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Mediterranean Humanitarian Crisis: if not now, then when will the EU  trigger the “temporary protection” mechanism ?

by Emilio De Capitani

According to a joint press release the Foreign and Home Affairs Council have decided today to submit a Ten point action plan  of immediate actions to be taken by the European Council, which will meet next Thursday (23 April), in response to the crisis situation in the Mediterranean.

The ten points are the following:
“1. Reinforce the Joint Operations in the Mediterranean, namely Triton and Poseidon, by increasing the financial resources and the number of assets. We will also extend their operational area, allowing us to intervene further, within the mandate of Frontex;
2. A systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers. The positive results obtained with the Atalanta operation should inspire us to similar operations against smugglers in the Mediterranean;
3. EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EASO and EUROJUST will meet regularly and work closely to gather information on smugglers modus operandi, to trace their funds and to assist in their investigation; (NDR JOT MARE ?)
4. EASO to deploy teams in Italy and Greece for joint processing of asylum applications;
5. Member States to ensure fingerprinting of all migrants;
6. Consider options for an emergency relocation mechanism;
7. A EU wide voluntary pilot project on resettlement, offering a number of places to persons in need of protection;
8. Establish a new return programme for rapid return of irregular migrants coordinated by Frontex from frontline Member States;
9. Engagement with countries surrounding Libya through a joined effort between the Commission and the EEAS; initiatives in Niger have to be stepped up.
10.Deploy Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) in key third countries, to gather intelligence on migratory flows and strengthen the role of the EU Delegations.(emphasis added)

Frankly all these measures are much less than what one would reasonably expect in response to  the growing number of displaced persons trying to reach the European shores.

When even FRONTEX (the EU Agency which evaluates the pressure on the EU external borders) considers that between half and one million people might try to cross the Mediterranean in the coming months, it is more than likely that the EU will face “a massive inflow” of displaced persons requiring a common system of temporary protection (art.78 p2 lett c TFEU).

But if this is the case then for the first time the European Union will have to implement the provisions of the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) which was adopted at the time of the Kosovar crisis.

The very objective of the Directive  deals with mass influx of “third-country nationals or state-less persons who have had to leave their country or region of origin, or have been evacuated, in particular in response to an appeal by international organisations, and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that country, …in particular: (i) persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence; (ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised violations of their human rights;” (art. 2 Lett C Directive 2001/55/EC)

First and foremost this Directive is the only case where Schengen Member States have to comply with a BINDING mechanism of solidarity as art 8 of the Directive requires EU Member States, if necessary, to provide ‘persons to be admitted to their territory for the purposes of temporary protection with every facility for obtaining the necessary visas, including transit visas’.

According to Article 5 of the Temporary Protection Directive “The existence of a mass influx of displaced persons shall be established by a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council”.

Why doesn’t Italy  formally ask the Commission to submit such a proposal ?

Already in 2011 the European Commission (MEMO/11/226, Press release, Brussels, 8 April 2011) declared that it “would also be ready to consider proposing the use of the mechanism foreseen under the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC), if the conditions foreseen in the directive are met. Consideration could only be given to taking this step if it is clear that the persons concerned are likely to be in need of international protection, if they cannot be safely returned to their countries-of-origin, and if the numbers of persons arriving who are in need of protection are sufficiently great. Resort to this mechanism would allow for the immediate protection and reception in the territory of EU Member States for persons concerned, as well as offering a “breathing space” for the national asylum systems of the Member States most directly affected.”

Moreover  in 2013, the European Parliament listed the application of the Temporary Protection Directive among the possible measures to be taken to address the Syrian crisis.

Unlike the vague terms (“pilot project”, “consider options”…)of the “Ten point plan” debated today by the EU Ministers,  Directive 2001/55 could, at last, establish a binding mechanism as“The Council Decision shall have the effect of introducing temporary protection for the displaced persons to which it refers, in all the Member States, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive. The Decision shall include at least:
(a) a description of the specific groups of persons to whom the temporary protection applies;
(b) the date on which the temporary protection will take effect;
(c) information received from Member States on their recep-tion capacity;
(d) information from the Commission, UNHCR and other rele-vant international organisations.
4. The Council Decision shall be based on:
(a) an examination of the situation and the scale of the move-ments of displaced persons;
(b) an assessment of the advisability of establishing temporary protection, taking into account the potential for emergency aid and action on the ground or the inadequacy of such measures;
(c) information received from the Member States, the Commission, UNHCR and other relevant international organisations.” (art. 5 p 3 and 4 Dir. 2001/55/EC)

Fifteen years ago the death of 54 Chinese irregular migrants who suffocated in a lorry opened the way for the first EU measures dealing with smugglers and the trafficking of human beings. Won’t  the European Council after several thousands  deaths, now take this occasion to implement a Treaty provision and ask for the implementation of an already existing EU legislation ? Unfortunately this looks like a rhetorical question..

TEXT of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof
(emphasized by me)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular point 2(a) and (b) of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1)
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(3),
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions(4),
 

Whereas:
(1) The preparation of a common policy on asylum, including common European arrangements for asylum, is a constituent part of the European Union’s objective of establishing progressively an area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the European Union.
(2) Cases of mass influx of displaced persons who cannot return to their country of origin have become more substantial in Europe in recent years. In these cases it may be necessary to set up exceptional schemes to offer them immediate temporary protection.
(3) In the conclusions relating to persons displaced by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia adopted by the Ministers responsible for immigration at their meetings in London on 30 November and 1 December 1992 and Copenhagen on 1 and 2 June 1993, the Member States and the Community institutions expressed their concern at the situation of displaced persons.
(4) On 25 September 1995 the Council adopted a Resolution on burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis(5), and, on 4 March 1996, adopted Decision 96/198/JHA on an alert and emergency procedure for burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis(6).
(5) The Action Plan of the Council and the Commission of 3 December 1998(7) provides for the rapid adoption, in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, of minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin and of measures promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving displaced persons.
(6) On 27 May 1999 the Council adopted conclusions on displaced persons from Kosovo. These conclusions call on the Commission and the Member States to learn the lessons of their response to the Kosovo crisis in order to establish the measures in accordance with the Treaty.
(7) The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, acknowledged the need to reach agreement on the issue of temporary protection for displaced persons on the basis of solidarity between Member States.
(8) It is therefore necessary to establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and to take measures to promote a balance of efforts between the Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons.
(9) Those standards and measures are linked and interdependent for reasons of effectiveness, coherence and solidarity and in order, in particular, to avert the risk of secondary movements. They should therefore be enacted in a single legal instrument.
(10) This temporary protection should be compatible with the Member States’ international obligations as regards refugees. In particular, it must not prejudge the recognition of refugee status pursuant to the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 on the status of refugees, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, ratified by all the Member States.
(11) The mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding refugees and other persons in need of international protection should be respected, and effect should be given to Declaration No 17, annexed to the Final Act to the Treaty of Amsterdam, on Article 63 of the Treaty establishing the European Community which provides that consultations are to be established with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant international organisations on matters relating to asylum policy.
(12) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for persons enjoying temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons.
(13) Given the exceptional character of the provisions established by this Directive in order to deal with a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, the protection offered should be of limited duration.
(14) The existence of a mass influx of displaced persons should be established by a Council Decision, which should be binding in all Member States in relation to the displaced persons to whom the Decision applies. The conditions for the expiry of the Decision should also be established.
(15) The Member States’ obligations as to the conditions of reception and residence of persons enjoying temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons should be determined. These obligations should be fair and offer an adequate level of protection to those concerned.
(16) With respect to the treatment of persons enjoying temporary protection under this Directive, the Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of international law to which they are party and which prohibit discrimination.
(17) Member States should, in concert with the Commission, enforce adequate measures so that the processing of personal data respects the standard of protection of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data(8).
(18) Rules should be laid down to govern access to the asylum procedure in the context of temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons, in conformity with the Member States’ international obligations and with the Treaty.
(19) Provision should be made for principles and measures governing the return to the country of origin and the measures to be taken by Member States in respect of persons whose temporary protection has ended.
(20) Provision should be made for a solidarity mechanism intended to contribute to the attainment of a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving displaced persons in the event of a mass influx. The mechanism should consist of two components. The first is financial and the second concerns the actual reception of persons in the Member States.
(21) The implementation of temporary protection should be accompanied by administrative cooperation between the Member States in liaison with the Commission.
(22) It is necessary to determine criteria for the exclusion of certain persons from temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons.
(23) Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely to establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between the Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons, cannot be sufficiently attained by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(24) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom gave notice, by letter of 27 September 2000, of its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Directive.
(25) Pursuant to Article 1 of the said Protocol, Ireland is not participating in the adoption of this Directive. Consequently and without prejudice to Article 4 of the aforementioned Protocol, the provisions of this Directive do not apply to Ireland.
(26) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the adoption of this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it nor subject to its application,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
 
CHAPTER I General provisions

Article 1
The purpose of this Directive is to establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin and to promote a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons.
 

