Category: 2. Values & principles of the European Union

The General Principles of EU Administrative Procedural Law

THE TEXT BELOW IS AN EXCERPT OF A STUDY ACCESSIBLE HERE 

Nota Bene: Upon request by the European Parliament JURI Committee this in-depth analysis explains what general principles of EU administrative procedural law are, and how they can be formulated in  the recitals of a  Regulation   on  EU  administrative  procedure.
Authors:  Diana-Urania Galetta, Professor of Administrative Law and European Administrative Law, University of Milan, , Herwig C. H. Hofmann,   Professor   of   European   and   Transnational   Public   Law,   Jean   Monnet Chair, University of Luxembourg,  Oriol  Mir Puigpelat,  Professor  of  Administrative Law,  University of Barcelona and  Jacques Ziller,  Professor of  EU  law, University of  Pavia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Background
The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament has requested an In-depth Analysis on “The general principles of EU administrative procedural law”. The In-depth Analysis is intended to be presented at a meeting of the Working Group on Administrative Law.
Aim
. The Analysis puts forward drafting proposals for the general principles of EU administrative procedural law to be included in the Recitals of a draft Regulation on EU Administrative procedures. More specifically, the Analysis tries to clarify the content of the general principles of EU administrative procedural law and suggest the most accurate formulation for the corresponding recitals.
The following general principles, which are related to the Right to good administration embedded in Article 41 Charter, to the principle of an open, efficient and independent European administration enunciated in Article 298 TFEU are translated into recitals: 1 Access to information and access to documents; Access to the file ; Duty of care; Data protection; Data quality; Effective remedy; Equal treatment and non-discrimination; Fair hearing; Fairness; Good administration; Impartiality; Legal certainty; Legality; Legitimate expectations; Participatory democracy; Proportionality; Reason giving; Rule of Law; Timeliness; Transparency.
(…)
2.2.   Structure and wording of recitals

Which general principles of EU law need to be referred to in the recitals of an EU regulation on Administrative Procedures depends on the content of the substantive provisions of the regulation.   The   purpose   of   establishing   an   EU   regulation   on   administrative   procedures   is   to improve the quality of the EU’s legal system by fostering compliance with the general principles of EU law in the reality of fragmentation between sector-specific procedures and the reality of the multi-jurisdictional nature and pluralisation of actors involved in the implementation of EU policies.
Fragmentation has often resulted in a lack of transparency, predictability, intelligibility and trust in EU administrative and regulatory procedures and their outcome, especially from the point of view of citizens.
A codification of administrative procedures can contribute to simplifying the legal system of the Union, enhancing legal certainty, filling gaps in the legal system and thereby ideally contributing to compliance with the rule of law. Overall, it can be expected that establishing enforceable rights of individuals in procedures that affect them, contributes to compliance with principles of due process  and  fosters procedural  justice.
Adopting such a regulation further has the potential to contribute not only to the clarity of the legal rights and obligations of individuals and participating institutions, offices, bodies and agencies, but also to the transparency and effectiveness of the legal system as a whole. An EU Regulation on Administrative Procedures has the potential to contribute to the objectives of clarification of rights and obligations. It also contributes to simplification of EU law by ensuring that procedures can follow one single rule-book and better regulation by allowing  to  improve the  overall  legislative quality.
The recitals of an EU regulation on administrative procedures will therefore contain various principles of EU law.
When identifying the principles of EU law which should be referred to in the recitals not only is it important to provide a list of principles but also to give them some order. In establishing such order, it has to be taken into account that there is neither an established ‘hierarchy’ of principles, nor do all general and foundational principles of EU law work in the same way. The important aspect of general principles is that they serve to guide the interpretation of legal rules of all levels of the EU’s legal system and fill gaps. In that context, the reference to a general principle of EU law in the recitals serves to reiterate its importance in interpreting a legal text such as the regulation on EU administrative procedure. It also serves to clarify which principles have been balanced by the legislature in establishing  specific  provisions  of  the regulation.

