1. EU and MS legal Order and Institutional framework – Page 23 – European Area of Freedom Security & Justice

PRACTICES AND APPROACHES IN EU MEMBER STATES TO PREVENT AND END STATELESSNESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE (LIBE) Full study (121 pages) accessible HERE

Authors: Prof Gerard Rene’ DE GROOT, Katja SWIDER, Olivier WONK

Aim

The aim of the present study is to describe the practices and approaches in all EU Member States concerning the prevention and eradication of statelessness. For that purpose the study analyses the relevant international and European standards (Chapter 2) and assesses the national practices in light of these standards (Chapter 3). Since the prevention and eradication of statelessness depends on proper mechanisms to identify stateless populations, the subject of procedures for determining statelessness is addressed. We also investigate whether installing such a procedure creates a ‘pull factor’ (Chapter 4). The study ends with a detailed analysis of the possible role of the European Union in preventing and reducing statelessness (Chapter 5).

Key Findings

International and European standards to prevent and end statelessness

Important standards on the avoidance and reduction of statelessness can be found in the 1954 United Nations (UN) Convention relating to the status of stateless persons, the 1961 United Nations (UN) Convention on the reduction on statelessness and the 1997 Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on Nationality.
The European Union pledged at the UN High-level Rule of Law Meeting in New York, which took place in September 2012, to stimulate EU Member States to address the issue of statelessness by ratifying the 1954 UN Convention and considering the ratification of the 1961 UN Convention.
For the interpretation and further development of standards following from these conventions, the UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness, published in 2012, and Recommendation 2009/13 of the Council of Europe on the position of children in nationality law are of paramount importance.
Landmark court decisions are the 2010 decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern (C-135/08) (concluding that deprivation of nationality, with statelessness as a result, may only happen after applying a proportionality test to such a measure) and the 2011 European Court of Human Rights decision in Genovese v. Malta (application no. 53124/09) (concluding that nationality is part of one’s personal identity and as such protected by the concept of private life under Article 8 ECHR) as well as the 2014 decision in Sylvie Mennesson v. France (application no. 65192/11) and Francis Labassee v. France (application no. 65941/11) (stipulating that aspects relating to one’s social identity need to have consequences for the nationality position of children born from cross-border surrogacy arrangements).

Assessment of Member State rules in light of international and European standards

The comparative analysis shows that several Member States violate international and European standards regarding protection against statelessness.
This is not only true for Member States that are not bound by the relevant international treaties, but also for Member States that have acceded to these conventions.

Moreover, the standards of protection against statelessness differ considerably between the Member States.
This is particularly problematic for the grounds for loss, since the loss of a Member State’s nationality, resulting in statelessness, implies the loss of European citizenship.
Exclusion from both the protection that nationality offers and the benefits of EU citizenship prevent people from accessing fundamental civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights and put them at risk of repeated or prolonged detention and destitution.
There is a need for greater clarity as regards the legal position of permanent resident non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia, who formerly held the citizenship of the Soviet Union, in light of international and European law. Indeed, in order to avoid that the activation of statelessness will prevent or reduce provisions, States sometimes deliberately do not classify a person as “stateless”, but assign the person involved a different label. This occurred in Latvia and Estonia with the introduction of the special status of “permanent resident non-citizen” in Latvia or a “person of undefined nationality” in Estonia.

Protection of stateless persons in the migratory context and statelessness determination procedures Continue reading “PRACTICES AND APPROACHES IN EU MEMBER STATES TO PREVENT AND END STATELESSNESS”

Attentats terroristes de Paris : “fluctuat nec mergitur”, envers et contre tout

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE ON NOVEMBER 15 2015

par Henri Labayle

Le carnage abominable commis dans les rues de Paris, ce vendredi soir, fait resurgir nombre d’interrogations déjà posées dans ces mêmes colonnes et restées sans réponses, il y a dix mois à peine.

Semblables et pourtant différentes, ces questions interpellent la société européenne autant que la société française. Elles obligent à ne pas laisser notre émotion prendre le pas sur ce qu’il reste de notre raison, à conserver deux convictions : celle d’un destin commun commandant que ne soit pas sacrifiés les principes d’une Communauté de droit .

1. Un destin commun

L’image donne souvent à la réalité l’apparence du spectacle. Les sociétés européennes se sont ainsi habituées au feuilleton médiatique de la violence terroriste, de ces attentats aux multiples formes allant de l’assassinat aveugle aux explosions meurtrières. Des rues d’Israël à celles de Beyrouth, hier encore, la relation de ces vies fauchées et de ces corps démembrés conservait jusqu’alors un caractère passablement artificiel pour les opinions publiques européennes. En tous cas pour celles qui n’avaient pas eu à en connaître dans leur chair comme en Irlande ou en Espagne. Loin et donc irréel …

Brutalement, l’attentat le plus violent que la France ait eu à connaître depuis plus d’un demi siècle ramène à la vérité. Les quatre vingt morts du Bataclan et la vision d’un corps de kamikaze devant le Stade de France donnent soudain une réalité tragique à des propos alarmistes que nous n’entendions pas, au sens premier du terme.

Nous ne comprenions pas en effet que l’on ne peut prétendre agir à l’extérieur de nos frontières sans conséquences. Nos sociétés n’ont pas davantage assimilé l’interdépendance dans laquelle nos destins particuliers se lient. De l’exode des réfugiés à travers le continent jusqu’aux attentats de Paris, toute lecture autocentrée ou hexagonale des évènements en cours est sans issue. Désormais, la libre circulation de la période contemporaine ne concerne pas seulement les individus mais elle intègre aussi la violence.

Or, là est le risque de voir le débat public s’égarer sans issue, dans la prétention qu’existerait une solution exclusivement nationale au défi que les sociétés démocratiques doivent relever. Au prétexte à peine dissimulé qu’à la pêche aux voix, l’argument fait recette.