Article 2
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) “temporary protection” means a procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection to such persons, in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection;
(b) “Geneva Convention” means the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967;
(c) “displaced persons” means third-country nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave their country or region of origin, or have been evacuated, in particular in response to an appeal by international organisations, and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that country, who may fall within the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention or other international or national instruments giving international protection, in particular:
(i) persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence;
(ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised violations of their human rights;
(d) “mass influx” means arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced persons, who come from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Community was spontaneous or aided, for example through an evacuation programme;
(e) “refugees” means third-country nationals or stateless persons within the meaning of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention;
(f) “unaccompanied minors” means third-country nationals or stateless persons below the age of eighteen, who arrive on the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an adult responsible for them whether by law or custom, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person, or minors who are left unaccompanied after they have entered the territory of the Member States;
(g) “residence permit” means any permit or authorisation issued by the authorities of a Member State and taking the form provided for in that State’s legislation, allowing a third country national or a stateless person to reside on its territory;
(h) “sponsor” means a third-country national enjoying temporary protection in a Member State in accordance with a decision taken under Article 5 and who wants to be joined by members of his or her family.
 

Article 3

  1. Temporary protection shall not prejudge recognition of refugee status under the Geneva Convention.
  2. Member States shall apply temporary protection with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and their obligations regarding non-refoulement.
  3. The establishment, implementation and termination of temporary protection shall be the subject of regular consultations with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant international organisations.
  4. This Directive shall not apply to persons who have been accepted under temporary protection schemes prior to its entry into force.
  5. This Directive shall not affect the prerogative of the Member States to adopt or retain more favourable conditions for persons covered by temporary protection.

 

CHAPTER II Duration and implementation of temporary protection
 

Article 4

  1. Without prejudice to Article 6, the duration of temporary protection shall be one year. Unless terminated under the terms of Article 6(1)(b), it may be extended automatically by six monthly periods for a maximum of one year.
  2. Where reasons for temporary protection persist, the Council may decide by qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council, to extend that temporary protection by up to one year.

 

Article 5

  1. The existence of a mass influx of displaced persons shall be established by a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council.
  2. The Commission proposal shall include at least:

(a) a description of the specific groups of persons to whom the temporary protection will apply;
(b) the date on which the temporary protection will take effect;
(c) an estimation of the scale of the movements of displaced persons.

  1. The Council Decision shall have the effect of introducing temporary protection for the displaced persons to which it refers, in all the Member States, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive. The Decision shall include at least:

(a) a description of the specific groups of persons to whom the temporary protection applies;
(b) the date on which the temporary protection will take effect;
(c) information received from Member States on their reception capacity;
(d) information from the Commission, UNHCR and other relevant international organisations.

  1. The Council Decision shall be based on:

(a) an examination of the situation and the scale of the movements of displaced persons;
(b) an assessment of the advisability of establishing temporary protection, taking into account the potential for emergency aid and action on the ground or the inadequacy of such measures;
(c) information received from the Member States, the Commission, UNHCR and other relevant international organisations.

  1. The European Parliament shall be informed of the Council Decision.

 

Article 6

  1. Temporary protection shall come to an end:

(a) when the maximum duration has been reached; or
(b) at any time, by Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council.

  1. The Council Decision shall be based on the establishment of the fact that the situation in the country of origin is such as to permit the safe and durable return of those granted temporary protection with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and Member States’ obligations regarding non-refoulement. The European Parliament shall be informed of the Council Decision.

 

Article 7

  1. Member States may extend temporary protection as provided for in this Directive to additional categories of displaced persons over and above those to whom the Council Decision provided for in Article 5 applies, where they are displaced for the same reasons and from the same country or region of origin. They shall notify the Council and the Commission immediately.
  2. The provisions of Articles 24, 25 and 26 shall not apply to the use of the possibility referred to in paragraph 1, with the exception of the structural support included in the European Refugee Fund set up by Decision 2000/596/EC(9), under the conditions laid down in that Decision.

 

CHAPTER III Obligations of the Member States towards persons enjoying temporary protection

 
 em>Article 8

  1. The Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to provide persons enjoying temporary protection with residence permits for the entire duration of the protection. Documents or other equivalent evidence shall be issued for that purpose.
  2. Whatever the period of validity of the residence permits referred to in paragraph 1, the treatment granted by the Member States to persons enjoying temporary protection may not be less favourable than that set out in Articles 9 to 16.
  3. The Member States shall, if necessary, provide persons to be admitted to their territory for the purposes of temporary protection with every facility for obtaining the necessary visas, including transit visas. Formalities must be reduced to a minimum because of the urgency of the situation. Visas should be free of charge or their cost reduced to a minimum.

 

Article 9
The Member States shall provide persons enjoying temporary protection with a document, in a language likely to be understood by them, in which the provisions relating to temporary protection and which are relevant to them are clearly set out.
 

Article 10
To enable the effective application of the Council Decision referred to in Article 5, Member States shall register the personal data referred to in Annex II, point (a), with respect to the persons enjoying temporary protection on their territory.
 

Article 11
A Member State shall take back a person enjoying temporary protection on its territory, if the said person remains on, or, seeks to enter without authorisation onto, the territory of another Member State during the period covered by the Council Decision referred to in Article 5. Member States may, on the basis of a bilateral agreement, decide that this Article should not apply.
 

Article 12
The Member States shall authorise, for a period not exceeding that of temporary protection, persons enjoying temporary protection to engage in employed or self-employed activities, subject to rules applicable to the profession, as well as in activities such as educational opportunities for adults, vocational training and practical workplace experience. For reasons of labour market policies, Member States may give priority to EU citizens and citizens of States bound by the Agreement on the European Economic Area and also to legally resident third-country nationals who receive unemployment benefit. The general law in force in the Member States applicable to remuneration, access to social security systems relating to employed or self-employed activities and other conditions of employment shall apply.
 

Article 13

  1. The Member States shall ensure that persons enjoying temporary protection have access to suitable accommodation or, if necessary, receive the means to obtain housing.
  2. The Member States shall make provision for persons enjoying temporary protection to receive necessary assistance in terms of social welfare and means of subsistence, if they do not have sufficient resources, as well as for medical care. Without prejudice to paragraph 4, the assistance necessary for medical care shall include at least emergency care and essential treatment of illness.
  3. Where persons enjoying temporary protection are engaged in employed or self-employed activities, account shall be taken, when fixing the proposed level of aid, of their ability to meet their own needs.
  4. The Member States shall provide necessary medical or other assistance to persons enjoying temporary protection who have special needs, such as unaccompanied minors or persons who have undergone torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.

 

Article 14

  1. The Member States shall grant to persons under 18 years of age enjoying temporary protection access to the education system under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member State The Member States may stipulate that such access must be confined to the state education system.
  2. The Member States may allow adults enjoying temporary protection access to the general education system.

 

Article 15

  1. For the purpose of this Article, in cases where families already existed in the country of origin and were separated due to circumstances surrounding the mass influx, the following persons shall be considered to be part of a family:

(a) the spouse of the sponsor or his/her unmarried partner in a stable relationship, where the legislation or practice of the Member State concerned treats unmarried couples in a way comparable to married couples under its law relating to aliens; the minor unmarried children of the sponsor or of his/her spouse, without distinction as to whether they were born in or out of wedlock or adopted;
(b) other close relatives who lived together as part of the family unit at the time of the events leading to the mass influx, and who were wholly or mainly dependent on the sponsor at the time.