However, in order to structure the approach to the reference to general principles of EU law in the recitals of the EU regulation on administrative procedure, the various principles can be grouped. Taking into account the very nature of recitals our proposal is mainly grounded in the idea that the recitals not only have a legal purpose (of interpreting the norms in the regulation), but should also have a ‘citizen friendly’ informative purpose. The principles in the recitals therefore need to be presented in a way that may prompt the non-expert to read  them.
(…)
The proposed recitals are not comprehensive: they are limited to the scope of clarifying the content of general principles of EU administrative procedure law, what other general principles are relevant to the implementation and interpretation of administrative procedure rules, and why those principles are important. Other components need to be added to the recitals such  as,  to name  one  example, the legal  basis  of  the act.

Recitals (1) to (5) are intended to explain to a broader public why those principles matter. Recitals (7) to (22) attempt to explain what the content and meaning of those principles are. Recital (6) briefly alludes to internal principles which are very important for the implementation of the principles mentioned in Article 298 (1) TFEU of an open, efficient and independent administration without necessarily creating enforceable subjective rights; contrary to the other principles those internal principles are not further developed in their enunciation in so far as they do not necessarily correspond to subjective rights. One or more specific recitals might be devoted to those principles once the articles of the operative part  of  the  Regulation  will  have been  drafted.
The order in which those principles are presented derives from grounds which are explained in section 1.2 of this note. The recitals include footnotes that are obviously not intended to remain in the proposal of a Regulation. Their purpose is to give the most useful references (mainly about case law)  to  the  reader  of this  note.
(…)
3.2. Proposed Recitals Continue reading “The General Principles of EU Administrative Procedural Law”

IS A TEMPORARY GREXIT LEGALLY POSSIBLE? EMU AS THE HOTEL CALIFORNIA

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Steve Peers

According to press reports, while today’s Eurogroup meeting, called to consider a possible new bail-out plan for Greece, was taking place, the German government was leaking a plan for a ‘temporary Grexit’. Before considering the political or economic merits of this idea, there’s an obvious question: is this legally possible? In a word: No.

It’s not legally possible simply because a permanent Grexit isn’t legally possible, and so a temporary one isn’t either. I’ll briefly recap the reasons why, based on my recent blog post. There’s no reference in the Treaties to any power of a Member State to leave EMU once it joins, or of the EU institutions to remove that Member State from EMU, whether it agrees to that or not. A Member State can leave EMU by leaving the EU, but there’s no Treaty power to throw a Member State out of the EU, or to suggest that any Member State might ever be under the obligation to leave.

This week, Andrew Duff suggested that it might be possible to use the existing Treaties to arrange a Grexit. In his view, the power set out in Article 140(2) TFEU to decide on a Member State’s admission to the EU is reversible. However, this view is not legally tenable. Article 140(2) is only a power to join the euro, not to leave it. This interpretation is reinforced by Article 140(3) TFEU, which refers to the ‘irrevocable’ fixing of exchange rates. Overturning a decision made to join the euro by qualified majority vote (on the basis of Article 140(2)) would not be enough; it would also be necessary to overturn the exchange rate decision made by unanimityon the basis of Article 140(3). So Greece would have to consent – even if any of this were legally possible.

Some might suggest that the CJEU would simply ignore the plain words of the Treaty and accede to political reality, as it did in the cases of Pringle (on the ESM bail-out treaty), and Gauweiler (on ECB bond-buying). But those cases concerned measures which were intended to save monetary union, and which had broad support from Member States. A forced Grexit (temporary or not) would meet neither criterion. And much as many Germans hate to admit it, there is a textual basis to the rulings in Pringle and Gauweiler: the Treaty did not expressly ban loans to Member States, and it implicitly permits the ECB to buy government bonds on the secondary markets. The argument for a forced Grexit does not even have a fig leaf to hide its obvious illegality.

Nor can the Greeks be forced out by the actions of the ECB. The Treaty ban on forced exit from EMU must logically rule out measures which have the same result in practice. And even the measures which the ECB has taken to date (never mind others which it might take in future) are highly questionable, and are already being legally challenged, as I blogged earlier. We can’t assume that the CJEU will always back the legality of the ECB’s actions: the UK won a case against it earlier this year, and the Commission beat it in court years ago as regards the application of EU anti-fraud law.

