The Mejiers Committee on the inter-parliamentary scrutiny of Europol

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON THE MEJIERS COMMITTE (*) PAGE  HERE

  1. Introducton

Article 88 TFEU provides for a unique form of scrutiny on the functioning of Europol. It lays down that the [regulations on Europol] shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol’s activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments.

Such a procedure is now laid down in Article 51 of the Europol Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/794), which provides for the establishment of a “specialized Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG)”, which will play the central role in ensuring this scrutiny. The Europol Regulation shall apply from 1st of May 2017.

Article 51 of the Europol Regulation also closely relates to Protocol (1) of the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the EU. Article 9 of that protocol provides: “The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together determine the organization and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union.”

Article 51 (2) does not only lay down the basis for the political monitoring of Europol’s activities (the democratic perspective), but also stipulates that “in fulfilling its mission”, it should pay attention to the impact of the activities of Europol on the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons (the perspective of the rule of law).

The Meijers Committee takes the view that improving the inter-parliamentary scrutiny of Europol, with appropriate involvement of both the national and the European levels, will by itself enhance the attention being paid by Europol on the perspectives of democracy and the rule of law, and more in particular the fundamental rights protection. It will raise the alertness of Europol as concerns these perspectives.

Moreover, the scrutiny mechanism could pay specific attention to the fundamental rights protection within Europol. This is particularly important in view of the large amounts of – often sensitive – personal data processed by Europol and exchanged with national police authorities of Member States and also with authorities of third countries.

The implementation of Article 51 into practice is currently debated, e.g. in the inter-parliamentary committee of the European Parliament and national parliaments.1 As specified by Article 51 (1) of the Europol regulation, the organization and the rules of procedure of the JPSG shall be determined.

The Meijers Commitee wishes to engage in this debate and makes, in this note, recommendations on the organization and rules of procedure.

  1. Context

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The time has come to complain about the EU Terrorism Directive

By Maryant Fernández Pérez

Nearly a year has passed since we told that you’d be now complaining about the Terrorism Directive. On 16 February, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will vote on the draft Terrorism Directive. EU policy-makers have meaningfully addressed only very few of the concerns that EDRi and other NGOs have raised since the beginning of the EU legislative process.

We worked hard during the elaboration of the Terrorism Directive at the EU level: we defended digital rights since the very beginning, providing policy-makers with expert input; we joined forces with other digital rights organisations; and raised our voice against key proposals together with NGOs like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the Open Society Foundations (OSF), the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) and the Fundamental Rights European Experts (FREE) Group (see our joint statements here and here). As a result of the hard work and numerous exchanges with policy-makers, not everything in the Directive is bad for digital rights.

What’s good?

Unfortunately, not as much as we would like. However, there are still some positives. Several provisions that we had advocated for are part of the final text, for example an assurance, in principle, of being able to express radical, polemic or controversial views.

We managed to eliminate mandatory internet “blocking”, and some safeguards were introduced with regard to removing and blocking online content and limiting when the absurdly vague concept of unduly compelling a government can constitute a terrorist offence. We also killed some bad proposals that, for instance, tried to undermine encryption and the use of TOR.

What’s wrong?

From a digital rights perspective, there is a long list of bad elements that the European Commission, EU Member States* and the majority of the MEPs of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties (LIBE) have introduced and/or kept in the draft Terrorism Directive, including the following:

To sum up, it took a year and two months to conclude a legislative instrument that endangers the protection of our rights and freedoms. This compares badly with the time that it took the EU to conclude an instrument to protect fundamental rights, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (five years, and two more years until it enters into force). Obvious, depressing, conclusions can be drawn about the priorities that drove different parts of the EU decision-making process in both cases.

Therefore, we urge the European Parliament to vote against this Directive or at least vote in favour of some of the amendments proposed to improve some of the elements listed above.

What can you do?

You can raise awareness and contact your MEPs prior to the debate on 15 February (starting around 3pm CET) and the vote on the Directive on 16 February (around 12pm CET). After the vote, it will be the turn of your Member State to implement the Directive and give meaning to the ambiguous provisions of the Directive. If the Terrorism Directive is adopted, civil society should look closely how their national parliaments will implement it, so it will not lead to abusive provisions. Ultimately, yet again, we will have to rely on the courts to be the guardians of our civil liberties.

If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to contact us!

The Ever-expanding National Security State in Europe: the Case of Poland

by Luigi LIMONE (*)

One of the most alarming developments across the European Union is the effort by States to make it easier to invoke and prolong a “state of emergency” as a response to terrorism or the threats to violent attacks. Emergency measures, which are generally supposed to be temporary, have become embedded in ordinary criminal law. Parliaments across the European Union are adopting a number of coercive measures in fast-truck processes, leaving little time for consideration on their impact on human rights and civil liberties.

In compliance with international human rights law, exceptional measures should only be applied in genuinely exceptional circumstances and, as stated by Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”.

Nevertheless, phenomena such as the rise of nationalist parties, anti-refugee sentiment, stereotyping and discrimination against Muslims communities, intolerance for speech or other forms of expression, risk that this “emergency measures” will target certain people for reasons which have nothing to do with a genuine threat to national security or from terrorist-related acts.

Up to now, France is the only EU Member State to have formally declared a state of emergency on national security grounds for terrorism-related acts on the last couple of years. However, other Member States have passed laws in fast-track processes and engaged in operations in response to real or perceived security threats. A clear example comes from Austria and Hungary, which have recently invoked the threat of terrorism in the context of the refugee crisis with profoundly negative impact on the right to seek and enjoy asylum in Europe.

One of the countries which is currently attracting the attention of several NGOs working in the field of human rights protection is Poland. Several cases of human rights violations as well as dismantlement of the rule of law have been reported since the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party came to power in October 2015.

In June 2016, Poland enacted a new Counter-terrorism Law following a fast-track legislative process. This law consolidates sweeping powers in the hands of the Internal Security Agency (ISA) and, combined with other recent legislative amendments, it creates conditions for violations of the rights to liberty, privacy, fair trial, expression, peaceful assembly and non-discrimination.

