The new guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: some critical comments

by Emilio De Capitani

In the coming days the European Council will debate and adopt the long awaited Guidelines which will shape the future of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for forthcoming years. These guidelines follow the end of the current Stockholm Programme (2009-2014) and come near the end of the last transitional period for the measures adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (what remains of the former intergovernmental ‘third pillar’ cooperation).

Regrettably the draft European Council Conclusions which have been circulated (see the Annex below) and the programme of the incoming “trio” Presidencies (Italian, Latvian and Luxembourg) which will implement them in the next 18 months confirm the worst provisions detailed in our previous post on this issue.

If anyone was searching for proof that European Strategies lack political vision and are a collection of bureaucratic and diplomatic choices, he or she will find in these documents the confirmation of this thesis.

The emphasis of the European Council on the external dimension of the justice and home affairs polices by privileging soft law instruments such as the Global Approach on Migration or instruments such as mobility partnerships confirm two emerging trends since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty :
– to transfer to the European Council the main EU political choices in the last area where the treaties still do not grant and effective parliamentary and judicial control.
– to continue to avoid legally binding measures on which solidarity mechanisms can be established (Schengen, Frontex, and Eurosur being the exceptions which confirm the rule).

Rhetorical declarations aside, the draft European Council guidelines confirm the choice for general (and generic) strategies such as the Internal security strategy or the anti-drugs strategy which are adopted without any debate between the European Council members nor with the European Parliament.
These Strategies should then be implemented by the so called “Policy Cycle” where EU agencies and the Member States representatives – instead of verifying their consistency with national internal security strategies deciding which areas the EU’s intervention could add value in – pick and choose (on voluntary basis) some priorities which are approved without debate (as point A) by their ministers without (again) any European or national parliamentary debate.

Where choices and priorities are instead very clearly stated is on the role of the EU Agencies (Europol, Eurojust, EASO..) and bodies (the Anti Terrorism Coordinator) or where it is decided to go on with the establishment of an ambitious technocratic project such as the “smart borders” system (the feasibility of which is still to be proved even in the United States).
Follows the same logic the creation of an entry-exit system for third country nationals to control better the problems of the “over stayers” (those who remain after their initial permitted period of stay runs out) which apparently is one of the most dangerous threats to the EU. Needless to say that this idea is not new as it was raised by the US Congress years ago and was considered “silly” in the US also by the former Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff under the BUSH administration.

Even worse, both the European Council draft Conclusions and the trio Presidency programme insist as one of their big priorities is the establishment of a “bona fide traveller” system which will discriminate between one traveller and another on the basis of de facto arbitrary criteria. They also reinstate their commitment to the creation of a European passenger name record (PNR) system.

All these projects have in common the rather paranoic idea that any traveller is a potential danger. This is appalling in an European Union where there is still no permanent connection between the criminal records of the Member States, so that information on real criminals could be shared by triggering adequate measures in all the EU territory. This should already happen in the Schengen framework but, obviously, only if law enforcement authority take advantage of the alerts. The fact that the author of the recent attack to Jewish Museum in Brussels was freely circulating even after been checked twice as a dangerous person on the Schengen information System is not reassuring and prove once again that the security weaknesses do not lie in the lack of personal data but in the lack of police cooperation.

Selling out, for a false sense of security, the real fundamental rights of EU citizens, cannot be the real answer to the threats the EU will face in the coming years.

These inconsistencies can be solved by overcoming the ‘silo’ approach inside and between the MS and by better framing with a legislative measure the policy cooperation between the Member States (which still do not trust each other). True efficiency should then be measured if the threats are really supranational.

Even a project like PNR could have its (crazy) logic if somewhere in Europe there were a central intelligence system which could filter these data against a massive intelligence analysis and profile, as happens in the USA. But as it has been designed, PNR will be only a policy laundering exercise where the European Union legislation is adopted to justify the collection of massive personal data at national level. Should we remember that only on April 8th the Data retention directive, which followed the same logic, wasannulled by the CJEU as a clear violation of the proportionality principle and of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter?

The point is that selling out the personal data of EU citizens appears to the European Council less costly than building a real binding framework for police cooperation on the basis of Article 87 of the TFEU.
The proof is given by the new Europol whose proposed legal basis (after amendments during negotiations) makes no more reference to Article 87 TFEU and which does not compel the Member States to share their security related informations.

These being the worrying projects on the European Council and Council side one can only hope that the newly elected European Parliament, in its July session, will challenge them and take the lead for a new alternative and legally sound policy which can shape in the next legislature an European area of Freedom, Security and Justice where the citizens’ needs and not the administrations will be the real compass.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25, chapter 26

Annex – Draft European Council Guidelines (published on Statewatch)

1. One of the key objectives of the Union is to build an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders, with full respect for fundamental rights. To this end, coherent policy measures need to be taken with respect to asylum, immigration, borders, police and judicial cooperation.

2. All the dimensions of a Europe that protects its citizens and offers effective rights to people inside and outside the Union are interlinked. The success or failure in one field depends on the performance in the other fields as well as on synergies with related policy areas. The answer to many of the challenges in the area of freedom, security and justice lies in relations with third countries, which calls for improving the link between the EU’s internal and external policies. This has to be reflected in the internal organisation of the EU institutions and bodies. Coordination with and within the Member States should be stepped up.

3. Building on the past programmes, the overall priority is now to consistently transpose, effectively implement and consolidate the legal instruments and policy measures in place. Intensifying operational cooperation, enhancing the role of the different EU agencies and ensuring the strategic use of EU funds will be key. In further developing the area of freedom, security and justice over the next years, it will be crucial to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, including data protection, whilst addressing security concerns, also in relations with third countries, and to adopt a strong EU General Data Protection framework by 2015.

4. Faced with challenges such as instability in many parts of the world as well as global demographic trends, an ageing population and skills shortages in Europe, the Union needs an efficient and well-managed migration and asylum policy. A comprehensive approach is required, optimizing the benefits of legal migration and offering protection to those in need while tackling irregular migration resolutely.

