Category: 1. EU and MS legal Order and Institutional framework

Police et justice à l’échelle de l’Union européenne, du désamour au divorce ? La Sécurité intérieure européenne contre l’Espace pénal européen

par Pierre Berthelet (*)

La police et la justice se portent un « amour réciproque » affirme le Professeur Labayle non sans ironie. Il suffit de se rappeler les relations parfois tendues entre les forces de sécurité intérieure d’un côté, et l’autorité judiciaire de l’autre. Il suffit aussi de se remémorer les relations de temps à autre houleuses entre le ministre de l’Intérieur et le Garde des Sceaux, et ce, quelle que soit d’ailleurs la couleur politique du gouvernement.

Même si la rivalité police-justice demeure une question toujours délicate à évoquer, elle est somme toute assez banale en France et dans bon nombre d’États membres de l’Union. Un élément reste néanmoins remarquable, ayant trait, en l’occurrence, à un déplacement à l’échelle européenne de cet affrontement existant au niveau national.

D’emblée, le déplacement de la problématique des rapports difficiles entre la police et la justice à l’échelon de l’Union peut sembler surprenant en raison du fait qu’il n’existe pas d’autorité judiciaire pénale européenne, du moins avant la création d’un Parquet européen dont les statuts sont encore actuellement en négociation.

Il n’y a pas non plus de police européenne. L’office européen de police, Europol, ne possède pas de pouvoirs coercitifs et le traité de Lisbonne de 2007 l’a clairement précisé, enterrant, s’il en est, les derniers espoirs d’un FBI européen.

Ensuite, les questions relatives aux rapports entre la police et la justice ont été abordées au niveau européen sous l’angle de la coopération. En effet, les États souverains ont accepté de mettre en commun certaines de leurs compétences dans ce domaine. Néanmoins, étant donné la sensibilité des matières évoquées (liées intimement aux prérogatives régaliennes du droit de punir et du droit de protéger), ils ont consenti uniquement à la création de mécanismes destinés à faciliter l’entraide entre services policiers d’États différents, de même qu’entre autorités judiciaires.

Pour ces deux raisons, un affrontement police-justice peut paraître en décalage avec le regard porté sur l’Union européenne en tant que projet politique et sur son action dans le domaine des politiques pénales et de sécurité. Elle l’est d’autant plus que police et justice cohabitent sous le même toit, c’est-à-dire dans le cadre d’un même projet, à savoir l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice (ELSJ) qui, comme son nom l’indique, associe étroitement la sécurité à la liberté et à la justice.

Reste que depuis la création de la « justice et affaires intérieures » (JAI) par le traité de Maastricht de 1992 et l’instauration de cet ELSJ par le traité d’Amsterdam de 1997, beaucoup d’eau a coulé. En premier lieu, le cadre institutionnel a changé et même fondamentalement.

Le traité de Lisbonne a substitué la méthode communautaire à la méthode intergouvernementale. L’ELSJ relève, à présent, du mécanisme de procédure législative ordinaire : le Parlement européen est co-législateur avec le Conseil de l’UE et la Commission européenne dispose d’un quasi-monopole d’initiative législative, tandis que la Cour de justice de Luxembourg peut statuer pleinement sur les actes adoptés.

En deuxième lieu, et ce point mérite d’être souligné, police et justice ont noué des rapports de concurrence depuis le début. La JAI était déjà marquée par des tensions entre les avancées de la coopération policière et les retards de la coopération judiciaire.

La création d’Europol en 1995 a été l’un des éléments justifiant, à côté du souci de ne laisser aucune zone d’impunité aux délinquants au sein du territoire européen, la création d’Eurojust en 2002. Cependant, cette compétition prenait les atours d’une émulation : l’intégration en matière policière s’accompagnait d’une intégration dans le domaine judiciaire.

À l’heure actuelle, la situation est différente. La concurrence se transforme en rivalité et l’émulation en séparation. En effet, l’action de l’Union européenne en matière policière et judiciaire s’organise autour de deux projets distincts : l’Espace pénal européen et la Sécurité intérieure européenne. L’objectif de cette contribution est de montrer que le développement de ces deux projets n’est pas complémentaire et que ceux-ci sont sous-tendus par des logiques distinctes, promus par des communautés rivales, chacune essayant d’imposer ses conceptions à l’autre concernant le rapport liberté/sécurité.

Deux projets différents

Prenant le relais de la Justice et des Affaires intérieures (JAI), l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice (ELSJ) connecte étroitement diverses problématiques : lutte contre le terrorisme et les formes graves de la criminalité (criminalité organisée, blanchiment, drogue, corruption, traite des êtres humains, etc.), gestion des migrations et des frontières de l’UE, entraide policière et judiciaire civile et pénale.

Cet espace a constitué le terreau sur lequel sont nés plusieurs projets dont le degré de maturation est variable, notamment l’Espace pénal européen et la Sécurité intérieure européenne, chacun d’eux étant mu par des logiques distinctes, l’un tendant à accorder une place de plus en plus prioritaire à la « liberté », alors que l’autre offre clairement une place prééminente à la « sécurité ».

L’Espace pénal européen est bien connu des pénalistes et même au-delà. Il dérive des travaux menés en matière de collaboration judiciaire européenne, initiés dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Europe et prolongés dans celui l’Union européenne à partir du traité de Masstricht. Les actions menées par l’Union consistent à améliorer les dispositifs d’entraide entre les autorités judiciaires nationales. L’objectif de cet Espace pénal européen vise, à travers différents mécanismes, tels que la reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires nationales et le rapprochement des législations pénales des États membres, à faire émerger une solidarité judiciaire à l’échelle européenne.

Au-delà de l’idée d’un renforcement de l’arsenal pénal destiné à mieux lutter contre la criminalité et à faire en sorte que les frontières entre États membres ne soient plus un obstacle pour les autorités judiciaires des différents pays, le projet d’Espace pénal revêt un caractère politique au sens où il s’agit d’un projet d’intégration tendant vers l’émergence d’une justice pénale européenne. Les projets menés, dont le plus emblématique est, sans nul doute le mandat d’arrêt européen, ont pour but de conférer aux autorités judiciaires nationales un sentiment d’appartenance à un ensemble supranational. L’Espace pénal européen a une dimension à la fois juridique (à travers divers outils mis en place pour lutter contre la criminalité transnationale) et symbolique (en référence à l’adhésion aux valeurs communes, en premier lieu la justice entendue comme un idéal).

La Sécurité intérieure européenne est, quant à elle, plus récente. Mentionnée ponctuellement dans les textes adoptés dans la foulée des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, elle émerge formellement seulement quelques années plus tard. Envisagée par le programme de Stockholm, en tant que document directeur de l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice pour la période 2009-2014, elle repose sur un document que le Conseil de l’UE a approuvé les 25 et 26 février 2010. Il s’agit en l’occurrence de la stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure qui énonce les menaces et les risques pesant sur l’Union et ses États membres.

Cette stratégie détermine les orientations d’une action européenne dans le domaine de la sécurité intérieure et structure la réponse à donner. Elle est un document politique préconisant une approche transversale et intégrée. Il s’agit d’apporter une réponse qui dépasse les politiques de l’UE existantes. À côté de cette dimension intersectorielle, la stratégie entend également transcender les clivages culturels et/ou nationaux. Il est question de mettre en commun les connaissances et les savoir-faire d’acteurs émanant d’horizons différents. Elle vise donc à inclure les organismes publics et privés, à caractère lucratif ou non, de même que les organisations non gouvernementales. Enfin, la stratégie entend développer une approche fondée sur l’information, et ce, sur un mode proactif, le but étant d’intervenir de manière précoce à l’encontre des menaces et des risques identifiés.

La Commission européenne a réalisé, à plusieurs reprises, un bilan de l’action menée. Dans tous les cas de figure, elle a considéré que les avancées étaient conséquentes et que la Sécurité intérieure européenne prenait forme.

Des projets aux logiques distinctes

La stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure est fondée essentiellement sur l’idée d’un monde dangereux, l’objectif étant de mieux protéger l’Union et ses citoyens, et de préserver plus efficacement ses États membres vis-à-vis de menaces évolutives dans une Europe en pleine mutation. Les préoccupations sont donc de parer les menaces et de faire face aux risques en évitant que des attaques ou des catastrophes surviennent et, lorsque celles-ci ont lieu, de gérer les conséquences.

L’Espace pénal européen repose sur une logique différente. Historiquement, le droit pénal européen tire sa légitimité de cette conception « épée » (sur cette image, voir les travaux d’Anne Weyembergh), de nombreux instruments ayant été adoptés en ce sens au cours des années 1990 et 2000. Les rapports entre répression et droits de l’homme sont incarnés par deux images, d’un côté, le glaive de la justice, figurant l’imperium et la sévérité de la réponse pénale à l’égard des auteurs d’infraction, et de l’autre côté, le bouclier, représentant une justice faisant preuve de modération dans la fixation des peines, se montrant proportionnée dans la détermination du quantum de la santion au regard de la gravité des actes, et surtout protectrice des droits dont jouissent ces mêmes auteurs dans la procédure pénale.

Répression et protection sont en tension, mais dans un État de droit, le souci d’une sanction efficace est toujours contrebalancé par une volonté de respecter les règles définissant avec minutie le cadre procédural à respecter et octroyant un ensemble de droits à la personne mise en cause.

Cela étant dit, les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont accentué la dimension répressive du droit pénal. Le mandat d’arrêt européen, dont le projet a été approuvé dans le sillage des attaques, est une illustration du phénomène selon lequel, selon la formule de Thierry Balzacq, la « sécurité » a conquis la « justice ».

Néanmoins, un mouvement inverse s’est opéré en réaction aux mesures sécuritaires prises après les attaques de New York. En germe avec l’adoption de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux proclamée au cours du Conseil européen de Nice, le 7 décembre 2000, ce mouvement s’est développé au cours des années 2000 et il s’est prolongé au début des années 2010. Une mobilisation des pénalistes a eu lieu à compter de l’adoption de ces mesures sécuritaires, manifestant une critique des effets d’une vision trop répressive jugée néfaste à la préservation des libertés. Elle résulte aussi de la prise de conscience, avec l’adoption du texte instituant le mandat d’arrêt européen en 2002, de l’impact du droit pénal européen sur le droit national.

Une opposition autour de deux communautés sectorielles

Sécurité intérieure européenne et Espace pénal européen associent chacun des acteurs aux origines multiples. Le projet de Sécurité intérieure européenne permet, à travers la dimension « sécurité » de l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice, d’associer les services nationaux variés allant des services de renseignement aux gardes-frontières en passant par la police judiciaire, cette dernière étant amenée progressivement à modifier ses techniques d’enquête, au nom de la lutte contre la menace dans une « Europe des insécurités », autour d’une approche davantage proactive.

Le projet d’Espace pénal européen contribue, quant à lui, à mettre à l’agenda la protection des droits fondamentaux. Il rassemble les acteurs mettant l’accent sur la dimension « liberté » et « justice » de l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice.

Les communautés sectorielles promouvant respectivement la Sécurité intérieure européenne et l’Espace pénal européen se caractérisent par leur forte hétérogénéité.

Il y a d’un côté des magistrats, certains universitaires, notamment des pénalistes favorables à la sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux, des hauts fonctionnaires nationaux et des membes des cabinets de la Justice, la direction générale « Justice » (DG Justice) pour la Commission européenne, des ONG défendant les droits de l’Homme, dans une certaine limite la commission des libertés civiles du Parlement européen (LIBE), le Contrôleur européen à la protection des données soucieux de préserver les citoyens européens de toute atteinte à la vie privée, la Cour de justice de l’Union (CJUE), gardienne de l’État de droit et garante du respect du droit de l’Union européenne, en particulier les dispositions de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux, et l’Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (FRA) dont la mission est de protéger à l’échelle de l’Union, aux côtés de la Cour de justice, les libertés des citoyens européens.

Il y a de l’autre, les « sécuritaires », à savoir les services de sécurité des États membres (services de renseignement, garde-frontières, police, douane), des hauts fonctionnaires nationaux et des membres du cabinet de l’Intérieur, la direction générale « Affaires intérieures » (DG HOME) pour la Commission européenne, les agences de sécurité (Europol et Frontex) et le secteur privé (en particulier l’industrie de la sécurité et notamment, les entreprises spécialisées dans le data mining, de même que les sociétés productrices de nouvelles technologies de surveillance des frontières).

Sécurité versus liberté et justice

Les divergences de vues entre les partisans de la Sécurité intérieure européenne et ceux de l’Espace pénal européen constituent une opposition de principe sur les rapports entre la liberté et la sécurité. Elle procède de l’affrontement d’acteurs aux cultures professionnelles distinctes, aux logiques d’action différentes et aux conceptions divergentes, voire antagonistes.

Il existe d’un côté, la conception des participants à l’élaboration de l’Espace pénal européen auquel appartiennent les magistrats, du moins ceux qui se considèrent comme protecteurs des droits fondamentaux et comme gardiens de l’État de droit, et pour qui l’entraide policière doit s’intégrer dans le projet d’Espace pénal européen. Cet espace doit déboucher à long terme, sur l’édification d’une justice pénale européenne organisée autour d’un parquet européen, et reposant sur un ensemble juridique composé de normes pénales européennes harmonisées. L’intervention de l’Union préconisée par les partisans de l’Espace pénal européen repose sur un ensemble de principes d’action tels qu’« il faut lutter contre la criminalité dans le respect des garanties offertes aux mis en cause », « la sécurité ne doit pas constituer une atteinte excessive aux libertés fondamentales », « l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice est un espace de droit ».