The new Counter-terrorism Law gives a broad and vague definition of terrorism which paves the way for: a) the expansion of indiscriminate mass surveillance powers; b) the targeting of foreign nationals; c) the extension of pre-charge detention.

According to Amnesty International, such an ill-defined and imprecise definition allows for disproportionate interference with human rights as well as arbitrary application and abuse.

The UN Human Rights Committee recommended in October 2016 that a definition be adopted that “does not give the authorities excessive discretion or obstruct the exercise of rights”.

The Counter-terrorism law includes provision for the Director of the Internal Security Agency to order the immediate blocking of specific websites with no prior judicial authorization if he or she considers that a delay could result in “terrorist incident”. Such a provision compromises the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information.

Freedom of peaceful assembly is also under threat under the new Counter-terrorism Law.

The Law, in fact, establishes a terror alert system which, if it reaches the level of three or four, allows the authorities to ban assemblies and large-scale events in particular locations.

The lack of transparency in the operation of the alert system, together with the vague definition of terrorism, could result in violations of the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. As a result, the terror alert system could be used by the government as an excuse to ban peaceful public protests against its policy on a wide range of issues, including abortion or Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) rights.

Foreign nationals in Poland are particular targets of the new Counter-terrorism Law. They can be subjected to a range of covert surveillance measures, including wire-tapping, monitoring of electronic communications and surveillance of telecommunication networks and devices without any judicial oversight for the first three months.

Such surveillance is permitted if there is a “fear” that a foreign national may be involved in terrorism-related activities. In addition, the Law does not provide procedural safeguards to ensure that anyone made aware of surveillance can challenge it and have access to an effective remedy against unlawful surveillance. It also impacts Polish citizens who communicate or live with foreigners under investigation.

Poland’s new Counter-terrorism Law also provides for 14 days of detention without charge of people suspected of “terrorist crimes”. Since such detention measures can be adopted on the basis of information obtained through the broad surveillance powers given to the executive, the suspects and their lawyer may be denied access to the evidence upon which the pre-charge detention is based. Given the fact that the new surveillance powers primarily target foreigners, such measures could discriminate against non-nationals and have a disproportionate impact on foreign individuals, their families and communities.

Furthermore, the situation in Poland appears very critical when it comes to criminal law and to protection from discrimination and hate crimes in particular. While the country has made some progress in addressing hate crimes against certain groups, it has left others entirely behind, thus creating a double system and a significant protection gap in law as well as in practice.

Polish criminal law provides for the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes motivated by race, ethnicity, nationality, religion and political affiliation. However, it does not establish that age, disability, gender, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation and social or economic status are grounds to investigate and prosecute hate crimes.

As stated in a report published by Amnesty International in September 2015, members of ethnic minorities, refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants continue to experience discrimination and violence in practice. In addition, transgender and intersex people are not explicitly protected from discrimination on grounds of gender identity and expression, and protection on the grounds of disability and religion is limited as well.

The situation is particularly crucial with regard to discrimination motivated by gender identity as well as expression and sexual orientation. LGBTI people are not sufficiently protected, as demonstrated by the huge number of homophobic and transphobic hate crimes. As far as women and girls are concerned, they continue to face obstacles in accessing legal and safe abortion and frequent cases of sexual harassment and rape are still being reported.

The current legal framework governing abortion in Poland is one of the most restrictive in Europe with terminations legally permitted only when the life of the foetus is under threat, when there is a grave threat to the health of the mother and in the instance that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.

A new bill proposing to further restrict sexual and reproductive rights was submitted to Parliament on 5 July 2016. The restrictive measure is intended to ban abortion in all circumstances except for when it is considered to be the only means available to save a woman’s life. It would also criminalize women and girls who are found to have obtained abortion as well as the people encouraging or assisting them to do so.

Following mass protests and women’s strikes, the bill has been eventually rejected but the government, supported by the Polish Catholic church, has announced that it is considering other restrictions, including a total ban of emergency contraception and of the morning after-pill in particular.

In conclusion, significant deterioration in several areas has been observed since the Law and Justice party’s assumption of power in October 2015. A total of 148 new laws and legislative amendments have been enacted since then, which have led to serious violation of several fundamental rights enshrined in international human rights treaties, including the right to life, health and freedom from torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment as well as the right to privacy, information, equality and non-discrimination.

(*) FREE Group Trainee

Sources:

– Dangerously Disproportionate: The Ever-expanding National Security State in Europe, by Amnesty International, 17 January 2017, Index number: EUR 01/5342/2017

– Poland: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee – 118th session, 17 Oct.-04 Nov. 2016, Index number: EUR 37/4849/2016

– Poland: Dismantling Rule of Law?, Amnesty International Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review – 27th Session of the Upr Working Group, April/May 2017,  EUR: 37/5069/2016

 

Brexit: the Prime Minister sets the wrong course

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Steve Peers

Today’s speech by Prime Minister Theresa May gave a number of indications as to the government’s intentions as regards implementing Brexit. Overall, while the speech contained some welcome parts, it made fundamentally the wrong decision about the country’s future.

Welcome parts of the speech

The welcome parts of the speech include the argument that it ‘remains overwhelmingly and compellingly in Britain’s national interest that the EU should succeed’. Indeed, any ‘unravelling’ of the Union between these neighbouring states is not in the economic or security interests of the UK. Her suggestions about what the EU should do next contain much common sense – although it is doubtful that the remaining EU is very interesting in listening to the leader of a country that is intending to leave. In particularly, her complaints about too much ‘uniformity’ and not enough ‘diversity’ will strike some as bizarre – coming from a country with opt-outs on the single currency, Schengen, justice and home affairs (and previously social policy) plus a budget rebate.

The commitment to retain status for EU citizens in the UK is not new, but still welcome. It is disappointing however that there was no commitment to entrench their rights unilaterally, as recently proposed by a group of Leave and Remain supporters in a British Future report. There could be compromise ways to address this: publishing a draft Bill to this effect, or entrenching the rights in law conditional on EU reciprocity. One can only hope that the issue will be addressed at an early stage of the negotiations.

The interest in continued collaboration on research, police cooperation and foreign policy is also welcome, since the UK still has joint interests with other Member States in these fields. But it is content-free: what exactly would the UK like to participate in? How does this square with her assertion that the UK will not be involved with ‘bits’ of the EU?

