Category: 1. EU and MS legal Order and Institutional framework

American authorities access to banks data: challenges…and perspectives

The EU parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties provoked a certain sensation by deciding on the 4 February to suggest to the European Parliament plenary not to conclude the interim agreement which allows the Treasury Department of The United States of America to access financial data processed by SWIFT (already published in this blog).

What the press has not explained is that this negative vote does not end the transatlantic cooperation in this domain. In fact, the second paragraph of the Recommendation invites the Commission and the Council to submit proposals complying with the new legal framework established by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Indeed, a successful conclusion of the agreement signed by the Council seems to be too shy and too advanced at the same time.

Too shy since the data protection legislation applied will remain that of the Member State where the data are stored (the Netherlands) or that of the State controlling SWIFT (Belgium). Furthermore, the authority verifying the admissibility of the request will also belong to one of these two countries despite the participation of the European Union.

The transatlantic legal framework will be the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, or if the conclusions will not be ratified, the bilateral agreements EU-Netherlands and EU-Belgium.

As the European Parliament’s rapporteur points out the type of access to financial data as foreseen by the TFTP is not admissible on the basis of the ordinary procedures applied in case of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In this respect there is a risk to exceed the scope of the agreement by giving for granted the existence of a clarity in the field of data protection as well as police and judicial cooperation which does not exist not even between the Member States of the European Union.

In this regard, suffice to say that the European Union does not have a comprehensive legal framework to adequately face internal security challenges related to data protection in the field of security and police and judicial cooperation despite the numerous requests made by the European Parliament. This kind of solidarity has started with Schengen although it does not involve all the Member States.

 At this stage it is inevitable to recall the old saying “nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet”, i.e. the European Union cannot transfer more powers of what itself has.

Indeed, the European Union has given to the United States all it could on the basis of the current legislation on the Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America concluded in Washington on 28 October 2009.

The Agreement foresees:

  •  The possibility to access banks’ data of natural or legal persons provided the latter are identified (see article 4 of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance) on the basis of the European legislation in this domain (Third Directive on Money Laundering and Financial Information Regulation)
  • The possibility to extradite individuals to the United States applying the same conditions of the European Arrest Warrant
  • the possibility to create common investigation teams (on the basis of European norms concerning Europol and the Convention on Criminal Assistance).

This said, it is still technically feasible to make the transatlantic cooperation even more ambitious and make sure that the jurisprudence produced by international agreements may be translated in internal legislative measures.

To reach this goal it will then be necessary to put forward a series of simultaneous political operations which have been impossible to develop before.

Now, the first question concerns whether the American pressure will convince Member States to finally set up the necessary legal framework.

Secondly and more significantly, it is necessary to understand whether the requests put forward by the United States are compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter on Fundamental Rights.

Thirdly, it is necessary to identify which European authority will be responsible for the Member States. For instance, one possibility to assess will be whether it would be possible to extend Eurojust and/or Europol’s powers instead of that of Dutch and Belgian authorities, ensuring at the same time loyal cooperation between the Member States.

Moreover, challenges do not only arise on this part of the Atlantic. The American negotiator is facing other equally demanding questions. For example, in case the authority in charge of the conclusions of the Agreement remains the Administration it will not be possible to seal an “executive agreement” since -by definition- it cannot modify the legal status of the American and European citizens.

What is more, an executive agreement will hardly secure the respect of those guarantees which the Charter requires avoiding hazardous appeals in front of the European and National Courts (see Karlsruhe …).

To do that it would be necessary, as in the case of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to pass the Congress and obtain two-thirds of the votes in the Senate. Once again, as it is often the case during the challenging evolution of the European Union, with fantasy and mutual respect it will be maybe possible to build a Transatlantic area of freedom, security and justice to which the Stockholm Programme and the inter-ministerial declaration referred on 28 October.