Il existe de l’autre côté, les acteurs appartenant à la Sécurité intérieure européenne estimant peu ou prou que l’entraide policière s’intègre dans un vaste ensemble organisé autour de la lutte contre les diverses formes d’insécurité identifiées. Cet ensemble se développe autour de principes d’action tels que « la manière de faire la sécurité doit se renouveler face à l’hybridation des menaces transnationales », « la réponse doit être globale à l’égard d’un monde de plus en plus mondialisé où les différentes formes de criminalité sont interconnectées », avec, en toile de fond, la nécessité de protéger l’Union vis-à-vis d’un ensemble de menaces et de risques : les réseaux de passeurs de clandestins, les trafiquants de drogue, les organisations criminelles venant notamment de Russie et des Balkans occidentaux, certaines formes particulières de radicalisation et de terrorisme comme les « loups solitaires ». Il s’agit aussi de se doter des moyens permettant de dépister de manière précoce le crime, devenu une question stratégique au même titre que le terrorisme ou la cybermenace, et ce, à partir de techniques permettant de travailler en amont des réalités criminelles. Il est question également d’améliorer le cycle de gestion de catastrophes en renforçant la collaboration entre États membres et en optimisant les différentes phases du cycle à travers des processus plus élaborés, par exemple dans le domaine de la protection des infrastructures critiques.

L’absence d’opposition rigide et monolithique

Les acteurs des communautés sectorielles s’affrontent par projets spécifiques. Néanmoins, l’opposition entre deux pôles antagonistes est en recomposition constante. Il n’y a pas en effet deux blocs figés et homogènes. Ainsi, le pôle des « sécuritaires » est loin de former un tout cohérent. L’élaboration de la Sécurité intérieure européenne est un enjeu entre participants, qu’il s’agisse des agences européennes, des États membres par l’entremise des représentants des cabinets ministériels, des hauts fonctionnaires nationaux et des services de police, de douane, de renseignement ou de surveillance des frontières, ou encore des entreprises privées désireuses de nourrir un marché européen de la sécurité en pleine croissance.

Quant aux promoteurs de la protection des libertés, tous ne sont pas sur la même ligne. Si les pénalistes sont soucieux de la préservation des garanties procédurales lors du procès pénal, le Contrôleur européen à la protection des données est plus attaché à la défense de la vie privée contre diverses formes d’atteintes, et ce, indépendamment de la dimension pénale de celles-ci.

De leur côté, les hauts fonctionnaires et les membres de cabinets de la Justice des États membres ont une sensibilité diverse concernant l’amplitude de la protection des libertés à accorder, liée notamment aux différences culturelles, en particulier selon que leur tradition juridique s’inscrit dans le champ de la Common law ou de la Civil law.

Le Parlement européen est, de son côté, préoccupé par la défense des droits fondamentaux, mais également par ses prérogatives de colégislateur, et il arrive qu’il doive arbitrer entre ces deux types de préoccupation, parfois au détriment de la sauvegarde des libertés. Quant à la Cour de justice de l’Union de Luxembourg, elle doit parvenir à s’imposer dans un domaine, la sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux, dans lequel la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme de Strasbourg a dégagé une jurisprudence abondante depuis des décennies, notamment concernant les garanties procédurales.

(*) Cet article est une version allégée et simplifiée de l’article publié dans les Cahiers de la sécurité et de justice, n° 31, 2015, pp 39-49. Voir aussi alias securiteinterieure.fr

The Paris Terrorist Attacks : Failure of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?

Original published on the CDRE site on 8 JANVIER 2016

by P. de Bruycker et D. Watt (Odysseus Omnia), H. Labayle (CDRE), A. Weyembergh et C. Brière (Eclan)

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on Friday 13th November, the French President declared a state of emergency and announced the introduction of a number of measures to “mobilise all possible forces in order to neutralise the terrorists and to guarantee the security of all the areas which could be concerned”. These measures included the reintroduction of controls by France at its internal borders with other Schengen States in the interest of preventing both the entry into the territory of dangerous individuals seeking to carry out terrorist attacks, and to thwart the escape of the attackers.

Nonetheless, Salah Abdeslam, a suspect believed to be one of the masterminds of the attacks, managed to escape by crossing the border between France and Belgium during the night from Friday to Saturday without being apprehended and has still not been arrested since, despite significant effort on the part of the Belgian and French police forces. More surprising, although relatively ignored by the media is that he was checked by French police in the border region (around the city of Cambrai) but not apprehended. How can this have happened in the heart of the EU where border guards, police, judges and intelligence services use modern technology to trace such people?

Before putting the area of freedom, security and justice on trial – as some politicians have done – it is certainly important to objectively examine the manner in which the workings of this beast have been confronted by the reality of terrorism. Whether it has to do with controls carried out at borders (Section 1 of this article), or cooperation between national police forces (Section 2), it must be noted that the primary responsibility in this case does not rest with the mechanisms created by the European Union. In contrast, the failure to prevent the rather predictable attacks now creates the question of sharing intelligence between the competent national intelligence agencies, a matter which does not fall within the Union’s competences (Section 3).

1. The pending questions about border policy

Knowing what we know today about the Paris attacks and the background of the perpetrators, a distinction needs to be made between the matter of terrorists crossing internal and external borders of the Schengen Area.

a. The crossing of internal borders

The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) regulates the crossing of the borders of the concerned EU Member States. As outlined in an article by Evelien Brouwer on this blog, Schengen States can, on the basis of Article 23 of the SBC, temporarily reintroduce controls at their internal borders if there is clear justification on the grounds of a threat to public policy or internal security. The existence of such a threat is obviously not in question here.

Schengen States have certain instruments at their disposal to guarantee effective border management in the Schengen Area. The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a database for storing and sharing information about certain individuals who should not enter or travel within the Schengen Area. The second generation – “SIS II” – was established to include the new Member States after the 2004 enlargement by Regulation 1987/2006, which also sets out rules on its operation and use.

There are several reasons a person may be registered in the SIS. Firstly, alerts may be issued in order to refuse entry or stay to third-country nationals either because they are criminals or because their entry has been banned due to non-respect of the immigration rules (Article 24 of Regulation 1987/2006). Secondly, alerts may be issued in order to arrest third-country nationals or EU citizens on the basis of a European arrest warrant (EAW) or extradition. This type of alert applies to missing individuals, persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure, and for the purpose of discreet or specific checks (see Council Decision 2007/533).

As Salah Abdeslam is French and not a third-country national, he could not, by definition, be the object of an alert related to the immigration policy. When he was checked by the French police during the night of 13 to 14 November, he was not known to the French authorities apparently because, despite being French, he was living in Belgium. He was also not the object of an alert for the purpose of arrest as the EAW was only issued by Belgium after the attacks, on Sunday. He had however been signalled in the SIS by the Belgian authorities as a person to be the object of a “discreet or specific check”. Following Article 36 of Council Decision 2007/533, such an alert may be issued for the purposes of prosecuting criminal offences and for the prevention of threats to public security, “in particular where an overall assessment of a person, in particular on the basis of past criminal offences, gives reason to suppose that that person will also commit serious criminal offences in the future”.

Given the stated goals of the closure of French borders – to stop the escape of those who carried out the attacks – one might begin to question how it can be that the check conducted by the French police did not lead to the arrest of Salah Abdeslam. Even if he was not mentioned in the SIS for the purpose of arrest, a signal for a discreet or specific check should have attracted the attention of the police and could have lead to his arrest. One can rightly wonder what happened: was the information stored in the SIS not precise enough? In this case, did the French police use the SIRENE system to get more information from the Belgian authorities? If not, why? We are used to Schengen-bashing and recently to Belgium-bashing, could it be fair to say that this time there should be some France-bashing?

It would be interesting to get an answer to those questions in order to understand what was indeed the problem. In any case, even if there had been a problem with the SIS and not with the actions of the French Police, it is clear that such transnational criminality can only be addressed at the international level. In any case, the answer lies perhaps in a better SIS or a better use of the SIS by Member States. The answer is certainly not less Schengen.

b. The crossing of external borders

The attacks in Paris have brought a significant amount of attention to the issue of border controls, in particular since it has been confirmed that at least one of the terrorists, holding a Syrian passport, entered the EU through Greece via a route used by refugees. It is also suggested that the Paris attackers, themselves EU citizens, had left the EU to fight in Syria and returned to carry out the attacks in Paris, and that one of them, Salah Abdeslam, could even have managed to flee to Syria after the attacks. This is the phenomenon of so-called “Foreign Fighters”: EU citizens who become radicalised and leave their home in the EU to join the war in Syria before returning to Europe. The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, has been warning Member States for many months about the need for strong action to be taken in this area, though his warnings have not been heeded. The main concern here is that such individuals are extremely difficult to detect, including when they enter or leave the Schengen Area by crossing its external borders.

The Schengen Borders Code provides in Article 7(2) that European citizens and other people enjoying the right to free movement in the EU, such as the family members of these groups, who cross the Schengen external border shall only be subject to minimum checks. This concerns the travel documents presented by those persons at the external border, such as an identity card or passport. On the contrary, third-country nationals are subject to thorough checks following Article 7(3) that foresees under point (a)(vi) “the direct consultation of the data and alerts on persons and, where necessary, objects included in the SIS and in national data files”. Such checks are sometimes described as being about persons instead of about documents.

Although Border Guards may consult relevant databases such as the SIS to ensure, among other things, that European citizens crossing the external borders do not represent a serious threat to internal security, a systematic consultation of these databases is not permitted. The EU and  its Member States have been struggling with this prohibition of systematic checks of persons for some years now. It is clear that absolutely all EU citizens cannot be checked against databases at one crossing point of the external borders as this would directly contravene this provision. The Commission considers that this does not prevent conducting systematic checks of persons selected on the basis of a risk assessment, for instance some category of persons embarking on flights going to or coming from the vicinity of a conflict zone. TheHandbook for Border Guards was modified on 15 June 2015 to include that interpretation.

Nonetheless, Member States in the Council have been calling for the revision of the SBC regarding the systematic consultation of databases for persons enjoying free movement since the beginning of the year, motivated in large part by the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015. The concerns about the threat of foreign fighters crossing back into the EU undetected are also the basis for a list of Common Risk Indicators (CRI’s), which has been drawn up by the Commission. However, it appears that these confidential CRI’s are too general and too vague in nature, leading to their ineffective implementation by Border Guards. Indeed, a Council document from 5 October from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator explains that “challenges remain in the proper implementation of CRI’s at the external border”. No doubt the ineffectiveness of CRI’s is a contributing factor to the Council’s renewed call for revision of the SBC, as expressed by the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs on 20 November. Meeting in the wake of the Paris attacks, the Council stated that Member States shall “undertake to implement immediately the necessary systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, including on individuals enjoying the right of free movement”.

One can hardly deny that such checks can be necessary, in particular at the external borders of some areas that foreign fighters are believed to cross more often than others. The current provision of the Schengen Borders Code seems inappropriate by forbidding systematic checks and this explains why the European Commission finally decided on 15 December 2015 to present a proposal to amend Article 7 of the SBC that will, once adopted, not only allow but oblige border guards to verify that an EU citizen is not “considered to be a threat to the internal security, public policy, international relations of any of the Member States or to public health, including by consulting the relevant Union and national databases, in particular the SIS”.

Does this contravene the freedom of movement that EU citizens enjoy on the basis of the EU treaties? The answer seems at first look negative, because freedom of movement concerns a priorimovement within the borders of the European Union and not the crossing of its external borders. Nevertheless, Directive 2004/38 implementing freedom of movement also contains provisions recognising the right of EU citizens to enter and to leave the territory of the Member States that could be considered part of the freedom of movement. Article 4 on the right of exit and Article 5 of the right of entry exist “without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls”. If this provision, interpreted narrowly, does not explicitly cover the consultation of databases, one should not forget that Article 27 of the same Directive allows Member States to restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. There is no doubt that the consultation of databases for security purposes like the SIS falls under the exception of public security. The conclusion is that the Commission proposal is in line with freedom of movement enjoyed by EU citizens.

Even if one may consider that a proposal to modify Article 7 of the SBC could have been presented earlier by the Commission without wasting time to discuss its possible interpretation with Member States, the Schengen acquis will be clarified to allow the systematic control of the movement of foreign fighters at the external borders of the EU. The sooner the better, so that the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament must now prove that when necessary, they can amend existing EU rules in a period of time comparable to that within which Member States with a Parliament made of two chambers can operate.

2. The effectiveness of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters after the attacks

The Paris attacks and their subsequent developments, such as the flight of the suspected terrorist, Salah Abdeslam, to Belgium by car, trigger the application of mechanisms of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. These mechanisms have been extensively developed since the mid-1990’s, and particularly after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. Today a vast array of instruments, actors and databases are at the disposal of national authorities in charge of investigating and prosecuting terrorism. The anti-EU discourse that followed the attacks, which so often focusses on inaction during grave events, should have been balanced by an analysis of what happened in reality.

In the field of police cooperation, the importance of Europol should be underlined, both in terms of exchange and analysis of information and in terms of support for operational actions. The adoption of the compromise text on the Commission’s original proposal for a Europol Regulation, which was approved by the Council on 4 December 2015, should contribute to the improvement of cross-border police cooperation, as it should increase the agency’s capacity to act as “a hub for information exchange between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States”. One “Focal Point Travellers » has especially been set up in 2014, in which “foreign fighters” are recorded, even though it is for the Member States to make the focal point a reality by providing the content. The so-called 2008 “Prüm Decision” should be mentioned here as well. It aims particularly at mandating the exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data (VRD) amongst the Member States.

In terms of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Christiane Taubira, French Minister for Justice, insisted after the JHA Council of 20 November 2015, that we do have instruments to address this type of crime and they have worked well for the cooperation with the Member States affected by the investigations.

On the morning following the attacks, requests for mutual assistance in judicial matters were issued and sent to Belgium and Germany. They were addressed very quickly on the basis of the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union.