Certes, l’Europe et ses constructions sécuritaires demeurent des boucs émissaires faciles et cette attitude présente, au demeurant, l’avantage d’éviter la question des responsabilités nationales. L’espace de libre circulation de Schengen constitue l’archétype de ces procès en sorcellerie, ceci avant même que les progrès des investigations policières nous fournissent un tableau plus précis des choses et de leur exacte dimension, internationale ou européenne. Il est donc mis à profit pour essayer de persuader qu’à l’heure d’Internet, guérites et képis seraient une protection imparable. Incapables de gérer hier Sangatte et aujourd’hui Calais, nous serions à même de garantir la sécurité nationale en nous privant de la seule échelle pertinente qui vaille, l’échelle européenne…

Que les inspirateurs et les commanditaires des attentats soient établis à l’étranger ne dissimule en rien la dimension nationale du crime, depuis l’implication de ses auteurs matériels jusqu’au lieu de sa réalisation. Le vieux fantasme de l’ennemi de l’étranger ne résiste guère à l’analyse et celle-ci doit nous conduire à l’introspection. Impossible de réduire ou d’oublier la nationalité française de plusieurs des terroristes. De même, si les yeux se tournent actuellement vers la Belgique, pays voisin, c’est là encore parce que des ressortissants français y auraient séjourné.

Dès lors et comme hier à propos des attentats de janvier, il se confirme malgré nos réticences à l’admettre lucidement que nos propres sociétés ont enfanté des monstres criminels. Une prise de conscience est donc indispensable, avant tout anathème et tout discours guerrier.

Prise de conscience, d’abord, de l’extrême vulnérabilité des sociétés modernes face à une criminalité atypique et asymétrique. Ni ses motivations ni ses modes opératoires ne sont encore pleinement assimilés par le corps social. Les sacrifices humains y sont délibérément assumés par ceux qui en sont à la fois auteurs et victimes. Dans l’histoire du terrorisme en Europe, que 7 des 8 assaillants répertoriés à ce jour se soient fait exploser avec leurs explosifs est une première, absolument terrifiante et sur les ressorts de laquelle nous devrions nous interroger en priorité. Elle exprime une détermination et une radicalisation extrêmes qui condamnent largement l’action policière à l’impuissance, malgré tous ses efforts et ses qualités.

Prise de conscience, ensuite, de ce que ce mal n’est pas propre à une société nationale mais qu’il frappe l’ensemble de l’Union européenne. De façon quasiment identique, avec ou sans usage du principe de laïcité ou du respect de la diversité culturelle et religieuse, la société européenne s’avère incapable de dégager une réponse audible et convaincant dans un combat d’idées qui conduit à perdre celui des valeurs.

Le juge de ses consciences lui-même, la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, vient de témoigner récemment en Grande Chambre de son impuissance à dessiner clairement les frontières de la liberté d’expression. Stigmatisant avec facilité les insanités de Dieudonné ou la négation de la Shoah, il tolère de façon passablement discutable la marge d’appréciation des Etats en matière de génocide arménien … Sans curseur, comment imaginer alors de façon efficace et incontestable un encadrement législatif de cette liberté en Europe, face aux discours radicaux ?

Prise de conscience enfin de ce que l’abandon des questions sécuritaires au fond de commerce des partis extrémistes est une erreur couteuse. Elle alimente à la fois un sentiment désormais injustifié de quiétude civile mais elle risque aussi de nourrir la surenchère et l’excès dans la réaction politique, une fois la menace concrétisée. L’unanimité du pessimisme des services de sécurité français quant à la vraisemblance d’attentats graves contraste ici depuis de longues semaines avec le discours public aseptisé et politiquement correct.

De ce destin commun, manifestement, nombre d’acteurs politiques n’ont pas pris la mesure, préférant évaluer les avantages politiciens qu’ils en escomptent dans les échéances à venir.

Passe encore que l’effet d’aubaine ravisse les tenants des partis extrêmes. Il est moins normal que les représentants de certains Etats membres, comme la Pologne, se saisissent de la situation pour y trouver prétexte à habiller leur refus d’une politique commune d’asile et d’immigration actée à Lisbonne. Et il n’est pas davantage explicable que le souhait « d’une nouvelle politique européenne d’immigration » fasse irruption dans l’allocution d’un ancien Président de la République à un instant de l’enquête où la seule nationalité connue des criminels est française …

A bon escient, Jean Claude Juncker a donc raison d’inciter à ne pas confondre les victimes, que sont l’immense majorité des syriens fuyant l’Etat islamique, et les criminels, que sont leurs tortionnaires.

2. La guerre et le droit

L’outrance des propos tenus ici et là peut s’expliquer par la gravité et l’émotion du moment. Si elle n’a qu’un mérite, c’est de signifier à quel point les attentats de Paris trouvent leurs racines à l’extérieur du territoire de l’Union.

A user d’un mot, la « guerre », qu’il faudrait manier avec précaution face à ce qui est avant tout un crime au sens de la loi pénale, comme y incitent justement Bertrand Badie ou un ancien premier ministrefrançais, les autorités françaises n’ont pas réalisé à quel point les conséquences en étaient prévisibles. Le droit ne peut y être indifférent et le respect du principe de légalité doit demeurer l’axe de notre réaction.

Passons sur le fait que les juristes demeurent interrogatifs sur certaines formes de l’action militaire sur les théâtres d’opération extérieurs, à commencer par l’élimination physique de l’adversaire. N’en restons qu’aux suites de l’abus des postures martiales, inversement proportionnelles à la réalité concrète de trois bombardements aériens en trois mois.

Il ne fallait guère être devin pour comprendre que la propagande terroriste s’en nourrirait pour désigner ses objectifs opérationnels, en toute indifférence pour la subtilité de nos positionnements diplomatiques. « Faire la guerre » implique de se placer sous le feu de l’adversaire et s’il n’est pas certain que l’opinion française en ait eu conscience, il est sûr en revanche que nul ne le lui a expliqué franchement …

Quitte à le faire, sans doute fallait-il introduire alors une cohérence plus grande dans la conduite de cette diplomatie. Par exemple envers les Etats qui sont les soutiens à peine déguisés de l’Etat islamique en Syrie et contribuent dans le même temps à équilibrer notre commerce extérieur, à notre grande satisfaction. Peut-être était-il bon aussi de déployer toute l’énergie nécessaire pour faire le jour sur les circuits de financement et de commercialisation de ses rapines par le même Etat islamique, au vu et au su de tous, au besoin en s’intéressant aux ambiguïtés du comportement des autorités turques et de ses voisins …

Par ailleurs, les outils juridiques et opérationnels de la réponse au terrorisme qui avaient fait l’objet de sévères mises en cause, au plan européen comme national, appellent immédiatement un examen attentif. Gérer la crise en termes militaires n’empêchera pas de se livrer à l’évaluation de ce qui a été fait ou pas depuis 10 mois et les attentats de Charlie Hebdo.