The EU-USA Provisional Agreement on Interbank Financial data access (SWIFT) under European Parliament scrutiny

In the next few weeks the European Parliament will receive  several international agreements in the field of police and judicial cooperation negotiated or signed -albeit not yet ratified by the European Council- before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 

Among these, special attentions deserve the two agreements signed with the United States concerning access to personal data to fight against terrorism.

The first one concerns personal data managed by airline companies when they conclude a transport contract which has as a destination or point of transition the United States (EU-USA Agreement on access to Passenger Name Record- PNR).

The second one, recently published in the Official Journal, concerns the access to personal and financial data exchanged via interbanking messages and processed worldwide, in almost their totality, by a specific society called SWIFT .

Their access is regulated by the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) on the basis of which the USA Treasury Department may request via an administrative mandate (“subpoena”) to access personal and financial data to prevent and fight terrorism.

The advantage of interbanking messages relies on their fast and easy accessibility compared to financial information, whose access is regulated by the prevention programmes for combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. In fact, on the basis of these measures applied worldwide, it is a bank’s responsibility to signal suspicious transactions to the National Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) which in turn transmits the information to the FIU of the countries involved in terrorist investigations.[1]  

On the contrary TFTP access is direct, avoiding delays, risks of incomprehension and non-cooperative banks around the globe.

Even if available data are limited (such as clients generalities and amounts of transferred money) they become  essential once they are cross-checked with information coming from other sources related to judicial, police and intelligence investigations.

This is obviously an extraordinary instrument also for the USA. This authorisation is based on exceptional powers granted to the President of the United States on a temporary basis by the  Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC, sections 1701-1706). The President immediately used them after the 9/11 attacks and since then the Congress has renewed its authorisation every year.[2]

The TFTP programme remained secret up to 2006 when the USA press[3] published a series of articles and the Society SWIFT released a few statements after obtaining more restrictive measures to the access of data by the USA Treasury Department. 

This took place despite the fact that the TFTP is exceptionally not covered by the Privacy ACT of the United States and neither by the general norms laid down to protect privacy in financial transitions.

The debate triggered at the European Union level resulted in a series of hearings and resolutions of the European Parliament[4], it  set off an investigation of the CE Commission, an opinion of the data protection national authorities Working Group and an investigation carried out by the Belgian authorities ,who are the one responsible for the control of the activities carried onby the company  SWIFT.

The conclusions of these discussions pointed out that the management of these data – although illegal in the EU territory-  is legal in the USA territory on condition that:

-the company SWIFT adheres to the voluntary programme “SAFE HARBOR” to protect its clients[5] and

– American authorities respect a series of self-imposed limitations to limits data access; Furthermore,  the constant presence of SWIFT employees when data are collected should be granted and a periodical review by an independent authority  nominated in a concerted way by the USA and the EU takes place.

This complex jurisdictional construction was – and still is-  based on the principle that these data are in the USA territory and therefore under jurisdiction of the American authorities.

However, things chaged when the company SWIFT restructured the systems architecture of the financial messaging network in 2007 and its global data centres.  Becasue of this, SWIFT decided that the data coming from interbanking transactions outside the USA territory were all relocated exclusively within the European territory no longer allowing a mirror copy of these data in the American servers.

Based on the argument that retained data are crucial to the fight against terrorism, American authorities asked to keep on accessing these data also once they would have been relocated to the EU territory (and under EU legislation), with the guarantee that in case of a terrorist threat these data would have been transmitted back to the EU.

This ofer was mainly made on the basis that the majority of the European states are not equipped to use and process the data gathered in the TFTP. Therefore, in this way not only the United States but also the European Union would have benefit from the programme. 

On the basis of this reasoning, negotiations started before summer 2009 and have been carefully followed by the European Parliament which in its resolution in September 2009 listed the minimum conditions to be applied to make sure that the use of data of TFTP is compatible with European standards. These indications refer to data protection as well as judicial protection standards, given that these are information that can be used for counter terrorism activities.