Single market and customs union

The Prime Minister declared her opposition to ‘partial membership of the European Union, associate membership of the European Union, or anything that leaves us half-in, half-out.’ But there is no such thing as ‘partial’ or ‘associate’ membership of the EU. May is slaying straw dragons in her own imagination here.

She goes on to confirm her opposition to single market membership (as distinct from single market access) for the UK, for several reasons. It is striking that she makes no assertion that the UK will be better off out of the single market economically. Indeed, the IFS has estimated that the UK will lose 4% of GDP if it leaves the single market without a free trade deal, due to the loss of market access that this entails. While May goes on to say that she seeks a free trade deal, this is bound to entail less trade between the UK and the EU than single market membership, as free trade deals do not remove as many non-tariff barriers as the single market rules.

So what are her reasons? One is control of immigration – and free movement of persons is a non-negotiable condition of the EU for participation in the single market.  Here she fails to consider that the European Economic Area (EEA) treaty includes a safeguard on free movement which could be invoked in order to control it. May’s description of free movement includes overstated claims about its effect on public services, ignoring the impact of limited government funding of health and education in recent years – while she cannot bring herself to mention the overall economic benefit derived from EU migrants.

Another is budget contributions. She rules out any budget contributions except for participation in individual programmes. There is no consideration of whether the EEA option – giving money directly to poorer EU countries, with more control over the spending by the contributor – would be desirable in return for increased market access.

Next, there is the role of the ECJ. May states that single market membership ‘would mean accepting a role for the European Court of Justice that would see it still having direct legal authority in our country.’ Let’s not mince words: this is not true. The EEA states are not subject to the ECJ at all, but to the separate EFTA Court. That court has less jurisdiction than the ECJ, and a large number of its rulings are not binding at all. It is only obliged to follow ECJ rulings delivered before 1991.

More broadly, May states that this ‘would to all intents and purposes mean not leaving the EU at all.’ Again, this is not really true. EEA members are not subject to EU rules on agriculture, foreign policy, fisheries, justice and home affairs (except via separate treaties, in part) or trade with non-EU countries – the very issue which May devotes a large part of her speech to.

This brings me to a false dichotomy on which her speech rests: that there is some sort of choice to be made between EU membership and ‘Global Britain’. In fact, barriers to trade with non-EU countries have been coming down, both due to EU membership of the WTO and due to bilateral trade deals between the EU and non-EU countries. The share of UK trade with non-EU countries has therefore been rising – as Leavers are often quick to point out. Many other EU countries trade more that the UK does with non-EU states – as May herself pointed out last year. So it’s not EU membership that significantly holds back trade with non-EU states.

It is true that inside the EU’s customs union, the UK cannot sign its own trade deals with non-EU states. But the UK could seek to remain in the single market (like Norway) but leave the customs union. Indeed, Norway and other EEA countries have a number of their own trade agreements. In effect, this would be the best of both worlds – maintaining the maximum possible access to the EU’s internal market via means of full participation, while simultaneously having the freedom to sign additional trade deals with non-EU countries.

She also argues that both sides in the referendum made clear it was about the single market. But the single market was not on the ballot paper and was not often mentioned. When it was mentioned, some Leavers, like Dan Hannan, expressly declared that single market membership would not be affected. I recall well a common cut-and-paste statement from Leave supporters in Facebook posts beginning ‘The UK will not be leaving the EEA…’. Although David Cameron stated that leaving the EU meant leaving the single market, why should anyone be bound by his falsehood? And why should one claim made during the campaign be treated as politically binding, while others – notably those which appeared on the side of a bus – are not?

As for the customs union, May proposes a ‘have your cake and eat it’ version – a special deal simplifying border crossings, while being free to sign the UK’s separate international trade deals. Time will tell if this idea interests the EU.

A transitional deal

The Prime Minister accepts that the UK cannot switch immediately to a new arrangement, but cannot bring herself to support a transitional deal, saying ‘[i]nstead, I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the 2-year Article 50 process has concluded’. Such an arrangement would then be phased in. This time frame is unlikely, given that she wants a bespoke deal, involving special arrangements on customs and comprehensive free trade.  So what happens if the Brexit Fairy does not deliver by this deadline?

The role of parliament

Early on in the speech, May states that ‘the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is the basis of our unwritten constitutional settlement’. Unfortunately, these are empty words. A Martian reading this would assume that she had gone to court to try to ensureparliamentary involvement in the triggering of Article 50 – rather than to block it.

Furthermore, her speech comes in place of any white paper or any other public consultation on the best course to follow after Brexit. She ‘concedes’ that parliament will vote on the final deal, but this is not much of a choice – a free trade deal or nothing – unless there is an option to negotiate a different deal (not enough time) or to stay in the EU on the basis of another referendum on the exit terms (ruled out by the government).  In any event, it’s not a real concession: the Constitutional Reform and Governance Actof 2010 makes a form of parliamentary control a legal requirement in principle for most treaties. She made no commitment for a full Act of Parliament to approve the final deal – even though one is required for even minor changes to EU Treaties, and even for the approval of some EU legislation.

So May seeks credit for doing something she was anyway legally required to do. In fact, she deserves blame for previously threatening to ignore the law, and even now involving Parliament as little as possible and planning to offer it a fait accompli.

As for EU legislation converted to UK law, by the future Great Repeal Bill, she states that it will only be changed ‘after full scrutiny and proper Parliamentary debate’. This sounds nice superficially, but falls short of a commitment to use Acts of Parliament on key issues. Rather it sounds like an intention to use Statutory Instruments, which can’t usually be amended by Parliament and are rarely blocked. Without a commitment to use Acts of Parliament, her guarantee to uphold workers’ rights derived from EU law is worth rather less than she suggests; and there is no such commitment as regards environmental law.

The devolved administrations

The Prime Minister states that ‘we will put the preservation of our precious Union at the heart of everything we do’ and that she will ‘strengthen our precious Union’. However, her plan necessarily rejects the detailed suggestions of the Scottish government from December (discussed here) for the future EU/UK trade relationship.  So not only is the Scottish (and Northern Irish) public’s view on the desirability of Brexit is overridden, but also the Scottish government’s later views on how Brexit should take place are ignored. The Scottish government paper can hardly be ‘considered’ if it has already been overruled.