La mise en cause de l’entraide répressive européenne à l’époque a eu, au moins, des effets visibles. Les autorités allemandes ont ainsi immédiatement fait état de l’arrestation d’un suspect, muni d’armes et apparemment à destination de la France. Les prolongements de l’enquête vers la Belgique sont plus significatifs encore de la parenté des inquiétudes et de la qualité des coopérations. A la fois parce que la Belgique s’avère être un centre névralgique de l’action radicale islamique en Europe, comme en témoignent les affaires Nemmouche ou celle du Thalys, mais aussi comme l’illustre le nombre sidérant de « combattants étrangers » qui en partent.

L’impuissance des autorités publiques belges à y faire face, 6 services de police et 19 municipalités différentes y concourent en vain (!!!) dans la banlieue bruxelloise, démontre si besoin en était la nécessité d’une action concertée. Deux des kamikazes français identifiés n’y résidaient-ils pas ? La qualité des échanges et des contrôles Schengen est une réponse avérée en ce sens. Le partage d’expérience aussi.

Précédant le point d’étape qui devait être effectué en tout état de cause en Conseil au mois de décembre, les constats du coordinateur de la lutte contre le terrorisme devraient être instructifs de ce point de vue quant au degré d’engagement des Etats membres dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Des indicateurs communs de risques positivés par la Commission à l’alimentation des fichiers tels que le SIS II ou le fichier Europol consacré aux « combattants étrangers » ou à l’entraide judiciaire au sein d’Eurojust, l’ambiance a changé. Elle semble, en tous cas, différente, au regard de ce qu’elle était au lendemain des attentats de Charlie Hebdo.

Pour autant, les résistances du passé ne sont pas entièrement dépassées. S’il est trop tôt pour en évaluer l’impact dans le schéma criminel qui a conduit aux attentats de Paris, il conviendra de les confronter aux conclusions des diverses commissions d’enquête ayant fait suite aux attentats de janvier, à l’Assemblée nationale comme au Sénat.

La tonalité du discours des autorités françaises n’est guère encourageante de ce point de vue, à écouter les propos pontifiants de leur ministre de l’Intérieur. Lecture purement intergouvernementale de cette coopération, silence sur les organes intégrés que sont Eurojust ou Europol et la valeur ajoutée que pourrait fournir une coordination européenne de la poursuite, impasse sur le caractère obligatoire que devrait présenter cette coopération au regard du traité de Lisbonne et sur la sanction des Etats défaillants, il semble que le logiciel de nombre d’Etats membres, dont le nôtre, n’ait guère été mis à jour depuis Maastricht.

Ont-ils pris conscience que le monde et ses dangers ont changé et que le besoin de sécurité de ses citoyens est pourtant le moteur le plus fort de l’intégration européenne ?

Implementing the Lisbon Treaty Improving the Functioning of the EU on Justice and Home Affairs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A STUDY FOR THE CIVIL LIBERTIES PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE. (FULL VERSION, 76 pages HERE)

AUTHORS : Dr. Sergio Carrera and Prof. Elspeth Guild .

The functioning of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies has been subject to important institutional and legislative reforms after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This study has examined the most important changes brought about by this new Treaty framework on European cooperation covering the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and explored concrete ways to make their implementation more effective.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced six main transformations to previous JHA cooperation setting which aimed at ensuring more legitimate, democratic and accountable EU decision-making in the JHA policy field:

First, the end of the former (First/Third) pillar divide and the expansion of the Community method of cooperation to a majority of JHA fields;
second, a stronger democratic accountability via an enhanced role played by the European Parliament and national parliaments;
third, a legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights;
fourth, a wider judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU);
fifth, the establishment of new EU security and justice agencies;
and finally, the development of new external dimensions of JHA policy.

During the last five years the EU has adopted more than two-hundred legal acts falling under Title V (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Yet, the above-mentioned innovations have been subject to exceptions and differentiation.

These have covered the use of enhanced cooperation and special legislative procedures, a privileged position (‘opt out’/’opt in’ method) by the UK and Ireland, and transitional limitations affecting the enforcement powers by the Commission and the CJEU over police and criminal justice judicial cooperation and which came to an end in December 2014.

This study has signalled four main challenges affecting the implementation and effective operability of EU JHA cooperation as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty:

A first challenge relates to the inconsistency emerging from differentiation and variable geometry in European cooperation. While enhanced cooperation has been used in very limited occasions, furthering differentiation in JHA through the use of ‘integration or concentric circles’ could lead to the emergence of various ‘areas’ where different degrees of freedom, security and justice would exist.

Such a fragmented picture would contravene the Treaty objective of establishing one “common Area” where EU citizens enjoy the same European standards and rights across the Union’s territory. It would also challenge the practical effectiveness of EU JHA law acquis. Furthermore, discussions on the feasibility and desirability of different paths of integration for different countries draw attention away from the fact that much remains to be done to fully implement those Treaty articles playing a key role in strengthening the commonality of the EU AFSJ.

A second challenge relates to the negative impact that ‘variable geometry’ inflicts on EU citizens and residents’ rights and freedoms. The proliferation of parallel, concentric and even competing ‘areas’ of JHA cooperation may lead to a lack of legal protection or cases of discriminatory treatment depending on which area the individual happens to be or exercise free movement EU fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should not be geographically conditioned to where an EU citizen or resident is across the EU.

Moreover, any future legislative reform or Treaty change should not leave the door open to lowering down existing EU citizenship rights and freedoms.

There are important practical issues and obstacles in the full exercise of democratic accountability throughout the application of the ordinary legislative procedure.

The last five years have demonstrated that a number of barriers still persist towards the full acceptance and recognition of the EP as co-legislator and policy-setter in AFSJ policies. A case in point is the external dimensions of JHA. Another issue relates to the actual ways in which the ordinary legislative procedure works in practice, which is often subject to flexibility, informalities (e.g. ‘trilogues’) and early compromise agreements which pose internal barriers towards transparency and accountability in legislative procedures. There is also not enough attention paid to the fundamental rights compliance of the EP’s internal legislative work and fundamental rights impact assessments in all relevant phases of the drafting of legislation.