Against this background two agreements have been put forward:  a first transitional agreement of the limited duration of 9 months and a second longer one whose negotiations should start in the next few weeks.

The “transitional” text of the first agreement has now been published in the Official Journal and will enter into force on 1st February 2010;  it recalls some of the concerns of the European Parliament, not last the one concerning the need to anchor the implementation of this agreement to that on judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the EU and the USA concluded in Washington on 28 October 2009.[6]

It is too early to predict what the European parliament will do. One should not give for granted the outcome of the parliamentary scrutiny and its final vote since the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 16 TFEU) and the now binding Charter of Fundamental Rights[7] have introduced even stricter standard in terms of data protection.

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[1] See GAFI recommendations such as the VII financial provision to gather data concerning transfer above 1.000 $ in Europe (3.000 $ in the USA) and to make them available to the authorities; see also Communitarian Directives on money laundering and Communitarian Regulations in this field (such as  Regulation (CE) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 November 2006 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds)  

[2] CRF Presidential Executive Order 13224 issued by the President George Bush on 23 September 2001.

[3] See Wikipedia reconstruction: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorist_Finance_Tracking_Program

[4] See resolution of 6 July 2006 on the interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT system by the US secret services (OJ C 303 E, 13.12.2006, p. 843) and Resolution of 14 February 2007 on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues (OJ C 287 E, 29.11.2007, p. 349).

[5] The Commission CE assessed that Safe Harbor guaranteed a sufficient level of data protection back in 2001.

[6] Processing of EU originating Personal Data by United States Treasury Department for Counter Terrorism Purposes – “SWIFT” (OJ C 166, 20.7.2007, p. 18).

[7] See also the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular Articles 7, 8, 47, 48 and 49 thereof, Council of Europe Convention No 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

The approval of Protocol 14 opens the way to the EU adhesion to the European Convention on Human Rights

Russian lawmakers voted on Friday to ratify a key protocol on reforming the European Court of Human Rights, clearing the way for the long-delayed reform after years of resistance from Moscow.

The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, ratified on Friday 15 January 2010 the Protocol 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights with an overwhelming majority of 392 votes in favour and 56 opposed. Russia was the last member of the 47-nation Council of Europe to have ratified it.

Russia was pushed to reverse its previous rejection of the protocol in 2006 because the Council of Europe agreed to a provision stating that a Russian judge would participate in any decisions concerning Russia (more than 30.000 out of the 12.000 pending cases) and because the remaining 46 members decided in May 2009 to carry on the reforms also without Russia with the so-called Protocol 14bis.

Reforms under Protocol 14 were necessary to streamline the European Court of Human Right’s work, reduce its backlog and increase the effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights control system. Indeed over the past years the Court increased its caseload from 404 cases in 1981 to 34.546 cases in 2002!

Protocol 14 complements a first crucial reform  entered into force in 1998 which brought about the current single, full-title and compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and recognition of the right of individual petition, abolishing the crucial role played by the Committee of the Ministers up to that moment.

However, this reform proved inadequate to cope with the new situation and in 2000 new works started aimed at further streamlining and speeding up the procedures to cope with the influx of applications generated by the constant increase in the number of states part of the Council (which in 2004 already counted 800 million citizens) and, more importantly, due to the increased awareness of European citizens to the protection of human rights.

It can be argued that the European Court of Justice is a victim of its own success. indeed, it is often considered the last resort especially by those individuals that consider their judicial systems inadequate (Russia is one of these countries given that some 30.000 cases out of the 120.000 cases awaiting review by the court originated from it). This also true for those cases where conditions to appeal do not apply (more than 90% of the appeals is eventually inadmissible).

The considerable amount of complaints brought before the Court leads to long lasting procedures which seriously endanger the credibility of the Court, especially when it is called to rule on …the reasonable duration of processes in the states parts of the Convention.