5. To remain an attractive destination for talents and skills, Europe must compete in the global race for talent. Strategies to maximise the opportunities of legal migration should be developed, including the streamlining of existing rules and a dialogue with the business community. The Union should also support Member States’ efforts for active integration policies which foster social cohesion and economic dynamism.

6. The Union’s commitment to international protection requires a strong European asylum policy based on the Treaty’s principles of solidarity and responsibility. The full transposition and effective implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is an absolute priority. This should result in high common standards and stronger cooperation, creating a level playing field where asylum seekers are given the same procedural guarantees and protection throughout the Union. It should go hand in hand with a reinforced role of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), particularly in promoting the uniform application of the acquis. Converging practices will enhance mutual trust and allow to move to future next steps, including mutual recognition of asylum decisions.

7. Addressing the root causes of irregular migration flows is an essential part of the EU migration policy. It is imperative to avoid the loss of lives of migrants undertaking hazardous journeys as well as to prevent and reduce irregular migration. A sustainable solution can only be found by intensifying cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Migration policies must become a much stronger integral part of the Union’s external and development policies, applying the more for more principle and building on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. The focus should be on the following elements:
– strengthening and expanding Regional Protection Programmes, in particular in the Horn of Africa, in close collaboration with UNHCR. In view of the protracted crisis in Syria, increase contributions to global resettlement efforts;
– addressing smuggling and trafficking in human beings more forcefully, with a focus on priority countries and routes. Particular attention should go at present to the situation in Eritrea and the Sinai;
– establishing an effective common return policy and enforcement of readmission agreements;
– fully implementing the actions identified by the Task Force Mediterranean.

8. The establishment of the Schengen zone, allowing people to travel without internal border controls, and the increasing numbers of people travelling to the EU require efficient management of the EU’s external borders to ensure strong protection. This is in the first place the role of the Member States, which must fully take their responsibilities. At the same time the Union must mobilize all the tools at its disposal to support them in this task. To this end:
– the integrated management of the external borders should be modernised to ensure smart border management with an entry-exit system and registered travellers programme and helped by the new Agency for Large Scale IT systems (EU-LISA);
– Frontex, spearheading European solidarity in the area of border control, should reinforce its activities in terms of operational assistance and increase its reactivity towards rapid evolutions in migration flows, making full use of the new European Border Surveillance System EUROSUR;
– the possibility of setting up a European System of Border Guards to enhance the control and surveillance capabilities at our external borders should be explored.
At the same time, the common visa policy needs to be modernised by facilitating legitimate travelling while maintaining a high level of security and implementing the new Schengen governance system.

9. It is essential to guarantee a genuine area of security to European citizens by preventing and combatting organised crime, human trafficking and corruption. At the same time, an effective EU Counter terrorism policy is needed, whereby all relevant actors work closely together, integrating the internal and external aspects of the fight against terrorism. In this context, the European Council reaffirms the role of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. In its fight against organised crime and terrorism, the Union should back the national authorities by mobilising all instruments of judicial and police cooperation, with a reinforced coordination role for Europol and Eurojust, including through:
– the review of the internal security strategy;
– the improvement of cross-border information exchanges, including on criminal records;
– the development of a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity and cybercrime;
– the prevention of radicalisation and extremism and addressing the phenomenon of foreign fighters, including through a legal instrument allowing for EU wide alerts.

10. The smooth functioning of a true European area of justice with respect of the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States is vital for the EU. In this regard, mutual trust in each other’s justice systems should be further enhanced. A sound European justice policy will contribute to economic growth by helping businesses and consumers to benefit from a reliable business environment within the internal market. Further action is required to:
– promote the consistency and clarity of EU legislation for citizens and businesses;
-simplify access to justice; promote effective remedies and use of technological innovations including the use of e-justice;
– examine the reinforcement of the rights of persons, notably vulnerable persons, in civil procedures to facilitate enforcement of judgements in family law and in civil and commercial matters;
– enhance mutual recognition of decisions and judgments in civil and criminal matters;
– reinforce exchanges of information between the authorities of the Member States;
– fight fraudulent behaviour and damages to the EU budget by advancing negotiations on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office;
– facilitate cross-border activities and operational cooperation;
– enhance training for practitioners;
– mobilise the expertise of relevant EU agencies such as Eurojust and the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).

11. As one of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union, the right of EU citizens to move freely and reside and work in other Member States needs to be protected, including against possible abuse or fraudulent claims.

12. The European Council calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure the appropriate legislative and operational follow-up to these guidelines and will hold a mid-term review in 2017.

The reform of Europol: modern EU agency, or intergovernmental dinosaur?

(ORIGINAL PUBLISHED on EU LAW ANALYSIS)

by Steve PEERS

Introduction

The EU’s police cooperation agency, Europol, has played a major role in the development of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation in the EU from an early stage. Europol was originally set up informally, then on the basis of a 1995 Convention, subsequently replaced by a Council Decision in 2009. While its powers have gradually been expanded, so has the controversy about its accountability and the adequacy of its data protection rules. Since it is a creature of the former ‘third pillar’ (the previous special rules on policing and criminal law) it is something of a ‘dinosaur’ in institutional terms, being an essentially intergovernmental body.

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament (EP) now has joint powers with the Council as regards the adoption of a Regulation governing Europol, and the Treaty now refers expressly to the importance of ensuring accountability to both national parliaments and the EP. Furthermore, the EU institutions agreed in 2012 a ‘Common Understanding’ on standard rules which would apply to the governance of EU agencies. To expand Europol’s powers further, while addressing the issues of governance, accountability and data protection, the Commission proposed a new Regulation reconstituting Europol in 2013.

At the most recent Justice and Home Affairs Council, ministers agreed the Council’s position on the Commission’s proposal. Since the European Parliament also recently agreed its own position, this clears the way for negotiations to take place between the two institutions for a final deal, once the EP is fully operational again following the recent elections. This is therefore a good time to examine the progress of discussions on the proposed Regulation so far.