A final challenge concerns the lack of effective instruments or mechanisms to duly safeguard the foundations of the EU AFSJ and its legal principles enshrined in Articles 2 and 6 TEU. The presumption of mutual trust between the Member States on their compliance with rule of law and fundamental rights has been increasingly at stake during the last five years of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

This is especially so in those EU JHA legal domains working on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and administrative decisions.

The EU faces a ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ consisting of the lack of an effective and legally binding monitoring/supervisory mechanism of EU Member States’ compliance with rule of law principles and fundamental rights after accession. If EU Member States cannot guarantee an independent and impartial judiciary able to test whether the EU State to which an EU citizen who is a suspect in criminal proceedings or a third country national seeking asylum are going to be sent to complies with fundamental rights, how can the principle of mutual recognition stay valid?

The Study suggests that any future legislative or Treaty change should not promote or enable further differentiation or fragmentation in the next generations of EU AFSJ cooperation. It should neither allow for restricting existing EU rights and freedoms enjoyed by European citizens and residents. The European Parliament should give priority to devising and ensuring the effective implementation of a mutual trust-building agenda in the next generations of EU AFSJ cooperation.

The agenda would focus on the following three trust enhancing policy actions:

First, implementation and evaluation: The European Parliament should focus on ways to ensure more timely, consistent and effective implementation of EU JHA legislation by EU Member States authorities. The relevant Parliament Committees could play a more actively role in following up the ways in which the Commission enforces the transposition JHA law. A new evaluation system should be developed on the basis of Article 70 TFEU to better ensure the full application of the principle of mutual recognition and strengthen mutual confidence in domains such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and asylum policies.

Second, accountability, transparency and fundamental rights: The European Parliament should adopt an internal strategy aimed at strengthening internal accountability, transparency and fundamental rights compliance in the operability of the ordinary legislative procedure and other relevant legislative processes on JHA cooperation.

Third, the rule of law: The Parliament should call for the adoption of a new ‘EU Copenhagen mechanism’ to ensure independent and regular monitoring of rule of law compliance by EU Member States after accession. This mechanism should be based on independent academic expertise.

It could be linked the monitoring processes and results of the European semester cycle on economic governance. This could take place through a ‘rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights Copenhagen Policy Cycle’ which would formalize EU inter-institutional coordination. The Parliament should play an active role. A new Copenhagen (rule of law) mechanism should not remain a purely inter-governmental process under the remits of the Council or an agreement between EU Member States. Instead it could be legally built under the current Article 7 TEU by mainly focusing on further elaborating and making more transparent the ways in which this provision is triggered by Council, Commission and/or the European Parliament.

No Treaty change would be required for such an instrument to be established. From a longer-term perspective, democratic accountability and judicial controls of such an instrument could be further ensured and formally foreseen in the Treaties, which could in turn imply Treaty change.

CAMERON’S CHATHAM HOUSE SPEECH: FULL SPEED AHEAD FOR THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE UK’S EU MEMBERSHIP?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS ON Tuesday, 10 November 2015

by Steve Peers

Today’s Chatham House speech by David Cameron set out more detail of the UK’s demands for renegotiation of its EU membership. It was accompanied by aletter from Cameron to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, which set out a summary of his requests.

The speech also set out two changes to UK law which the government plans to make, as regards the EU Charter of Rights and (possibly) the role of UK courts reviewing the EU courts. Since these are changes to domestic law, they do not have to be negotiated with other Member States, unless there is a legal argument that they would breach EU law.

This is the latest elaboration of Cameron’s requests; I have commented earlier on his specific suggestions regarding free movement of EU citizens, and regarding other issues. I will refer back to what I’ve said already in those posts where relevant.

Changes to UK law

On the first change to UK law, Cameron referred to the government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights Act and replace it with a ‘British Bill of Rights’, which (as he acknowledged) are separate from EU law as such. But he then went on to state: “And as we reform the relationship between our courts and Strasbourg, it is right that we also consider the role of the European Court of Justice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. So – as was agreed at the time of the Lisbon Treaty – we will enshrine in our domestic law that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights does not create any new rights. We will make it explicit to our courts that they cannot use the EU Charter as the basis for any new legal challenge citing spurious new human rights grounds.”

This is a new point not raised in the Chatham House speech. What should we make of it? At first sight, it is not really any different from Article 1(1) of the special Protocol on the role of the Charter in the UK and Poland, which provides:

The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.

A clause in the preamble to this Protocol provides: “WHEREAS the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create new rights or principles;”

So the Prime Minister’s commitment to change UK law could be met simply by making express reference to these provisions of the Protocol – or by incorporating their wording – in an Act of Parliament. This would simply reiterate the application of these rules to the UK, given that the Protocol already applies in UK law by virtue of the European Communities Act.

Any more far-reaching approach (such as that advocated by a House of Commons committee last year, as discussed here) would run the risk of complicated breaches of EU law. It’s impossible to say now whether that would happen or not, in the absence of any proposed legislation on this point.

For the sake of context, it should be noted that the CJEU has ruled in the NS case that the Charter did not add any rights to the ‘general principles of EU law’, which were the basis for protection of human rights in the EU legal system prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. And in Fransson, the Court ruled that the scope of the Charter (ie when it applied to Member States’ action) was the scope of the general principles. True, the Charter can be used to set aside Acts of Parliament, even by the lower UK courts, as in recent cases involving embassy staff andGoogle. But that’s true of EU law generally, including the previous general principles, as we saw in judgments like Kucukdeveci.

The Prime Minister’s second pledge was to consider whether to introduce a national check on EU measures like that asserted by the German Federal Constitutional Court, concerning the loss of ‘essential constitutional freedoms’ and the review of acts by the EU institutions to check if they remain within the scope of the EU’s powers.

Such a measure would breach EU law in principle, since the CJEU has long ruled that it is the sole judge of whether an EU law is invalid. But Cameron is correct to point out that other national constitutional courts have done the same thing. A full-bodied constitutional conflict has been avoided in practice because those other courts have been reluctant to use those powers, and because the CJEU has maintained a dialogue with them (which does not extend to agreeing with them all the time: see discussion of the recent case law on the ECB’s OMT scheme).