As the Explanatory Report clarifies all these shortcomings will be reduced. The Court will have the procedural means and flexibility it needs to process all applications in a timely fashion, while allowing it to concentrate on the most important cases which require in-depth examination by making a single judge competent to declare inadmissible or strike out an individual application. Furthermore, the college composed of 3 judges  will decide on the admissibility of a case as well as on its content when the case has been object of a consolidate jurisprudence.  

The fact that the Protocol opens the opportunity to the Committee of Ministers to decide by a two-thirds majority to bring proceedings before the Grand Chamber of the Court against any State which refuses to comply with the Court’s final judgment is politically relevant.

As it is relevant, last but not least, that article 17 by amending article 59 of the Convention allows the  adhesion to the Convention by the EU.

This represents an important political signal although it is clear that the Protocol does not take into account the EU’s opinion since at the time of the negotiations the EU it did not have the juridical authority to sit at the negotiating table. 

Despite this, what is important is that now the adhesion to the Convention is not only possible but also compulsory. It is established in article 6(2) of the TEU and protocol 8 of the consolidated version of the new Treaties, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1st December. This will include Protocol 14 and the other protocols already ratified by all EU Member States (1 and 6). 

However, few questions still remain open such as the future of the protocols not ratified by all Member States dealing with domains falling under the EU competences (Protocols 4, 7, 12 and 13). 

In conclusion, a new phase for the construction of a Europe of rights has now started. Despite a foreseeable long path ahead (unanimity and ratification by all the Members of the EU is compulsory), the Spanish Presidency’s determination to define a mandate to finally kick off the formal negotiations is a good omen. 

As usual, the European Parliament will make its voice heard, given that its consensus is required.   

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After Lisbon a reshuffle for the consular and diplomatic protection of the EU citizens ?

Will the Treaty of Lisbon, the new Stockholm Programme and the new figure of the European Union High Representative wake up the sleeping beauty of the consular and diplomatic protection of the European citizens ?

Even the Head of State and Government have recognised that “..This right, enshrined in the Treaties, is not well publicised, and more effort is needed to ensure its full application. Targeted communication campaigns could be conducted in connection with this right…” Moreover they have invited the Commission to “..consider appropriate measures establishing coordination and cooperation necessary to facilitate consular protection in accordance with Article 23 TFUE.”

As a matter of fact not many of the half billion European citizens know that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1994 …“[e]very citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State.” (art. 23 TFUE, formerly art 20 of TEC)

It is worth recalling that under international public law, both customary and treaty law (1) , Consular and diplomatic protection should be provided by the States to their nationals.

In particular Consular protection or assistance is the provision of help and immediate assistance by a State to its nationals, both individuals and bodies, or to nationals of another State (2) when in distress. The most frequent situations are the relief and repatriation of distressed citizens of the Union, the assistance of victims of serious accident or serious illness, or of violent crime or the assistance to people arrested and detained or even the repatriation of the bodies in cases of death or catastrophes such the tragic Haiti earthquake. In these case, the State supports, by career or honorary consuls, its nationals (or non-nationals) in asserting their rights under the legal system of a foreign State, provided that the individual concerned has given his consent.

Diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility (3) . In this case, the State acts on its own behalf, to protect its rights, on an international level and through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement conducted by diplomatic officials or Government representatives (4) .

It is only very recently the EU has been associated to the exercise of these functions so deeply rooted in the States sovereign functions and this it happened only during the last twenty years with the developpement of the Schengen cooperation which brought progressively together the officials of the member states administrations in activities such as the visa delivering and by implementing the same common consular instructions.

Therefore Member States remain jealously attached to these functions and even after the Lisbon Treaty they avoided a legislative role of the EU institutions by stating that “Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection.”