So can anything be done legally to change the current position? As I suggested in my earlier blog post, it would be possible to amend the Treaties, or to somehow engineer proceedings that challenged the legality of Greek EMU membership from the outset, or the legality of Greek debts; or (more precariously) to use Article 352 TFEU (the residual powers clause of the Treaties) to regulate the effects of a Grexit that had already taken place de facto.

But let me offer another suggestion: it could arguably be legal to adopt a measure based on Article 352 which nominally retains Greece’s status as an EMU member, but exempts it from some of the normal rules applicable to EMU members. This has the advantage of bending rules a little without breaking them entirely. Since Article 352 requires unanimous voting, it avoids the economic and political problem with Duff’s proposal: throwing a Member State out of EMU by a qualified majority would show the world that the EU’s monetary union is very fragile indeed. Using Article 352 would ensure that Greece consents to whatever happens to it.

I won’t thrash out the details now of what this might entail. But some have pointed out that, for instance, Scotland has no official legal tender, but pounds are simply accepted as currency in practice. It might similarly be arguable that the euro would remain nominally legal tender in Greece, but some sort of parallel currency, not formally legal but accepted for certain purposes, could be introduced for a limited period.

I’m not suggesting that this is the best solution, either legally, economically or politically. In my view, the least bad solution would be a fresh bail-out deal with rather less austerity, or (since that’s not realistic) acceptance of the current Greek offer (including debt restructuring) with an independent advisory board to oversee and make suggestions for its detailed implementation. Only if that idea fails (which currently seems possible) should a more radical fall-back position be considered.

Metaphors about Greece have been done to death (and I’m afraid I’ve contributed to this myself). So let’s sum this idea up with a lyric from a famous rock song: Greece can check out of EMU any time it likes, but it can never leave.

“(EU’s) Laws are like sausages. You should never watch them being made…” (*)

by Emilio De Capitani

As denounced in several posts of this blog the distance between the daily practice of the EU institutions and the democratic principles enshrined in the Treaties is growing day by day.

I am not referring here to the way how representative democracy is framed at EU level. Suffice to remember how last year the voters have been tricked with the “spitzencandidate” game by four political families suggesting that each one of them was promoting alternative EU models. After the election three of them have become part of the same political majority in the European Parliament  so that left and right are now intertwined that you hardly distinguish whose strategy is prevailing. Moreover in the interinstitutional game such majority in the European Parliament mirrors the majority in the big EU countries and in this situation there is no has no real incentive for the EU citizens representatives in changing the situation in the EU or in its main member states.

No, what I am referring here is the way how the EU institutions are jeopardising day by day the Treaty rules which support participative or “input” democracy which aims to give everyone a ‘say’ notably when the EU legislation is initiated, negotiated and adopted.

This model of the “govern by the people” now enshrined in the Treaties is extremely important in a legal order which is very rightly perceived far from EU citizens and which looks still framed by bureaucrats and diplomats more incline to the so called “output democracy” or the “govern for the people” where the management needs prevail on the citizen (and national parliaments) participation. However this government by the elites has become even stronger since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding it is stated that:

“Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.” (art.10 TEU).

“(1) In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. (2). The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act. (3). Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph.” (art.15 p 1-3 TFEU)

As I have explained here these principles are circumvented by the daily practice of the EU institutions which have built a parallel world of the so called “trilogues” where they meet negotiate and decide without any transparency towards the European citizens or even the National Parliaments. The latter have just a say at the beginning of the “movie” but disappear immediately after and even if most of them could follow the EU legislative works are threatened by the Council of the European Union of not diffusing the legislative preparatory work because it is covered by the …”professional secrecy” rule (!).

To try to change this state of things I have then asked to the European Parliament, the institution which is deemed to take in account more than other the needs of participative democracy, the texts which are debated during the interinstitutional trilogues and which reflect the evolution of the position of the different institutions during the legislative negotiations.

After a first denial from the EP secretariat  I have submitted a confirmatory application  where I have tried to raise the attention of the European Parliament Bureau (which brings together the EP President and Vice Presidents), on the constitutional, institutional and operational arguments in favour of transparency during legislative negotiations (see here).