There’s a pledge not to weaken existing powers of devolved bodies, but there will surely be battles ahead over which level of government should exercise powers over devolved competences returned from the EU.  Conversely, there’s no suggestion of any granting any additional devolved powers, which might have been appropriate to address the obviously highly divergent views of Scotland, Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. There’s another pledge to maintain the Common Travel Area between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but this is content-free.

In short, there’s nothing here to ‘strengthen’ the Union at all. Its ‘preservation’ depends solely upon the continued argument that Scotland would be worse off outside the UK’s economic union – while simultaneously maintaining that the UK is better off outside the European version of the same.

Unity and Brexit

The Prime Minister declares that the referendum ‘victors have the responsibility to act magnanimously’, and the losers to accept the result. But she has not shown the slightest magnanimity in her speech today. She dismisses the arguments for staying in the single market made by those – like the Scottish government – who sought to remain in the EU but who believe that single market membership would be a reasonable compromise for a badly divided country.

More broadly, her emollient tone today cannot erase the memory of her conference speech in October – full of sneering references to ‘citizens of the world’ and the dreaded ‘liberal elites’ (cue the Star Wars Imperial March music). It’s a strange world in which Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson – graduate of Eton and Balliol College – dismisses people like me – the grandson of a miner, the son and stepson of factory workers – as part of the ‘elite’.

Still less can her speech erase the memory of her Lord Chancellor failing in her statutory duty to defend the independence of the judiciary from screeching headlines about the ‘Enemies of the People’. And if she really believed in magnanimity in concrete terms, she could have announced a unilateral decision to let EU citizens stay in the UK.

Conclusion

Some of the Prime Minister’s speech is valuable – setting the right overall tone on relations with the EU, implicitly rejecting the more harmful ‘WTO-only’ option, and eschewing (hopefully genuinely) future derision of the 48% who took a different point of view in the referendum. But ultimately she has made the wrong decision on single market participation, putting politics ahead of the country’s economic interests. And key parts of the speech are vague, incorrect, misleading, hypocritical or fantasist. Perhaps we were better off with ‘Brexit means Brexit’.

TELE2 SVERIGE AB AND WATSON ET AL: CONTINUITY AND …RADICAL CHANGE

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUROPEAN LAW BLOG  (JANUARY 12, 2017)
By Orla Lynskey

 

Introduction

The CJEU delivered its judgment in Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson on 21 December 2016. The Court had been asked by a Swedish and British court respectively to consider the scope and effect of its previous judgment in Digital Rights Ireland (discussed here). The judgment reflects continuity in so far as it follows in the line of this, and earlier judgments taking a strong stance on data protection and privacy. Yet, the degree of protection it offers these rights over competing interests, notably security, is radical. In particular, the Court unequivocally states that legislation providing for general and indiscriminate data retention is incompatible with the E-Privacy Directive, as read in light of the relevant EU Charter rights. While the judgment was delivered in the context of the E-Privacy Directive, the Court’s reasoning could equally apply to other EU secondary legislation or programmes interpreted in light of the Charter. This judgment will be a game-changer for state surveillance in Europe and while it offered an early Christmas gift to privacy campaigners, it is likely to receive a very mixed reaction from EU Member States as such. While national data retention legislation has been annulled across multiple Member States (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Germany and Romania), this annulment has been based on an assessment of the proportionality of the relevant measures rather than on a finding that blanket retention is per se unlawful. For those familiar with the facts and findings, skip straight to the comment below.

Facts

The preliminary ruling stems from two Article 267 TFEU references regarding the interpretation of the Court’s judgment in Digital Rights Ireland (henceforth DRI). The first, Tele2 Sverige AB, was a Swedish reference resulting from the refusal by Tele2 Sverige (a Swedish electronic communications provider) to continue to retain electronic communications data following the finding in DRI that the Data Retention Directive was invalid. A dispute regarding the interpretation of DRI ensued and the Swedish Justice Minister commissioned a report to assess the compatibility of Swedish law with EU law and the ECHR. This report concluded that DRI could not be interpreted as prohibiting general and indiscriminate data retention as a matter of principle, or as establishing criteria – all of which must be fulfilled – in order for legislation to be deemed proportionate. Rather, it held that it was necessary to conduct an assessment of all the circumstances in order to determine the compatibility of Swedish legislation with EU law. Tele2 Sverige maintained that the report was based on a misinterpretation of DRI. Given these differing perspectives, the referring court asked the Court to give ‘an unequivocal ruling on whether…the general and indiscriminate retention of electronic communications data is per se incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 and 52(1) of the Charter’ [50].

The second preliminary reference (Watson) arose before the Court of Appeal in the context of applications for judicial review of the UK’s Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) on the grounds that this Act was incompatible with the EU Charter and the ECHR. It was disputed before the national court whether DRI laid down ‘mandatory requirements of EU law’ that national legislation for communications data retention and access must respect. The domestic referring court suggested that it was appropriate to distinguish between legislation governing retention, and legislation governing access. DRI was confined to an assessment of the former as it assessed the validity of the Data Retention Directive, which excluded provisions relating to data access. The latter, provisions on data access, must be subject to a distinct validity assessment in light of their differing context and objectives, according to the referring court. The Court of Appeal did not however deem the answer to this question obvious, given that six courts in other EU Member States had declared national legislation to be invalid on the basis of DRI. It therefore asked the Court to consider whether, firstly, DRI lays down mandatory requirements of EU law that would apply to the regime governing access to retained data at national level. It also asked whether DRI expands the scope of the Charter rights to data protection and privacy beyond the scope of Article 8 ECHR. The Watson reference was dealt with pursuant to the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105(1) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and joined to the Tele2 Sverige reference for oral arguments and judgment.

Findings of the Court

The Scope of the E-Privacy Directive

The Court examined, as a preliminary point, whether national legislation on retention and access to data fell within the scope of the E-Privacy Directive. Article 15(1) of that Directive provides for restrictions to certain rights it provides for when necessary for purposes such as national security and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. Article 15(1) also allows for the adoption of data retention legislation by Member States. However, Article 1(3) of that Directive states that the Directive will not apply to, amongst others, ‘activities concerning public security, defence, State security (…) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law’. There is thus an apparent internal inconsistency within the Directive.