Among the other instruments specific to the EU legal order which have been used in this context, theFramework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is to be mentioned. Adopted in the aftermath of 9/11, the EAW, which is considered the “success story” of the EU area for criminal justice, organises faster and simplified surrender procedures, directly conducted by judicial authorities, without political involvement and with a limited number of grounds for refusal. One or more EAWs have been issued since the Paris attacks against suspects, which implies that competent law enforcement authorities located on the EU territory have the duty to arrest them. On the request of the issuing judicial authority, the issuance of an EAW can be coupled with its transmission via an alert in the Schengen Information System and/or in the Interpol database.

The European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), based on a 2009 Council Decision, which is to be read with the Framework Decision on the organisation and the content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States, has also been mobilised and proved its added value for the collection of information on the past convictions of the terrorist suspects. Operational since 2012, this system couples the principle of centralising convictions in the criminal records of the Member State of nationality with an interconnection of the criminal records of the Member States, enabling electronic exchange of standardised information.

Finally, joint investigation teams (JITs), belonging both to police cooperation and judicial cooperation, have a clear added-value. A JIT has been set up between France and Belgium, for which the Ministries of Justice of each country gave their agreement on 16 November. The setting up of a JIT allows the constitution of a team consisting of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement authorities, established for a fixed period and a specific purpose, to carry out criminal investigations in one or more of the involved States. One of the advantages of such JITs is the exchange of information and evidence obtained, without having to go through requests for mutual legal assistance.

Despite these positive elements, cooperation between authorities of the EU Member States can still be improved:

  • Firstly, some of the abovementioned instruments, such as the 2008 Prüm Decision or the JITs Framework Decision, have not or have not correctly been transposed by Member States. The importance of correct implementation at the national level has been frequently underlined, for instance by the European Council Strategic Guidelines of June 2014 and by the conclusions of the JHA Council of 20 November. In this respect the end of the transitional period on the 1st December 2014 should push the recalcitrant Member States to conform with EU law as they may be subject to enforcement proceedings for non implementation of acts adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
  • Secondly, some difficulties are also being witnessed at the level of implementation in practice. There is, for instance, a considerable shortfall between, on the one hand, the information available at national level and, on the other hand, the information transmitted to and shared with the competent authorities of other Member States. Besides, the information transmitted to Europol is not always sufficient, hampering the completion of its mandate. In this context, on 20 November 2015, the JHA Council announced the establishment of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) on 1 January 2016, which is envisaged as a platform by which Member States can increase information sharing and operational cooperation with regard to the monitoring and investigation of foreign terrorist fighters, the trafficking of illegal firearms and terrorist financing. A similar centre, the EC3, was set up a few years ago in the field of cybercrime, and it has proven to be a useful tool. The utility of the ECTC will largely depend upon the willingness of Member States to share their information, which has been insufficient to date, as shown by the example of the “Focal Point Travellers” of Europol about foreign fighters following a discussion paper of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.
  • Thirdly, some of the abovementioned instruments suffer from certain limits. ECRIS works efficiently only with regard to EU citizens. Concerning third country nationals, it is still necessary to consult all Member States’ criminal records to know about their past convictions. For years, the possibility of establishing a European index for convicted third country nationals has been discussed. In its conclusions of 20 November, the JHA Council welcomed the intention of the Commission to submit an ambitious proposal for the extension of ECRIS to cover third country nationals by January 2016.
  • Finally, further new legislative measures should be proposed shortly, for instance in the field of the approximation of substantive criminal law, particularly the criminalisation of terrorist offences. Indeed, according to the Council conclusions of 20 November, the Commission should present a proposal for a directive updating the 2002 and 2008 Framework Decisions on Combating Terrorism . This revision will implement in EU law the UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) and the additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Foreign Terrorist Fighters. This will especially aim to oblige Member States to criminalise offences linked to travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism.

In conclusion, the recent tragic terrorist attacks have shown that national police and judicial authorities are aware of the tools at their disposal in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. They do not hesitate to rely on them. However there is still room for improvement. The transnational elements of the recent attacks clearly illustrate the need for cross-border cooperation in the criminal field. Member States should realise that the solution encompasses more cooperation and that reflexes of national sovereignty are vain and detrimental to the identification and prosecution of terrorist suspects. In such a move forward, the EU must ensure the right balance between the different interests at stake and not sacrifice fundamental rights at the altar of security as underlined by Stefan Braum in a recent paper published on the blog of the GDR/ELSJ.

3. The failure of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of intelligence

In the days following the attacks, criticisms were voiced against the deficiencies in the cooperation between national intelligence services. It was for instance reported that the Belgian services had information about the danger represented by the Abdeslam brothers, but never shared this information with their French colleagues.

It is important to make a preliminary remark distinguishing cooperation in the field of police information on the one hand and intelligence in the sense of renseignements in French on the other hand.

Whereas police information sharing is subject to EU legislation, adopted under the EU competences in police cooperation in criminal matters, as described above, intelligence sharing does not fall within the EU competences, and the EU is prevented from taking any action in this regard. In the current legal framework, in force since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, no less than three provisions insist on the lack of competence for the EU in matters of national security. Article 4(2) TEU provides that the EU shall respect the essential State functions of its Member States, including safeguarding national security. InArticles 72 and 73 TFEU, it is stated that the Title of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the safeguarding of internal security, and it is open to the Member States to organise between themselves and upon their responsibility such form of cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent departments of their administration responsible for safeguarding national security. In other words, cooperation between national intelligence services in charge of safeguarding national security is left in the hands of the Member States, and is thus conducted on an intergovernmental basis.

As a consequence, blaming the EU for the lack of intelligence sharing between France and Belgium is an unjustified criticism. The idea of creating a European Intelligence Agency has been mentioned by some observers but was promptly rejected on Friday 20 November by the JHA Council, as it appears to be outside of the scope of EU competences in the current state of the EU treaties. Moving forward in this field in the institutional framework of the EU would clearly imply a revision of the treaties. The feasibility of such revision is of course questionable because of its extremely high sensitivity in terms of national sovereignty. It shall indeed not be forgotten that intelligence is, by definition, extremely sensitive data, which national authorities may be reluctant to share, for instance in order to safeguard the safety of their informants. Furthermore, even cooperation within each Member State is sometimes problematic, as intelligence service might be reluctant to cooperate extensively with law enforcement, judicial or other authorities.

The absence of EU competences does not imply that there is a complete absence of European multilateralisation of cooperation in the field of the intelligence. In this regard, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) is to be mentioned. However, this centre has a limited mandate, which is to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative and to the EEAS, in the fields of security, defence and counter-terrorism. This agency is the successor of the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN), created to answer the need of timely and accurate intelligence analysis to support EU policymaking. Despite its title, this agency is not a European Intelligence Agency. It has no operational powers, nor powers in the field of cooperation between national intelligence services. Its core mandate consists of publishing intelligence assessments, reports and summaries, as well as threat assessments for EU personnel, on the basis of open sources and analytical reports transferred from national intelligence authorities. Another initiative to mention is the so-called ‘Club de Berne’, which is an intelligence-sharing forum between the intelligence services of the EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland, within which a counter-terrorism group was established in 2001. It works outside the EU institutional framework but entertains some relations with it, especially via the participation of the INTCEN.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the shock generated by the Paris attacks should push the EU and its Members to engage in a much deeper reflection than their many working meetings have provoked. They must reflect firstly on the criminal motivations which led EU citizens, both French and Belgian, to commit such abominations. To stubbornly insist to the public that these criminals were not the product of our own societies is a grave error which prevents us from considering the causes and therefore inhibits us from conceiving of the appropriate response. They must further reflect on the multiple failures and responsibilities relating to the events in Paris. Rather than exploiting them to justify criticism of the EU, it should be realised that a more integrated and coordinated area of freedom and security is the only possible solution.

This is true on two conditions. The first condition is that there must be real responsibility in its administration, which is far from the case in current border management and intelligence sharing. The second condition is that, above all, there must be an agreement on the values which make up this area, in both the central role of the judicial institution and its fundamental guarantees.

Attentats terroristes de Paris : une défaillance de l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice ?

PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE (8 JANVIER 2016)

 par P. de Bruycker et D. Watt (Odysseus Omnia), H. Labayle (CDRE), A. Weyembergh et C. Brière (Eclan)

 

Les attaques terroristes du 13 novembre à Paris ont conduit le Président de la République française à déclarer l’état d’urgence et annoncer l’introduction de mesures visant à « mobiliser toutes les forces possibles afin de neutraliser les terroristes et de garantir la sécurité de tous les lieux qui pourraient être visés ». Parmi ces mesures figure la réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures avec les autres Etats de l’espace Schengen, dans le but de prévenir l’entrée sur le territoire d’individus dangereux qui cherchent à commettre des attaques terroristes ainsi que d’empêcher les assaillants de fuir.

Néanmoins, Salah Abdeslam, le cerveau présumé des attaques, a réussi à s’enfuir en traversant la frontière entre la France et la Belgique dans la nuit du vendredi au samedi sans être appréhendé, et il n’a toujours pas été arrêté depuis, malgré les importants moyens déployés par les forces de police belges et françaises. Plus surprenant, bien que relativement ignoré par les médias, est le fait qu’il ait été contrôlé par la police française dans la région frontalière (près de la ville de Cambrai) sans être arrêté. Comment cela a-t-il pu se produire au cœur de l’UE où les garde-frontières, la police, les juges et les services de renseignement aidés par des moyens technologiques modernes suivent en permanence de tels individus ?

Avant, comme certains responsables politiques l’ont fait hâtivement, d’instruire le procès de l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice, sans doute est-il bon d’examiner objectivement les conditions dans lesquelles les rouages de cet espace ont été confrontés à la réalité du terrorisme. Qu’il s’agisse du contrôle opéré aux frontières (1) ou de la collaboration des polices (2), force est de constater que la première des responsabilités n’incombe pas ici aux mécanismes institués par l’Union européenne. En revanche, et la question ne relève pas des compétences de l’Union, l’échec à prévenir des attentats pourtant largement prévisibles pose désormais la question de l’échange des renseignements entre les services nationaux compétents (3) ?

1. Les questions en suspens au sujet de la politique des frontières

D’après ce que l’on sait aujourd’hui de la réalisation des attentats de Paris et des trajectoires de leurs auteurs, une distinction doit être faite entre le franchissement par les terroristes des frontières internes etexternes de l’espace Schengen.

a. le franchissement des frontières internes :

Le Code Frontières Schengen (CFS) règlemente le franchissement des frontières des Etats Membres concernés. Ainsi que l’a souligné Evelien Brouwer dans son article sur le blog Omnia, les Etats parties à l’espace Schengen peuvent, sur base de l’Article 23 du CFS, temporairement réintroduire des contrôles aux frontières internes s’il existe une justification claire sur base d’une menace pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure. L’existence d’une telle menace n’est évidemment pas contestable ici.

Les Etats de l’espace Schengen disposent d’un certain nombre d’instruments pour garantir une gestion efficace des frontières au sein de cet espace. Ainsi, le Système d’Information Schengen (SIS) est un fichier informatique utilisé pour enregistrer et partager l’information au sujet de certains individus qui ne devraient pas pouvoir entrer ou voyager au sein de l’espace Schengen. Sa deuxième génération – « SIS II » – a été mise en place pour inclure les nouveaux Etats Membres suite à l’élargissement de 2004 par le règlement 1987/2006 qui comporte également les règles relatives à son fonctionnement et son utilisation.

Une personne peut être fichée dans le SIS pour différentes raisons. Premièrement, un signalement peut être lancé afin d’empêcher l’entrée ou le séjour d’une personne ressortissante d’un pays tiers à l’UE qui a commis un crime ou qui a fait l’objet d’une interdiction d’entrée pour non-respect des règles en matière d’immigration (article 24 du Règlement 1987/2006). Deuxièmement, un signalement peut être lancé au sujet de ressortissants de pays tiers, mais aussi de citoyens européens, recherchés en vue d’une arrestation aux fins de remise sur base du mandat d’arrêt européen (MAE) ou aux fins d’extradition. Le SIS II contient également des signalements concernant des personnes disparues, des personnes recherchées dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire, ou des personnes aux fins de contrôle discret ou spécifique (voir décision 2007/533 du Conseil).

Salah Abdeslam étant Français et non un ressortissant de pays tiers, il ne pouvait pas, par définition, faire l’objet d’un signalement pour un motif lié à la politique migratoire. Lorsqu’il a été contrôlé pour la police française dans la nuit du 13 au 14 novembre, il n’était pas connu des autorités françaises apparemment parce que, bien que Français, il habitait en Belgique. Il ne faisait pas non plus l’objet d’un signalement en vue d’une arrestation car le MAE le concernant n’a été délivré par la Belgique qu’après les attaques, le dimanche. Il avait toutefois été signalé dans le SIS par les autorités belges comme étant une personne devant faire l’objet de contrôle « discret » ou spécifique. D’après l’Article 36 de la décision 2007/533 du Conseil précitée, un tel signalement peut être effectué pour la répression d’infractions pénales et pour la prévention de menaces pour la sécurité publique, notamment « lorsque l’appréciation globale portée sur une personne, en particulier sur la base des infractions pénales commises jusqu’alors, laisse supposer qu’elle commettra également à l’avenir des infractions pénales graves ».

Vu les objectifs énoncés pour justifier la fermeture des frontières françaises – mettre en échec la fuite des assaillants – on peut donc se demander pourquoi les contrôles effectués par la police française n’ont pas donné lieu à l’arrestation de Salah Abdeslam. Même s’il n’était pas mentionné dans le SIS en vue d’une arrestation, un signalement aux fins de contrôle discret ou spécifique aurait dû attirer l’attention de la police opérant le contrôle. On peut légitimement se demander ce qu’il s’est passé : l’information enregistrée dans le SIS n’était-elle pas suffisamment précise ? Dans ce cas, la police française a-t-elle utilisé le système SIRENE afin de recevoir plus d’informations de la part des autorités belges ? Si non, pourquoi ? Les reproches adressés généralement à la Belgique lors de ces tragiques épisodes, ne doivent-ils pas être partagés ?