The answer I have just received (see below a version emphasized/notated  by me) is appalling because not only the European Parliament endorse the Council practice but declares that the protection of the effectiveness of the decision making process (which has no more standing in the treaties for legislative activity) overrides the right of the citizens to be informed and that confidentiality is necessary to avoid the risk of the EP Rapporteur losing the ‘trust’ of the Council Presidency (!?). Until now I was convinced that the EP main preoccupation was not to loose the trust of half billion citizens and to drive in a transparent way a political strategy which can also be supported at national level by the same political families in the national parliaments….
Will this be the position of the Ombusdman who has recently open an inquiry on the Trilogues interinstitutional practice ? Will this be the position of the Court ? It is too early to answer this question but this will arrive (better soon than later)

Emilio De Capitani

(*) Quoted from Otto Von Bismark

LETTER RECEIVED on 08.07.2015 from Ildiko GALL-PELCZ EP Vice-President in charge  of Access to documents Continue reading ““(EU’s) Laws are like sausages. You should never watch them being made…” (*)”

“DON’T MENTION THE EXTRA JUDGES!” WHEN CJEU REFORM TURNS INTO FARCE

PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS ON Friday, 3 July 2015

by Steve Peers

The classic British comedy Fawlty Towers derived its humour from the doomed attempts of the ill-tempered hotel owner Basil Fawlty to control the uncontrollable situations that developed around him, often taking out his frustrations on his waiter, Manuel. No one would seriously suggest emulating Basil Fawlty’s management style. But nevertheless, the debate over the reform of the Court of Justice is increasingly resembling a Fawlty Towers episode.

Let’s review. After several previous failed attempts at reforming the EU judicial system, the Court of Justice suggested that the lower EU court (the General Court) should have double the number of judges – two per Member State, instead of one. The EU’s civil service tribunal (with seven judges) would close down, merged into the General Court. The senior Court of Justice would retain one judge per Member State. For the background, further details and arguments in favour, see my earlierblog post.

This proposal was opposed by many staff in the General Court. So four General Court judges appeared before the European Parliament to object to this plan (let’s call them, collectively, ‘Manuel’). For discussion of Manuel’s counter-arguments, see the recent blog post by Professors Pech and Alemanno; and for Manuel’s written argument itself, see here.

Very recently the proposal was formally adopted by the Council. But it still has to be agreed with the European Parliament (EP), and some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) appear to have great misgivings, fuelled by the dissenting judges. Cue an angry response by the CJEU’s President Skouris (let’s call him ‘Basil’). As documented by Duncan Robinson in the Financial Times, hecomplained that the EP was willing to listen to the rebels, and threatened retaliationagainst the dissenting judge. Manuel might soon get whacked by that frying pan.

With the greatest respect, there are profound problems with Skouris’ approach. First and foremost, his response has become the story (it’s also been covered elsewhere). This diverts attention from the pros and cons of the argument for CJEU reform. I’m not criticising the journalists – it’s their job to report on his response, and he should have anticipated the effect it would have. Also, now that his response has become the story, it gives the impression that the proposal is a greedy grab for money by the judges. In fact. as I pointed out in my earlier post, the CJEU had previously suggested fewer extra judges. It only asked for doubling the number in despair, when it became clear that Member States could not agree on a more modest number, due to national egotism.

Secondly, Skouris’ angry letters give the impression that the CJEU is an authoritarian institution. Certainly, any ordinary employer would not take kindly to public criticism of its policy by its staff. For instance, if (entirely hypothetically) I had objections to the management of the University of Essex, I would not air them in a public forum. But the CJEU is a public body, in a political system whose legitimacy is clearly fragile. These attempts to silence dissent surely damage the Court’s authority more than the dissent itself would. Anyway, they gave that dissent far more publicity than it would otherwise have had (the well-known ‘Streisand effect’).