To guide its findings, the Court had regard to the general structure of the Directive. While the Court acknowledged that the objectives pursued by Articles 1(3) and 15(1) overlap substantially, it held that Article 15(1) of the Directive would be deprived of any purpose if the legislative measures it permits were excluded from the scope of the Directive on the basis of Article 1(3) [73]. Indeed, it held that Article 15(1) ‘necessarily presupposes’ that the national measures referred to therein fall within the scope of that directive ‘since it expressly authorizes the Member States to adopt them only if the conditions laid down in the directive are met’. [73]. In order to support this finding, the Court suggests that the legislative measures provided for in Article 15(1) apply to providers of electronic communications services [74] and extend to measures requiring data retention [75] and access to retained data by national authorities [76]. It justifies this final claim – that the E-Privacy Directive includes data access legislation – on the (weak) grounds that recital 21 of the directive stipulates that the directive’s aim is to protect confidentiality by preventing unauthorised access to communications, including ‘any data related to such communications’ [77]. The Court emphasises that provisions on data access must fall within the scope of the Directive as data is only retained for the purpose of access to it by competent national authorities and thus national data retention legislation ‘necessarily entails, in principle, the existence of provisions relating to access by the competent national authorities to the data retained’ [79]. The Court also noted that the Directive requires providers to establish internal procedures for responding to requests for access based on the relevant provisions of national law [80].

The compatibility of ‘general and indiscriminate’ data retention with EU law

The Court then moved on to consider the most important substantive point in the judgment: the compatibility of ‘general and indiscriminate’ data retention with the relevant provisions of EU law. It began by recalling that the E-Privacy Directive’s overarching aim is to offer users of electronic communications services protection against the risks to fundamental rights brought about by technological advances [83]. It emphasised, in particular, the general principle of confidentiality of communications in Article 5(1) of the Directive and the related safeguards for traffic data and location data (in Articles 6 and 9 respectively), [85-87]. While the Court acknowledged that Article 15(1) of the Directive allows for exceptions to these principles by restricting their scope, it held that this provision must be interpreted strictly. It clearly stated that Article 15(1) cannot permit the exception to the Directive’s confidentiality obligation to become the rule, as this would render the confidentiality obligation meaningless [89].

The Court also emphasised that according to Article 15(1)’s wording it must be interpreted in light of general principles of EU law, thus including the fundamental rights in the EU Charter [91]. The Court noted, with reference to its previous case-law, the importance of the fundamental rights engaged in the current context, namely the right to privacy (Article 7), the right to data protection (Article 8) and the right to freedom of expression (Article 11) ([92]-[93]). The limitations on the exercise of these Charter rights are echoed in the E-Privacy Directive, recital 11 of which states that measures derogating from its principles must be ‘strictly’ proportionate to the intended purpose, while Article 15(1) itself specifies that data retention should be ‘justified’ by reference to one of the  objectives stated in Article 15(1) and be for a ‘limited period’ [95]. In considering whether national legislation complies with these requirements of strict necessity, the Court observed that ‘the legislation provides for a general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication’ and that the retention obligation on providers is ‘to retain the data systematically and continuously, with no exceptions’ [97].

Having established the scope of the retention obligation, the Court emphasised the revealing nature of this data and recalled its finding in DRI that the data ‘taken as a whole, is liable to allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained’ [98]. The Court also stated that the data provides the means of profiling the individual concerned and – importantly – that the information is ‘no less sensitive having regard to the right to privacy, than the actual content of the communications’ [99]. The Court held that general and indiscriminate data retention legislation entailed a particularly serious interference with the rights to privacy and data protection and that the user concerned is, as a result, likely to feel that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance [100]. It could also, according to the Court, affect the use of means of electronic communication and thus the exercise by users of their freedom of expression [101]. The Court therefore held that only the objective of fighting serious crime could justify national data retention legislation [102].

While the Court acknowledged that the fight against serious crime may depend on modern investigative techniques for its effectiveness, this objective cannot in itself justify the finding that general and indiscriminate data retention legislation is necessary for this fight against crime [103]. It noted in particular that such legislation applies to persons for whom ‘there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious criminal offences’ and that no exception is made for those whose communications are subject to professional secrecy [106]. As a result of these failings, the Court held that the national legislation exceeds the limits of what is strictly necessary and cannot be considered justified under Article 15(1), read in light of the Charter [107].

The Court did not go so far as to deem all data retention unlawful however. It highlighted that Article 15(1) does not prevent a Member State from introducing legislation that would facilitate targeted retention of traffic and location data for the preventive purpose of fighting serious crime. Such legislation must however be limited to what is strictly necessary in terms of the categories of data retained; the means of communication affected, the persons and the period of time concerned [108]. In particular, such legislation should indicate ‘in what circumstances and under which conditions’ a data retention measure could be adopted as a preventive measure [109]. The Court also emphasised that while the precise contours may vary, data retention should meet objective criteria that establish a connection between the data to be retained and the objective pursued [110]. The national legislation must therefore be evidence-based: this objective evidence should make it possible to ‘identify a public whose data is likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal offences’ [111].

Mandatory Requirements of DRI?

Having established the incompatibility of generalised data retention legislation with EU law, the Court then went on to consider whether EU law precludes national data retention and access legislation if that legislation:

  • does not restrict access solely to the objective of fighting serious crime;
  • does not require access to be subject to prior review by a court or independent body
  • and, if it does not require that the data should be retained within the EU [114].