It should be noted that the ‘essential constitutional freedoms’ which Cameron refers to are fundamental rights as protected by the German Basic Law (the de facto German constitution). It remains to be seen whether the ‘British Bill of Rights’ which Cameron plans will protect human rights so strongly in the UK that there is any real prospect of the EU taking those rights away. If not, Cameron’s proposal looks like the constitutional equivalent of shaving all his hair off, while simultaneously insisting on the fundamental importance of his comb.

Changes to EU law Continue reading “CAMERON’S CHATHAM HOUSE SPEECH: FULL SPEED AHEAD FOR THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE UK’S EU MEMBERSHIP?”

A new wideranging EP resolution on mass surveillance in the “post Snowden” (and Schrems ) era.

Below the provisional text voted yesterday 29 October by the European Parliament on mass surveillance and violation of fundamental rights to privacy and data protection. The press has already highlighted that the EP voted by 285 to 281 to call on the member states to “drop any criminal charges against Edward Snowden, grant him protection and consequently prevent extradition or rendition by third parties, in recognition of his status as whistle-blower and international human rights defender”. Moreover the EP calls on the Commission to give consideration to the impact of the Court of Justice Safe Harbor ruling of 6 October on any other instruments for the transfer of personal data to the US and to report on the matter by the end of 2015. Very rightly the Strasbourg plenary acknowledges that the Court ruling “has confirmed the long-standing position of Parliament regarding the lack of an adequate level of protection under this instrument” so that the Commission has to “immediately take the necessary measures to ensure that all personal data transferred to the US are subject to an effective level of protection that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU”.

But here is the point : bulk collection of personal data (as foreseen by several US practices agreed with the EU in the PNR and TFTP cases) are not themselves threatening the “essence” of data protection under EU law as protected by the art.52 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights so that they are no negotiable even with the best friend and ally such the USA?

Passed by 342 votes to 274 , with 29 abstentions, this is a center-left resolution where liberals and socialists voted together but (not surprisingly) EPP and ECR voted against. In this legislature where socialists and conservatives have created a sort of “grosse Koalitionen” the text risks to be only a political gesture before the public opinion if not followed by consistent votes on the legal binding texts currently on the EP table such as the data protection reform or the transatlantic negotiations on the so called “umbrella agreement” and on “Safe Harbor”.

Moreover the text even if criticizes the European Commission as “inadequate” and evokes the possibility of a “fail to act” against it does not triggers it. The risk is then this very inspired and solid text remains a toothless tiger.. The coming weeks will show if this tiny majority will be confirmed when the post-Lisbon data protection reform will be voted.

Emilio De Capitani

European Parliament resolution of 29 October 2015 on the follow-up to the EP resolution of 12 March 2014 on the electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens (2015/2635(RSP)) Continue reading “A new wideranging EP resolution on mass surveillance in the “post Snowden” (and Schrems ) era.”

The law enforcement challenges of cybercrime: are we really playing catch-up?

FULL STUDY ( 68 pages) ACCESSIBLE HERE

Abstract : This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee. With a number of high-profile criminal cases, such as ‘Silk Road’, cybercrime has been very much in the spotlight in recent years, both in Europe and elsewhere. While this study shows that cybercrime poses significant challenges for law enforcement, it also argues that the key cybercrime concern for law enforcement is legal rather than technical and technological. The study further underlines that the European Parliament is largely excluded from policy development in the field of cybercrime, impeding public scrutiny and accountability. AUTHOR(S): Dr. Ben Hayes, Dr. Julien Jeandesboz, Dr. Francesco Ragazzi, Dr. Stephanie Simon, and Prof. Valsamis Mitsilegas.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cybercrime has become one of the key priorities for EU law enforcement agencies, as demonstrated by the establishment of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in January 2013 and the development of specific European threat assessment reports in this field. High-profile criminal investigations such as the ‘Silk Road’ case, major data breaches or particularly nefarious hacks or malware attacks have been very much in the spotlight and widely reported in the media, prompting discussions and debates among policymakers and in law enforcement circles. Over the last few months, the cybercrime debate has specifically evolved around the issue of encryption and anonymisation.

In this context, this Study argues that debates on the law enforcement challenge of cybercrime in the EU should steer clear both of doomsday scenarios that overstate the problem and scepticism that understates it, and that the key cybercrime concern for law enforcement is legal in nature rather than simply technical and technological. Indeed, the Study finds that the key challenge for law enforcement is the lack of an effective legal framework for operational activities that guarantees the fundamental rights principles enshrined in EU primary and secondary law.

In order to address this core argument, this Study starts by analysing claims and controversies over the Internet ‘going dark’ on law enforcement (Section 2). It shows that these claims have been made for quite some time and should be considered as moral panics rather than accurate reflections of the challenges posed by cybercrime to law enforcement. Moreover, current controversies rehash older ones, conflating law enforcement concerns with intelligence-gathering and surveillance concerns. Without denying the fact that criminal activities do take place online, pose technical difficulties to law enforcement services and require the availability of specific capabilities, this section demonstrates that these difficulties do not impede criminal investigation to such an extent that exceptional means should be envisaged. While these technical aspects need to be considered, they raise issues related to policy and law rather than technology as such. The policy and law-related challenges are made greater by the fact that defining cybercrime is not an easy task. Very broad definitions have been adopted at the EU level, often leading to overlapping and sometimes conflicting mandates.

Section 3 thus analyses the institutional architecture of EU cybercrime policy. It shows that the complexity of cybercrime measures and the expansive mandates and number of actors involved in their implementation make it difficult to ascertain and circumscribe the full scope of EU cybercrime policy. Whereas the Council of Europe (CoE) sought to codify cybercrime powers into an international convention, much of the EU’s policy to fight cybercrime is based on non-legislative measures, including operational cooperation and ad hoc public-private partnerships. Furthermore, important distinctions and restrictions designed to ensure a ‘separation of powers’ between state agencies concerned with law enforcement (cyber-policing), civil protection (cybersecurity), national security (cyber-espionage) and military force (offensive cyber capabilities) are harder to distinguish in the area of cybercrime, at both national and EU level. Section 3 underlines that, within this complex architecture, and with the blurring of the boundaries between those responsible for policing the Internet, for gathering intelligence from it, for conducting cyber-espionage against foreign targets, and for ensuring the safety of critical internet infrastructure, the European Parliament and civil society are largely excluded from policy development, impeding public scrutiny and accountability. This compounds the EP’s existing problems in ensuring that fundamental rights and data protection are diligently protected in the area of justice and home affairs.