  1. In cases where the separate family members enjoy temporary protection in different Member States, Member States shall reunite family members where they are satisfied that the family members fall under the description of paragraph 1(a), taking into account the wish of the said family members. Member States may reunite family members where they are satisfied that the family members fall under the description of paragraph 1(b), taking into account on a case by case basis the extreme hardship they would face if the reunification did not take place.
  2. Where the sponsor enjoys temporary protection in one Member State and one or some family members are not yet in a Member State, the Member State where the sponsor enjoys temporary protection shall reunite family members, who are in need of protection, with the sponsor in the case of family members where it is satisfied that they fall under the description of paragraph 1(a). The Member State may reunite family members, who are in need of protection, with the sponsor in the case of family members where it is satisfied that they fall under the description of paragraph 1(b), taking into account on a case by case basis the extreme hardship which they would face if the reunification did not take place.
  3. When applying this Article, the Member States shall taken into consideration the best interests of the child.
  4. The Member States concerned shall decide, taking account of Articles 25 and 26, in which Member State the reunification shall take place.
  5. Reunited family members shall be granted residence permits under temporary protection. Documents or other equivalent evidence shall be issued for that purpose. Transfers of family members onto the territory of another Member State for the purposes of reunification under paragraph 2, shall result in the withdrawal of the residence permits issued, and the termination of the obligations towards the persons concerned relating to temporary protection, in the Member State of departure.
  6. The practical implementation of this Article may involve cooperation with the international organisations concerned.
  7. A Member State shall, at the request of another Member State, provide information, as set out in Annex II, on a person receiving temporary protection which is needed to process a matter under this Article.

 

Article 16

  1. The Member States shall as soon as possible take measures to ensure the necessary representation of unaccompanied minors enjoying temporary protection by legal guardianship, or, where necessary, representation by an organisation which is responsible for the care and well-being of minors, or by any other appropriate representation.
  2. During the period of temporary protection Member States shall provide for unaccompanied minors to be placed:

(a) with adult relatives;
(b) with a foster-family;
(c) in reception centres with special provisions for minors, or in other accommodation suitable for minors
(d) with the person who looked after the child when fleeing.
The Member States shall take the necessary steps to enable the placement. Agreement by the adult person or persons concerned shall be established by the Member States. The views of the child shall be taken into account in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
 

CHAPTER IV Access to the asylum procedure in the context of temporary protection

 
Article 17

  1. Persons enjoying temporary protection must be able to lodge an application for asylum at any time.
  2. The examination of any asylum application not processed before the end of the period of temporary protection shall be completed after the end of that period.

 

Article 18
The criteria and mechanisms for deciding which Member State is responsible for considering an asylum application shall apply. In particular, the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application submitted by a person enjoying temporary protection pursuant to this Directive, shall be the Member State which has accepted his transfer onto its territory.
 

Article 19

  1. The Member States may provide that temporary protection may not be enjoyed concurrently with the status of asylum seeker while applications are under consideration.
  2. Where, after an asylum application has been examined, refugee status or, where applicable, other kind of protection is not granted to a person eligible for or enjoying temporary protection, the Member States shall, without prejudice to Article 28, provide for that person to enjoy or to continue to enjoy temporary protection for the remainder of the period of protection.

 

CHAPTER V Return and measures after temporary protection has ended

 
Article 20
When the temporary protection ends, the general laws on protection and on aliens in the Member States shall apply, without prejudice to Articles 21, 22 and 23.
 

Article 21

  1. The Member States shall take the measures necessary to make possible the voluntary return of persons enjoying temporary protection or whose temporary protection has ended. The Member States shall ensure that the provisions governing voluntary return of persons enjoying temporary protection facilitate their return with respect for human dignity.

The Member State shall ensure that the decision of those persons to return is taken in full knowledge of the facts. The Member States may provide for exploratory visits.

  1. For such time as the temporary protection has not ended, the Member States shall, on the basis of the circumstances prevailing in the country of origin, give favourable consideration to requests for return to the host Member State from persons who have enjoyed temporary protection and exercised their right to a voluntary return.
  2. At the end of the temporary protection, the Member States may provide for the obligations laid down in CHAPTER III to be extended individually to persons who have been covered by temporary protection and are benefiting from a voluntary return programme. The extension shall have effect until the date of return.

 

Article 22

  1. The Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the enforced return of persons whose temporary protection has ended and who are not eligible for admission is conducted with due respect for human dignity.
  2. In cases of enforced return, Member States shall consider any compelling humanitarian reasons which may make return impossible or unreasonable in specific cases.

 

Article 23

  1. The Member States shall take the necessary measures concerning the conditions of residence of persons who have enjoyed temporary protection and who cannot, in view of their state of health, reasonably be expected to travel; where for example they would suffer serious negative effects if their treatment was interrupted. They shall not be expelled so long as that situation continues.
  2. The Member States may allow families whose children are minors and attend school in a Member State to benefit from residence conditions allowing the children concerned to complete the current school period.

 

CHAPTER VI Solidarity

 
Article 24
The measures provided for in this Directive shall benefit from the European Refugee Fund set up by Decision 2000/596/EC, under the terms laid down in that Decision.
 

Article 25

  1. The Member States shall receive persons who are eligible for temporary protection in a spirit of Community solidarity. They shall indicate – in figures or in general terms – their capacity to receive such persons. This information shall be set out in the Council Decision referred to in Article 5. After that Decision has been adopted, the Member States may indicate additional reception capacity by notifying the Council and the Commission. This information shall be passed on swiftly to UNHCR.
  2. The Member States concerned, acting in cooperation with the competent international organisations, shall ensure that the eligible persons defined in the Council Decision referred to in Article 5, who have not yet arrived in the Community have expressed their will to be received onto their territory.
  3. When the number of those who are eligible for temporary protection following a sudden and massive influx exceeds the reception capacity referred to in paragraph 1, the Council shall, as a matter of urgency, examine the situation and take appropriate action, including recommending additional support for Member States affected.

 

Article 26

  1. For the duration of the temporary protection, the Member States shall cooperate with each other with regard to transferral of the residence of persons enjoying temporary protection from one Member State to another, subject to the consent of the persons concerned to such transferral.
  2. A Member State shall communicate requests for transfers to the other Member States and notify the Commission and UNHCR. The Member States shall inform the requesting Member State of their capacity for receiving transferees.
  3. A Member State shall, at the request of another Member State, provide information, as set out in Annex II, on a person enjoying temporary protection which is needed to process a matter under this Article.
  4. Where a transfer is made from one Member State to another, the residence permit in the Member State of departure shall expire and the obligations towards the persons concerned relating to temporary protection in the Member State of departure shall come to an end. The new host Member State shall grant temporary protection to the persons concerned.
  5. The Member States shall use the model pass set out in Annex I for transfers between Member States of persons enjoying temporary protection.

 

CHAPTER VII Administrative cooperation

 
Article 27

  1. For the purposes of the administrative cooperation required to implement temporary protection, the Member States shall each appoint a national contact point, whose address they shall communicate to each other and to the Commission. The Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, take all the appropriate measures to establish direct cooperation and an exchange of information between the competent authorities.
  2. The Member States shall, regularly and as quickly as possible, communicate data concerning the number of persons enjoying temporary protection and full information on the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the implementation of temporary protection.

 

CHAPTER VIII Special provisions

 
Article 28

  1. The Member States may exclude a person from temporary protection if:

(a) there are serious reasons for considering that:
(i) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(ii) he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the Member State of reception prior to his or her admission to that Member State as a person enjoying temporary protection. The severity of the expected persecution is to be weighed against the nature of the criminal offence of which the person concerned is suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes. This applies both to the participants in the crime and to its instigators;
(iii) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;
(b) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the host Member State or, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, he or she is a danger to the community of the host Member State.

  1. The grounds for exclusion referred to in paragraph 1 shall be based solely on the personal conduct of the person concerned. Exclusion decisions or measures shall be based on the principle of proportionality.

 

CHAPTER IX Final provisions

 
Article 29
Persons who have been excluded from the benefit of temporary protection or family reunification by a Member State shall be entitled to mount a legal challenge in the Member State concerned.
 