The Court reiterated an early finding that access to retained data must be for one of the exhaustive objectives identified in Article 15(1) of the E-Privacy Directive, and that only the objective of fighting serious crime would justify access to retained data [115]. Such legislation must also set out clear and precise rules indicating when and how competent national authorities should be granted access to such data [117]. The Court also held that national legislation must set out the substantive and procedural conditions governing access based on objective criteria [118-119]. Such access can, ‘as a general rule’ be granted only ‘to the data of individuals suspected of planning, committing or having committed a serious crime or of being implicated in one way or another in such a crime’ [119]. Access to the data of others might exceptionally be granted where, for instance, vital national interests are threatened by terrorist activities, if there is objective evidence to reflect the effective contribution access to such data could make [119]. As a result, access to retained data should, with the exception of cases of validly established urgency, be subject to a prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority at the request of the competent national authorities [120]. These competent national authorities must also notify the persons affected by the data access, under the applicable national procedures, as soon as such notification no longer jeopardises the investigations. The Court highlighted that such notice is necessary to enable these individuals to exercise their right to a legal remedy pursuant to the Directive and EU data protection law [121].

On the issue of data security, the Court held that Article 15(1) does not allow Member States to derogate from the Directive’s data security provisions, which require providers to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the effective protection of retained data. The Court held that a particularly high level of data security was appropriate given the quantity and nature of the data retained and the riskiness of this operation. It therefore held that the national legislation must provide for the data to be retained within the EU, and for the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period [122]. Member States must also ensure that an independent authority reviews compliance with EU law, as such independent control of data protection compliance is an essential element of the right to data protection set out in Article 8(3) Charter. The Court emphasised the link between such independent supervision and the availability of a legal remedy for data subjects [123]. The Court therefore concluded that national legislation that did not comply with these conditions would be precluded pursuant to Article 15(1) as read in light of the Charter [125]. However, it was for the relevant national courts to examine whether such conditions were satisfied in the present case [124].

Finally, in relation to the UK Court of Appeal’s query regarding the relationship between the EU Charter rights to data protection and privacy and Article 8 ECHR, the Court held that the answer to this question would not affect the interpretation of the E-Privacy Directive and thus matter in these proceedings [131]. It recalled its settled case-law that the preliminary reference procedure serves the purpose of effectively resolving EU law disputes rather than providing advisory opinions or answering hypothetical questions [130]. This did not however prevent it from offering a sneak preview of its thinking on this matter. It emphasised that, while the EU has not acceded to the ECHR, the ECHR does not constitute a formally incorporated element of EU law. It did however note that Article 52(3) seeks to ensure consistency between the Charter and the ECHR without adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law. EU law is not therefore precluded from providing more extensive protection than the ECHR. The Court added that Article 8 of the Charter concerns a fundamental right which is distinct from that enshrined in Article 7 and which has no equivalent in the ECHR. Therefore, while the Court did not answer the question of which offered a wider scope of protection, it did confirm the distinctiveness of these two rights.

Comment

The Tele2 judgment represents a rupture with the past in one very significant way: the Court, for the first time, unequivocally states that blanket data retention measures are incompatible with EU law, read in light of the Charter. This radical finding is likely to receive a mixed reaction. For instance, in the UK some will lament that this judgment comes too late to have influenced the passage into law of the UK’s new data retention legislation, the Investigatory Powers Act, 2016. This legislation – which allows for bulk interception and hacking, amongst other things – should now be found to be incompatible with EU law, with all of the post-Brexit implications for ‘adequacy’ this may entail (also here). Others, such as the UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation – David Anderson QC – have expressed regret. Anderson QC suggests that:

‘Precisely because suspects are often not known in advance, data retention which is not universal in its scope is bound to be less effective as a crime reduction measure.  In addition, a person whose data has not been retained cannot be exonerated by use of that data (e.g. by using location data to show that the person was elsewhere).’

The Advocate General (here; and commentary here) had similarly noted that data retention could help competent authorities ‘examine the past’ [AG, 178]. He had refused to declare general retention measures per se unlawful, preferring instead to assess the compatibility of data retention legislation against strict proportionality requirements [AG, 116]. His approach could therefore be said to be more nuanced and systematic than that of the Court. While examining proportionality stricto sensu he concluded that it would be for national courts to weigh the benefit of ‘examining the past’ with the potential it would provide for authorities to abuse this power by using metadata to catalogue entire populations, noting that evidence of abuses had been put before the Court [AG, 259-260]. This evidence before the Court might help to refute the critique that the Court should have focused on the actual harm of communications metadata retention ‘and sought to avoid assertions based on theory or informal predictions of popular feeling’.

Blanket retention was not the only important point on which the Court and the Advocate General departed. The Advocate General explicitly claimed that DRI set out mandatory requirements [AG, 221] while the Court did not. The Advocate General was also more stringent than the Court by requiring that data is retained in the relevant Member State [AG, 241] while the Court opted for the marginally more realistic requirement that data is retained in the EU. The Advocate General did not, however, consider Article 15(1) a derogation to the E-Privacy Directive (and therefore not a provision that required strict interpretation). The Court did not however engage with his elaborate reasoning on this point [AG, 106-115]. The Court did however confirm that competent national authorities must notify persons affected by data access as soon as such notification no longer jeopardises the investigation [121]. This significant procedural right is likely to play an important role in acting as a check on abusive access requests.

Perhaps the only fly in the ointment for the digital rights groups that intervened before the Court is the Court’s seemingly uncritical endorsement of geographic and group profiling. It does this when it emphasises that there should be relationship between the data retained and the threat, for instance when the data pertains to a ‘geographic area’ [108]. The ethical and social issues such profiling may entail would require further consideration. The Court appears to recognise this by suggesting that such profiling would need to be strictly evidence-based ([111]). Should generalised retention measures be replaced by ad hoc location-based retention measures, the legality of the latter would itself be the subject of much controversy.

Verfassungsblog :The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity

 ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE

by 

  1. Independently from this procedure, the Hungarian government, right after its Slovakian counterparts’ submission also challenged the quota decision before the European Court of Justice. This procedure is still pending, but the ECJ in its decision won’t take into account neither the text of the Hungarian constitution, nor the domestically binding interpretation of it by the Constitutional Court.
  2. Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, para 86.
  3. See for instance Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann (2009) OJ C 113, 1.5.2010.
  4. See these matters mentioned in P. Faraguna, ’Taking Constitutional Identities Away from the Courts’, Brook. J. Int’l L. Vol. 41:2. 2016. 491, at 506-508.
  5. In May 2015, a few days after many hundreds of refugees have drowned in the Mediterranean Viktor Orbán announced that ‘We need no refugees’.
  6.  Some critics of the historical constitution even raise the possibility that the Court might consider the Hungarian Jewish laws, first of such acts in Europe outside of Germany, as part of it.
  7.  See I. Császár, B. Majtényi, ’Hungary: The Historic Constitution as the Place of Memory’, M. Suksi, K. Agapiou-Josephides, J-P. Lehners, M. Nowak (eds.) First Fundamental Rights Documents in Europe, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015. 57-69.