It should be noted that Ireland has opted in to this proposed Regulation, while the UK and Denmark have opted out. The UK’s objections are due to the proposals to place national law enforcement bodies to comply with Europol’s requests to start investigations, and to supply information to Europol without a national security exception. However, as discussed further below, the Council’s and EP’s positions on the proposal address these issues, raising the possibility that the UK will opt in after adoption of the Regulation.

Europol’s powers
Continue reading “The reform of Europol: modern EU agency, or intergovernmental dinosaur?”

The European Investigation Order: shaping a new approach to mutual recognition in criminal matters.

By Steve PEERS (*) and Emilio DE CAPITANI (**)

The adoption of Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order (EIO) is a milestone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the European Union notably after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and of the EU Charter. This post focusses in turn on the broader legal context of the new Directive, its territorial scope in light of various opt-outs, and its important provisions on the relationship between human rights and mutual recognition.

A comprehensive single instrument

As from 22 May 2017, this Directive replaces most of the existing laws in a key area of judicial cooperation – the transfer of evidence between Member States in criminal cases – by a single new instrument which will make trans-border investigations faster and more efficient.
That current patchwork of rules comprises:
– the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 (and its two additional protocols);
– parts of the Schengen Convention;
– the 2000 EU Convention on Mutual assistance in criminal matters (and its Protocol);
– the 2008 Framework Decision on the European evidence warrant;[i] and
– the 2003 Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence (as regards freezing of evidence).

Unlike the European Evidence Warrant, which most Member States thought was useless and have not bothered to implement, the new Directive will cover almost all investigative measures such as interviewing witnesses, obtaining of information or evidence already in the possession of the executing authority, and (with additional safeguards) interception of telecommunications, and information on and monitoring of bank accounts.
The Directive will not apply to Schengen cross-border surveillance by police officers under the Schengen Convention, or to the setting up of a joint investigation team and the gathering of evidence within such a team which. According to the legislator, these issues “require specific rules which are better dealt with separately”.

A small part of the previous Conventions will remain in force because they regulate issues outside the scope of investigations, such as compensation for wrongful conviction. A handbook for practitioners will clarify this issue in future.

Territorial scope

Continue reading “The European Investigation Order: shaping a new approach to mutual recognition in criminal matters.”

Access to documents: the Council might not implement a key CJEU judgment

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON “EU LAW ANALYSIS”
by Professor Steve PEERS

Monday, 19 May 2014

The EU is often accused by critics of a lack of openness and transparency – and often such criticisms are justified. This is particularly the case as regards the EU legislative process. In principle, this process ought to resemble the open process seen in national legislatures, with full public access to the drafts of legislation that passes through the legislative chamber(s).

However, despite the adoption of a general Regulation on access to documents in 2001, this aspect (among others) of EU transparency is problematic.
The reason for this is that, within the Council, some Member States wish to keep their positions secret, at least while the negotiations are ongoing. Of course, this profoundly undermines the argument that citizens of each Member States, via national parliaments, can hold each individual government accountable for its action within the Council. For some Member States, though, accountability would bring embarrassment.

The CJEU, in accordance with its prior case law emphasising the importance of transparency in the EU legislative process, ruled in the Open Access Info judgment last year that the names of Member States in principle had to be released to the public.

This ruling would seem to be straightforward enough. But the Council is trying to wriggle out of it.

According to an internal Council document discussed by Member States’ EU ambassadors (Coreper) last week, the Council is considering three options:
– referring always to Member State positions;
– making no reference to Member State positions;
– or continuing an unsystematic approach to this issue.

The first option (full transparency) is rejected, because it sometimes this will not be ‘appropriate’, ie it might embarrass Member States. The second option is rejected, because it will be useful to have a record of Member States’ positions. So the suggestion is for the third option.

If this third option is chosen, what seems likely to result is that whenever a Member State believes that its position might be embarrassing, it will ask that there should be no listing of its name in the footnotes.

Moreover, the Council document does not foresee any active transparency, ie disclosing a document with Member States’ positions as soon as it is drawn up.

The new rules (when agreed) will only apply to documents when an individual requests a copy of them. By the time that the Council replies to such a request, discussions on a particular issue could have moved on and so there will not be an opportunity to have a public debate on whether a particular Member State’s position is justified.

So the whole process of challenging the Council in Court as regards this crucial aspect of EU legislative decision-making is ultimately likely to have only limited practical effect.

Perhaps the next step in this battle will have to be non-judicial: either a demand by the European Parliament that the Council open up its legislative proceedings further (or at the very least, that both institutions open up the secretive ‘trialogue’ process); or a complaint to the European Ombudsman that the Council should proactively make all its legislative documents public without individual request.
(NDR Emphasized by me)

‘The next Justice and Home Affairs programme: will it be fit for purpose?’

By Henri LABAYLE , Steve PEERS and Emilio DE CAPITANI

“If a man does not know what port is he steering for, no wind is favourable to him” (Seneca)

Soon to be debated by Coreper (the Member States’ representatives to the EU), the Greek Council Presidency proposals (see here) on the future European Council guidelines on the post-Stockholm Programme in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) are quite disappointing , if not even disturbing.
Back in Tampere in 1999, the European Council (the heads of state and government of Member States) succeeded in the double challenge of framing their internal security in a supranational dimension by preserving at the same time the smooth evolution of the EU machinery. That spirit now seems far away.
Quite on the contrary, the perspective proposed by the Council Presidency looks rather surreal, if not disconnected from reality.
This is probably not a coincidence, so we have to consider that such a blindness is a deliberate choice, leading us to wonder , as it happens in any good detective story , to whom the crime will benefit… However what is already clear is that these draft guidelines will hardly be in the interest of the European Union citizens (totally ignored by the text), and not even in the interest of the European Union itself, whose effectiveness will hardly be strengthened.

I – The democratic imperative Continue reading “‘The next Justice and Home Affairs programme: will it be fit for purpose?’”