Thirdly, by attacking the dissenters instead of countering their arguments, it gives the impression that there is no good argument in favour of the Court’s proposals, since the brave truth-tellers are being silenced. And in tactical terms, it’s particularly hard to see how attacking the very MEPs whom Skouris needs to convince to support his proposals will win them round. Continue reading ““DON’T MENTION THE EXTRA JUDGES!” WHEN CJEU REFORM TURNS INTO FARCE”

Agenda européen pour les migrations et protection des réfugiés : « l’Europe n’est pas à la hauteur »

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE 3 JUILLET 2015

par Henri Labayle, CDRE

Ces fortes paroles du président de la Commission, à l’issue du Conseil européen des 25 et 26 juin, sont un reflet exact de la situation. La déception qu’elles traduisent est à la mesure du geste politique accompli par le chef de l’exécutif. Il convient de lui en rendre justice.

La tiédeur des conclusions adoptées par les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement est en effet symptomatique d’une Europe se berçant de mots, incapable de respecter les valeurs dont elle se réclame. En bref, en pleine crise d’identité comme de projet. Incapables de s’accorder sur un accueil obligatoire des demandeurs de protection (1), les Etats membres se sont satisfaits du simple principe de cet accueil (2).

1. Le refus de tout mécanisme contraignant

Il ne fallait pas être grand clerc pour deviner les suites réservées à la proposition courageuse de la Commission de donner, enfin, un sens concret à la solidarité entre Etats membres que ces derniers ont prétendu graver dans le marbre des traités. Au point qu’ici même, il y a un mois, on avait conclu à leur enterrement avant l’heure, sinon à une manoeuvre politique.

Il était en effet peu vraisemblable qu’une majorité se dégage en faveur des idées phares contenues dans la proposition faite au Conseil d’instituer des mesures provisoires en matière de protection internationale au profit de l’Italie et de la Grèce (COM (2015) 286). L’ambition était politique sinon numérique : les Etats étaient invités à réinstaller et relocaliser 60.000 demandeurs de protection dans l’Union européenne, de manière obligatoire, en deux ans et sur la base de critères de répartition.

Pour une fois, l’Union n’a pas déçu ceux qui l’observent : elle a été effectivement incapable d’assumer ses responsabilités, comme à l’habitude. La nouveauté, en revanche, provient des lignes de front qui se sont dessinées à cette occasion, allant au delà des surenchères verbales.

a. la lenteur des mesures opérationnelles Continue reading “Agenda européen pour les migrations et protection des réfugiés : « l’Europe n’est pas à la hauteur »”

Passenger Name Records, data mining & data protection: the need for strong safeguards

EXCERPTS FROM EXPERTS’ OPINION SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PUBLISHED ON THE STATEWATCH SITE)

by Douwe KORFF and Marie GEORGES (FREE-Group Members)

Introduction

Much has been said and written about Passenger Name Records (PNR) in the last decade and a half. When we were asked to write a short report for the Consultative Committee about PNR, “in the wider contexts”, we therefore thought we could confine ourselves to a relatively straightforward overview of the literature and arguments.

However, the task turned out to be more complex than anticipated. In particular, the context has changed as a result of the Snowden revelations. Much of what was said and written about PNR before his exposés had looked at the issues narrowly, as only related to the “identification” of “known or [clearly ‘identified’] suspected terrorists” (and perhaps other major international criminals). However, the most recent details of what US and European authorities are doing, or plan to do, with PNR data show that they are part of the global surveillance operations we now know about.

More specifically, it became clear to us that there is a (partly deliberate?) semantic confusion about this “identification”; that the whole surveillance schemes are not only to do with finding previously-identified individuals, but also (and perhaps even mainly) with “mining” the vast amounts of disparate data to create “profiles” that are used to single out from the vast data stores people “identified” as statistically more likely to be (or even to become?) a terrorist (or other serious criminal), or to be “involved” in some way in terrorism or major crime. That is a different kind of “identification” from the previous one, as we discuss in this report.

We show this relatively recent (although predicted) development with reference to the most recent developments in the USA, which we believe provide the model for what is being planned (or perhaps already begun to be implemented) also in Europe. In the USA, PNR data are now expressly permitted to be added to and combined with other data, to create the kinds of profiles just mentioned – and our analysis of Article 4 of the proposed EU PNR Directive shows that, on a close reading, exactly the same will be allowed in the EU if the proposal is adopted.