Even if the wording of art. 23 TFUE is adamant in conferring directly to EU citizens (5) this right (confirmed also in Article 46 of the now legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) to transform it in a reality and to enforce it before a judge, Member States should have had agreed a sound and coherent legal implementing framework.
Therefore the true fact is that since the entry into force in ’94 of art. 20 TEC only few binding acts have so far been taken by the Member States (6) and art. 1 of the first ’95 general decision (which entered into force only in 2002), covers only the consular protection .
Even in this case the approach has been minimalistic as it appears from the one page Decision of ’95 (7) which looks more anxious to avoid financial assistance, and to guarantee full repayment in cases of extreme distress, than to establish a full fledged system of assistance and alleviate suffering for EU citizens.

In the last twelve years no other bindings acts have been adopted on Consular protection and only recently, after 2006, under the pressure of the European Council and of the Commission the member states have agreed on some complementary and non-binding Guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries as well as on non-binding measures to counter crisis outside the territory of the EU (such as the notion of the “Lead State Concept” according to which a member state will on voluntary basis coordinate the consular protection in a specific third country and prepare if needed evacuation plans in case of disasters or of terrorists attacks) (8).

Moreover there are not many signs that Member States have started ” … the international negotiations required to secure this protection. “ as required by art. 23 of the TFUE (former art. 20 of the EC Treaty)

It could then be considered an understatement the European Parliament declaration according to which the right to consular and diplomatic protection has remained ‘underdeveloped’(9). The Strasbourg Assembly should then be praised as it asked to the Member States and Commission to foster the current situation by improving the current :
a) – lack of legal certainty : The generic brochure published on the Council Site and the publication on the EU Citizens passports of the art.23 TFUE (former 20 TEC) are useful but, still , could not be considered sufficient for European Citizens who can challenge this situation before the national and european Courts;
b) – lack of common EU standards. For the time being Member States are obliged not to discriminate between their own nationals and citizens of the other EU countries. Given that the standards granted are different according to the countries concerned (for instance it seems that Danes authorities, due to their constitutional duties ensure a wider protection than the one the UK authorities give) also the treatment granted for the non nationals will be different from the one they can enjoy from their own country.
c) – lack of operational transparency. The situation is unsatisfactory also as far as the practical issues are concerned as there is no simple way to know which consular post of an EU Member State could be contacted in a specific third country . Even the notion of “lead state” remain very vague even between the Member States themselves (guess how could be for one of the 180 millions of EU citizens travelling abroad ..)
d) – lack of financial solidarity. The most frequent cases are the ones of people who lost everything and need financial help. Due to the absence of common system of compensation between the member States (such as the ones who exists on the territory of the EU for other purposes) the Consular Offices are very reluctant in assuming financial burdens.

Will this unsatisfactory situation be overcome ?

After the Lisbon Treaty the EU institutions even if without legislative powers will be entitled to financially and logistically support the MS actions in the framework of EU Directives to be adopted according to art. 23 of the TFUE as evoked in the Stockholm Programme.

It is more than likely that the first proposals will mainly try to overcome the weaknesses denounced by the EP resolution (clear definition of scope of the consular protection, financial compensation system between the Member States when anticipating money for another MS citizen, creation of an Internet global site which can give the links to the “Lead State” offices in each third Countries …etc etc) even if this institution will not be involved in codecision but will be only consulted…

Moreover a positive evolution could come out from the strengthened cooperation between the MS diplomatic missions with the new European Union External Action Service as defined by the Article 35 TEU (ex Article 20 TEU) which states that :
“The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted pursuant to this Chapter are complied with and implemented.
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments.
They shall contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the Union to protection in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article 20(2)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of the measures adopted pursuant to Article 23 of that Treaty.”