Article 30
The Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
 

Article 31

  1. Not later than two years after the date specified in Article 32, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive in the Member States and shall propose any amendments that are necessary. The Member States shall send the Commission all the information that is appropriate for drawing up this report.
  2. After presenting the report referred to at paragraph 1, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive in the Member States at least every five years.

 

Article 32

  1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 2002 at the latest. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
  2. When the Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the Member States.

 

Article 33
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
 

Article 34
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Done at Brussels, 20 July 2001.
For the Council
The President

  1. Vande Lanotte

 
NOTES
(1) OJ C 311 E, 31.10.2000, p. 251.
(2) Opinion delivered on 13 March 2001 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
(3) OJ C 155, 29.5.2001, p. 21.
(4) Opinion delivered on 13 June 2001 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
(5) OJ C 262, 7.10.1995, p. 1.
(6) OJ L 63, 13.3.1996, p. 10.
(7) OJ C 19, 20.1.1999, p. 1.
(8) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
(9) OJ L 252, 6.10.2000, p. 12.
 

ANNEX I
(..)

ANNEX II
The information referred to in Articles 10, 15 and 26 of the Directive includes to the extent necessary one or more of the following documents or data:
(a) personal data on the person concerned (name, nationality, date and place of birth, marital status, family relationship);
(b) identity documents and travel documents of the person concerned;
(c) documents concerning evidence of family ties (marriage certificate, birth certificate, certificate of adoption);
(d) other information essential to establish the person’s identity or family relationship;
(e) residence permits, visas or residence permit refusal decisions issued to the person concerned by the Member State, and documents forming the basis of decisions;
(f) residence permit and visa applications lodged by the person concerned and pending in the Member State, and the stage reached in the processing of these.
The providing Member State shall notify any corrected information to the requesting Member State.
 
 

Europe behind bars: the use of the European Prison Rules in the French prison system. Awaiting the European Union?

by Charline QUILLÉROU (EU-LOGOS Athéna trainee)

NB The text below summarizes a French Master thesis.

The reform of the prison system is a sensitive issue in France. This debate takes place in a context of dilapidating prison buildings and chronic overcrowding, exacerbated by punitive criminal justice policies. Such a situation leads to sub-human conditions of detention that have been condemned many times, both nationally by MPs[1], associations involved in the defence of detainee’s rights[2] or various papers[3], and internationally by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe[4] and the European Court of Human Rights. The reforms undertaken have difficulties improving significantly these conditions of detention.

The Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) have a role to play in protecting the rights of persons deprived of their liberty. Recommendations have been instrumental in changing national practices. Nevertheless, the EU has almost turned a deaf ear to it while the CoE has been very active. In its resolution of December 2011, the European Parliament recognised that “whereas detention conditions and prison management are primarily the responsibility of Member States […] shortcomings, such as prison overcrowding and allegations of poor treatment of detainees, may undermine the trust which must underpin judicial cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions by EU Member States”[5]. As a result in June 2011, the European Commission published a Green paper entitled “Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention”.  Since then, nothing has happened at the level of the EU.

The CoE is an intergovernmental organisation created in 1949 by a group of European countries – Belgium, Denmark, France, the United-Kingdom, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – that today consists of 47 Member States. All the EU Member States take part in the CoE, together with Turkey and Russia, to name but a few. According to its statute, “the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”[6] To achieve that purpose, especially in regards criminal matters, the CoE relies on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).

The European Prison Rules (EPR) consist of a set of three recommendations made by the CoE which define the minimum rules applicable in prison facilities both for detainees and staff. They cover many aspects of prison life such as hygiene, nutrition, contact with the outside world, work, recreation, education, transfer of prisoners, health or training of prison staff. Therefore, the idea is to harmonise national practices across Europe. Initially adopted in 1973, the EPR were updated in 1987 and 2006. The latest update attempted to take into account the developments in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in the norms established by the CPT, in societal changes that arose due to security constraints in the aftermath of 9-11 and the resulted prison population inflation.

There are 108 EPR, detailed in 308 recommendations. It is of crucial importance to understand that a recommendation is not legally binding. The EPR are not entitled to be transposed into national law as such, but are meant to serve as a guide for Member States in formulating their policies and legislation. This is well exemplified in the Commentary to Recommendation Rec(2006)2 that indicates : “prison administrations should seek to apply all Rules in the letter and the spirit of the principles.”[7] The main objectives are the establishment of common standards and reinforcement of international cooperation through appropriate incentives. The incitement dimension of the EPR refers to the issue of the influence of the CoE within the territory of the Member States that has been theorized as “europeanisation”. The europeanisation process refers to the influence of the European institutions or organisations on national and sub-national politics, policies and polity. Prison matters are barely addressed by the European institutions and CoE recommendations are not legally binding. On such important policies, europeanisation is only about the Council of Europe, even though human rights lie at the heart of the EU.

If European activities have a substantial impact on national institutions and policies, heterogeneity is its main feature. The adoption of the revised EPR in 2006 is a case in point, revealing the complex mechanisms of europeanisation at work. This is all the more true given that it led to the adoption of the French prison law of 24 November 2009, which, according to the Ministry of Justice Web site, “validated and translated into domestic legislation the majority of the European Prison Rules”. All these elements raise the following question:

To what extent do the European Prison Rules participate in the europeanisation of the French prison system? Continue reading “Europe behind bars: the use of the European Prison Rules in the French prison system. Awaiting the European Union?”

State Surveillance: the Venice Commission updates its 2007 Report

By Emilio DE CAPITANI

The Council of Europe’s, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (VENICE COMMISSION) during its 102nd Plenary Session (Venice, 20-21 March 2015) has updated its 2007 Report on the democratic Oversight of the security services and report on the democratic oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies.
In a time where EU founding States such as France are discussing some very cotroversial rules on potential mass interception and the European Union is more and more attracted by the so called “intelligence led policing” the Venice Commission recommendations are particulary timely and worth reading.

Below the Executive Summary of the updated Venice Commission’s Report.

1. The scope of the study.
As a result of processes of globalization and of the creation of internet, internal and external security threats may not be easily distinguished anymore. Significant threats may come from non-state actors. Consequently, one of the most important developments in intelligence oversight in recent years has been that Signals Intelligence or SIGINT does not relate exclusively to military and external intelligence anymore, but also falls to some extent into the domain of internal security. Thus, signals intelligence now can involve monitoring “ordinary telecommunications” (it is “surveillance”) and it has a much greater potential of affecting individual human rights. Different states organize their signals intelligence function in different ways. The summary which follows discusses issues generally, and should not be seen as asserting that all states follow a particular model of signals intelligence, or regulate it in a particular way.

2. Is there a need for improved democratic control?
Strategic surveillance involves access both to internet and telecommunications content and to metadata (all data not part of the content of the communication). It begins with a task being given to the signals intelligence agency to gather intelligence on a phenomenon or a particular person or group. Very large quantities of content data, and metadata, are then collected in a variety of different ways. The bulk content is subjected to computer analysis with the help of “selectors”. These can relate to persons, language, key words concerning content (e.g. industrial products) and communication paths and other technical data.

3. Unlike “targeted” surveillance (covert collection of conversations by technical means (bugging), covert collection of the content of telecommunications and covert collection of metadata), strategic surveillance does not necessarily start with a suspicion against a particular person or persons. Signals intelligence aims to inform foreign policy generally and/or military/strategic security, not necessarily at investigating internal security threats. It has a proactive element, aiming at find or identify a danger rather than merely investigating a known threat. Herein lies both the value it can have for security operations, and the risks it can pose for individual rights.

4. Agencies engaged in signals intelligence tend to have the bulk of the intelligence budget, and produce most intelligence, but the systems of oversight over them have tended to be weaker. There are a variety of explanations for this.
First, it is argued that access to mere metadata does not seriously affect privacy, and nor does access to content data because this is done by computerized search programmes (“selectors”). However, metadata now can reveal much about private life, and the content selectors can be designed to collect information on specific human beings and groups.
Second, telecommunications used to be mainly by radio, with an ensuing lower level of privacy expectations; however, the vast bulk of telecommunications is now by fiber-optic cable.
Third, strategic surveillance being aimed at external communications, it was argued that it is the privacy of non-citizens or non-residents which is affected; however, leaving aside the issue of whether such a distinction is acceptable under the ECHR, for technical reasons there is an inevitable mixing of the internal and external communications, and an ensuing risk of circumvention of tougher domestic controls and oversight which might exist over “ordinary” surveillance. Fourthly, controls have been weaker on account of the technical complexity and rapid technological growth of the area. It should be borne in mind, however, that if this sector is left unregulated, it will be the intelligence agency itself instead of the legislature which carries out the necessary balancing of rights, with the risk of erring on the side of over-collecting intelligence. The fifth reason is that various factors – too rapid growth in the size of a signals intelligence agency, rapid growth in technology, loss in institutional memory, political pressure to secure quick results – may adversely impact the integrity and professionalism of the staff. Finally, signals intelligence is an international cooperative network, which creates specific oversight problems.