In light of these gaps in oversight and accountability, Section 4 analyses in particular the challenge of jurisdiction, cooperation and fundamental rights safeguards. This section argues that operational challenges in cybercrime law enforcement do not change the obligation of EU institutions and Member States to ensure the safeguarding of EU fundamental rights in any operating framework of internal or transnational cooperation in law enforcement and criminal justice. Cybercrime law enforcement frequently cites the challenge of accessing and transferring data through existing Mutual Legal Assistance agreements. Yet practices taken outside of established legal channels cannot guarantee rights protections and run the risk of raising mistrust in the general public, the private sector and in transatlantic relations. Furthermore, across the spectrum of cybercrime prevention, investigation, and prosecution, the particular geography of the digital environment is said to complicate the traditional territorial foundations of law. Law enforcement bodies make continuous reference to the ways in which traditional legal structures stand in the way of operations. However, an updated legal framework designed to overcome these challenges should foreground fundamental rights concerns, which are essential to ensure due process and a necessary condition for the successful prosecution of cybercriminal offences.

In light of these findings, the Study concludes with key recommendations for the European Parliament.

In particular, to ensure that the Parliament is not marginalised altogether with respect to the implementation and review of EU cybercrime policies by the exercise of delegated powers, EU agency discretion and non-legislative decision-making bodies, further monitoring of EU council structures, Europol and international cooperation agreements is required (Recommendation 1).

Moreover, the EP should ensure that the development of any cooperation/information-sharing framework guarantees the respect of fundamental rights (Recommendation 2).

In light of the current discussions on a revised CoE Cybercrime Convention, the European Parliament should, further, ensure that the Convention’s obligations are consistent with EU law and fundamental rights protections (Recommendation 3).

The EP must also ensure that cybercrime is not used as a justification to undermine new information security protocols and the right to privacy in telecommunications, both of which are fundamental components of the functioning of the Internet (Recommendation 4).

Finally, if European law enforcement agencies need to keep pace with technological change, it is imperative that training courses on cybercrime forensics and digital evidence include an applied fundamental rights component (Recommendation 5).

Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses

FULL STUDY ( 152 pages) ACCESSIBLE HERE

This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee. It sets out to develop a better understanding of the main cybersecurity threats and existing cybersecurity capabilities in the European Union and the United States. The study further examines transnational cooperation and explores perceptions of the effectiveness of the EU response, pinpointing remaining challenges and suggesting avenues for improvement. AUTHORS : Dr Nicole van der Meulen, Eun A Jo and Stefan Soesanto (RAND Europe)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Commission published the European Union Cyber Security Strategy along with the accompanying proposal for a Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive in 2013. Since the proposal was published, the cybersecurity landscape has continued to evolve, leading to questions regarding the nature and seriousness of the cyberthreats faced by the European Union (EU), the capabilities of Member States to manage these threats and respond to incidents, and the effectiveness of these capabilities. At the time of writing, discussions about the content and scope of the proposed NIS Directive are continuing. This study of cybersecurity threats in the EU was commissioned by the European Parliament (EP). It has five objectives:

To identify key cyberthreats facing the EU and the challenges associated with their identification.
To identify the main cybersecurity capabilities in the EU.
To identify the main cybersecurity capabilities in the United States (US).
To assess the current state of transnational cooperation.
To explore perceptions of the effectiveness of the current EU response.

Defining cybersecurity

Any study of cybersecurity must reflect on the challenges introduced by the different meanings of the term. There is no consensus on a standard or universally accepted definition of cybersecurity. The term cybersecurity has roots in information security but is now used to refer to a broader range of issues, linked to national security. The observation that cybersecurity means different things to different people is not without its consequences. How the issue is framed influences what constitutes a threat as well as what counter-measures are needed and justified.

Mapping cybersecurity threats

The study team’s analysis of six threat assessments¹ and an existing meta-analysis carried about by Gehem et al. (2015) highlight the difficulty with systematically comparing threat assessments and gauging the reliability of data and findings on the basis of which threat assessments are conducted. The challenge rests in part in the absence of a commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a threat and the variation in the methodology and metrics used for threat assessments. Moreover, some threat assessments reference or are based on other threat assessments, rather than original sources, leading to potential duplication of findings and lack of clarity about the evidence underlying threat assessments. As a result, there is no clearly established framework to classify and map threats.

The study team created a framework for mapping threats. The framework distinguishes:

Threat actors: states, profit-driven cybercriminals, and hacktivists and extremists.
Threat tools: malware and its variants, such as (banking) Trojans, ransomware, point-of-sale malware, botnets and exploits.
Threat types: unauthorised access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information and denial of service.

The mapping of the cyberthreat landscape through the review of the six threat assessments was complemented by a discussion on the varying perceptions of the severity of threats and the concept of‘threat inflation’.

Cybersecurity capabilities in the EU

To respond to the evolving threat in the area of cybersecurity, the EU has aimed to provide an overarching response through the publication of the EU Cyber Security Strategy together with the proposed NIS Directive. The Strategy identifies five objectives including:

Achieving cyberresilience.
Drastically reducing cybercrime.
Developing cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Developing the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity.
Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU and promote core EU values.

This study focuses on providing a descriptive overview of capabilities for the first three objectives. Capabilities for the purposes of this study have been operationalised as institutional structures, such as agencies and departments.

In the area of cyberresilience, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is the primary player at the EU level. ENISA is tasked with addressing the existing fragmentation in the European approach to cybersecurity, namely by bridging the capability gaps of its Member States. In the cybercrime domain, the European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) serves as a European cybercrime platform. Besides combatting cybercrime, EC3 also gathers cyberintelligence and serves as an intermediary among various stakeholders, such as law enforcement authorities, Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), industry and academia.
In the area of cyberdefence, the European Defence Agency (EDA) supports the capability development necessary to implement the Strategy. Its most apparent activities remain in research and development and designing a common crisis response platform. Given that foreign and defence policies have conventionally been areas of domestic competence, it is understandable that EU-wide cyberdefence capabilities have developed at a different pace compared to the other two objectives, cyberresilience and cybercrime.

Cybersecurity capabilities in the US

Cybercapabilities in the US are challenging to map in a comprehensive manner. The tendency to layer initiatives and agencies makes navigating the different components difficult. For the purposes of a high-level comparison with the EU cyber capabilities, the study focuses on key institutional players and their roles in relation to three strategic priorities: cyberresilience, cybercrime and cyberdefence.