 

THE POWER TO CONCLUDE THE EU’S NEW GENERATION OF FTA’S: AG SHARPSTON IN OPINION 2/15

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUROPEAN LAW BLOG 

By Laurens Ankersmit

To say that the EU’s new generation of trade agreements (such as CETA and TTIP) is politically controversial is becoming somewhat of an understatement. These free trade agreements (FTA), going beyond mere tariff reduction and facilitating hyperglobalization, have faced widespread criticism from civil society, trade unions, and academics. It may come as no surprise therefore that the legal issue over who is competent to conclude such agreements (the EU alone, or the EU together with the Member States) has received considerable public attention, ensuring that the Advocate General Sharpston’s response to the Commission’s request for an Opinion (Opinion 2/15) on the conclusion of the EU-Singapore FTA (EUSFTA)  has made the headlines of several European newspapers.

The Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, delivered on 21 December, is partly sympathetic to the Commission’s arguments on EU powers, but ultimately refutes the most outlandish of the Commission’s claims to EU power vis-à-vis that of its constituent Member States. The Opinion is of exceptional length (570 paragraphs, to my knowledge the longest Opinion ever written), and contains an elaborate discussion on the nature of the division of powers between the EU and the Member States and detailed reasoning on specific aspects of the EUSFTA such as transport services, investment protection, procurement, sustainable development, and dispute settlement.

Given the breadth of the AG’s conclusions, the aim of this post is to discuss the Opinion only in relation to investment protection and to reflect upon some of the consequences for the Commission’s investment policy, perhaps the most controversial aspect of this new generation of trade agreements.

A short history of the EU’s powers in the field of investment protection

The EU’s powers in the field of investment are relatively new. Only with the Treaty of Lisbon did the scope of the common commercial policy (CCP) extend to cover ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI), thereby putting at least part of current international investment policies within EU exclusive competence. The history of the inclusion and decades long push by the Commission to extend the EU’s trade policy to cover investment is quite interesting (see this excellent and informative contribution by Robert Basedow).

From the 1970s onwards, the Commission’s push for extending the EU’s trade powers to cover investment met with resistance from the Member States. However, in the context of the Iraq war and the constitutional momentum of the Laeken convention, delegates of the convention focussed on the reform of EU foreign policy and ignored the proposed addition of FDI to the CCP by Irish liberal-conservative MP John Bruton (Bruton was shortly thereafter appointed EU ambassador to the United States). During the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), Member States chose not to spend their political capital on the ‘technical issue’ of FDI.

As a result, the Commission was able to claim a major victory with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty with the extension of EU trade powers to foreign direct investment. A direct consequence of this addition was that the EU now needed to be formally involved in the negotiation and conclusion of investment agreements covering foreign direct investment. This triggered the Commission’s investment policy which resulted in the inclusion of investment protection chapters in agreements such as the EUSFTA and CETA.

Leading up to the conclusion of the first new generation of trade agreements, the Commission decided it did not get enough with its extensive foot in the door in international investment policy and claimed the entirety of these investment chapters as EU-only in its request for an Opinion. As a result, the ECJ will now be required to interpret the term ‘foreign direct investment’ for the first time and clarify whether the EU’s powers in the area of portfolio investment (as opposed to foreign direct investment) also fall within the EU’s (implied) exclusive powers.

The AG’s Opinion

The nuanced Opinion of the Advocate General is certainly sympathetic to some of the Commission’s arguments, but rejects the Commission’s proposition that the EU has exclusive competence over all matters related to investment protection in the EUSFTA. I will discuss the three main issues discussed, namely:

  • The meaning and scope of ‘foreign direct investment’ in Article 207 TFEU;
  • The issue of portfolio investments as an implied exclusive power;
  • Termination of prior bilateral investment agreements by the EU.

The meaning and scope of ‘foreign direct investment’ in Article 207 TFEU

On the first issue, the Advocate General had to give meaning to the term ‘foreign direct investment’ in article 207 TFEU that has not yet been interpreted by the ECJ. The Advocate General took a contextual approach to the meaning of FDI, using the concept of ‘direct investment’ in the case-law of the ECJ in interpreting the free movement of capital provisions and OECD, IMF, and UNCTAD definitions. Accordingly, foreign direct investment is to be understood as a foreign investment ‘which serve[s] to establish or maintain lasting and direct links, in the form of effective participation in the company’s management and control, between the person providing the investment and the company to which that investment is made available in order to carry out an economic activity.’ (para. 322) The Advocate General subsequently suggested a threshold of at least 10% of the voting power as ‘evidentiary guidance’ of effective participation in the company’s management and control.

In relation to the scope of Article 207 TFEU and ‘foreign direct investment’, the AG, siding with the Commission, found that the term also covered issues that regulated the ‘post[-]establishment’ phase of investment and not merely market access of foreign direct investment.  Applying the Daichi Sankyo-test, the AG concluded that the CCP ‘covers the regulation of the protection of foreign direct investment in so far as the availability of that protection has a direct and immediate effect on whether to carry out the foreign direct investment and on the enjoyment of the benefits of that investment.’ (paras 323-336) The regulation of the post-establishment phase could not be excluded because the effectiveness of rules permitting market access of investment could be subsequently undermined if there was regulation of the post-establishment phase.

The issue of portfolio investments as an implied (exclusive) power

After having sided with the Commission, the Advocate General nonetheless rejected the Commission’s arguments in relation to portfolio investments. The Commission did not argue that portfolio investments came within the scope of Article 207 TFEU, but came up with a rather adventurous interpretation of Article 3 (2) TFEU. That article codifies the ECJ’s case-law on implied exclusive treaty-making powers, and in particular the AETR doctrine which establishes such competence if the conclusion of the agreement in question ‘may affect common rules or alter their scope’. It is commonly understood that the reference to ‘common rules’ refers to EU secondary legislation, but in the absence of any common rules in the area of portfolio investment, the Commission argued that the Treaty rules on the free movement of capital themselves could also be considered ‘common rules’ in the sense of Article 3 (2) TFEU.