5. Strategic surveillance is not necessarily “mass” surveillance but can be when bulk data is collected and the thresholds for accessing that data are set low. Signals intelligence agencies tend to possess much more powerful computing facilities and thus have a greater potential to affect privacy and other human rights. They thus need proper regulation in a Rechtsstaat.

6. Jurisdiction.
The collection of signals intelligence may legitimately take place on the territory of another state with its consent, but might still fall under the jurisdiction of the collecting state from the view point of human rights obligations under the ECHR. At any rate, the processing, analysis and communication of this material clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the collecting State and is governed by both national law and the applicable human rights standards. There may be competition or even incompatibility between obligations imposed on telecommunications companies by the collecting state and data protection obligations in the territorial state; minimum international standards on privacy protection appear all the more necessary.

7. Accountability. Organization.
Signals intelligence is expensive and requires sophisticated technical competence. Hence, while all developed states nowadays require a defensive function – cyber security – only some have an offensive signals intelligence capacity, either in the form of a specialist signals intelligence agency or by allocating a signals intelligence task to the external intelligence agency.

8. Form of the mandate.
Most democratic states have placed at least part of the mandate of the signals intelligence function in primary legislation, as required by the ECHR. More detailed norms or guidelines are normally set out in subordinate legislation promulgated either by the executive (and made public) or by the Head of the relevant agency (and kept secret). There may be issues of quality of the law (foreseeability etc) in this respect.

9. Content of the mandate.
The mandate of a signals intelligence agency may be drafted in very broad terms to allow collection of data concerning “relevant” “foreign intelligence” or data of “relevance” to the investigation of terrorism. Such broad mandates increase the risk of over-collection of intelligence. If the supporting documentation is inadequate, oversight becomes very difficult.

10. Collection of intelligence for “the economic well-being of the nation” may result in economic espionage. Strategic surveillance however is useful in at least three areas of business activity: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (and violation of export control conditions generally), circumvention of UN/EU sanctions and major money laundering. A clear prohibition of economic espionage buttressed by strong oversight and the prohibition for the intelligence agencies to be tasked by the government departments or administrative agencies involved in promoting trade would be useful prevention mechanisms.

11. Bulk transfers of data between states occur frequently.
In order to avoid circumvention of rules on domestic intelligence gathering, it would be useful to provide that the bulk material transferred can only be searched if all the material requirements of a national search are fulfilled, and this is duly authorized in the same way as searches of bulk material obtained through national searches.

12. Government control and tasking.
Taskers depend on the nature of the intelligence sought (diplomatic, economic, military and domestic). Taskers should not be regarded as external controls.

13. Network accountability.
Due to their different geographical location and to the nature of internet, states frequently collect data which is of interest to other states or have access to different parts of the same message. The links between allied states as regards signals intelligence may be very strong. The “third party” or “originator rule” may thus be a serious obstacle to oversight and should not be applied to oversight bodies.

14. Accountability and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
The ECHR consists of minimum standards, and it is only a point of departure for European States, which should aim to provide more extensive guarantees. The European Court of Human Rights has not defined national security but has gradually clarified the legitimate scope of this term. In its case-law on secret measures of surveillance, it has developed the following minimum safeguards to be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power: the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped, a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.

15. The Court’s case law on strategic surveillance is so far very limited, although there is also national case law and oversight bodies practice based on the ECHR. Several of the standards related to ordinary surveillance have to be adapted to make them apply to strategic surveillance. The first safeguard (applicable only to states which allow the use of signals intelligence to investigate crimes) is that the offences which may be investigated through signals intelligence should be enumerated, and thus provision should be made for the destruction of data which might incidentally be gathered on other offences. The exception of transferring data to law enforcement should be narrowly defined and subject to oversight.

16. Another safeguard is a definition of the categories of people liable to have their communications intercepted. The power to contact chain (i.e. identify people in contact with each other) should be framed narrowly contact chaining of metadata should normally only be possible for people suspected of actual involvement in particularly seriously offences, such as terrorism. If the legislature nonetheless considers that such a widely framed contact-chaining power is necessary, then this must be subject to procedural controls and strong oversight.

17. As regards searches of content data, there are particular privacy implications when a decision is being considered to use a selector which is attributable to a natural person (e.g. his or her name, nickname, email address, physical address etc.). Strengthened justification requirements and procedural safeguards should apply, such as the involvement of a privacy advocate. The safeguard is also relevant as regards subsequent decisions to transfer intelligence obtained by strategic surveillance to internal security agencies, to law enforcement or to foreign services.

18. Interception of privileged communications by means of signals intelligence is particularly problematic as is use of signals intelligence against journalists in order to identify their sources. Methods must be devised to provide lawyers and other privileged communicants and journalists with some form of protection, such as requiring a high, or very high, threshold before approving signals intelligence operations against them, combined with procedural safeguards and strong external oversight.

19. The safeguard of setting out time limits is not as meaningful for strategic surveillance as it is for ordinary surveillance. Periods of surveillance tend to be long, and continually renewed. Retention periods also tend to be long: data originally thought to be irrelevant may, as a result of new data, come to be seen as relevant. Provision could be made for a requirement to make periodic internal reviews of the (continued) need to retain the data. To be meaningful, such a duty must be backed up by external oversight.

20. Two very significant stages in the signals intelligence process where safeguards must apply are the authorization and follow-up (oversight) processes. That the latter must be performed by an independent, external body is clear from the ECtHR’s case law. The question which arises here is whether even the authorization process should be independent.

21. Internal and governmental controls as part of overall accountability systems. For a number of reasons, It has been particularly tempting to rely primarily on internal controls in the area of strategic surveillance, but they are insufficient. Generally speaking, external oversight over signals intelligence needs to be strengthened considerably.

22. Parliamentary accountability.
There are a number of reasons why parliamentary supervision of strategic surveillance is problematic. First, the technical sophistication of signals intelligence makes it difficult for parliamentarians to supervise without the aid of technical experts. Second, the general problem of parliamentarians finding sufficient time for oversight along with all their other duties is particularly acute as regards strategic surveillance, where for controlling the dynamic process of refining the selectors (as opposed to a post-hoc scrutiny), some form of standing body is necessary. Thirdly, the high degree of network cooperation between certain signals intelligence agencies means an added reluctance to admit in parliamentary oversight, which can thus affect not simply one’s own agencies, but also those of one’s allies. In some states the doctrine of parliamentary privilege means that parliamentary committees cannot be security-screened, adding to an already-existing fear of leaks. The other, crucial, factor is that strategic surveillance involves an interference with individual rights. Supervision of such measures has traditionally been a matter for the judiciary. The constitutional principle of separation of powers can make it problematic for a parliamentary body to play such a quasi-judicial role.

23. A decision to use particular selectors, resembles, at least in some ways, a decision to authorize targeted surveillance. As such, it can be taken by a judicial body. As the decision involves considerable policy elements, knowledge of intelligence techniques and foreign policy are also desirable. Finding a group of people who combine all three types of competence is not easy, even for a large state. Thus, it is easier to create a hybrid body of judges and other experts. As regards follow-up (oversight) it is necessary to oversee decisions made by automated systems for deleting irrelevant data, as well as decisions by human analysts to keep the personal information collected, and to transfer it to other domestic and foreign agencies. This type of oversight is of a “data protection” character, most suitably assigned to an independent, expert administrative body. Neither of these types of decision is “political” in nature. What, by contrast, is more “political” is the prior decision taken, that somebody, or something, is of sufficient importance to national security to need intelligence about. This is the type of decision which would benefit from a (closed) discussion in a political body, where different spectrums of opinion are represented. Another type of policy-oriented issue is deciding the general rules regarding who, and under what circumstances, signals intelligence can be exchanged with other signals intelligence organisations. A third is making a general evaluation of the overall effectiveness and efficacy of signals intelligence measures. A fourth role for a political body is to engage in a continuous dialogue with whatever expert oversight body is established.