In the area of cyberresilience, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the formal leader. The DHS is responsible for securing federal civilian government networks, protecting critical infrastructure and responding to cyberthreats.
In the area of cybercrime, the US has not designated any lead investigative agency. Instead, numerous federal law enforcement agencies combat cybercrime in their own capacity. These include the US Secret Service (USSS) and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Cyber Crimes Center, which are both agencies within the DHS. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s cyberdivision is also involved.
In cyberdefence, the Department of Defence (DoD) plays a leading role. It is readily apparent from the DoD’s multiple publications that the US has become more open about its capabilities and willing to name its adversaries. The DoD is also increasingly encompassing in its response to cyberthreats over time, investing in both defensive as well as offensive cybercapabilities, as detailed in its cyberdefence strategy published in April 2015. Commentators note that deterrence is a key characteristic of the US cyberdefence strategy.

Transnational cooperation

The necessity to engage in transnational cooperation to counter the complex challenge posed by cybercrime is widely recognised both inside and outside the EU. Transnational cooperation exists at both the strategic and the operational level. The EU-US Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime is an example of strategic cooperation and is the first transatlantic dialogue to tackle common challenges in the area of cybercrime and cybersecurity. On an operational level, transnational cooperation has manifested through a range of activities, from botnet takedown to disruption of underground forums.

Challenges, however, remain in the area of combatting cybercrime as identified by the study team through the interviews. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are widely regarded as outdated and obstacles to effective and timely information sharing. Further, the importance of acquiring data for investigations is debated among law enforcement agencies and civil society groups. Deconfliction – avoiding the duplication or conflict of efforts – is another challenge. Due to the involvement of various stakeholders, cooperation is essential to avoid potentially disrupting others’ efforts. The draft Europol Regulation contains provisions that interviewees have reported could complicate the attainment of information from the private sector, possibly obstructing future operations.²

Effectiveness of the EU response

Ideally, capabilities respond directly to threats and the effectiveness of the EU response can be measured by noticeable changes in the threat landscape. However, such an assessment is not feasible; there is not enough information available in the public domain and measurement problems persist. Moreover, the EU response is still very much in development and geared towards addressing fragmentation in its approach to cybersecurity, as well as the approach taken by the 28 Member States. This consists of harmonising strategies and standards and coordinating regulatory interventions, as well as facilitating (or more precisely, requiring) information sharing and gap closures between Member States. Due to the inherently relative nature of cybersecurity and the challenges associated with attaining cyberresilience, it is difficult to state whether the new initiatives have been successful. Given these challenges to measuring effectiveness, the study team explored perceptions about the effectiveness of the EU response based on existing commentary and supplemented with interviewees’ responses.

The first key finding in relation to the perceived effectiveness of the EU response is that while there is still fragmentation, there is also discernible improvement. Particularly noteworthy is the strategic cooperation agreement between ENISA and EC3, which aims to facilitate closer cooperation and the exchange of expertise. However, questions remain about fragmentation, especially with respect to the proposed NIS Directive. Various points of dissension remain as the trilogue negotiations between the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union continue. Moreover, fragmentation is notable not only in terms of operational capabilities but also in terms of Member States’ understanding of the cyberdomain. Bridging these gaps will therefore require technical support as well as strategic guidance.

The second finding is that differences in opinion persist as to whether the overall approach to cybersecurity should be voluntary and informal or mandatory and formal. For example, the CERT community, which has conventionally relied on voluntary participation and cooperation between private and public entities, appears less willing to move to a system in which information sharing is mandatory. In contrast, other security agencies favour law enforcement and support more stringent requirements, for instance in information sharing, as they believe voluntary reporting has failed.

Third, as the new approach proposed through the Strategy and the draft NIS Directive is largely regulatory in nature, the issue of scope – in terms of the entities formally included as having a role in cybersecurity – is heightened and contested. One issue is whether Internet service providers (ISPs) should be included. These scoping challenges are likely to exacerbate existing contentions surrounding the NIS Directive and call into question whether the present regulatory approach is appropriate to secure European cyberspace.

Policy options

Based on this study’s findings the research team suggests the following policy options for the European Parliament’s consideration in terms of EU action on cybersecurity. Each option is elaborated in the Conclusion.

Encourage ENISA, EC3 and others involved in European cyberthreat assessments to investigate further harmonisation of threat assessments, which can effectively incorporate information from Member States and other EU agencies and provide clearer indications of the evidence base for the assessment. This recommendation follows from the findings from the review of threat assessments undertaken for this study.
Make use of existing structures as much as possible. One of the concerns identified by the study team – from a review of existing literature and in interviews with experts – was the tendency of the Commission to develop new structures and exclude existing initiatives and agencies.
Consider reinserting law enforcement in the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The attempt to overcome fragmentation at the EU level is hampered by the exclusion of law enforcement from provisions in the proposed NIS Directive.
Ensure Europol has speedy and more direct access to information from the private sector. Speedy access to relevant information from the private sector is essential for Europol to combat transnational cybercrime. There is potential for this access to be hindered by having to go through the Member States, which may reduce the effectiveness of Europol’s operations, especially as Europol cooperates with partners at the transnational level.
Assess what capability gaps actually exist between the Member States and measure progress. Despite the claims about gaps between Member States, our research suggests that there is very little empirical evidence to indicate which States are more advanced than others and in what areas. To improve this situation and to develop a better understanding of these gaps, ranking Member States and identifying areas of improvement could be made more explicit.

…continue reading

NOTES

1 (ACSC: Threat Report; BSI: State of IT Security Germany; ENISA: Threat Landscape (ETL); Europol: Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA); NCSC: Cyber Security Threat Assessment the Netherlands (CSAN); Verizon: Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR).
2 European Parliament. 2014b. Legislative resolution of 25 February 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA. P7_TA(2014)0121 (COM(2013)0173 – C7-0094/2013 – 2013/0091(COD)). As of 12 October 2015: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-0121&language=EN&ring=A7-2014-0096

Meijers Committee : Accommodating British EU-demands and democratic change of the Treaties

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE ON 28 October 2015

Introduction

In recent years, the British government has repeatedly expressed concerns about current EU law and suggested particular changes. Some of these changes require amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). According to public sources, the European Council asked David Cameron to present his particular proposals in writing four weeks in advance of the European Council of 17/18 December 2015. It is not certain that those proposals will be made publicly available.