The Advocate General rejected this interpretation, inter alia, because this would risk leading to exclusive competences of the EU merely because of the existence of Treaty provisions. For the AG, Article 3 (2) TFEU lays down additional grounds for EU exclusive competence other than the express exclusive powers in Article 3 (1) TFEU and therefore that ‘competence must […] stem from some other basis than the Treaties themselves’ (para. 353). Indeed, one may wonder why the Treaty drafters would have not explicitly granted the EU exclusive treaty-making powers in the field of free movement of capital if the Commission’s reasoning would be followed.

Moreover, as the AG pointed out, this would amount to allowing the EU to change the Treaties via the conclusion of an international agreement. For the AG, the purpose of Article 3 (2) cannot be to entitle the EU ‘to “affect” rules of primary EU law or to ”alter their scope” by concluding an international agreement. […] Primary law can be changed only by amending the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU.’ (para. 354).

Lastly, however, the Advocate General accepted the existence of implied shared powers between the EU and the Member States in the field of portfolio investment on the basis of the free movement of capital provisions (paras. 363-370, again siding with the Commission). She based her finding on the fact that this was necessary to achieve one of the objectives of the Treaties (second ground in article 216 (1) TFEU). For the AG, it was not necessary that the EU was competent to adopt secondary legislation, but it was sufficient that the issue fell within the scope of EU law (which according to the AG it did because of Article 63 TFEU).

I am personally a bit puzzled by this finding. In my opinion, the competence to adopt secondary legislation is a prerequisite, not least in order to determine the appropriate procedure to be followed for the adoption of an international agreement (see article 218 (6-8) TFEU). After all, the doctrine of implied powers rests on the proposition that the implied powers derive from a legal basis permitting the adoption of rules without explicitly mentioning international agreements. In that sense, only article 352 TFEU would potentially be a conceivable legal basis. Article 64 (2) TFEU, for instance, provides that the EU may adopt measures ‘on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment – including investment in real estate – establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets.’ Article 64 (2) TFEU therefore relates to direct investment, not portfolio investment. While article 64 (2) TFEU covers financial services and securities to capital markets and thus may relate to portfolio investment, it does not cover all portfolio investments.

Termination of prior bilateral investment agreements by the EU

The third and last issue the Advocate General addressed was the question whether the EU has the power to terminate prior Member State investment agreements with Singapore. At first glance, this question may seem a bit absurd, as the Member States and not the EU have concluded these agreements. However, the Commission had argued that such competence exists on the basis of the EU law theory of succession, according to which the EU assumes the responsibilities of the Member States for international agreements concluded by them that now fall entirely within the exclusive competence of the EU. Of course, the ECJ would only be faced with this question if it indeed follows the arguably stretched argumentation of the Commission on implied exclusive powers in the first place.

The Advocate General held that only the Member States had such powers to terminate prior BITs and that accordingly the EUSFTA should be a mixed agreement. Her argument is based on both EU and international law. In relation to EU law, Article 351 TFEU requires Member States to take all appropriate measures to eliminate any incompatibilities between pre-accession agreements (eg the Poland-Singapore 1993 BIT) and the Treaties. For the AG, Article 351 TFEU confirms that Member States remain party to such agreements and bear the responsibility for eliminating any incompatibilities. (paras. 378-389) In relation to international law, the AG could not find any legal argument that would suggest that the EU automatically succeeds to an international agreement concluded by the Member States. (paras. 391-398)

Comments

If the Advocate General’s Opinion is followed by the ECJ, the powers to conclude agreements covering investment are for all intents and purposes shared between the EU and the Member States. This may be to the dismay of proponents of agreements such as TTIP and CETA who would like to see a ‘swift’ ratification process, but one may wonder whether pushing through such controversial agreements at EU level is politically desirable for the EU in the first place. In any event, it seems plain that the issue of mixity should be guided by the constitutional principle of conferral and not by political expediency in the eyes of the proponents of such trade deals.

A final issue that is worth noting is the Advocate General’s comments on the compatibility of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the EUSFTA with the Treaties. As I mentioned before, the Commission did not ask the ECJ to resolve this question in addition to the competence question, despite the fact that it requested this Opinion after the Court delivered its Opinion 2/13 on the draft accession agreement to the ECHR. This may suggest that the Commission’s request was borne out of political expediency seeking to expand its powers only and avoiding any legal issues that may constrain its powers. Astonishingly, however, the Commission seems to be turning the issue on its head. In his comments before the European Parliament, the Commission’s chief CETA negotiator Mauro Pettriccione’s suggests that if the ECJ does not object to ISDS in Opinion 2/15, we can assume that the ECJ considers the mechanism compatible with the Treaties (see at 12:30:30).

Advocate General Sharpston, however, was pretty clear on this issue (para. 85):

It is also important to bear in mind that the Commission’s request does not concern the material compatibility of (any part of) the EUSFTA with the Treaties. Thus, the Court is not asked to consider, for example, the compatibility of an ISDS mechanism with the Treaties. That type of dispute resolution appears not only in the EUSFTA but also in other trade and investment agreements currently negotiated or in the course of negotiation by the European Union. In the present proceedings, the issue as regards the ISDS mechanism (and other forms of dispute resolution for which the EUSFTA provides) is only the question ‘who may decide’. My analysis in this Opinion is therefore without prejudice to such issues (if any) as there may be concerning the material compatibility of the EUSFTA, including the provisions regarding the ISDS mechanism, with the Treaties.

The Commission seems all to willing to have its cake and eating it. Nonetheless, the Court’s views in this Opinion could have implications for a future request for an Opinion on the compatibility of ICS in CETA or any other FTA. If the Court takes an even wider view than the Advocate General on EU competence, this may facilitate the conclusion of agreements such as CETA as ‘EU-only’. This in turn will sideline Member States ability to make a request for an Opinion, not least because a swift ratification will ensure that the Court can no longer express itself on the issue.