24. Judicial authorization.
A system of authorization needs to be complemented by some form of follow-up control that conditions are being complied with. This is necessary both because the process of refining selectors is dynamic and highly technical and because judges do not tend to see the results of the signals intelligence operations as these seldom lead to prosecutions. Thus the safeguards applying to a subsequent criminal trial do not become applicable.

25. Accountability to expert bodies.
The boundary line between parliamentary, judicial, and expert bodies is not hard and fast; in some states, oversight bodies are a mixture of the three. Expert bodies have a particular role to play in ensuring that signals intelligence agencies comply with high standards of data protection.

26. Complaints mechanisms.
Under the ECHR, a state must provide an individual with an effective remedy for an alleged violation of his or her rights. Notification that one has been subject to strategic surveillance is not an absolute requirement of Article 8 ECHR. If a state has a general complaints procedure to an independent oversight body, this can compensate for non-notification. There are certain requirements before a remedy can be seen as effective.

27. Concluding remarks.
States should not be content with the minimum standards of the ECHR. Signals intelligence has a very large potential for infringing the right to private life and other human rights. It can be regulated in a lax fashion, meaning that large numbers of people are caught up in a trawl and intelligence on them is retained, or relatively tightly, meaning that the actual infringement with private life and other human rights is kept down. The Swedish and German models have definite advantages over the other models studied from this perspective. In any event it is necessary to regulate the main elements in statute form and to provide for strong mechanisms of oversight. The national legislature must be given a proper opportunity to understand the area and draw the necessary balances.

Will the Syrian crisis (at least!) trigger a true EU “common” migration policy ?

by Isabella MERCONE (FREE Group Trainee)

The ‘Syrian refugee crisis’ or ‘Syrian humanitarian crisis’, originated by a civil war in 2011, has been going on for more than 4 years now, causing millions of people in need of protection to flee from Syria to neighbouring countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt), in seek of safety. Moreover, the situation has aggravated in the last year, after the establishment of the ISIS State between Syria and Iraq. [1] Due to its gravity, the issue is at the moment in the spotlight of media and public opinion. Concerns about the issue has already been expressed by all European institutions.[2]

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Notably, in a resolution adopted already in the last legislature ( October 2013), the European Parliament was already calling for ‘safe entry and fair asylum procedures’, ‘temporary admission to the EU’, and resettlement as ‘an essential tool to address acute needs’, reiterating the ‘need for more solidarity with member states facing particular pressure to receive refugees.’
Moreover, the resolution encouraged EU countries ‘to make full use of money to be made available from the Asylum and Migration Fund and the Preparatory Action to “Enable the resettlement of refugees during emergency situations”.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

In a recent decision , the European Commission has underlined the importance of ‘sharing responsibility between Member States and strengthening cooperation with third countries’, and suggested that the Union Actions should ‘focus on EU-wide measures promoting the consolidation of the CEAS, including its possible deepening, promotion of resettlement and transfer, and capacity building and strengthening of asylum systems of third countries’.
However, in fact not much has been so far put in practice by EU institutions to respond to Syrian refugee crisis, especially in respect with the support to third countries most affected by the flow. Nowadays, with 3,9 million Syrians refugees displaced among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt[3], the European Union has to take action and adopt a real common EU approach to respond to Syrian refugee crisis. In order to do so, it needs:

  • A regulation that establishes a strengthened common asylum and migration system;
  • Adequate funding to implement such common actions to respond to the emergency.

The “Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund” (AMIF)

The AMIF (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) is the EU Funding Programme concerning asylum and migration for the period 2014-2020. It was established with Regulation (EU) No 516/2014[4]. With a total budget of EUR 3.137 billion for the whole period (2014-2020), it is aimed at ‘promoting the efficient management of migration flows’ and at the ‘implementation, strenghtening and development of a common EU approach to asylum and migration’.[5] It replaces the three separate funding programmes created for the period 2007-2013 (ERF, European Refugee Fund; EIF, European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals; RF, European Return Fund), in the attempt to create a common financial framework for EU asylum, immigration and external border control policies.

Should art. 80 on solidarity complement the legal basis ?

EU Member States cooperation in the policy area of migration and asylum has been developing in the last twenty years, starting from the Schengen intergovernmental cooperation paving the way to the suppression of internal border controls. The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty embodied the former intergovernamental Schengen cooperation by splitting it in a new title of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) dedicated to “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons” and by dealing with security related policies in the so called “third pillar” (police and judicial cooperation in crimial matters). 

Ten years later the Lisbon Treaty has progressively overcome this dual regime by  merging all these policies in the Title V TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), which deals with freedom, security and justice, and which explicitly calls for the adoption of a common policy on asylum, immigration and external borders, based on solidarity between EU countries and fairness to non-EU nationals (article 67(2)TFEU). In particular, article 80 TFEU (Principle of solidarity) specifically states that, in the implementation of this EU policy on migration and asylum, Member States should respect the principle of “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”, ‘including its financial implications’.  With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force also the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights whose articles 18 and 19 strengthen the right of asylum (also covered by art. 78 TFEU) and the principle of non-refoulement [6] at level of  EU primary law. This has been the basic legal framework in which the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation (EU) 516/2014[7], establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF).[8] However it is worth noting that Regulation formal legal basis  are articles 78(2) and 79(2) and (4) TFEU but the Council of  European Union did’nt accept the EP proposal to add also article 80 TFEU as complementary legal basis.  This divergence of view between the three institutions is clearly stressed in the declarations adopted at the time of the EP vote [9] In fact, the EP had advocated for the explicit inclusion of article 80 TFEU in the legal basis of the regulation, but finally surrendered to national parliaments will and adopted the final text without any reference to this article, in order to allow the Fund to start functioning.
Finally, concerning States that are allowed to opt-out in Title V related issues, all EU Member States, with the exception of Denmark, are part in the AMIF.

AMIF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES Continue reading “Will the Syrian crisis (at least!) trigger a true EU “common” migration policy ?”

La Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme à l’Assemblée nationale : quand le ridicule ne tue pas

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE

9 AVRIL 2015
par Henri Labayle, CDRE

Une fois encore, une partie de la classe politique française a su se mettre à la hauteur des enjeux : dans sa participation à la défense des valeurs de la République, au lendemain des attentats terroristes de Paris, rien ne lui est apparu plus légitime qu’une violente charge contre la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme.

Ainsi, une proposition de résolution de l’Assemblée nationale, déposée le 12 février 2015 (AN n° 2061), invite le Gouvernement rien moins qu’à « renégocier les conditions de saisine et les compétences de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH) sur les questions touchant notamment à la sécurité nationale et à la lutte contre le terrorisme ».

Son rejet est anecdotique, si son inscription ne l’est pas tout à fait. On en sourirait même, si les signataires du texte ne comptaient pas parmi eux, entre autres, deux anciens secrétaires d’Etat en charge des affaires européennes, un professeur agrégé des facultés de droit et nombre d’avocats attestant finalement que les passerelles que les élus se sont ouvertes vers cette profession sont une bien mauvaise nouvelle pour la justice. Ailleurs, on s’étonnerait de voir des auxiliaires de justice se faire les chantres de l’exclusion du juge. Ici, au Palais Bourbon, pas vraiment … La lecture du compte-rendu de la séance du 2 avril 2015 est, à cet égard, atterrante quand bien même d’autres professionnels du droit, avocats eux aussi, ont su appeler à la raison avec talent et dans le même temps.

Ces manifestations urticantes ne sont pas nouvelles mais, dans le contexte ambiant, il peut être instructif d’aller au delà du jeu politicien en s’interrogeant sur la crédibilité de la mise en cause du juge de Strasbourg. Comment se réclamer des valeurs de la démocratie tout en proposant la mise à l’écart de l’une de ses principales expressions, le droit à la protection juridictionnelle ?