It is worth noting that some signals of this change of attitude and more positive approach from the MS diplomats could be taken in the latest Council report on the ways to respond to disasters in third countries.
In the same perspective it is also possbile that the European Parliament even if it would not play a direct legislative role will probably make full use of its budgetary powers to make more evident the european solidarity in these situations.
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NOTES
(1) See also Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 500, p. 95. http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf
(2) Article 5 (e) and 8 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In particular, the latter states: ‘Upon appropriate notification to the receiving State, a consular post of the sending State may, unless the receiving State objects, exercise consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State’.
(3) International Law Commission, Article 1 Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection.
(4) Provided that the requirements of diplomatic protection have been met, i.e. there has been a violation of international law for which the respondent State can be held responsible, local remedies have been exhausted and the individual concerned has the nationality of the acting State. According to Articles 46 and 45 (c) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, only temporary and at the request of a third State not represented in the receiving State or in case of breakdown in diplomatic relations between two States, a State may, with the prior consent of a receiving State, undertake the protection of the interests of the third State and of its nationals.
(5) In a consistent line of case law, the ECJ has elaborated different aspects and consequences inherent to these treaty provisions, emphasising that “citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member states”. See inter alia ECJ, Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 82; for a recent assessment see Attorney General Colomer, opinion in Cases C-11/06 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher, 20.3.2007
(6) See: 95/553/EC: Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations ; 96/409/CSFP: Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 25 June 1996 on the establishment of an emergency travel document (See the consolidated version from 1.1.2007)
(7) As example of a MS Ratification see FR: http://www.franceurope.org/pdf/adapt/decret2002701.pdf LUX: http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/1997/0049/a049.pdf#page=2
(8) See Council of the European Union, Guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, Council Doc. 10109/06, 2.6.2006(a), as adopted by the General Affairs Council during its 2736th Council meeting in Luxembourg, 12.6.2006. See Council of the European Union, Reinforcing the European Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities, Council Doc. 10551/06, Brussels, 15.6.2006(b); see also M. Barnier, For a European civil protection force: Europe aid, European Commission, Brussels, May 2006
(9) European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Working Document on diplomatic and consular protection for citizens of the Union in third countries, 13 June 2007, Rapporteur Ioannis Varvitsiotis http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5531372
(10) “CONSULAR ASSISTANCE : Besides further refining the Lead State Concept, two papers have been studied and adopted by the Consular Affairs working group, as part of the consular guidelines already approved by the Council: an “Internal Information Strategy”, aimed at ensuring proper training of consular staff on issues derived from obligations under the treaties; and a paper on “Consular Crisis Coordination”, aimed at strengthening cooperation during consular crises affecting several Member States. The Commission will assist in the development of a “training kit” on EU-related obligations, to be used by Member States in their national training of staff to be posted abroad. Work has also been initiated to develop the next generation of European emergency travel documents (ETDs) containing new security features. A Troika meeting has been held with the US to discuss issues of common concern and possibilities for strengthened cooperation in third countries. Training sessions for Member State’s consular staff have been organised, facilitating the exchange of information and best practise between actors in the field of consular protection.”

Internal security in the EU: the priorities of the next 18 months

Following the previous note on borders, immigration and asylum we wil now proceed with the priorities announced by the Spanish presidency in the field of internal security of the EU. These come from the working document of the Spanish, Belgium and Hungarian Council Presidencies which will follow one after the other in the next 18 months. As usual, additional notes will provide a comprehensive overview of the different topics.

Continue reading “Internal security in the EU: the priorities of the next 18 months”

The new powers of the Court of Justice after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty

The press release published on November 30th by the Court of Justice is worth reading by everybody interested in the European Law as well by the every individual whishing to bthe protection of its rights.
The very essential and clear text is the following:

The Treaty of Lisbon and the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007 by the 27 Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the Union, comes into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the two fundamental treaties – the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community, with the latter to be known in future as the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (TFEU). (1)
The Treaty of Lisbon makes changes to the organisation and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Continue reading “The new powers of the Court of Justice after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty”

New prospects for relations between the Court of Justice and national courts

Everyone knows the fundamental role of the Court of Justice in the construction of a European legal space. Indeed, thanks to its preliminary rulings which guide the work of national courts when they are called upon to enforce community law. Over the decades, the dialogue between European and national courts has ensured an increasingly faithfully interpretation of community law as well as the development of a true common legal culture.