Répondre à ces questions serait instructif afin de cerner le problème réel. Au delà, et même si cet échec est imputable au SIS et non aux agents nationaux, il est évident qu’une telle criminalité transnationale ne peut être réglée qu’au niveau international. Dans tous les cas, la réponse se trouve peut-être dans un SIS plus performant ou une meilleure utilisation du SIS par les Etats Membres. Elle n’est certainement pas pas le moins de Schengen évoqué ici et là.

b. le franchissement des frontières extérieures 

Les attaques de Paris ont attiré une part importante de l’attention sur la question des contrôles aux frontières extérieures, en particulier après la confirmation qu’au moins un des terroristes était entré sur le territoire de l’UE par la route utilisée par les réfugiés en utilisant un passeport syrien. On avance également que les assaillants, citoyens européens, ont pu quitter l’UE pour se battre en Syrie et revenir pour commettre les attaques de Paris. On craint même que l’un d’entre eux, Salah Abdeslam, ait réussi à s’enfuir en Syrie après les attaques. Il s’agit là du phénomène desdits « combattants étrangers » : des citoyens européens qui, après être devenus radicalisés, quittent leur maison en Europe pour aller se battre en Syrie avant de revenir. Depuis de longs mois, le coordinateur de la lutte contre le terrorisme, Gilles de Kerchove, alertait les Etats membres sur la nécessité d’une réaction vigoureuse, en vain. La préoccupation concrète, ici, est que ces individus sont extrêmement difficile à détecter lorsqu’ils entrent ou quittent l’espace Schengen.

Le Code Frontières Schengen prévoit dans son Article 7(2) que les citoyens européens, ainsi que toute personne jouissant du droit communautaire à la libre circulation, ne font l’objet que d’une vérification minimale lorsqu’ils franchissent les frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen. Cela vise les documents de voyage présentés par ces personnes aux frontières extérieures, carte d’identité ou passeport. Au contraire, les ressortissants de pays tiers sont sujets à des contrôles plus approfondis en vertu de l’Article 7(3) qui prévoit au point (a)(vi) « la consultation directe des données et des signalements relatifs aux personnes et, si nécessaire, aux objets intégrés dans le SIS et dans les fichiers de recherche nationaux ». De tels contrôles sont parfois décrits comme portant sur les personnes plutôt que les documents.

Bien que les garde-frontières puissent consulter les bases de données utiles, comme le SIS, afin de s’assurer, entre autres, que les citoyens européens qui franchissent les frontières extérieures ne représentent pas une menace sérieuse pour la sécurité intérieure, une consultation systématique de ces bases de données n’est pas permise.

Cette interdiction pose problème depuis quelques années à l’UE et aux Etats Membres. Selon la disposition en cause, il est évident que chaque citoyen européen ne peut pas être contrôlé lorsqu’il franchit les frontières extérieures de l’UE. D’après la Commission, cela n’empêche pas de mener des contrôles systématiques au sujet de certaines personnes sur base d’une évaluation des risques, par exemple des personnes embarquant sur un vol à destination ou en provenance d’une région proche d’un conflit. LeManuel à l’intention des garde-frontières a ainsi été modifié le 15 juin 2015 pour inclure cette dernière interprétation.

Néanmoins, depuis le début de l’année 2015 et après les attentats de Charlie Hebdo, les Etats Membres au sein du Conseil ont demandé à ce que le CFS soit révisé au sujet de la consultation systématique des bases de données pour les personnes jouissant de la liberté de circulation. Les inquiétudes au sujet de la menace que représentent les combattants étrangers de retour dans l’espace Schengen sans être détectés ont également donné lieu à l’établissement d’une liste d’Indicateurs du Risque Communs (IRC) par la Commission. Cependant, il apparaît que ces indicateurs confidentiels sont trop généraux et trop vagues. Ils ne sont dès lors pas mis en œuvre de manière efficace par les garde-frontières.

Le 5 octobre 2015, dans un document à destination du Conseil de l’UE, le coordinateur de l’UE pour la lutte contre le terrorisme expliquait ainsi qu’il reste des problèmes à régler en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre coordonnée des indicateurs de risque communs. Il fait peu de doute que l’inefficacité des IRC pousse le Conseil à réclamer la révision du CFS, ainsi que l’ont exprimé les Ministres du Conseil « Justice et Affaires Intérieures » le 20 novembre 2015. Se réunissant au lendemain des attaques de Paris, le Conseil a affirmé que les Etats Membres s’engageaient à « mettre immédiatement en œuvre les contrôles systématiques et coordonnés nécessaires aux frontières extérieures, y compris des personnes jouissant du droit à la libre circulation ».

Il n’est pas contestable que de tels contrôles soient nécessaires, notamment aux frontières extérieures par lesquelles les « combattants étrangers » sont susceptibles de passer plus souvent. Leur interdiction par le Code Frontières Schengen apparaît en définitive inapproprié et cela explique pourquoi la Commission européenne a finalement décidé de présenter le 15 décembre 2015 une proposition visant à modifier l’Article 7 du CFS, dont elle n’a d’ailleurs pas jugé utile de fournir encore la traduction en langue française près d’un mois après. Une fois adoptée, non seulement elle autorisera mais elle obligera les garde-frontières à vérifier qu’un citoyen européen n’est pas « considéré comme étant une menace pour la sécurité intérieure, l’ordre public, les relations internationales d’un Etat Membre ou pour la santé publique, y compris en consultant les bases de données européennes et nationales pertinentes, en particulier le SIS ».

Cela contrevient-il pour autant à la liberté de circulation dont jouissent les citoyens européens sur base des Traités européens ? A première vue, la réponse semble négative, car la liberté de circulation concerne a priori les mouvements au sein de l’Union européenne et non le franchissement de ses frontières extérieures. Néanmoins, la directive 2004/38 mettant en œuvre la liberté de circulation contient des dispositions qui reconnaissent aux citoyens européens le droit d’entrer et de quitter le territoire des Etats Membres. L’article 4 sur le droit de sortie et l’article 5 sur le droit d’entrée existent « sans préjudice des dispositions concernant les documents de voyage, applicables aux contrôles aux frontières nationales ». Si ces dispositions, interprétées restrictivement, ne couvrent pas explicitement la consultation des bases de données, il ne faut pas oublier que l’Article 27 de la même directive autorise les Etats Membres à restreindre la liberté de circulation et de séjour d’un citoyen de l’UE pour des raisons d’ordre public, de sécurité publique ou de santé publique. Il ne fait aucun doute que la consultation des bases de données pour des raisons de sécurité comme c’est le cas pour le SIS tombe sous l’exception de sécurité publique. En conclusion, la proposition de la Commission ne viole pas la liberté de circulation dont jouissent les citoyens européens.

Même si d’aucuns estiment que la proposition de la Commission aurait pu venir plus tôt, l’acquis de Schengen sera clarifié pour permettre le contrôle systématique des combattants étrangers aux frontières extérieures de l’UE. Au plus vite au mieux, ensuite le Conseil des Ministres et le Parlement européen devront prouver qu’ils peuvent modifier les règles européennes existantes quand cela est nécessaire et dans un laps de temps comparable à celui dans lequel les Etats Membres avec un Parlement bicaméral peuvent opérer.

2. L’efficacité de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale après les attaques

Les attaques de Paris et les événements qui ont suivis, telle que la fuite en Belgique du suspect Salah Abdeslam, ont déclenché la mise en oeuvre des mécanismes de coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale institués dans l’Union. Depuis le milieu des années 90 et en particulier depuis l’entrée en vigueur du Traité d’Amsterdam, ces mécanismes sont de plus en plus développés. Aujourd’hui, une série importante d’instruments, d’acteurs et de bases de données est à la disposition des autorités nationales en charge d’enquêter et de poursuivre les faits de terrorisme. Le discours europhobe qui a suivi les attentats aurait donc gagné à être équilibré par un examen de ce qui s’est réellement passé, bien loin des blocages que la gravité de tels évènements conduit parfois à constater au sein des Etats. Là encore les constats de Gilles de Kerchove à l’adresse du Conseil, opérés au lendemain des attentats, sont sans appel. Ils témoignent de la large inutilisation des outils à disposition.

En termes de coopération policière, l’importance d’Europol doit être soulignée, à la fois en termes d’échange et d’analyse d’informations et en termes de support opérationnel. L’approbation par le Conseil, le 4 décembre 2015, d’un texte de compromis sur un projet de règlement relatif à Europol émanant de la Commission devrait contribuer à améliorer la coopération policière entre Etats car Europol devrait avoir plus de moyens pour agir comme « le centre névralgique de l’échange d’informations entre les services répressifs des États membres ». Un « point de contact voyageurs » (focal point travellers) a spécialement été créé en 2014, dans lequel les combattants étrangers sont enregistrés, même s’il appartient aux Etats membres de lui donner une réalité concrète en l’alimentant. La dite « décision Prüm » doit également être mentionnée ici. Elle vise particulièrement à rendre obligatoire l’échange entre Etats membres de données relatives à l’ADN, l’empreinte digitale et l’immatriculation des voitures.

En termes de coopération judiciaire en matière pénale, Christiane Taubira, la garde des Sceaux française, a réaffirmé, suite à la réunion du Conseil Justice et Affaires Intérieures du 20 novembre 2015, que nous disposions des instruments nécessaires pour faire face aux crimes de terrorisme et que ces instruments ont bien fonctionnés en ce qui concerne la coopération entre les Etats membres impliqués dans l’enquête.

Au lendemain des attaques, une demande d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale a été envoyée à la Belgique et à l’Allemagne. Ces demandes ont été envoyées très rapidement sur base de la convention de 2000 relative à l’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale entre les États membres de l’Union européenne.

Parmi les autres instruments spécifiques à l’ordre juridique européen et qui ont été utilisés dans ce contexte, la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI relative au mandat d’arrêt européen (MAE) doit être mentionnée. Adoptée suite aux événements du 11 septembre 2001, le MAE, qui est considéré comme étant la « success story » de l’espace pénal européen, met en place des procédures de remise simplifiées et plus rapides, directement entre autorités judiciaires, sans implications politiques et avec un nombre limité de motifs de non-exécution. Au moins un MAE a été délivré depuis les attaques de Paris ce qui implique que les autorités policières et judiciaires compétentes des Etats membres ont l’obligation d’arrêter les personnes visées. Sur requête de l’autorité judiciaire qui délivre un MAE, ce dernier peut être accompagné par un signalement dans le Système d’Information Schengen (SIS) et/ou dans la base de données Interpol.

Le système européen d’information sur les casiers judiciaires (ECRIS), basé sur une décision du Conseil de 2009 et qui doit être lue en combinaison avec la décision-cadre concernant l’organisation et le contenu des échanges d’informations extraites du casier judiciaire entre les Etats membres, a aussi été mobilisé et les informations contenues au sujet des condamnations passées des suspects ont démontré la valeur ajoutée de ce système. Opérationnel depuis 2012, ce système combine la centralisation des condamnations dans les archives pénales de chaque Etat membre et l’interconnexion de ces archives, permettant l’échange électronique d’informations standardisées.

Enfin, les équipes communes d’enquêtes (ECE), faisant partie à la fois de la coopération policière et de la coopération judiciaire, ont une valeur ajoutée évidente. En l’espèce, une ECE a été créée immédiatement entre la France et la Belgique, pour laquelle les Ministres de la Justice des deux pays ont donné leur accord le 16 novembre. Cette création a permis la constitution d’une équipe composée de juges, de procureurs et d’autorités policières pour une durée déterminée et pour un objectif défini, à savoir mener des enquêtes pénales dans chacun des pays concernés. Un des avantages de ces ECE est l’échange d’informations et des preuves obtenues, sans devoir faire une demande d’entraide judiciaire.

Malgré ces éléments positifs, la coopération entre les autorités nationales doit encore être améliorée :

  • premièrement, certains des instruments décrits ci-dessus, telle que la décision Prüm de 2008 ou la décision-cadre relative aux ECE, n’ont pas du tout ou pas correctement été transposés par les Etats membres. L’importance de la correcte mise en application des dispositifs européens au niveau national a à maintes fois été soulignée, par exemple dans les orientations stratégiques du Conseil européen de juin 2014 et dans les conclusions du Conseil Justice et Affaires Intérieures du 20 novembre 2015. A cet égard, la fin de la période de transition le 1er décembre 2014 devrait pousser les Etats Membres récalcitrants à se conformer au droit européen car un Etat peut faire désormais l’objet de poursuites pour non-application du droit dérivé européen, même adopté avant l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne.
  • deuxièmement, des difficultés se manifestent également au niveau de l’application pratique des instruments européens. Il y a, par exemple, une différence considérable entre l’information disponible au niveau national et l’information transmise et/ou partagée avec les autorités compétentes d’autres Etats membres; en outre, les informations transmises à Europol ne sont pas toujours suffisantes, mettant ainsi à mal la réalisation de son mandat. Dans ce contexte, le Conseil Justice et Affaires Intérieures a annoncé le 20 novembre 2015 l’établissement le 1er janvier 2016 du Centre européen de lutte contre le terrorisme (CELCT), qui a vocation à devenir une plateforme permettant aux Etats Membres de renforcer l’échange d’informations et la coopération opérationnelle en ce qui concerne la surveillance des combattants terroristes étrangers et les enquêtes à leur sujet, le trafic d’armes illicites et le financement du terrorisme. Un centre similaire a été créé il y a quelques années en matière de cybercriminalité, le EC3, et cela s’est avéré être un outil utile. L’utilité du CELCT dépendra en grande partie de la volonté des Etats membres de partager les informations dont ils disposent, qui aujourd’hui reste insuffisante comme le démontre l’exemple du point de contact « voyageurs » d’Europol au sujet des combattants étrangers.
  • troisièmement, certains des instruments décrits ci-dessus souffrent de limites intrinsèques. ECRIS fonctionne bien mais seulement en ce qui concerne les citoyens européens. Au sujet des ressortissants de pays tiers, il est toujours nécessaire de consulter les archives de chaque Etat membre afin de connaître les condamnations passées de ces individus. La possibilité de créer une base de données européenne au sujet des ressortissants de pays tiers ayant fait l’objet d’une condamnation est discutée depuis plusieurs années. Dans ses conclusions du 20 novembre, le Conseil JAI a accueilli favorablement l’intention de la Commission de soumettre d’ici la fin janvier 2016 une initiative ambitieuse visant à étendre ECRIS pour inclure les ressortissants de pays tiers.
  • enfin, de nouvelles mesures législatives devraient être initiées incessamment, notamment au niveau du rapprochement des droits matériels en matière pénale, et en particulier en ce qui concerne la criminalisation des infractions terroristes. En effet, selon les conclusions du Conseil du 20 novembre, la Commission devrait présenter une proposition de directive mettant à jour les décisions-cadre de 2002 et 2008 relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Cette réforme intégrera en droit européen la Résolution 2178 (2014) du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU ainsi que leProtocole additionnel à la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe pour la prévention du terrorisme. Cela aura principalement pour effet d’obliger les Etats Membres à criminaliser les voyages à l’étranger à des fins terroristes.