An agreement by the Heads of Government to change the Treaties, would give rise to serious concerns over legality, transparency, parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The Meijers Committee argues that the European Council should not be the exclusive forum to consider changes to the Treaties in an effort to accommodate British political demands. The Meijers Committee stresses that national parliaments, the European Parliament and, possibly, a Convention have a role to play and should not be left out of the current negotiations only to be confronted later on with a political agreement cast in stone.

This note describes the proper procedures by which the EU treaties can be amended and explains why a European Council or Head of Government agreement would be void or unlawful. In addition, the reforms of one of the substantive policy areas, free movement law, are analysed on the basis of specific proposals formulated by British Ministers over the past year.¹ At the European Councils of 25/26 June and 15 October 2015 Mr Cameron raised this issue and it was decided that it would be further discussed in December.² After the June European Council, Mr Cameron announced that the UK is seeking changes under three other headings as well: sovereignty of Member States (no longer ‘an ever closer union’ and more influence of national parliaments), fairness (the interests of Member States not participating in the Euro should be “more fairly balanced”) and on competiveness of the EU.

European Council agreement to amend the Treaties

Continue reading “Meijers Committee : Accommodating British EU-demands and democratic change of the Treaties”

Les migrants en situation irrégulière, sujets d’une discrimination légale : l’exemple du droit à la liberté et à la sûreté

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE ON 19 OCTOBER 2015

Par Chloé Peyronnet, EDP (Lyon)

Pendant que la « crise » des réfugiés occupe l’agenda politique et médiatique européen, la politique de retour de l’Union européenne continue à s’appliquer aux migrants non éligibles à une protection internationale. La directive 2008/115/CE a fait l’objet d’une nouvelle décision préjudicielle en interprétation (C-290/14). Cette dernière confirme une ligne jurisprudentielle faisant primer une conception sécuritaire de l’effet utile sur les droits fondamentaux des intéressés, en l’occurrence le droit à la liberté et à la sûreté. Victimes d’un déni d’habeas corpus, parfois d’une double-peine et pouvant cumuler les statuts de non-éloignables et d’indésirables, les migrants en situation irrégulière se voient appliqué un droit à la liberté et à la sûreté amputé qui s’avère de facto discriminatoire.

En janvier 2015, le nombre de morts en mer Méditerranée est devenu trop important pour être ignoré. Depuis lors, le sort des migrants sans-papiers cherchant à regagner le territoire des États-membres de l’Union européenne semble être au centre de l’attention médiatico-politique. En réalité, malgré l’emploi fréquent du terme générique de « migrants », seuls les demandeurs d’asile ont l’heur d’être placés sous le feu des projecteurs. Les migrants familiaux, les migrants économiques et les migrants potentiellement éligibles à une protection internationale dont ils ne peuvent faire la demande sont de facto exclus du paysage journalistique et de l’agenda gouvernemental. Sans s’attarder sur l’extrême porosité des situations humaines recouvertes par ces catégories juridiques, l’on peut d’ores et déjà souligner que les problématiques de la gestion de l’immigration irrégulière n’ont pas disparu avec l’augmentation massive du nombre de demandeurs d’asile (qui, par définition, ne peuvent être qualifiés de migrants irréguliers tant que leur demande n’a pas été définitivement rejetée). En effet, dans le cadre de l’espace Schengen, tout migrant sans-papiers qui n’a pas obtenu de protection internationale est en situation irrégulière et a dès lors vocation à être « retourné » vers le territoire d’un Etat tiers, qu’il s’agisse de son Etat d’origine ou d’un Etat lié par un accord de réadmission avec l’Union européenne ou l’un de ses Etats membres.

Au sein de l’espace Schengen, une harmonisation minimale a été réalisée par la directive 2008/115/CE du 16 décembre 2008 (directive « retour »), dont l’article 15 encadre la « rétention à des fins d’éloignement » (qualifiée en droit français de « rétention administrative »). Cette privation de liberté, qui se singularise par son appartenance à la matière administrative, est applicable aux migrants en situation irrégulière faisant l’objet d’une procédure de retour (initiée en droit français par une obligation de quitter le territoire français ou une mesure d’expulsion). Exclue de la matière pénale avec la bénédiction de la Cour EDH, cette mesure est une éloquente illustration des « discriminations légales » dont font l’objet les migrants en situation irrégulière quant à la protection de leurs droits fondamentaux, dont la vocation universelle s’avère parfois chimérique.

Entre déni d’habeas corpus et double peine Continue reading “Les migrants en situation irrégulière, sujets d’une discrimination légale : l’exemple du droit à la liberté et à la sûreté”

“Foreign Fighters” and EU implementation of the UNSC resolution 2178. Another case of “Legislate in haste, repent at leisure…” ? (2)

by Dalila DELORENZI (FREE Group Trainee – Original in Italian)

1. Foreword
As the hostilities in Syria and Iraq continue and terrorism activities worldwide seem to be on the rise, EU Member States are increasingly confronted with the problem of aspiring and returning ‘foreign fighters’ as described already in this blog HERE. More precisely, in the EU the term is used to indicate European citizens who, after leaving to join jihadist groups, may have become further radicalised and acquired combat experience, and therefore be capable of carrying out deadly terrorist attacks once they return to Europe.

Such phenomenon is anything but new; however, its scale certainly is: as illustrated by the rise of the terrorist group calling itself “Islamic state”, the phenomenon has acquired an entirely new dimension – according to the EU intelligence sources 19% of the total fighters originated from the EU.

It explains then the wide perception of these individuals as a serious threat to the security of both individual Member States and the EU as a whole – especially in the aftermath of the recent terrorist attacks occurred in Brussels[1], Paris[2], Copenhagen[3].

Broadly speaking , a different way to envision human mobility and checks at external borders of Schengen has come to light. Whereas initially, they were rather conceived to protect the Schengen area from threats coming from country outside the Schengen zone, now such threat to security is deemed to be already inside the EU, due to the fact that most of the time militants returning to Europe possess the nationality of a Member State.

2. EU response Continue reading ““Foreign Fighters” and EU implementation of the UNSC resolution 2178. Another case of “Legislate in haste, repent at leisure…” ? (2)”