Data Protection after Lisbon and the Charter : with the “Google” ruling the CJEU deals with possible abuses by private companies…

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

ORIGINAL TITLE : The CJEU’s Google Spain judgment: failing to balance privacy and freedom of expression
By Steve Peers

The EU’s data protection Directive was adopted in 1995, when the Internet was in its infancy, and most or all Internet household names did not exist. In particular, the first version of the code for Google search engines was first written the following year, and the company was officially founded in September 1998 – shortly before Member States’ deadline to implement the Directive.
Yet, pending the completion of negotiations for a controversial revision of the Directive proposed by the Commission, this legislation remains applicable to the Internet as it has developed since. Many years of controversy as to whether (and if so, how) the Directive applies to key elements of the Web, such as social networks, search engines and cookies have culminated today in the CJEU’s judgment in GoogleSpain, which concerns search engines.

The background to the case, as further explained by Lorna Woods, concerns a Spanish citizen who no longer wanted an old newspaper report on his financial history (concerning social security debts) to be available via Google. Of course, the mere fact that he has brought this legal challenge likely means that that the details of his financial history will become known even more widely – much as many thousands of EU law students have memorised the name of Mr. Stauder, who similarly brought a legal challenge with a view to keeping his financial difficulties private, resulting in the first CJEU judgment on the role of human rights in EU law.

The Court’s judgment Continue reading “Data Protection after Lisbon and the Charter : with the “Google” ruling the CJEU deals with possible abuses by private companies…”

“Lisbonisation” of EUROJUST : on the right track, however…..

An Overall Analysis of the Proposal for a Regulation on Eurojust

ATTENTION !! ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUCRIM  4 / 2013

by Prof. Dr. Anne Weyembergh (*)

As explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Nice,1 and preceded by a provisional unit (“pro-Eurojust”),2 Eurojust was established through a Decision of 28 February 2002.3 The latter was amended by the Decision of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust.4 Shortly after the celebration of its 10th birthday in 2012, Eurojust became the subject of a new reform. On the 17th of July 2013, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), based on Art. 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).5 This initiative was introduced at the same time as the proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Of-fce (EPPO).6

As stated in the title of this article, this analysis aims to give an overall review of the proposal for a Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust). It will be divided into two parts. The frst part will be devoted to the main innovative features of the initiative and to the main improvements it brings (I). The second part will highlight some disappointing features or sources of concern (II). Continue reading ““Lisbonisation” of EUROJUST : on the right track, however…..”

Data Retention: a landmark Court of Justice’s ruling.(6) Are national data retention laws within the scope of the Charter?

ATTENTION !!!REBLOGGED FROM EU LAW ANALYSIS

Sunday, 20 April 2014

By Steve Peers

Following the annulment of the EU’s data retention Directive by the CJEU, an obvious important question arises: are national data retention laws subject to the same ruling of the Court? The purpose of this post is to set out the reasons why they are.

The starting point for this analysis is Article 51 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that the Charter applies to the EU institutions and other EU bodies, but to the EU’s Member States ‘only’ when they are ‘implementing’ EU law. What does that mean?

On the narrowest interpretation, Member States ceased to be implementing EU law on data retention from the moment that the data retention Directive became invalid. After all, from that point, there was no EU data retention law to implement. However, it is arguable that Member States can still be regarded as ‘implementing’ EU law where their national legislation was introduced to implement an EU obligation. It’s a novel point, because it’s rare for the CJEU to annul EU laws on substantive grounds. And where the Court has done so, it has more often annulled only a small part of those EU laws (in the Test-Achats judgment, for instance).

But that is merely an alternative argument that the EU Charter continues to apply to national data retention law. The main argument is based on solidly established case law of the CJEU regarding the scope of EU human rights protection where Member States derogate from EU law.

EU human rights rules and national derogations from EU law Continue reading “Data Retention: a landmark Court of Justice’s ruling.(6) Are national data retention laws within the scope of the Charter?”

April 8th 2014 : A dawn of a new european data protection era ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON THE INTERNET SITE OF
Réseau universitaire européen dédié à l’étude du droit de l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice(ELSJ)

La Cour de justice et la protection des données : quand le juge européen des droits fondamentaux prend ses responsabilités
9 AVRIL 2014
par Henri Labayle, CDRE

(English translation will follow)

C’est par deux grandes décisions que la Cour de justice aura marqué de son empreinte le droit de la protection des données à caractère personnel. Rendus le même jour en grande chambre, le 8 avril 2014, ces deux arrêts méritent d’être rapprochés : ils témoignent à tous égards de la volonté de la Cour de marquer un coup d’arrêt en assumant pleinement ses responsabilités de juge des droits fondamentaux.
Le premier d’entre eux pouvait paraître anecdotique par ses circonstances, sinon par son contexte. Frappant un Etat membre, sa décision Commission c. Hongrie (C 288/12) lui permet cependant de rappeler la nécessaire indépendance de ceux qui, dans les Etats membres, veillent au respect de la directive 95/46 relative à la protection des données.
Le second, éclatant et retenant à ce titre l’attention de tous, la conduit à prononcer de manière inusitée par sa généralité l’invalidité de la directive 2006/24 relative à la conservation des données, dans les affaires jointes Digital Rights Ireland (C 293/12) et Seitlinger (C-594/12).
Calée sur son office de protection des droits fondamentaux, prenant pour référence quasi-exclusive la Charte des droits fondamentaux et pour méthode de raisonnement celle qui est de mise à Strasbourg, la Cour de justice s’avère alors un garant résolu des droits individuels.