En résumé, les récentes et tragiques attaques terroristes ont démontré que les polices nationales et les autorités judiciaires ont connaissance des outils à leur disposition en matière de coopération policière et judiciaire dans le domaine pénal. Des améliorations sont néanmoins toujours possibles. La nature transnationale des récentes attaques illustrent clairement la nécessité de la coopération transfrontalière en matière pénale. Les Etats membres devraient se rendre compte que la solution passe par une coopération renforcée et que les réflexes souverainistes sont non seulement vains mais aussi préjudiciables à l’identification et à la poursuite des personnes suspectées de terrorisme. En ce faisant, l’UE doit veiller à garantir un juste équilibre entre les différents intérêts en jeu et ne pas sacrifier les droits fondamentaux au nom de la sécurité, ainsi que la récemment souligné Stefan Braum dans un article publié sur ce blog.

3. L’échec de la coopération intergouvernementale en matière de renseignement

Dans les jours suivants les attaques, des critiques se sont élevées à l’encontre des carences au niveau de la coopération entre les services de renseignement nationaux. Il a, par exemple, été avancé que les services belges détenaient des informations relatives au danger représenté par les frères Abdeslam, sans que jamais ces informations n’aient été transmises à leurs collègues français.

Il est important de distinguer la coopération policière, d’une part, et la coopération en matière de renseignement, d’autre part. Alors que l’échange d’informations au niveau de la police est soumis au droit dérivé européen, adopté sur base des compétences de l’Union en matière de coopération policière, l’échange d’informations entre services de renseignement n’entre pas dans les compétences de l’UE, et l’UE n’a pas capacité à agir de façpn contraignante dans ce domaine.

Dans le cadre législatif en vigueur depuis l’adoption du Traité de Lisbonne, pas moins de trois dispositions insistent sur le fait que l’UE n’est pas compétente en matière de sécurité nationale. L’Article 4(2) du TUE stipule que l’Union respecte les fonctions essentielles de l’Etat, y compris la sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale. Aux articles 72 et 73 du TFUE, il est affirmé que le titre relatif à l’Espace de Liberté, de Sécurité et de Justice « ne porte pas atteinte à l’exercice des responsabilités qui incombent aux États membres pour le maintien de (…) la sauvegarde de la sécurité intérieure » et qu’il « est loisible aux États membres d’organiser entre eux et sous leur responsabilité des formes de coopération et de coordination qu’ils jugent appropriées entre les services compétents de leurs administrations chargées d’assurer la sécurité nationale ». En d’autres termes, la coopération entre les services de renseignement nationaux chargés d’assurer la sécurité nationale reste entre les mains des Etats membres et est donc menée sur une base intergouvernementale.

Par conséquent, imputer à l’UE le manque de coopération en matière de renseignement entre la France et la Belgique est injustifié. L’idée de créer une agence de renseignement européenne a été mentionnée par certains Etats mais elle a rapidement été rejetée le vendredi 20 novembre par le Conseil JAI tant cette hypothèse excède les compétences de l’Union dans l’état actuel des Traités, indépendamment de son opportunité. Toute avancée institutionnelle dans ce domaine requiert au préalable une révision des Traités. La faisabilité d’une telle révision est évidemment incertaine en raison de l’extrême sensibilité que cela poserait au regard de la souveraineté nationale tant il est clair que les services de renseignement disposent, par définition, de données sensibles dont les autorités nationales ne peuvent envisager le partage. Ceci sans développer un autre argument, très concret, la coopération au sein même d’un Etat est parfois elle-même problématique face à la réticence des services de renseignement à l’idée de coopérer trop largement avec les autorités policières, judiciaires ou autres.

L’absence de compétences de l’UE ne signifie pas qu’il y ait une absence complète de multilatéralisation européenne de la coopération en matière de renseignement. A cet égard, le Centre de l’UE pour l’analyse d’informations (INTCEN) mérite la mention. Cependant, ce centre a un mandat limité qui est de fournir des analyses des renseignements, des alertes précoces et des comptes rendus de la situation au Haut Représentant ainsi qu’au service européen pour l’action extérieure, en matière de sécurité, de défense et de contre-terrorisme. Cette agence a succédé au Centre d’information de l’UE (SITCEN), créée pour répondre au besoin d’analyses de renseignement afin d’aider les décideurs européens. Malgré son titre, cette agence n’est pas une agence de renseignement européenne. Elle n’a aucun moyen opérationnel, ni aucun pouvoir en matière de coopération entre agences de renseignement nationales. Son mandat consiste à publier des évaluations des services de renseignements, des rapports et des résumés, ainsi que des évaluations des risques pour le personnel de l’Union sur base de sources librement accessibles et des rapports analytiques que les services de renseignement nationaux lui transmettent. Une autre initiative à mentionner concerne l’existence du dit « Club de Berne », forum d’échange de renseignements entre les services de renseignement des Etats membres, de la Norvège et de la Suisse, au sein duquel un groupe anti-terrorisme a été créé en 2001. Il fonctionne en-dehors du cadre institutionnel européen mais il entretient néanmoins des relations avec celui-ci, particulièrement à travers la participation du INTCEN.

Conclusion

Au total, le choc provoqué par les attentats de Paris devrait obliger l’Union et ses membres à une réflexion d’une autre ampleur que celle qu’elle a proposée à ses citoyens lors de ses multiples réunions de travail.

Réflexion, d’abord, sur les itinéraires criminels ayant pu conduire des citoyens de cette Union, français comme belges, à de telles abominations. Persister à prétendre aux opinions publiques inquiètes que ces criminels ne seraient pas le produit de nos sociétés est une erreur grave, empêchant de réfléchir aux causes et donc d’imaginer les réponses. L’est tout autant l’abus des postures et des vocabulaires guerriers. C’est ici le droit pénal qui est en cause et non celui de la guerre, c’est ici dans le refus de toute légitimité au criminel que réside l’enjeu majeur. Pourquoi paraître alors valoriser son action en lui accordant un statut autre que celui d’un criminel de droit commun ? Démarche, par parenthèse, que poursuit l’Union depuis quarante ans …

Réflexions ensuite sur les défaillances et responsabilités multiples en cause. Loin d’être en première ligne, et donc de justifier la démagogie des critiques accablant l’Union européenne, la réalisation d’un espace de liberté et de sécurité est, en aval, la seule réponse possible.

A deux conditions. Celle d’une responsabilité réelle de ses membres dans son administration, ce qui est loin d’être le cas tant dans le domaine de la gestion des frontières que dans celui du partage de renseignements. Celle surtout d’un accord sur les valeurs structurant cet espace, tant dans le rôle central de l’institution judiciaire qu’à propos des garanties fondamentales.

Standing up for children? The Directive on procedural safeguards for children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings

Original published on Tuesday, 22 December 2015 on EU LAW ANALYSIS

“If we don’t stand up for children, then we don’t stand for much.”

by Marian Wright Edelman (*)

Effective human rights protection is fundamental to any concept of fairness in the criminal justice system. Fairness, however, is relative: it may require different levels of protection in different circumstances.

Children require special measures of protection to take account of their particular vulnerability and needs (UN CRC Committee, General Comment 10, para 10). International standards confirm state obligations in this regard (e.g. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the Council of EuropeGuidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice.). The need for extra protection has also been confirmed by the ECtHR which has stated that the right to a fair trial under Article 6 requires that: “a child charged with an offence is dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age/level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceeding”(T v. UK, No. 24724/94, 16 December 1999, at [84]).

The Commission states that approximately 1 million children face criminal justice proceedings in the EU each year (around 12% of the total) (Commission Staff Working Document 2013). It has gathered data on child justice and its reports shows wide variability in practice and procedure between States. The EU has now agreed the text of a Directive to establish specific procedural safeguards for child suspects. This is the fifth in a series of six EU-specific standards, all in the form of Directives, which have been agreed under a Roadmap for strengthening the procedural rights in criminal proceedings (on the fourth measure, on presumption of innocence, see discussion here; on the sixth proposal, on legal aid, see discussion here). The Directives attempt to promote consistency in procedural protection within the criminal justice systems of EU Member States. Measure E of the Roadmap requires special safeguards to be created for vulnerable suspects. A Recommendation setting out procedural safeguards for vulnerable persons has already been published. This post deals with the recently agreed Directive on child suspects.

THE DIRECTIVE Continue reading “Standing up for children? The Directive on procedural safeguards for children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings”

Economic challenges and prospects of the refugee influx

THE FULL TEXT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERVICE IS ACCESSIBLE HERE 

SUMMARY
The current refugee influx represents the largest population movement in Europe since World War II. Its size and complexity make it difficult to draw conclusions on the economic challenges and prospects valid for each Member State of the European Union (EU).
Many experts agree that, in the short term, the refugee influx will lead to rising costs, arising from the need to provide food, shelter and first aid. In the longer term, the refugee influx could be positive for the European economy by, for example, addressing the EU’s alarming demographic trends. Depending on their education, skills and willingness to work, refugees might improve the ratio of active workers and also contribute to innovation, entrepreneurship and GDP growth. Regarding the labour market, migrants can fill important niches both in fast-growing and declining sectors of the economy, and contribute to labour-market flexibility.
Refugee, migration and asylum policy is largely under the auspices of the Member States and intergovernmental EU policy-making. The uncontrolled mass arrival of refugees has highlighted the different views in the Member States on migration and immigration, driven by economic, social and cultural divergences and spurred the debate on a new EU migration policy.
According to the European Parliament, the EU and its Member States should target the potential gains from the current influx by, inter alia, successful economic and social integration of the refugees.

Continue reading…

The New EU General Data Protection Regulation – A First Assessment

Original published on the European Academy for Freedom of Information and Data Protection  site (EAID)

by Peter SCHAAR

The results of the trilogue of the EU institutions (European Parliament, Commission and Council) on the data protection reform package (SEE BELOW)  is an important milestone on the way into the global information society. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will replace 28 different data protection laws of the Member States.

The reach of the new legal framework extends beyond the European Union. Even companies with headquarters outside the EU will have to comply with the GDPR so far they are doing business in EU Member States and process data generated here (article 3 para. 2). Compliance with the rules is monitored by independent data protection authorities, which all have in future same, effective sanction powers.

In cases of serious infringements they may impose fines up to up to 4% of the global annual turnover against the respective companies (art. 79). It has to be highlighted, that a number of last minute attempts have failed to mitigate or weaken the new privacy requirements in central points, such as on scope of the regulation or the purpose limitation rules.

Nevertheless, there are also areas where the result is less positive than hoped for. Thus, the EP has not been completely successful in the requirements on individual consent to the processing of personal data (‚the data subject’s consent‘ means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative, signifies agreement to personal data relating to them being processed“ – article 4 para 8). Explicit consent is only required if consent refers to „special categories of personal data“ (article 9) – such as health data or genetic information. Also the rules on profiling lag behind the demands of privacy advocates. The relevant provisions are limited to decisions based solely on automated processing, which produce legal effects concerning the data subject or similarly significantly affects him or her (article 20).

During the negotiations, critics – in particular from Germany – complained the GDPR would weaken or undermine the data protection requirements defined by national law.  Today we can say, this fear did not realize, at least in general.

Only in specific areas the new legal requirements are lagging behind the present national laws, for example with regard to the more stringent data protection provisions for Internet services of the German Telemedia Act.  On the other hand, the German data protection level is just here high only in theory, but not de facto.

This became evident from the example Facebook: German data protection authorities have failed with lawsuits against the company whose European headquarters is located in Dublin – to undertake to comply with the German data protection rules.

However, every company that does business in Europe in future must comply with the new single European data protection law. This is real progress, even if the GDPR in certain areas lagging behind the national law.

In addition, there are other areas – such as the Federal Citizens Registration Act – where data protection requirements of new EU regulation are stricter than the present German legislature.

The unconditional dissemination of public register data on request to everybody is not compatible any more with European law and must be terminated.

Light and shadow also for the rules on the internal data protection officer (DPO). On one hand, article 35 obliges public authorities and government agencies – except for courts acting in their judicial capacity – to designate a DPO.  Also those private companies have to designate a DPO, whose „core activities consist of processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or their purposes, require regular and sistematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale“ or with core activities consisting „of processing on a large scale of special categories of  data pursuant to Article 9 and data relating to criminal convictions and offences“.

However, the significantly more stringent requirements of the German Federal Data Protection Act on DPOs have not completely been included in the GDPR. At least the adopted text allows the national legislators to stick to the mandatory designation of DPO (article 35 (4): „in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 1, the controller or processor … may or, where required by Union or Member State law shall, designate a data protection officer …“) .