After all, what value might have fundamental rights to stakeholders if judges are not capable to secure their correct application?

In this regard it must be recognised that the increased synergy between European and national judges (acting in this case as ‘European’ judges) together with the new powers of European Court of Justice in the area of freedom, security and justice resulted by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon will definitely increase individual’s rights in this domain.

For example, in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (the so-called “third pillar”), before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court’s ability to issue preliminary rulings relied upon Member States’ discretion on the basis of Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union (*). Indeed up to the 30 November several of these Member States did not accept the Court’s competence competence.

Another example relates to the domains ‘communitarised’ in 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam (immigration, borders, asylum and judicial and criminal cooperation). Although in this case the situation was a bit better, Article 68 TEC (**) limited the possibility to obtain pre-trial interpretation only to judges of last appeal.

With the Treaty of Lisbon this situation has radically changed. With a Communication  appeared in the Official Journal on 5 December, the European Court of Justice has published a series of apparently non-binding guidelines aimed at establishing a daily relation between national and European judges.

In this regard, the guidelines concerning the urgent preliminary ruling procedure related to the area of freedom, security and justice are particularly interesting. They state:

The procedure is governed by Article 23a of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJEU 2008 C 115, p. 210) and Article 104b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. National courts may request that this procedure be applied or request the application of the accelerated procedure under the conditions laid down in Article 23a of the Protocol and Article 104a of the Rules of Procedure.”

Conditions for the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure

33. The urgent preliminary ruling procedure is applicable only in the areas covered by Title V of Part Three of the TFEU, which relates to the area of freedom, security and justice.

34. The Court of Justice decides whether this procedure is to be applied. Such a decision is generally taken only on a reasoned request from the referring court. Exceptionally, the Court may decide of its own motion to deal with a reference under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, where that appears to be required.

35. The urgent preliminary ruling procedure simplifies the various stages of the proceedings before the Court, but its application entails significant constraints for the Court and for the parties and other interested persons participating in the procedure, particularly the Member States.

36. It should therefore be requested only where it is absolutely necessary for the Court to give its ruling on the reference as quickly as possible. Although it is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of such situations, particularly because of the varied and evolving nature of the rules of European Union law governing the area of freedom, security and justice, a national court or tribunal might, for example, consider submitting a request for the urgent preliminary ruling procedure to be applied in the following situations: in the case, referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, of a person in custody or deprived of his liberty, where the answer to the question raised is decisive as to the assessment of that person’s legal situation or, in proceedings concerning parental authority or custody of children, where the identity of the court having jurisdiction under European Union law depends on the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling.

However, it must be pointed out that these new competences will not be applied before five years  in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters for acts adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (art. 10 Protocol 36).

Also with this temporally exception it is nonetheless clear that a new phase has now started also for European judges. The interpretation of community law can now be based on an even more authority Court which in turn can rely on the Treaty and the binding Charter on Fundamental Rights binding for all the institutions, including European and national judges.

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(*) EX Article 35 (TEU)
1. The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have jurisdiction, subject to the conditions laid down in this Article, to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established under this Title and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.
2. By a declaration made at the time of signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam or at any time thereafter, any Member State shall be able to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings as specified in paragraph 1.

3. A Member State making a declaration pursuant to paragraph 2 shall specify that either:

(a)any court or tribunal of that State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may request the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on a question raised in a case pending before it and concerning the validity or interpretation of an act referred to in paragraph 1 if that court or tribunal considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, or

(b) any court or tribunal of that State may request the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on a question raised in a case pending before it and concerning the validity of interpretation of an act referred to in paragraph 1 if that court or tribunal considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. Treaty on European Union 25

4. Any Member State, whether or not it has made a declaration pursuant to paragraph 2, shall be entitled to submit statements of case or written observations to the Court in cases which arise under paragraph 1.