1 – De la nécessaire indépendance des organes nationaux de protection des données à caractère personnel

Le premier ministre Viktor Orban n’a guère eu le temps de savourer sa victoire aux législatives, deux jours avant l’arrêt de la Cour. Celles-ci étaient observées avec attention en Europe, au vu de la tendance fâcheuse des autorités hongroises à prendre l’Union et ses valeurs pour « un paillasson » ainsi que Daniel Cohn Bendit l’avait vertement indiqué à Viktor Orban au Parlement européen en janvier 2012.
Parmi les mesures reprochées au régime hongrois en matière de droits fondamentaux (voir le rapport Ruiz Tavares A7-0229:2013 au Parlement européen), de sa modification constitutionnelle à ses atteintes à l’indépendance des juges, sa décision de mettre brutalement fin aux fonctions du commissaire hongrois à la protection des données était passée relativement inaperçue des non spécialistes.
Avec le Parlement, la Commission en avait fait cependant l’un des griefs justifiant l’engagement de trois procédures en constatation de manquement en mars 2012. La Cour avait donc à en connaître.
Les faits ne prêtaient guère à discussion : la directive 95/46 sur la protection des données à caractère personnel fait obligation aux Etats membres de désigner une ou plusieurs autorités chargées de veiller à son respect. Elle précise dans son considérant 62 que « l’institution, dans les États membres, d’autorités de contrôle exerçant en toute indépendance leurs fonctions est un élément essentiel de la protection des personnes à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel », ce que traduit son article 28 §1 en ces termes : « ces autorités exercent en toute indépendance les missions dont elles sont investies ».
En Hongrie, un commissaire à la protection des données élu en 2008 pour une durée de six ans jouait ce rôle. Au prétexte de réformer ce système, le Parlement hongrois avait décidé de remplacer cette institution par une nouvelle autorité chargée de la protection des données et de la liberté de l’information, d’où la cessation des fonctions du commissaire en question, M. Iori, et son remplacement pour un nouveau président de ladite autorité, pour neuf ans.
Ajoutée à l’évidente ingérence de l’exécutif hongrois dans cette nouvelle autorité, cette cessation forcée du mandat du commissaire hongrois justifiait donc la saisine de la Cour de justice par la Commission, appuyée par le Contrôleur européen de la protection des données.
Sans remettre en cause le droit souverain de l’Etat hongrois de modifier sa législation interne et son système de contrôle de la protection des données, la Commission refusait à la fois d’avaliser le fait que cette réforme aboutisse à la cessation du commissaire en poste mais aussi qu’elle puisse ne pas garantir l’indépendance totale de l’autorité exerçant ce contrôle. Celle-ci va au-delà de la simple indépendance fonctionnelle et prohibe toute forme de sujétion, qu’elle soit de nature institutionnelle, personnelle ou matérielle.
La jurisprudence a du reste eu l’occasion de trancher la question sur ce point (CJUE, 9 mars 2010, Commission c. Allemagne, C-518/07; 16 octobre 2012, Commission c. Autriche, C-614/10), particulièrement attentive à la condition d’un exercice des fonctions en « toute » indépendance, figurant dans la directive 95/46.
L’affaire était jugée suffisamment sérieuse pour que l’avocat général Melchior Wathelet, dans ses conclusions, ajoute « qu’un arrêt de la Cour constatant le manquement dans la présente affaire aurait une très grande importance non seulement pour les autorités créées en application de l’article 28 §1 de la directive, mais aussi pour toute autre autorité indépendante instaurée en application du droit de l’Union. En assurant ces autorités indépendantes de l’inamovibilité de leur mandat jusqu’à l’échéance prévue, sauf raisons graves préétablies par la loi et objectivement vérifiables, cet arrêt aurait pour effet de limiter considérablement le risque nuisible d’«obéissance anticipée» à des acteurs externes, publics ou privés. Un tel arrêt écarterait «l’épée de Damoclès» que représente le risque paralysant de cessation anticipée de leur mandat » (point 83).
C’est bien ainsi que la Cour l’entend, manifestement.
A « titre liminaire », et outre la directive, elle relie expressément et très utilement l’exigence d’un contrôle par une autorité indépendante du respect des règles de l’Union relatives à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel au droit primaire de l’Union et plus particulièrement à l’article 8 §3 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et de l’article 16 §2 TFUE.
On conçoit alors qu’elle fasse de cette exigence un « élément essentiel » de ce droit à la protection.
Elle a déjà jugé dans les affaires précitées que le seul risque que les autorités de tutelle de l’État puissent exercer une influence politique sur les décisions des autorités de contrôle suffit pour entraver l’exercice indépendant des missions de celles-ci. En effet, d’une part, il pourrait en résulter une «obéissance anticipée» de ces autorités eu égard à la pratique décisionnelle de l’autorité de tutelle et, d’autre part, « considérant le rôle de gardiennes du droit à la vie privée qu’assument les autorités de contrôle » (point 53), leurs décisions comme elles-mêmes doivent être au-dessus de tout soupçon de partialité.
Il restait à cerner l’étendue de l’obligation pesant sur les Etats membres concernant le respect de la durée du mandat de ces autorités jusqu’à leur terme. Elle ne s’y dérobe pas.
Leur accorder le droit de mettre fin au mandat d’une autorité de contrôle avant son terme sans respecter les règles et les garanties préétablies à cette fin par la législation applicable constituerait, de son point de vue une menace potentielle qui « planerait alors sur cette autorité tout au long de l’exercice de son mandat » et pourrait conduire à une forme d’obéissance de celle-ci au pouvoir politique, incompatible avec ladite exigence d’indépendance. Que la fin anticipée du mandat résulte d’une restructuration ou d’un changement de modèle n’y changerait rien.
Elle délivre alors son interprétation : l’exigence d’indépendance mentionnée par la directive 95/46 doit être « nécessairement être interprétée comme incluant l’obligation de respecter la durée du mandat des autorités de contrôle jusqu’à son échéance et de n’y mettre fin de manière anticipée que dans le respect des règles et des garanties de la législation applicable » (point 55). Le droit de l’Union en pouvait raisonnablement être compris comme autorisant la Hongrie à adopter un comportement différent.
D’où la constatation du manquement commis par les autorités hongroises à leurs obligations, que la Cour de justice n’accepte pas d’atténuer en faisant droit à la demande la Hongrie de limiter dans le temps les effets de son arrêt.

2 – De la proportionnalité de l’ingérence des pouvoirs publics dans la conservation des données

L’arrêt rendu dans les affaires jointes Digital Rights Ireland et Seitlinger (C-293/12 et 594/12) est d’une importance plus grande encore. Par la radicalité de la solution de la Cour, l’invalidation entière d’une directive, comme par le raisonnement mené pour y parvenir et par l’impact de sa solution sur les pratiques nationales, il doit être salué. A une question de principe, la Cour apporte sans se dérober une réponse de même nature.