Even if, as expected, the provisions now adopted – the GDPR and the Directive on data protection for police and justice – will soon pass the formal EU legislative procedure, a lot of work has still to be done at European and at national level prior to their entry into force in 2018.

  • At EU level the compatibility of other legal provisions with the GDPR has to be reviewed. This particularly applies to the directive on data protection in electronic communications („ePrivacy Directive“).
  • Governments and parliaments of the Member States are requested to review their national law. This applies in particular for Germany with its numerous sector specific data protection provisions. Many laws need to be revised, some need to be eliminated.
  • A special mission coming to the national legislators is the processing of personal data in the employment context. Article 82 GDPR provides the national legislators with  competence to regulate the handling of employee data in detail. („Member States may, by law or by collective agreements, provide for more specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms in respect of the processing of employees‘ personal data in the employment context, …“).
  • National regulators have also to deal with the question of how far the legal provisions for data processing for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offenses or the execution of criminal penalties need to be adapted to the requirements of the new Data Protection Directive for police and justice.
  • Finally, businesses and public authorities have to adapt their practices to the new rules. New processes and procedures have to be designed, existing procedures need to be changed …

The European Academy for Freedom of Information and Data Protection (EAID), Berlin, will focus in the coming years on the impact of new EU data protection rules. For 2016 we are planning workshops for decision-makers in business, politics and administration on implementation of the new EU rules and on needs for revision of national legislation.

READ MORE ON THE DATA PROTECTION REFORM PACKAGE:

The text of the Draft Regulation as agreed is accessible HERE  (204 Pages !)
The text of the Multicolumn Table (with the positions of the three institutions) of the Draft REGULATION is here (671 pages !)
The text of the Draft Directive (data protection in the law enforcement sector) as agreed is accessible here ( 102 pages)
The text of the Multicolumn Table with the position of the three institutions on the Draft DIRECTIVE  is accessible here (271 pages !)

Zakharov v Russia: Mass Surveillance and the European Court of Human Rights

Reblogged also by EU LAW ANALYSIS on Wednesday, 16 December with permission from the IALS Information Lawand Policy Centre blog

by Lorna Woods, (*) 

Introduction 

The European Court of Human Rights has heard numerous challenges to surveillance regimes, both individual and mass surveillance, with mixed results over the years.   Following the Snowden revelations, the question would be whether the ECtHR would take a hard line particularly as regards mass surveillance, given its suggestion in Kennedy that indiscriminate acquisition of vast amounts of data should not be permissible. Other human rights bodies have condemned this sort of practice, as can be seen by the UN Resolution 68/167 the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. Even within the EU there has been concern as can be seen in cases such as Digital Rights Ireland (discussed here) and more recently in Schrems (discussed here). The Human Rights Court has now begun to answer this question, in the Grand Chamber judgment in Zakharov v. Russia(47143/06), handed down on December 4 2015.

Facts

Zakharov, a publisher and a chairman of an NGO campaigning for media freedom and journalists’ rights, sought to challenge the Russian system for permitting surveillance in the interests of crime prevention and national security. Z claimed that the privacy of his communications across mobile networks was infringed as the Russian State, by virtue of Order No. 70, had required the network operators to install equipment which permitted the Federal Security Service to intercept all telephone communications without prior judicial authorisation.

This facilitated blanket interception of mobile communications. Attempts to challenge this and to ensure that access to communications was restricted to authorised personnel were unsuccessful at national level. The matter was brought before the European Court of Human Rights. He argued that the laws relating to monitoring infringe his right to private life under Article 8; that parts of these laws are not accessible; and that there are no effective remedies (thus also infringing Art. 13 ECHR).

Judgment

The first question was whether the case was admissible. The Court will usually not rule on questions in abstracto, but rather on the application of rules to a particular situation. This makes challenges to the existence of a system, rather than its use, problematic. The Court has long recognised that secret surveillance can give rise to particular features that may justify a different approach. Problematically, there were two lines of case law, one of which required the applicant to show a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the security services had intercepted the applicant’s communications (Esbester) and which favoured the Government’s position, and the other which suggested the menace provided by a secret surveillance system was sufficient (Klass) and which favoured the applicant.

The Court took the opportunity to try to resolve these potentially conflicting decisions, developing its reasoning in Kennedy. It accepted the principle that legislation can be challenged subject to two conditions: the applicant potentially falls within the scope of the system; and the level of remedies available. This gives the Court a form of decision matrix in which a range of factual circumstances can be assessed. Where there are no effective remedies, the menace argument set out in its ruling in Klass would be accepted.

Crucially, even where there are remedies, an applicant can still challenge the legislation if ‘due to his personal situation, he is potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures’ [para 171]. This requirement of ‘potentially at risk’ seems lower than the ‘reasonable likelihood’ test in the earlier case of Esbester. The conditions were satisfied in this case as it has been recognised that mobile communications fall within ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ (see Liberty, para 56, cited here para 173).

This brought the Court to consider whether the intrusion could be justified. Re-iterating the well-established principles that, to be justified, any interference must be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate aim listed in Article 8(2) and be necessary in a democratic society, the Court considered each in turn.

The requirement of lawfulness has a double aspect, formal and qualitative. The challenged measure must be based in domestic law, but it must also be accessible to the person concerned and be foreseeable as to its effects (see e.g Rotaru). While these principles are generally applicable to all cases under Article 8 (and applied analogously in other rights, such as Articles 9, 10 and 11 ECHR), the Court noted the specificity of the situation. It stated that:

‘…. domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures’ [para 229].

In this, the Court referred to a long body of jurisprudence relating to surveillance, which recognises the specific nature of the threats that surveillance is used to address. In the earlier case of Kennedy for example, the Court noted that ‘threats to national security may vary in character and may be unanticipated or difficult to define in advance’ [para 159].

While the precision required of national law might be lower than the normal standard, the risk of abuse and arbitrariness are clear, so the exercise of any discretion must be laid down by law both as to its scope and the manner of its exercise. It stated that ‘it would be contrary to the rule of law … for a discretion granted to the executive in the sphere of national security to be expressed in terms of unfettered power’ [para 247]. Here, the Court noted that prior judicial authorisation was an important safeguard [para 249]. The Court gave examples of minimum safeguards:

  • The nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order
  • A definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped
  • A limit on the duration of telephone tapping
  • Protections and procedures for use, storage and examination of resulting data
  • Safeguards relating to the communication of data to third parties
  • Circumstances in which data/recordings must be erased/destroyed (para 231)
  • the equipment installed by the secret services keeps no logs or records of intercepted communication, which coupled with the direct access rendered any supervisory arrangements incapable of detecting unlawful interceptions
  • the emergency procedure provided for in Russian law, which enables interception without judicial authorization, does not provide sufficient safeguards against abuse.

The Court then considered the principles for assessing whether the intrusion was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, highlighting the tension between the needs to protect society and the consequences of that society of the measures taken to protect it. The Court emphasised that it must be satisfied that there are adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.

In this oversight mechanisms are central, especially where individuals will not – given the secret and therefore unknowable nature of surveillance – be in a position to protect their own rights. The court’s preference is to entrust supervisory control to a judge. For an individual to be able to challenge surveillance retrospectively, affected individuals need either to be informed about surveillance or for individuals to be able to bring challenges on the basis of a suspicion that surveillance has taken place.

Russian legislation lacks clarity concerning the categories of people liable to have their phones tapped, specifically through the blurring of witnesses with suspects and the fact that the security services have a very wide discretion. The provisions regarding discontinuation of surveillance are omitted in the case of the security services. The provisions regarding the storage and destruction of data allow for the retention of data which is clearly irrelevant; and as regards those charged with a criminal offence is unclear as to what happens to the material after the trial.

Notably, the domestic courts do not verify whether there is a reasonable suspicion against the person in respect of whose communications the security services have requested interception be permitted. Further, there is little assessment of whether the interception is necessary or justified: in practice it seems that the courts accept a mere reference to national security issues as being sufficient.

The details of the authorisation are also not specified, so authorisations have been granted without specifying – for example – the numbers to be interception. The Russian system, which at a technical level allows direct access, without the police and security services having to show an authorisation is particularly prone to abuse. The Court determined that the supervisory bodies were not sufficiently independent. Any effectiveness of the remedies available to challenge interception of communications is undermined by the fact that they are available only to persons who are able to submit proof of interception, knowledge and evidence of which is hard if not impossible to come by.

Comments

The Court could be seen as emphasising in its judgment by repeated reference to its earlier extensive case law on surveillance that there is nothing new here. Conversely, it could be argued that Zakharov is a Grand Chamber judgment which operates to reaffirm and highlight points made in previous judgments about the dangers of surveillance and the risk of abuse. The timing is also significant, particularly from a UK perspective. Zakharov was handed down as the draft Investigatory Powers Bill was published. Cases against the UK are pending at Strasbourg, while it follows the ECJ’s ruling in Schrems, with Davis (along with the Swedish Tele2 reference), querying whether theDigital Rights ruling applies to national data retention schemes, now pending before the ECJ (on that issue, see discussion here). The ECtHR noted the Digital Rights Ireland case in its summary of applicable law.

In setting out its framework for decisions, the Court’s requirement of ‘potentially at risk’ even when remedies are available seems lower than the ‘reasonable likelihood’ test in Esbester. The Court’s concern relates to ‘the need to ensure that the secrecy of surveillance measures does not result in the measures being effectively unchallengeable and outside the supervision of the national judicial authorities and of the Court’ [para 171]. This broad approach to standing is, as noted by Judge Dedon’s separate but concurring opinion, in marked contrast to the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Clapper where that court ‘failed to take a step forward’ (Opinion, section 4).

The reassessment of ‘victim status’ simultaneously determines standing, the question of the applicability of Article 8 and the question of whether there has been an infringement of that right. The abstract nature of the review then means that a lot falls on the determination of ‘in accordance with the law’ and consequently the question of whether the measures (rather than individual applications) are necessary in a democratic society. The leads to a close review of the system itself and the safeguards built in. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Court did not just look at the provisions of Russian law, but also considered how they were applied in practice.

The Court seemed particularly sceptical about broadly determined definitions in the context of ‘national, military, economic or ecological security’ which confer ‘almost unlimited degree of discretion’ [para 248]. Although the system required prior judicial authorisation (noted para 259], in this case it was not sufficient counter to the breadth of the powers. So, prior judicial authorisation will not be a ‘get out of gaol free’ card for surveillance systems. There must be real oversight by the relevant authorities.

Further, the Court emphasised the need for the identification of triggering factor(s) for interception of communications, as otherwise this will lead to overbroad discretion [para 248]. Moreover, the Court stated that the national authorisation authorities must be capable of ‘verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned’ [260-2], which in the context of technological access to mass communications might be difficult to satisfy. The Court also required that specific individuals or premises be identified. If it applies the same principles to mass surveillance currently operated in other European states, many systems might be hard to justify.

A further point to note relates to the technical means by which the interception was carried out. The Court was particularly critical of a system which allows the security services and the police the means to have direct access to all communications. It noted that ‘their ability to intercept the communications of a particular individual or individuals is not conditional on providing an interception authorisation to the communications service provider’ [para 268], thereby undermining any protections provided by the prior authorisation system.

Crucially, the police and security services could circumvent the requirement to demonstrate the legality of the interception [para 269]. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the equipment used does not create a log of the interceptions which again undermines the supervisory authorities’ effectiveness [para 272]. This sort of reasoning could be applied in other circumstances where police and security forces have direct technical means to access content which is not dependent on access via a service provider (e.g. hacking computers and mobiles).

In sum, not only has the Russian system been found wanting in terms of compliance with Article 8, but the Court has drawn its judgment in terms which raised questions about the validity of other systems of mass surveillance.

  • Professor of Internet Law, University of Essex

 

The Reform of Frontex: Saving Schengen at Refugees’ Expense?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Wednesday, 16 December 2015)

by Steve Peers

Years ago, shortly before the creation of Frontex (the EU’s border control agency) and the big EU enlargement of 2004, I discussed the future of EU borders policy with a senior German civil servant. Anxious about the forthcoming enlargement of the EU (and, in time, Schengen), his vision was that every Lithuanian or Polish border post would be jointly staffed by a friendly German.

Yesterday’s proposals from the European Commission don’t precisely reproduce that vision – but they do embody the same doubt that Member States (in the south, rather than the east) can be fully trusted to patrol the external border. Given that Frontex has been created in the meantime, it’s the agency itself – flanked by reserves from national border agencies – which would be sent in to help patrol the borders of Member States, albeit only in certain cases.

This is only one of a batch of proposals made yesterday. I’ll sum them all up, but focus on this one, as it’s the most important. Overall, though, the proposals are flawed, in two contradictory ways: they simultaneously seek to do too much in the area of border controls (where the Frontex proposal exceeds EU powers and is politically unprincipled) and too little in the area of asylum (since there is no significant attempt to address humanitarian or protection needs within the EU). In short, they seek to save the Schengen system, at the expense of refugees.

Overview

There’s a Commission communication issued yesterday which tries to sum up all the new proposals. But in an even smaller nutshell, here’s what the Commission has tabled. The flagship proposal is a Regulation which would replace the existing Frontex legislation, creating a new ‘European Border and Coast Guard’ (EBCG) consisting of national border guards plus the agency.  This is accompanied by two proposals for minor consequential amendments to the Regulations establishing the EU’s Fisheries Control Agency and Maritime Safety Agency, whose work would be coordinated with the EBCG.

Next, an amendment to the Schengen Borders Code would increase checks at the external borders on EU citizens and, to some extent, non-EU citizens, for security purposes. A fifth proposed Regulation attempts to make expulsion and readmission more effective, by creating a uniform document to be used during removals of irregular migrants to their country of origin.