5. The Court of Justice shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.

6. The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to review the legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions brought by a Member State or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. The proceedings provided for in this paragraph shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure.

7. The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States regarding the interpretation or the application of acts adopted under Article 34(2) whenever such dispute cannot be settled by the Council within six months of its being referred to the Council by one of its members. The Court shall also have jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States and the Commission regarding the interpretation or the application of conventions established under Article 34(2)(d).

(**) Article 68 TCE
1. Article 234 shall apply to this title under the following circumstances and conditions: where a question on the interpretation of this title or on the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this title is raised in a case pending before a court or a tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.

2. In any event, the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction to rule on any measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.

3. The Council, the Commission or a Member State may request the Court of Justice to give a ruling on a question of interpretation of this title or of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this title. The ruling given by the Court of Justice in response to such a request shall not apply to judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States which have become res judicata.

A new European Union after Lisbon?

After many years of skirmishes, referendums and tense debates, the Treaty of Lisbon finally entered into force on 1 December 2009.

The institutional framework of the European Union will finally become more transparent and streamlined although a few exceptions remain for the opt-outs granted to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Poland and Czech Republic.

The European Parliament will have (almost) full legislative powers and the European Court of Justice will monitor adherence to and respect of the rule of law in (almost) all domains falling under the European Union competence.

The European Community will therefore disappear after fifty-two years of honourable service. It will be incorporated within the European Union which will not hide its political vocation any further by pretending to be an economic body, as “eurosceptic” countries wanted it to be.

This arm wrestling, lasted for almost thirty years. It began with the Council of the European Union in London in 1981 when the foreign affairs ministers of Germany and Italy, namely Genscher and Colombo, presented a project for a “European Act”. Its aim was to develop political cooperation as well as promote the culture, fundamental rights and harmonisation of national legislations outside the domains already covered by the Community treaties, together with the fight against terrorism and criminality.
Continue reading “A new European Union after Lisbon?”

The Justice and Home Affairs Council presented to the European Council the priorities for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Stockholm Programme 2010-2014)

During a meeting that started under the Nice regime and finished under Lisbon, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs has adopted the proposal for the multi-annual 2010-14 strategic work programme in the area of freedom, security and justice which has already been addressed by the European Parliament and that should be adopted during the European Council of 10 December in Stockholm.

Following the Tampere Programme (1999) and that of the Hague (2004) the 82 pages of the new programme should define, under article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union “[…] the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice”.

A rather arduous exercise given that article 67 of the same Treaty establishes that this “area” should be carried out “[…] with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States”.

Now, a glance through the many suggestions of the documents highlights the existing strains between European perspectives and national resistances. This becomes apparent by analysing the ambiguity of the formulation used, the silences and the rhetorical – rather than concrete – calls to the protection of rights and fight against discrimination at the European level. 

The institutional perspective which was pretty much absent in the master proposal of the Commission (with the Irish referendum still pending at that point) as well as in the proposals prepared by the Future Group, finally peeps out with some unrehearsed recalls to the role of the European and national parliaments.

This democratic control visibly frightens the authors of these kind of document especially in relation to sensible domains such as judicial and police cooperation. This is because diplomats and civil servants with wide cultural, experience and technical skills, often perceive any openness to political dialogue as if they were taking a leapt into the unknown, even when they are genuine pro-Europeans.

A further demonstration of the persistence of these resistances comes from the almost desperate and then failed attempt to conclude a transatlantic agreement on a very sensible issues such as the exchange of financial data to fight terrorism, which took place during the last hours in force of the Treaty of Nice on the 30 November.

Nevertheless, the phase has now been ridden out and the actors of the three institutions should come to terms with this and increase their mutual trust, as it has already happened in other even more sensible domains for the European development, such as the internal market.