Une question de principe

C’est par la voie préjudicielle que la High Court Irlandaise, d’une part, et la Cour constitutionnelle autrichienne, d’autre part, interrogeaient la Cour de justice sur la validité de la directive 2006/24 sur la conservation des données générées ou traitées dans le cadre de la fourniture de services de communications électroniques accessibles au public ou de réseaux publics de communications. La première, à l’occasion de litiges nationaux concernant son application tandis que l’autre devait trancher une série impressionnante de contestations prenant la forme de recours en constitutionnalité faisant suite à la transposition de la directive en droit interne.
Etait principalement en cause l’obligation faite aux opérateurs économiques de collecter, conserver et rendre disponibles pendant un temps déterminé un nombre considérable de données à caractère personnel recueillies lors des communications individuelles dans l’ensemble de l’Union, ce afin de lutter contre des activités criminelles graves.
L’occasion était rêvée pour la Cour de justice de se prononcer sur les conditions dans lesquelles l’Union européenne peut juridiquement limiter l’exercice des droits fondamentaux, en l’espèce ceux du respect de la vie privée et de la protection des données à caractère personnel garantis par les articles 7 et 8 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union.

L’article 52 §1 de cette dernière reprend en effet la logique qui anime les droits conditionnels de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme en affirmant que « toute limitation de l’exercice des droits et libertés reconnus par la présente Charte doit être prévue par la loi et respecter le contenu essentiel desdits droits et libertés. Dans le respect du principe de proportionnalité, des limitations ne peuvent être apportées que si elles sont nécessaires et répondent effectivement à des objectifs d’intérêt général reconnus par l’Union ou au besoin de protection des droits et libertés d’autrui ». Les « explications » accompagnant la Charte et son article 7, abondamment citées dans le prétoire du Kirchberg, soulignent cet équilibre nécessaire.

La Cour était donc invitée à ce calcul de proportionnalité, derrière les questions des juges irlandais et autrichiens, pour évaluer la validité de la directive 2006/24.

Pour y parvenir, plusieurs clarifications étaient nécessaires. Déterminer la pertinence de l’invocation de la Charte en la matière était la plus simple, tant il allait de soi que la collecte et la conservation par les autorités nationales de données aussi sensibles pour la vie privée relevaient de son champ d’application.
Cerner la fonctionnalité exacte de la directive 2006/24 posait en revanche une question plus sensible.
On sait à cet égard la propension grandissante des institutions, telles que la Commission par exemple à propos de la migration ou de la justice, à réduire le fonctionnement de l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice à un prolongement du marché intérieur, accompagnée en cela par une doctrine ignorante de sa genèse et de sa charge politique. Négligeant celle-ci en mettant en avant une logique économique, cette approche est contraire à la réalité de l’Union comme au droit issu d’un traité qui garantit la sécurité à ses citoyens.
L’avocat général Cruz Villalon s’en faisait l’écho dans ses conclusions, multipliant les explications relatives à la « dualité fonctionnelle » de la directive 2006/24, adoptée « dans l’objectif de protéger le bon fonctionnement du marché intérieur, de mettre un terme à l’évolution hétérogène des réglementations existantes, tout en y faisant obstacle pour le futur ». La Cour de justice, dans son arrêt Irlande c. Parlement et Conseil de 2009 (C-301/06), avait d’ailleurs expressément rejeté une contestation portant sur la base juridique de cette directive, l’article 95 TCE, prétendant que l’unique objectif de la directive était en fait celui de la lutte contre le terrorisme réglée dans le titre VI du TUE de l’époque.
La Cour de justice n’en reste pas à cette lecture formelle et, de manière éclatante, elle relie la problématique à la politique de sécurité intérieure de l’Union européenne.
Il lui fallait en effet, dans le premier terme de son raisonnement visant à établir la légalité de la directive, identifier l’existence d’un intérêt public susceptible de justifier l’intervention de l’Union dans la vie privée des citoyens de l’Union c’est-à-dire vérifier que ces ingérences éventuelles répondent effectivement à des objectifs d’intérêt général reconnus par l’Union ou au besoin de protection des droits et libertés d’autrui, en vertu de l’article 52 §1 de la Charte.
Sans démentir ses affirmations précédentes relatives au besoin d’harmonisation des droits nationaux en matière de conservation des données, elle y apporte néanmoins un bémol qui contraste avec sa jurisprudence péremptoire de 2009 : « l’objectif matériel de cette directive vise, ainsi qu’il découle de son article 1er, paragraphe 1, à garantir la disponibilité de ces données à des fins de recherche, de détection et de poursuite d’infractions graves telles qu’elles sont définies par chaque État membre dans son droit interne. L’objectif matériel de cette directive est, dès lors, de contribuer à la lutte contre la criminalité grave et ainsi, en fin de compte, à la sécurité publique » (point 41). Fermez le ban …

On sait en effet depuis la jurisprudence Kadi que la lutte contre le terrorisme constitue un « objectif d’intérêt général de l’Union » tout comme l’est la lutte contre la criminalité grave afin de garantir la sécurité publique (CJUE, Tsakouridis, C‑145/09). De façon intéressante, la Cour souligne ici du reste que l’article 6 de la Charte énonce le droit de toute personne non seulement à la liberté, mais également à la sûreté (point 42).
Apportant ainsi un fondement à la politique sécuritaire de l’Union, dans la logique du préambule de son traité et des articles 3 §2 TUE et 67 §3 TFUE, la Cour n’avait plus alors qu’à évaluer la proportionnalité de l’ingérence ainsi constatée.