Inutile de prendre plaisir au jeu de l’arroseur arrosé. Celui-ci verra, en pleine séance, l’initiateur de la dite résolution être cité par ses contradicteurs pour ses propos louangeurs à l’égard de la Cour européenne … lorsqu’il était secrétaire d’Etat en charge des affaires européennes. On en restera à deux critiques principales portées par les signataires de la proposition : l’une relative à l’activisme de la Cour européenne, l’autre visant à interdire l’usage du recours individuel aux terroristes.

1. De l’activisme de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme

Continue reading “La Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme à l’Assemblée nationale : quand le ridicule ne tue pas”

Dublin III Regulation on asylum and unaccompanied minors

by Federica VIGNALE (Free Group Trainee)

Unaccompanied minors are “third-country nationals or stateless persons below the age of 18, who arrive on the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an adult responsible for them whether by law or custom, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person […][i]. In the last years Europe has been facing massive flows of this particular category of migrants; in the whole 2014, on the basis of data provided to Eurostat[ii] by the Ministries of Interior and official agencies, a total of 16,265 unaccompanied children has been registered as asylum applicants in the countries applying the EU Regulation No 604/2013[iii] – the 28 EU Member States, as well as the four third-countries participating in Schengen (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Denmark). These figures, however, could be not representative of the real situation because many of unaccompanied minors “do not register with the authorities either because they are unable or afraid to do so or because they have been advised by family members, peers or smugglers to keep on the move to another destination”[iv]. Furthermore, “others are not able to contact the authorities because they are being controlled by their traffickers and are destined for sexual, labour or other exploitation in Europe”[v].

Given the specific vulnerability of children and their great exposure to risks – trafficking, sexual exploitation, slavery or servitude – stronger efforts shall be made to assure adequate protection of unaccompanied minors, especially in the early stages of the asylum procedure. In this respect, UNHCR highlighted that the serious problems encountered in the past were attributable to transfers between Member States: children became homeless or destitute because of the lack of accommodations following transfers, accommodation of children in facilities for adults or in detention due to the lack of mutual recognition of age assessment outcomes, delays in accessing the asylum procedure following the delays in the appointment of a guardian in the receiving MS[vi]. These transfers are linked to the determination of the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection. In the case of unaccompanied minors, such rule is contained in article 8(4)[vii] of Dublin III Regulation – mentioned before – which provides that “[i]n the absence of a family member, a sibling or a relative as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Member State responsible shall be that where the unaccompanied minor has lodged his or her application for international protection, provided that it is in the best interest of the minor“. This disposition has, however, some gaps and ambiguities because there is no legal certainty in respect of responsibility for examining an unaccompanied minor´s application, and currently it is object of an amending proposal that could lead to meet the need of fewer transfers.

Background

When, in June 2013, Dublin III Regulation was adopted, there was already at European level the awareness of the ambiguity of the disposition related to minors. The co-legislators, however, expressed in that occasion their intention to clarify that ambiguity once the CJEU had ruled on case C-648/11[viii], which concerned the interpretation of Article 6(2) of Regulation 343/2003[ix] – Dublin II – that corresponds to the current article 8(4) of Dublin III. On 6 June 2013 the Court of Justice ruled that:

“The second paragraph of Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) N° 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, where an unaccompanied minor with no member of his family legally present in the territory of a Member State has lodged asylum applications in more than one Member State, the Member State in which that minor is present after having lodged an asylum application there is to be designated the “Member State responsible”.”

Therefore and in compliance with the Declaration of the European Parliament and of the Council attached to the Regulation[x], on the 26th June 2014 the European Commission presented an amending proposal[xi] “aimed at addressing the current ambiguity of the provision on unaccompanied minors who have no family, siblings or relatives on the territory of the Member States, by providing legal certainty in respect of responsibility for examining the application for international protection in such cases”.

The Commission proposal Continue reading “Dublin III Regulation on asylum and unaccompanied minors”

“Foreign Fighters” and EU implementation of the UNSC resolution 2178. Another case of “Legislate in haste, repent at leisure…” ? (1)

by Emilio DE CAPITANI

Foreword

Last week the European Parliament Civil liberties Committee (LIBE) debated for the first time how to legally frame the problem of “foreign fighters” operating in Syria and Iraq under the flag of the so called Islamic State and of Al Nusra or other insurgent movements at the EU level. The issue has been put on the LIBE agenda because the European Commission and the Council informed the EP of their intention to negotiate a protocol to the European Convention against terrorism within the framework of the Council of Europe, to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 on foreign “terrorist” fighters.

As happens very often when international, supranational and national law are intertwined, the issue is very complex. To make things even harder, the boundaries in international law between armed conflicts and international terrorism have been  progressively blurring since 9/11 and, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty competences in criminal matters and terrorism, they are increasingly being dealt with at the EU level.

In the following pages I will try to highlight the main aspects of the issue of Foreign Fighters starting from its International law dimension by taking as basic references:
– the excellent briefing  “Foreign Fighters under International Law”of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights; and
– the very timely and focused remarks of the former United Nations Special Rapporteur  on human rights and counter-terrorism Martin Scheinin on UNSC Resolution 2178. See:
“Back to post-9/11 panic? Security Council resolution on foreign terrorist fighters”  and “A Comment on Security Council Res 2178 (Foreign Terrorist Fighters) as a “Form” of Global Governance”

In a second post, I will focus on the specific relation between the Council of Europe, the European Union and EU Member States on this issue.

1 Foreign fighters before 9/11

The phenomenon of “foreign” fighters taking part in an armed conflict, or in an insurgency movement, in a different country than their own is not new.  Examples in the last century have included the Spanish civil war in 1936  or the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the war in Afghanistan following the 1989 Soviet invasion, the Bosnian conflicts in the 1990s, and the violence in Chechnya and Dagestan, in Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, not to speak of the recent Russian-Ukrainian crisis.

1.1 Foreign fighters as “combatants” in an armed conflict

Until recent times, from an international law perspective, the legal regime to be applied to foreign fighters depended on the nature of the armed conflict in which they were taking part. In case of armed conflict between States (International Armed Conflict) the legal regime was set by the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (1) which recognise the legitimate use of force, the role of “combatant” as well as the status of “Prisoner of War” (2). In case of “non international” armed conflicts which arise within a State and which could be defined as a situation of armed violence between regular armed forces and one or more organized armed non-state groups, the legal regime applicable is the less stringent regime of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions .

1.2 Terrorist acts during armed conflicts

It is worth recalling that while international law recognises that the use of force is inevitable during an armed conflict, it also prohibits acts which aim primarily to spread terror among civilian populations. These acts can be considered “war crimes” when they consist of ‘acts of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or health within the civilian population’ (“actus reus”) where the perpetrator ‘wilfully made the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence’. International Courts have therefore considered that the “mens rea” is a further element of the international criminal offence (i.e. the requisite intent), namely, the specific intent to spread terror.

The tricky point is that even if they could partially overlap when terrorist activities can be framed as “war crimes”, the legal frameworks at the international level on armed conflicts and against international terrorism have different scopes (3). The proof is that the use of force during an armed conflict (if it complies with International Humanitarian law) is legitimate and is not an act of terrorism (especially when fighting for self-determination). (4)

1.3 Preventing the movement of Foreign fighters Continue reading ““Foreign Fighters” and EU implementation of the UNSC resolution 2178. Another case of “Legislate in haste, repent at leisure…” ? (1)”

Fundamental Rights in the European Union: The role of the Charter after the Lisbon Treaty

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SITE (EPRS) 27-03-2015 (*)

Author Francesca FERRARO

ABSTRACT: The European Union, like its Member States, has to comply with the principle of the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights when fulfilling the tasks set out in the Treaties. These legal obligations have been framed progressively by the case law of the European Court of Justice. The Court filled the gaps in the original Treaties, thus simultaneously ensuring the autonomy and consistency of the EU legal order and its relation with national constitutional orders. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these principles have also been expressly laid down in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Being part of the body of EU constitutional rules and principles, the Charter is binding upon the EU institutions when adopting new measures, as well as for Member States during implementation. The Charter is the point of reference, not only for the Court of Justice, but also for the EU legislature, especially when EU legislation gives specific expression to fundamental rights. Moreover, fundamental rights are also of relevance for EU legislation covering all the other areas of Union competence.
(…)

1. Introduction

The protection of fundamental rights was not explicitly included in the founding Treaties of the European Communities, which contained only a small number of articles that could have had a direct bearing on the protection of the rights of individuals. For example, in the EEC Treaty, the rules on the general prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 7), on the freedom of movement for workers (Article 48), on the freedom to provide services (Article 52), on improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers (Article 117), on equal pay for men and women (Article 119), and on the protection of persons and protection of rights (Article 220), may be considered to have had a such bearing.

