduct poses a “present” threat to public policy or security. They may act on grounds of public policy or public security even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction on preventative grounds but specific to the individual concerned. The Commission will also clarify the notions of “serious grounds of public policy or public security” and “imperative grounds of public security” [grounds for expelling people who have resided for longer periods in a host Member State].  Moreover, on the occasion of a future revision of [the citizens’ Directive], the Commission will examine the thresholds to which these notions are connected.’

It’s not clear whether the revision of the Directive referred to at the end here will be as imminent as the planned proposal to amend the rules on a ‘prior lawful residence’ rule for non-EU family members. Otherwise the plan to issue guidelines is clearly not binding. The language on these guidelines partly reflects the existing law, but some features are new: the greater emphasis on past conduct, the lesser need to show that a threat is imminent and the possibility of expelling someone as a ‘preventative’ measure.

These changes fall within the scope of Cameron’s desire to have ‘stronger measures to deport EU criminals’. However, it should be noted that there is no specific reference to his plans for ‘tougher and longer re-entry bans for foreign rough sleepers, beggars and fraudsters’. While a conviction and re-entry ban for fraud might be covered by the guidelines referred to above, there’s no mention of clarifying entry bans as regards those guidelines, or changing the legislation on this issue. Also, as I noted in my comments on Cameron’s plans at the time, EU legislation does not allow for re-entry bans for rough sleepers and beggars, since the EU citizens’ Directive states unambiguously that a ban on entry cannot be imposed where a person was expelled for grounds other than public policy, public security and public health.

Longer waiting periods for free movement of persons from new Member States

Finally, it should be noted that the draft Decision briefly refers to Cameron’s plan to have longer waiting periods for free movement of persons in future accession treaties. It does not incorporate his suggestion, but merely notes it. However, since the details of each new Member State’s adaptation to EU law are set out in each accession treaty, which has to be approved by each Member State, the UK can simply veto any future accession treaties unless longer waiting periods for free movement are indeed included. The next accession to the EU is at least four years away, probably more. So nothing really turns on the absence of agreement with the UK’s position for now.

Conclusion

How to appraise the planned changes to free movement law? The most fervent supporters of the EU are likely to see some or all of them as a betrayal of the EU’s principles that should never be tolerated. But the departure of a large Member State is liable to do far greater damage to the EU’s integration project than acceptance of these changes ever would.

The changes, if they are all implemented as planned, would fall short of afundamental change in the UK’s relationship with the EU. But equally it is clearly wrong to say that they mean nothing – if in fact they are implemented. The changes would be modest but significant: amendments to three key pieces of EU legislation that would for the first time roll back EU free movement law, not extend it. Leaving aside the calls for non-binding guidelines, there would be cutbacks in in-work benefits (albeit for a limited period), significantly more control on the admission of non-EU family members of EU citizens, and more limited export of child benefit.

The plans not only raise questions of interpretation (although most legislative reforms do that), but of political and legal feasibility: the Commission is willing to propose them and the Member States support two of them, but do Member States support the third proposal – and the UK’s intention to pull the ‘emergency brake’? Will the European Parliament support any of them? Which of them would get past the CJEU? My assessment, as detailed above, is that the amendments on family members will probably be acceptable; the child benefit reforms are an open question; and the changes on in-work benefits are highly vulnerable.

Others may reach a different legal conclusion, of course. And British voters will also be making an assessment not only of the rest of the renegotiation package, but also on the broader pros and cons of EU membership.  These changes go nowhere near far enough for the EU’s strongest critics, but much too far for its biggest admirers. Time will soon tell whether the British public believes that they are a reasonable compromise.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 13

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Labels: benefits, Brexit, David Cameron, emergency brake, EU citizenship, EU reform, expulsion,family reunion, free movement of persons, free movement of workers, UK renegotiation