Une réponse de principe

Constater l’existence d’une ingérence dans les droits fondamentaux consacrés par les articles 7 et 8 de la Charte n’était guère compliqué et la Cour se livre sans difficulté à cet examen. Tant l’obligation de conservation des données à caractère personnel que l’accès des autorités nationales à ces données ou leur traitement constituent une ingérence flagrante dans les droits fondamentaux des individus et la Cour souligne à la suite de son avocat général qu’elle « s’avère d’une vaste ampleur et qu’elle doit être considérée comme particulièrement grave » (point 37).
De plus, la conservation des données et l’utilisation ultérieure de celles-ci étant effectuées sans que l’abonné ou l’utilisateur inscrit en soient informés est « susceptible de générer dans l’esprit des personnes concernées, ainsi que l’a relevé M. l’avocat général aux points 52 et 72 de ses conclusions, le sentiment que leur vie privée fait l’objet d’une surveillance constante ».
La seule question posée consistait donc à trancher le point de sa proportionnalité.
Le contrôle juridictionnel du principe de proportionnalité n’est pas étranger à la Cour de justice, chacun le sait. Néanmoins, et elle appréciera ce coup de chapeau tardif, la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme est passée maîtresse dans l’examen du jeu de la balance des intérêts en présence.
C’est donc très heureusement que la Cour de justice se réfère par analogie à l’article 8 CEDH et à la jurisprudence S. et Marper c. Royaume Uni, arrêt fondateur s’il en est, pour signifier que l’étendue du pouvoir d’appréciation du législateur de l’Union peut être strictement limitée en fonction d’un certain nombre d’éléments, parmi lesquels figurent, notamment, le domaine concerné, la nature du droit en cause garanti par la Charte, la nature et la gravité de l’ingérence ainsi que la finalité de celle-ci.

Elle délivre en fait ici sa grille de lecture.
Certes, les données conservées en application de la directive 2006/24 permettent aux autorités nationales compétentes en matière de poursuites pénales de disposer de possibilités supplémentaires d’élucidation des infractions graves. Elles constituent donc un instrument utile pour les enquêtes pénales et leur conservation de telles données peut être considérée comme apte à réaliser l’objectif poursuivi par ladite directive. Or, la lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité est d’une importance primordiale dont l’efficacité peut dépendre de l’utilisation de ces techniques modernes d’enquête.
Néanmoins, cet « objectif d’intérêt général, pour fondamental qu’il soit, ne saurait à lui seul justifier qu’une mesure de conservation telle que celle instaurée par la directive 2006/24 soit considérée comme nécessaire aux fins de ladite lutte ».
Prenant en considération, d’une part, le rôle important que joue la protection des données à caractère personnel au regard du droit fondamental au respect de la vie privée et, d’autre part, l’ampleur et de la gravité de l’ingérence dans ce droit que comporte la directive 2006/24, le pouvoir d’appréciation du législateur de l’Union ne saurait qu’être réduit et il appelle un contrôle juridictionnel strict.
Mentionnant la jurisprudence de la CEDH, la CJUE souligne que « la réglementation de l’Union en cause doit prévoir des règles claires et précises régissant la portée et l’application de la mesure en cause et imposant un minimum d’exigences de sorte que les personnes dont les données ont été conservées disposent de garanties suffisantes permettant de protéger efficacement leurs données à caractère personnel contre les risques d’abus ainsi que contre tout accès et toute utilisation illicites de ces données ».
Tel n’est manifestement pas le cas et la Cour parvient rapidement à une conclusion cruelle : « la directive 2006/24 ne prévoit pas de règles claires et précises régissant la portée de l’ingérence dans les droits fondamentaux consacrés aux articles 7 et 8 de la Charte. Force est donc de constater que cette directive comporte une ingérence dans ces droits fondamentaux d’une vaste ampleur et d’une gravité particulière dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union sans qu’une telle ingérence soit précisément encadrée par des dispositions permettant de garantir qu’elle est effectivement limitée au strict nécessaire ».

Comment ne pas la suivre ?

En premier lieu, la directive 2006/24 couvre de manière généralisée et indifférenciée l’ensemble des individus, des moyens de communication électronique et des données relatives au trafic, indépendamment de son objectif de lutte contre les infractions graves.
Deuxièmement, la directive ne prévoit aucun critère objectif permettant de garantir que les autorités nationales compétentes n’aient accès aux données et ne puissent les utiliser qu’aux fins qui leur sont assignées. Elle renvoie de manière générale aux « infractions graves » définies par chaque État membre dans son droit interne, sans précision procédurale ni contrôle préalable d’une juridiction ou d’une entité administrative indépendante.
Pire, la durée de conservation des données est d’au moins six mois et de 24 mois au maximum, sans encadrement des catégories de données en fonction des personnes concernées ou de l’utilité éventuelle des données par rapport à l’objectif poursuivi, ni critère objectif ni protection contre une utilisation abusive.
Enfin, et la précision est de taille au regard des échanges de données dans la lutte internationale contre la criminalité, la Cour met en cause le fait que la directive n’impose pas une conservation des données sur le territoire de l’Union.
Ainsi, la directive ne garantit pas pleinement le contrôle du respect des exigences de protection et de sécurité par une autorité indépendante, comme cela est pourtant explicitement exigé par la charte.
Or, un tel contrôle, effectué sur la base du droit de l’Union, constitue un élément essentiel du respect de la protection des personnes à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel.
Dans un tel contexte, l’invalidation de la directive 2006/24 coulait de source, au détail près de son ampleur et de son effet dans le temps.
La Cour de justice n’y va pas par quatre chemins, négligeant toute opération de chirurgie juridique visant à sauvegarder certains pans de la législation ou la face de ses auteurs. Le texte est invalidé dans son ensemble, créant de ce fait un vide juridique considérable.

A cela, la Cour aurait pu répondre en suivant la suggestion de son avocat général l’incitant à faire usage de la faculté que lui offre l’article 264 TFUE de limiter dans le temps les effets de sa déclaration d’invalidité.

Ce dernier faisait état d’une prudence nécessaire : « la mise en balance des différents intérêts en présence doit faire l’objet d’une pondération très attentive ». Si la violation des droits fondamentaux ne souffrait pas de doute, les invalidités constatées relevaient d’un simple défaut d’encadrement et les États membres avaient « de façon générale, ainsi qu’il ressort des éléments fournis à la Cour, exercé leurs compétences avec modération pour ce qui est de la durée maximale de conservation des données » point 157).