There are non-binding measures on border control issues too. The Commission has adopted a Handbook for use operating the EU’s ‘Eurosur’ system of maritime surveillance. It has also released its latest regular report on the Schengen system in practice.

In the area of asylum, there’s only one proposal for a binding measure: a Decisionwhich would exempt Sweden from the EU’s system of relocation of asylum-seekers (which I previously discussed here), for a period of one year. There’s a non-binding Commission Recommendation for a voluntary humanitarian admission programme of refugees from Turkey. Finally, there are Commission reports on the operation of the ‘hotspots’ for immigration control in Greece and Italy, and on the application of the recent plan to manage asylum and migration flows coming through the Western Balkans.

The new European Border and Coast Guard

As noted already, the proposal would replace the existing legislation establishing Frontex, which was first adopted in 2004, then amended in 2007 and 2011. (I previously produced a codified text of the Regulation – see here). To compare it with the text of the rules it replaces, see the Annex to the proposal. There would be no change to the separate legislation, adopted in 2014, which regulates Frontex actions as regards maritime surveillance (see my comments on that law here).

It should be emphasised that the legislation would not apply to the UK or Ireland, because they don’t participate fully in Frontex. In fact, according to CJEU case law, they can’t participate fully in Frontex unless they join the Schengen system fully – which is hardly likely, to say the least (it would require a referendum in the UK). However, the current loose cooperation between Frontex, the UK and Ireland would be retained, particularly for joint expulsions.

These new rules would – if agreed – significantly transform the status and role of Frontex. I won’t examine every detail for now (I might come back to the finer points during or at the end of the negotiations). Rather, my focus here is on the key aspects of the proposal. Keep in mind that this proposal is far from a ‘done deal’, since it has to be approved by a qualified majority in the Council (the UK and Ireland don’t have a vote, due to their opt-out) as well as the European Parliament. Already press stories suggest that many Member States oppose some key features of the proposal.

The first key feature of the law is the relationship between Frontex and national border forces. At present, the current Regulation states that ‘the responsibility for the control and surveillance of the external borders lies with the Member States’. Frontex is merely tasked with the ‘coordination’ of national forces.

But the proposed Regulation would, in effect, promote Frontex from the job of tea lady to the role of chief executive officer. The new law would not just upgrade the EU agency itself, but create a ‘European Border and Coast Guard’ consisting of national forces and the Agency. The Agency will adopt an ‘operational and technical strategy for the European integrated border control management’. National authorities then adopt their own strategies, but they must be ‘coherent’ with the Agency’s strategy. To put the strategy into effect, the Agency will not only be ‘reinforcing, assessing and coordinating’ national forces, but also taking control of them when Member States are not able to do so effectively.

The current tasks of Frontex – training, risk analysis, research, operational support, border surveillance, and support for expulsions – would all be retained and considerably enhanced. For instance, Frontex would have powers to send liaison officers to Member States, to check the ‘vulnerability’ of external border controls, to create a ‘return office’, and to gather and analyse more personal data. It would also have powers to send staff to third countries to participate in operations, not just (as at present) liaison officers. It would have more staff and funding, as well as reserve forces from Member States to call upon for border control or joint return operations. Most significantly, it would be able to send forces to an external border, in certain cases, without a Member State’s consent.

Is this power compatible with the limits on the powers of the EU? Article 72 TFEU states that the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Title of the Treaty ‘shall not affect the exercises of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’. This Article must apply to border control as well as policing, since there was an equivalent clause in the border controls and immigration Title of the Treaty before it was merged with the policing rules by the Treaty of Lisbon. It obviously does not rob the EU of all power to adopt laws regulating borders, since Article 77 TFEU goes on to confer powers to adopt laws on ‘the checks to which persons crossing external borders are subject’ and which are ‘necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders’.

But the JHA Title specifically restricts EU powers regarding intelligence agencies, and bans coercive powers for Europol (the EU police agency) and prosecutorial powers for Eurojust (the EU prosecutors’ agency). In my view these restrictions are particular applications of the general rule set out in Article 72, which must mean that while the EU can establish rules on border controls and regulate how Member States’ authorities implement them, it cannot itself replace Member States’ powers of coercion or control, or require Member States to carry out a particular operation.  This is consistent with Article 4(2) TEU, which requires the EU to respect Member States’ ‘essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security’, and with the requirement that any common EU defence would have to be agreed unanimously and ratified by national parliaments.

So the EU does not have the powers to send Frontex or its reserve forces to other Member States without their consent, or to require Member States to deploy those reserve forces without their consent either. Moreover, this is politically problematic for many Member States, who have historic concerns about foreign forces coming on to their territory without consent, stemming from the Cold War, the Second World War, and earlier history besides. While Frontex and its reserves should not be regarded as an ‘army’, due to their limited size and functions, they will nonetheless be perceived as such. So this aspect of the proposals is not only legally suspect, but politically ill-judged.

What to make of Frontex’s other enhanced powers, which Member States are rather more likely to accept? The key issue here is the accountability of Frontex for human rights abuses. The agency has fought a long battle with the EU Ombudsman to evade any accountability for individual cases, but it would finally lose that war, if this proposal is accepted. Individuals (or someone acting on their behalf) could make a complaint about human rights abuses, but it would be rejected if it was ‘anonymous, malicious, frivolous, vexatious, hypothetical or inaccurate’. Each complaint would go through the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, who would decide on admissibility and then either forward the complaint to the Frontex Executive Director or a national border force. If the complaint is well-founded it will be followed up, possibly by disciplinary action.

However, the proposed process is inadequate. The Executive Director, who will decide on the merits of admissible claims, is obviously not independent of Frontex. There is no reference to a remedy if the complainant believes that his or his complaint has been wrongly rejected as inadmissible or not well-founded. Even where Frontex considers the complaint well-founded, the remedies are ineffective: there is no reference to damages, or a possible criminal prosecution in the most outrageous cases. Furthermore, the new rules are limited in scope, as they do not apply to national border guards, who are responsible for alleged cases of illegal push-backs and assaults upon migrants. To address this, the other proposals released yesterday should be amended to require Member States to hold independent investigations with effective remedies in any case where national border guards are alleged to have acted in breach of fundamental rights.

There is also a need for specific rules regulating Frontex (and national authorities’) action as regards the ‘hotspots’ for migrants at external borders, to clarify that they are not making decisions on the merits of asylum applications or issuing return decisions, and that only national authorities can make such decisions with full respect for the safeguards and content of EU and national law. (For more on the lack of clarity regarding the ‘hotspots’, see Frances’ Webber’s analysis here).

Other new measures

The most significant other new measure is the proposal for changes to theSchengen Borders Code. At present (see codified text here), Member States must check EU citizens at the external borders (either on entry or exit), to ensure that they hold an EU Member State’s passport which is not registered as lost or stolen. But there is no obligation to check them in security databases, except on a ‘non-systematic basis’. As for non-EU citizens, they must be more thoroughly checked on entry, including the use of security databases, but on exit the consultation is only optional, and security checks need only be carried out ‘wherever possible’.

Both sets of rules would be amended by the new proposal. EU citizens would have to be checked in security databases, both on entry and exit. But if this ‘would have a disproportionate impact on the flow of traffic’ at land and sea borders, Member States could decide to carry out such checks on a ‘targeted’ basis. There is no such derogation for air borders, which will also be subject to separate legislation (recently agreed in principle) concerning the collection of passenger records (Member States will also apply this law to internal Schengen flights). Also, the enhanced border checks won’t be recorded as such in a database, although that would happen in future if recent plans to include EU citizens in the future ‘smart borders’ rules are put into effect. As for non-EU citizens, the current derogation relating to exit will be abolished, and there will always have to be a check in security databases, regardless of any disproportionate impact on traffic.

So overall, checks on EU citizens in security databases would no longer be the exception to the rule (as at present); they would be the rule – subject to exceptions. The exceptions are relatively limited and the proposal does not accept that pressure at air borders could also be ‘disproportionate’. Surely that is a possibility, since if checks add several seconds each to a check of hundreds of disembarking passengers, a back-up could swiftly ensue. Given that data on air passenger movements will soon be recorded anyway, and that the Schengen Information System can’t be used to deny entry to EU citizens, the only practical use for the new rules would be in catching someone who was meant to be arrested, perhaps on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant, or who should be placed under surveillance. But in the latter case it might be awkward to arrange for the surveillance to start without tipping off the person concerned that it’s happening. The proposal might prove useful in detecting people subject to potential arrest due to suspicion of receiving terrorist training (see the separate recent proposal on this point), but is it really necessary for that purpose that it apply at all air borders?

Overall, it may be questionable whether any increase in security that may result from this proposal is proportionate to its impact on passenger movements. There would be a stronger case to amend the Borders Code to allow Member States to check certain flights or border crossings systematically following a risk assessment. This may give rise to concerns about discrimination, but there are already distinctions based on nationality as to who needs a visa, and it would have to be specified that all those on the particular flight must be checked – not just those who ‘appear Muslim’. Checks on all flights could only be justified if it were clear that ‘foreign fighters’ were returning to the EU via other countries too.

As for the other proposals, the Regulation on a standard travel document for expulsion would not change the substantive rules on expulsion; time will tell if it leads to non-EU countries accepting more expelled persons.

The real problem is with the lack of ambition of the asylum measures. As noted above, the only binding measure suggested yesterday would exempt Sweden from the EU’s relocation rules. This is largely a cosmetic gesture, since only a tiny fraction of the 160,000 who were meant to be relocated – which anyway is not a huge proportion of those entering Greece and Italy – have in fact been relocated. In the meantime, the capacity of Greece and other States to register migrants, process asylum applications, and ensure basic living conditions for the persons concerned is clearly under immense strain.

What the EU really needs is a new strategy to deal with these protection and humanitarian needs. Is there anything it can do to make the relocation programme work? Failing that, can it assist Member States to process asylum applications, or do more than it is doing to ensure basic living conditions are satisfied? Why the focus on empowering Frontex, and no parallel attempt to empower the EU’s asylum support agency to play a greater role to address some or all of these issues?

Furthermore, pending a full review of the EU’s Dublin system (to be completed early next year), the Commission could at least have issued a recommendation to Member States on how to apply the existing Dublin rules on family reunion, and to widen the admission of family members to admit siblings, and the relatives of EU citizens or non-EU citizens who are legally resident other than as refugees or asylum-seekers.

As Thomas Spijkerboer and Tamara Last have pointed out, there is no shortage of migration controls in the EU. The death toll of migrants and refugees has built up over the decades in which visa requirements were imposed and carriers were sanctioned for letting those without authorisation get on a flight or a ferry. Bolstering Frontex may have an impact on the management of those who arrive, but solves neither the underlying problems in the country of origin or the huge pressure placed on national asylum systems – or the human misery that accompanies it.

NE BIS IN IDEM : interesting conclusions of Advocate General BOT

Without prejudice of the future Ruling of the Court on the subject, the  Advocate General Yves BOT conclusions published yesterday (FRENCH version HERE  ) are worth reading as they try to address  for the first time the compatibility of the Schengen Acquis with the european area of freedom security and justice as newly framed by the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 

EDC 

CONCLUSIONS DE L’AVOCAT GÉNÉRAL YVES Bot présentées le 15 décembre 2015 (1)

Affaire C‑486/14 Procédure pénale contre Piotr Kossowski

[demande de décision préjudicielle formée par le Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (tribunal régional supérieur de Hambourg, Allemagne)] «Renvoi préjudiciel – Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice – Convention d’application de l’accord de Schengen – Articles 54 et 55, paragraphe 1, sous a) – Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne – Articles 50 et 52, paragraphe 1 – Principe ne bis in idem – Validité de la réserve à l’application du principe ne bis in idem – Acquis de Schengen – Principe de reconnaissance mutuelle – Confiance mutuelle – Poursuites pénales dans un autre État membre contre la même personne et en raison des mêmes faits – Notion de ‘même infraction’ – Notion de ‘jugement définitif’ – Examen au fond – Droit des victimes»

  1. La présente affaire pose, pour la première fois, la question de la validité des réserves à l’application du principe ne bis in idem, prévues à l’article 55 de la convention d’application de l’accord de Schengen (2), au regard de l’article 50 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (ci-après la «Charte»).
  2. En particulier, le Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (tribunal régional supérieur de Hambourg) demande si la possibilité offerte aux États membres, inscrite à l’article 55, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la CAAS, de ne pas appliquer ce principe lorsque les faits visés par le jugement étranger ont eu lieu soit en tout, soit en partie sur leur territoire constitue une limitation à l’article 50 de la Charte autorisée par l’article 52, paragraphe 1, de celle-ci.
  3. Cette affaire est, également, l’occasion pour la Cour de préciser sa jurisprudence sur la notion de «jugement définitif», au sens des articles 54 de la CAAS et 50 de la Charte.
  4. Dans les présentes conclusions, nous exposerons les raisons qui nous amènent à faire valoir que la réserve prévue à l’article 55, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la CAAS doit être déclarée invalide. Puis, nous expliquerons pourquoi, selon nous, le principe ne bis in idem énoncé aux articles 54 de la CAAS et 50 de la Charte doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une ordonnance de non-lieu adoptée par le ministère public et clôturant la procédure d’instruction ne peut pas être qualifiée de «jugement définitif», au sens de ces articles, lorsqu’il ressort manifestement de la motivation de celle-ci que les éléments qui constituent la substance même de la situation juridique, tels que l’audition de la victime et celle du témoin, n’ont pas été examinés par les autorités judiciaires concernées.

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A –    Le droit de l’Union Continue reading “NE BIS IN IDEM : interesting conclusions of Advocate General BOT”

Looking forward : the new 18 months programme of the Council for the Freedom Security and justice area

The incoming new “trio” of Council Presidencies (Netherlands, Slovak and Maltese ) has just set the Council’s work programme covering the period January 2016 to June 2017 (doc .12396/15). You can read below the more relevant sections for the Freedom security and justice area related policies by including also the external dimension.
As always, in this kind of “Pravda-like” documents the most interesting messages are hidden behind the diplomatic jargon but, sometimes, even the visible part could be worth reading..