An explicit reference to fundamental rights at Treaty level appeared only over 30 years later, with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Indeed, according to Article F of the Treaty on European Union, the EU was obliged to: respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States as general principles of Community law.

Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), and notably of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), protecting fundamental rights is a founding element of the European Union and an essential component of the development of the supranational European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, originally solemnly proclaimed in Nice in 2000, has the same legal value as the Treaties. Even if it does not extend the competences of the Union, it gives them a new ‘soul’ by focusing on the rights of the individual with regard to all EU policies. The Charter draws on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the European Social Charter and other human-rights conventions, as well as the constitutional traditions common to the EU Member States, as stated in case law of the European Court of Justice. However, it also updates them by recognising new kinds of rights protecting individuals from new forms of abuses by public or private entities (such as the right to the protection of personal data and to good administration). The Charter is binding upon the EU institutions when enacting new measures, as well as for the Member States whenever they act within the scope of EU law.1

The Charter is the reference not only for the Court of Justice but also for EU law-making institutions, in particular the Commission, when launching new proposals which give ‘specific expression to fundamental rights’.2 This is the case with EU policies dealing with anti-discrimination, asylum, data protection, transparency, good administration, and procedural rights in civil and criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, fundamental rights (and the Charter) come into play in EU legislation in any other domain of EU competence, such as transport, competition, customs and border control. As these policies can also have an impact on the rights of citizens and other individuals, such as human dignity, privacy, the right to be heard and freedom of movement, EU and Member-State law should take the Charter into account when regulating these spheres.

An essential aspect of the EU’s fundamental rights policy will be the Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, which became obligatory under the Lisbon Treaty (Article 6(2) TEU).3 This would complement the system of protection of fundamental rights by conferring competence on the European Court of Human Rights to review EU measures while taking account of the Union’s specific legal order.

2. EU Fundamental rights prior to the Lisbon Treaty Continue reading “Fundamental Rights in the European Union: The role of the Charter after the Lisbon Treaty”

Member States and the rule of law. Dealing with a breach of EU values

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED IN THE EP THINK TANK SITE

by Eva-Maria Alexandrova POPTCHEVA

SUMMARY

The European Union is founded on values common to all Member States. These are supposed to ensure a level of homogeneity among Member States, while respecting their national identities, so facilitating the development of a European identity and their integration. Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms to enforce EU values, based on a political decision by the Council with the participation of the Commission and Parliament. Such decisions are exempt from judicial review.

The current mechanism is said to be unusable due to the high thresholds needed to adopt a decision in the Council, as well as Member States’ political unwillingness to use it. Various new approaches have been proposed by academics and by political actors, from a new independent monitoring body — the ‘Copenhagen Commission’, through extending the mandate of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), to introducing the possibility for the EU to suspend national measures suspected of infringing EU law.

The European Parliament launched the idea of a ‘European fundamental rights policy cycle’ with the cooperation of EU institutions, Member States and the FRA, as a ‘new Copenhagen mechanism’ to monitor the situation in Member States. This mechanism would incorporate an early-warning system, with ‘formal notices’ to Member States where a breach in the rule of law appears likely, before formal proceedings under Article 7, and a ‘freezing procedure’ for national measures infringing upon EU values.

In 2014, the Commission announced ‘A new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’, with a structured dialogue between the Commission and the Member State concerned and Commission recommendations and follow-up. On an initiative of the Italian Presidency, the Council decided in December 2014 to hold an annual dialogue, in the General Affairs Council, on the ‘rule of law’ in Member States.

A Union of values 

EU values and national identity

The EU ‘values’ were enshrined in the Treaties only with the Treaty of Lisbon, replacing the previous, less extensive ‘principles’. However, it has been clear from the very beginnings of the Communities that, to succeed, the European integration process needs a common basis of values to secure a degree of homogeneity amongst the Member States.1 The EU values are supposed to be the basis for a common European ‘way of life’, facilitating integration towards a political, not just a ‘market’, Union. They support the development of a European identity, while ensuring the legitimacy of the EU as founded on democratic values. However, when it comes to detailed definitions of each of the values, there are few accepted unreservedly.

The EU values enjoy two-fold protection. First, since the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, they form part of the accession criteria for candidates for EU membership (Article 49(1) TEU). Second, Member States must, following their accession, observe and promote the EU values. Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) establishes a procedure to sanction a Member State which does not uphold the values, through the suspension of membership rights. Moreover, the Union exports its values outside its territory, with the EU values underlying the international relations of the EU (Articles 21, 3(5), and 8 TEU).

On the other side of the coin are the national constitutional identities of Member States. According to Article 4(2) TEU, the Union must respect Member States’ national identities. This provision sets out a vision of a Union founded on values common to all Member States but which preserves the diversity of Member States’ political and organisational systems. This so called ‘constitutional individuality’ of the Member States can be reflected inter alia in state-organisational, cultural, including language, and historical heritage aspects.2 Hence, the common EU values represent limits to the diversity of Member States, reflected in their constitutional identities.

Some examples Continue reading “Member States and the rule of law. Dealing with a breach of EU values”

Another episode of the EU PNR saga: remarks of the national data protection authorities

LETTER SENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ART 29 WORKING PARTY (*) TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF THE EU PNR  DRAFT DIRECTIVE (emphasized by me)

Dear Mr Moraes,
Since the terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen, the discussion on the possible introduction of an EU Passenger Name Records system (hereafter: EU PNR) has moved significantly forward, both in the Council and in the European Parliament. In particular, Mr Kirkhope, rapporteur on this issue, has presented an updated report on the Commission’s 2011 draft directive establishing an EU PNR to your Committee.
As stated early last month, the Article 29 Working Party (hereafter: the WP 29) is not in principle either in favour of or opposed to PNR data collection schemes  (See press release issued by the Article 29 Working Party on EU PNR on 5 February 2015), as long as they are compliant with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data.
However, considering the extent and indiscriminate nature of EU PNR data processing for the fight against terrorism and serious crime, the WP 29 believes that it is likely to seriously undermine the rights as set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union.
In this regard, the Working Party acknowledges that there have been some improvements to the initial draft from a data protection perspective. Still, the Working Party wishes to urgently draw your attention to the following outstanding issues to ensure that the aforementioned fundamental rights are respected.
First, the necessity of an EU PNR scheme still has to be justified.  Precise argumentation and evidence are still lacking in that respect.   Further restrictions should also be made to ensure that the data processing is proportionate to the purpose pursued, in particular considering that the report now includes intra-EU flights in the data processing. Therefore, it is recommended that the data collection is limited with reference to specific criteria in order for the scheme to guarantee respect for individuals’ fundamental rights and to take the CJUE data retention judgment into account.  Besides this, the scope of the offences concerned should be further reduced and the retention period shortened and clearly justified.
In addition, a major error in the new Articles 10a and 12(1b) stemming from an apparent misunderstanding of the data protection authority’s role must be rectified in order to set the responsibilities of governments and data controllers.
Finally, the WP29 insists on the necessity to present as soon as possible a detailed evaluation of the efficiency of the PNR scheme. A sunset clause should also be inserted into the directive to assist in ensuring periodic review of the necessity of the system.

All these points will be developed in an appendix of this letter, as well as concrete modifications and improvements proposed to the text by the Working Party. I would be grateful if you would be so kind as to forward this letter to the members of your committee in order for them to take account of these views before the deadline for further amendments to the proposal. Naturally, the Working Party remains at your disposal for any clarification you would require and further input during the discussion on EU PNR.

Yours sincerely,
On behalf of the Article 29 Working Party,
Isabelle FALQUE-PIERROTIN Chairwoman

Appendix :
Demonstrating the necessity and ensuring the proportionality of the EU PNR scheme
Continue reading “Another episode of the EU PNR saga: remarks of the national data protection authorities”