La Cour s’y refuse, invitant de la sorte les institutions de l’Union à remédier au plus vite aux effets de leur inconséquence, terme faible s’il en est au vu des enjeux en cause.

EP STUDY : NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AVENUES FOR FURTHER EU INTEGRATION

This study was requested by the European Parliament’s Committees on Legal Affairs and on Constitutional Affairs. It investigates national constitutional limits to further EU integration and explores ways to overcome them. It includes an in-depth examination of the constitutional systems of 12 Member States (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom) and a bird’s eye view of all Member States. EU integration can be advanced by avoiding substantive constitutional obstacles in various ways. Overcoming the substantive obstacles requires managing national procedural constitutional hurdles. This is possible to the extent that the required broad political consensus exists.

AUTHOR(S) : Mr Leonard F.M. BESSELINK, Mrs Monica CLAES, Mrs Šejla IMAMOVIû, Mr Jan Herman REESTMAN.
This document is available on the Internet

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The central research question of this study is whether, and to what extent, national constitutions provide guidance for further European integration and reversely how the latter can take place in full respect for national constitutional identities.

2. The research involved an in-depth analysis of a representative selection of Member States: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK; and a bird’s eye view of all Member States. The study conducts a cross-national comparative analysis of the national constitutional approaches to EU integration, on the basis of which some final conclusions are offered.

3. This study deals with the relationship between the EU and national constitutions mainly from a national perspective. But there is also another side of the story, taking the EU perspective.
The EU Treaties (TEU and TFEU) acknowledge the central role of national constitutions, for instance when they require ratification by all the Member States ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ for their entry into force, for their amendment and for the accession of new Member States. This presumably implies more than a mere procedural rule and acknowledges that the Treaties should also substantively be in accordance with national constitutions, or at least, it grants the Member States the opportunity, if their constitution so requires, to ensure that they do not enter into Treaties which would be unconstitutional.
On a more general level, the EU expects its Member States to comply with the common fundamental constitutional values that all Member States share, and which also apply to the European Union (Arts. 2 and 7 TEU). More specifically with respect to fundamental rights protection, the Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the CJEU case law explicitly seek to connect EU human rights to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States. Yet, under the Treaties, the EU is not only bound to respect the common constitutional values of the Member States.
In addition, Article 4(2) TEU obliges the Union to respect ‘their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’.
Accordingly, if the Union should fail to respect these national identities as inherent in their fundamental constitutional and political structures, it would infringe not only those identities, but also the Treaty obligation to respect them. Whether this is indeed the case is, as a matter of EU law, to be decided ultimately by the Court of Justice of the Union, and not unilaterally by the Member States.
In addition, the Union must, under Article 4(2) TEU, respect the Member States’ essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.
The Treaty thus recognises that there are ‘essential State functions’ which remain with the Member States and which the EU must respect.
What exactly these functions are is not clear, beyond those mentioned in the provision.
On the other hand, and despite the central role of national constitutions in the EU constitutional edifice, Member States cannot invoke their national constitutions to escape compliance with EU law before the Court of Justice of the European Union. And even before national courts, national constitutional law should not, as a matter of EU law, take priority over conflicting provisions of national law.
Indeed, the principle of primacy of EU law,1 which is firmly settled in the case law of the CJEU, and has been confirmed in Declaration 17 annexed to the TEU, applies to national constitutional law as well. With respect to fundamental rights, more specifically, Article 53 of the Charter does not lead to a different conclusion.

4. Turning the perspective to national constitutions, it can be said that, in general, constitutions generally perform the four main functions of
* constituting the polity, which may be understood as expressing the basic social contract;
* organising and structuring the exercise of public authority and dividing powers between the various branches;
* limiting the exercise of public authority, which also includes fundamental rights protection of individuals and
* expressing common values of society and/or carrying its ‘national identity’.

As power-organizing tools, two of the main functions of constitutions go in different directions.
One is the enabling function of constitutions: constitutions constitute the institutions which are to exercise public authority and empower these institutions.
A second function is associated with ‘constitutionalism’ in a narrow sense and concerns the limiting function of constitutions: constitutions limit the exercise of public authority, for instance via human rights and a division of powers.
These different functions of a constitution are also reflected with regard to EU integration: national constitutions help to enable, and limit.

5. In the context of participation in the EU, the enabling function of constitutions is illustrated by those constitutional provisions which allow for a ‘limitation of sovereignty’ or a ‘transfer of sovereign powers’ to the EU.
However, national constitutions not only enable, but also set limits to further EU integration.
Membership of the European Union challenges the national constitutions in various ways: powers, which under the constitution have been attributed to national bodies, are transferred to the EU, and hence they are exercised differently from the way it was intended under the national constitution.
The EU is, as such, not bound by those national constitutions, but does indeed require the Member States to apply EU law even if it should infringe the national constitution.
Accordingly, the supremacy of the Constitution itself is challenged.
Seen in this light, it should come as no surprise that many Member States, while having adapted their constitutions to allow for membership and facilitate it, have at the same time retained constitutional limits and reservations, and impose conditions on EU law.
Moreover, constitutions are not only often considered to be expressions of the will of the people to form a polity (political autonomy) and to be governed under the constitution, but many constitutions also legally and judicially protect this foundational will.
This may take different forms, for instance by protecting the sovereignty of the state, statehood itself or the national nature of democracy, or a combination of these.

6. To put the constitutional obstacles to further EU integration in proper perspective, the report draws two main distinctions.
The first concerns a distinction between further integration under the current EU treaty framework and further integration by means of new (EU amendment) treaties.
The second distinction is that between substantive and procedural constitutional obstacles.
Generally, the substantive constitutional obstacles can be overcome by the adoption of a treaty (amendment), by the adoption of a constitutional amendment or by a combination of both.
For the adoption of such amendments, national procedural constitutional hurdles have to be taken.
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