Emilio De Capitani

Introduction

This document sets out the Council’s work programme as established by the future Netherlands, Slovak and Maltese Presidencies, covering the period January 2016 to June 2017.

Now that the economy is showing signs of recovery, the Union should focus on delivering strong economic growth. At the same time it faces unprecedented challenges notably to its security and as a result of migration. Responding to these challenges requires a fundamental re-think in several policy areas. But the three Presidencies also have the opportunity to develop new policies in areas where action at the European level can bring real added value.

In establishing the Council’s work programme, the three Presidencies have been guided by the priorities of the Strategic Agenda and recent conclusions of the European Council. They have put particular emphasis on the first pillar of the strategic agenda, since inclusive, smart and sustainable growth, jobs and competitiveness remain the top priority over the next eighteen months.

In implementing this programme the three Presidencies will take into account the importance of the principles underpinning better regulation. The Council as a co-legislator has a particular responsibility for ensuring that EU regulation is of the best quality and fully respects the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, simplicity, transparency, coherence and fundamental rights.

Better regulation will help meet the objectives set out in the Strategic Agenda. And a reduction in regulatory burdens will be an important driver for economic growth and competitiveness. The three Presidencies also note the Commission’s intention to launch a reflection on an increased role for national Parliaments in the preparation of EU decision-making.

This programme is presented in a new format. It is operational, and seeks to provide a framework for organising and programming the work of the Council over the next eighteen months. Its structure – in five pillars – follows that of the Strategic Agenda. It highlights, for each pillar, those key files and issues that the Council will need to address during the period. Equally, it does not aim to be exhaustive; the three Presidencies will ensure that the Council remains flexible and that it can respond to new developments, and that it swiftly addresses challenges that may appear.

The Presidencies acknowledge that many of the issues set out in this programme impact on each other. They will therefore ensure that all issues are handled in a way which takes full account of the wider context and of the potential impact in other sectors. Each section of the programme may involve the work of several Council configurations. The Presidencies will use every opportunity to improve the working methods of the Council in order to allow for better discussions and better results. They will also work closely with the European Parliament given its pivotal role as a co-legislator together with the Council.

Consistency of priorities across policies and institutions is crucial. The Presidencies have thus had consultations with the President of the European Council, and have ensured that this work programme reflects the Commission’s annual work programme for 2016. The Trio programme will also serve as a guide for the three Presidencies in their cooperation with other institutions on annual and multiannual programming.

(…)

  1. A Union of freedom, security and justice

 The area of freedom, security and justice will be developed on the basis of the Strategic Guidelines set out by the European Council in June 2014. The focus during the period will be on implementation, in a spirit of mutual trust, and ensuring coherence between all relevant policies and instruments, including the external aspects.

The topics of irregular migration flows and international protection remain high on the agenda and call for solidarity and responsibility from all Member States.

The Presidencies will aim at identifying gaps and explore new ways of addressing them.

Particular attention will be devoted to the “smart borders” package and the implementation of the actions identified in the Commission’s Communication on a European Agenda on migration of May 2015 and in the June and October 2015 EC conclusions, including work on the future development of the Common European Asylum System, efforts on relocation and resettlement, return and readmission, border management, stepping up the fight against human smuggling, and taking forward work in relation to legal migration.

Furthermore, the three Presidencies will work to ensure a better link between migration, security and external policy. The three Presidencies aim to make progress in the on-going legislative work concerning new management of external borders and the new Visa code.

In the field of security, further to the Commission’s Communication on a European Agenda on Security, the implementation of the Renewed EU Internal Security Strategy, is paramount.

The three Presidencies aim to have a comprehensive and integrated approach to cyber-security and cybercrime, corruption, serious and organized crime and trafficking in human beings, including for labour exploitation. The fight against terrorism remains high on the agenda of the Council.

Concerning the area of justice, the emphasis will be on consolidation and effectiveness of existing instruments in practice. The three presidencies will promote improvement of the quality of legislation, taking into account the needs of citizens, authorities and legal practitioners.

The three Presidencies will focus on progress on procedural rights in criminal proceedings as well as the continued the fight against fraud to the financial interest of the Union, including the work on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

As regards civil justice, work will focus on family law.

The three Presidencies will boost e-justice solutions.

Protection of human rights will be a general objective and the three Presidencies will try to take work forward on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human rights.
Progress on the Data Protection package will be one of the priorities[1].

This priority area includes the following:

European Agenda on Migration, including:
* the Review of the Blue Card Directive and a new approach to Legal Migration
* Evaluation of and possible amendments to the Dublin Regulation
* work on an EU relocation mechanism
* Further efforts to enhance resettlement opportunities
* Proposals for strengthening the role of the European Asylum Support Office
* Effectiveness of the Schengen area
* Proposal to amend the Asylum Procedure Directive (Directive 2013/32/EU) to strengthen ‘Safe Country of Origin’ provisions
* Work related to irregular immigration, including return and readmission
* Work emanating from the Action Plan on migrant smuggling 
* proposals for enhanced protection schemes in the proximity of the EU
* Migration Action Plan with Turkey
Reinforcement of Frontex, including in the context of discussions over the development of a European Border and Coast Guard System
Smart Borders proposals, including the Entry/Exit system and Registered Traveller Programme
Implementation of the Common European Asylum System, including regulation on the international protection of unaccompanied minors
A simplified Union Visa Code and Touring visa regulations
Visa facilitation and liberalisation agreements
Enlargement of the Schengen area
Europol Regulation
Passenger Name Records directive and agreements
Operational cooperation between law enforcement authorities
Legislative proposal on firearms
Peer evaluation regarding cybercrime

The EU Agenda on Security, including
* Follow-up to the Renewed EU Internal Security Strategy, including upcoming Commission initiatives on the revision of the framework decision on terrorism, improved rules on firearms, extension of ECRIS to third country nationals and fraud on non-cash payments
* Renewed EU strategy on trafficking in human beings
* Reviewing obstacles to criminal investigations on cybercrime, notably on issues of competent jurisdiction and rules on access to evidence and information
* New EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime
Supporting the establishment of a European Victims’ Rights Network
Data Protection Package
EU-US Data Protection Umbrella Agreement
Eurojust Regulation
European Public Prosecutor’s Office Regulation
Roadmap on strengthening procedural rights for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings, including notably the proposals on procedural safeguards for children and legal aid in European arrest warrant proceedings
EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights
Family law: matrimonial property regime and property consequences of registered partnerships
e-Justice
Regulation promoting the free movement of citizens and businesses by simplifying the acceptance of public documents
Rule of Law dialogue
Revision of the “Brussels II” Regulation on the Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility
Mutual recognition of confiscation orders
 

  1. The Union as a strong global actor

The EU’s strategic environment has changed due to globalisation and growing instabilities surrounding the EU, threatening our European values and security. Greater connectivity, competition and complexity in our global environment confront the EU with both challenges and opportunities. The EU will need to address this uncertain outlook, in which threats, challenges and opportunities coexist and EU internal and external security are increasingly intertwined.

In particular, in the EU’s neighbourhood, inherent instability has brought heightened risk.

To the east, disregard for the principles of international law has undermined the European security order and led to geopolitical tension. To the south, conflicts and human rights violations are predominant features, and have created long-lasting security, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges.

Against the background of this volatility in the broader neighbourhood, the credibility of the enlargement process and effective progress of the Western Balkans region towards the EU remains strategically important.

An “arc of instability”, stretching from Eastern Europe to the Sahel, affects the EU’s own security and threatens to undermine EU shared values and interests.

The EU must deal with emerging threats such as hybrid threats, terrorist groups with massive resources at their disposal such as ISIL/Da’esh and cyber-attacks; as well as perennial ones such as proliferation, piracy, extremism and terrorism.

 Greater human mobility has led to challenges from irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling. Universal human rights and democratic values are under attack by hostile ideologies and propaganda.

 Migration will most certainly remain high on the international agenda.

The implementation of The European Agenda on Migration, the European Council Conclusions of April, June and October 2015, the outcome of the Meeting of Heads of State or Government of September 2015, and the outcome of the Valletta-summit of 11-12 November 2015 as well as the High-level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans route of 8 October 2015, will be at the core of the Trio agenda with regard to the external aspects of migration.

 The agreed measures on migration will have to be implemented and assessed in 2016 and 2017 as some of them need a medium to long-term approach, particularly those aimed at stemming the flow of irregular migration and on tackling the root causes by reinforcing cooperation with countries of origin and transit in an integrated manner.

 On counter-terrorism the ambitious conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of February 2015 will need to be further implemented, in particular with regard to the EU’s external counter-terrorism work, including enhanced counter-terrorism political dialogues, the action plans and capacity building projects with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

The EU response will need to include an outward looking and joined-up approach to security and diplomacy. Relevant EU policies and instruments will need to be deployed in a more strategic way, aiming at protecting and  promoting EU values and interests.

In this regard, the forthcoming EU global strategy on foreign and security policy will play a crucial role in defining our political ambitions, objectives and instruments to achieve them. The review of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the mid-term review of European Neighbourhood Instrument will be central to defining a new approach to our neighbourhood.

Differentiation will be key, ensuring that the EU’s approaches take account of partner countries’ specific situations. Effective and coherent application of EU policies relating to external action is essential, working on the basis of a comprehensive approach that links, inter alia, diplomacy, trade, energy, development, migration, human rights, and security and defence.

 This will include the further development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as CSDP missions and operations continue to make a significant contribution to international peace and stability. EU civilian and military capabilities need to be strengthened and the CSDP better tailored to present and future challenges, including human rights considerations.

In accordance with the European Council conclusions of June 2015, the EU should further enhance cooperation, including internationally, in the field of security and defence, in close coordination with international parties such as the UN and NATO as well with the European defence industry.

 A facilitating role for the European Defence Agency is foreseen. Increased cooperation with partner organisations, greater complementarity and mutual exchange of information is key, in particular with the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the African Union in areas such as hybrid threats, maritime security, rapid reaction and cyber security.

Contributions by partners to the CSDP will continue to be encouraged. Implementation of capacity building in support of security and development with a flexible geographic scope,  as well as the development of an EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform, shared by CSDP and development cooperation policy, are also foreseen.

 Beyond the Neighbourhood, bolstering partnerships is key – in particular with likeminded actors, but also with partners of rising global and regional influence, as well as with multilateral organisations and other fora. In order to bring sufficient weight to bear, the EU must be united in defending European values and interests, human rights remaining a core value of the EU that guides and drives actions of the EU, both internal and external.

 The Americas present opportunities that need to be fully tapped. Overall, the EU has much to enable it to engage and influence in a positive way. A close and effective strategic relationship with the United States allows for close cooperation on many foreign and security policy issues. The EU will strive to strengthen mutual cooperation on trade, energy security, CSDP and data protection.

 In Asia there are tensions among regional players jostling for influence. The EU has a genuine strategic interest in promoting stability in Asia and will seek to convey a strong message of its commitment to Asia and its regional integration, including at the 11th ASEM summit to be held in July 2016. The EU will remain engaged with the countries of Central Asia, implementing the EU-Central Asia Strategy reviewed in June 2015.

 In close cooperation with African Countries, the EU will continue to work on the implementation of the EU-Africa Roadmap adopted at the 2014 summit and prepare for the next summit. Continued EU engagement will aim to prevent and address crisis situations, contribute to peace and stability and contain the growing flow of irregular migration and fight terrorism, in close cooperation with the African Union, regional organisations and international partners. The EU will continue to implement the regional strategies and accompanying action plans to contribute to the security and development of the Sahel, Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa regions.

 Adapting EU relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) after 2020 (post-Cotonou) to these new global realities and challenges will be part of these political reflections.

 Global challenges will continue to feature prominently on international agenda in 2016 and 2017. It is the EU’s aim to reach an ambitious and binding climate protection agreement at the UN Framework Climate Change Convention (COP 21) in Paris, which will have to be implemented by both the EU and its partners.

The preparation of a second climate diplomacy action plan will have to be explored in the light of the international implications of the Paris agreement. Regarding the promotion of EU’s energy security it will be important to assess the implementation of the external elements of the Energy Union communication endorsed by the European Council in March 2015, in particular regarding the support of EU’s diversification efforts with Foreign Policy instruments.  

 Development policy and cooperation remain central elements of the EU’s external action. The EU will continue its work to make its development assistance more effective and targeted. In pursuing this, the EU will also strengthen the efforts to link up the development cooperation programmes of the EU and Member States though Joint Programming. The EU and its Member States will also continue its efforts to better link up its external relations tools and instruments in line with the principles of the EU’s comprehensive approach.

 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development agreed in New York will provide a new global framework for sustainable development efforts. Consequently, the focus of the Trio Programme will be the implementation of this agenda, including on the internal EU implementation in the appropriate fora.

 The EU’s policies will need to be looked upon in line with the new Sustainable Development Goals, through a multi-stakeholder approach. Equally, fostering Policy Coherence for Development remains important to the implementation of the EU’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ambitions. In this context, the reviews of the development instruments as well as the discussions on EU-ACP relations after 2020 (post-Cotonou) are also important. 

 In a context of multiple and protracted crises, with unprecedented numbers of displaced persons, the EU will continue to contribute to the efficient delivery of humanitarian aid to those affected by conflict, instability and natural disasters. The first World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 will create momentum for innovative approaches and reinvigorating the collective responsibility of the international community in this regard.

 The Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta will work together in the Council of the European Union on a shared commitment focusing on the countries with a membership perspective, the Neighbourhood, as well as its adjacent regions, as well as the EU’s strategic partners, in support of the actions of the High Representative and the Commission.