Snowden has revealed much. But it is clear that his knowledge about what the “intelligence” agencies of the USA and the UK (and their allies) are really up to was and is still limited. He clearly had an astonishing amount of access to the data collection side of their operations, especially in relation to Internet and e-communications data (much more than any sensible secret service should ever have allowed a relatively junior contractor, although we must all be grateful for that “error”). However, it would appear that he had and has very little knowledge of what was and is being done with the vast data collections he exposed.

Yet it is obvious (indeed, even from the information about PNR use that we describe) that these are used not only to “identify” known terrorists or people identified as suspects in the traditional sense, but that these data mountains are also being “mined” to label people as “suspected terrorist” on the basis of profiles and algorithms. We believe that that in fact is the more insidious aspect of the operations.

This is why this report has become much longer than we had planned, and why it focusses on this wider issue rather than on the narrower concerns about PNR data expressed in most previous reports and studies.

The report is structured as follows. After preliminary remarks about the main topic of the report, PNR data (and related data) (further specified in the Attachment), Part I discusses the wider contexts within which we have analyzed the use of PNR data. We look at both the widest context: the change, over the last fifteen years or so, from reactive to “proactive” and “preventive” law enforcement, and the blurring of the lines between law enforcement and “national security” activities (and between the agencies involved), in particular in relation to terrorism (section I.i); and at the historical (immediately post-“9/11”) and more recent developments relating to the use of PNR data in data mining/profiling operations the USA, in the “CAPPS” and (now) the “Secure Flight” programmes (section I.ii).

In section I.iii, we discuss the limitations and dangers inherent in such data mining and “profiling”.

Only then do we turn to PNR and Europe by describing, in Part II. both the links between the EU and the US systems (section II.1), and then the question of “strategic surveillance” in Europe (II.ii).

In Part III, we discuss the law, i.e., the general ECHR standards (I); the ECHR standards applied to surveillance in practice (II, with a chart with an overview of the ECtHR considerations); other summaries of the law by the Venice Commission and the FRA (III); and further relevant case-law (IV).

In Part IV, we first apply the standards to EU-third country PNR agreements (IV.i), with reference to the by-passing of the existing agreements by the USA (IV.ii) and to the spreading of demands for PNR to other countries (IV.iii). We then look at the human rights and data protection-legal issues raised by the proposal for an EU PNR scheme. We conclude that part with a summary of the four core issues identified: purpose-specification and –limitation; the problem with remedies; “respect for human identity”; and the question of whether the processing we identify as our main concern – “dynamic”-algorithm-based data mining and profiling – actually works.

Part V contains a Summary of our findings; our Conclusions (with our overall conclusions set out in a box on p. 109); and tentative, draft Recommendations. (…)

Conclusions Continue reading “Passenger Name Records, data mining & data protection: the need for strong safeguards”

How the EU “legislative triangle” is becoming a “Bermudes, triangle “…

by Emilio De Capitani

According to several scholars the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the implementation of the democratic principle in the EU as well as the framework for participative democracy. In theory with entry into force of the Charter the EU has become more accountable to its citizens and there has been a clear improvement of the legal framework for EU legislative and non legislative activity. Even if not perfectly sound) there is now a clear definition of what should be considered of “legislative” nature and there is now a clear obligation (at primary law level) to debate publicly both in the Council and in the European Parliament.

Needless to say, the latter has been for years the champion of legislative and administrative transparency  not only in the citizens interest but also in view of the definition of its own marge of maneuver during the negotiations with the Council. This former EP attitude was not particularly appreciated by the Council and the Commission when in 2001, before Lisbon, the three institutions negotiated the first EU legislation in this domain. (Regulation 1049/01). However at the time it was easy to say that time was needed to promote open debates and votes in the Council and in the Commission because it would had required a change of culture in an institution mainly structured as a bureaucratic machinery (the Commission) or in an other framed by a diplomatic approach (the Council).

Five years after Lisbon such a change of culture in the Council and the Commission is it under way or is the other way round for the EP?

Have a look to the exchange of messages below and make your own opinion. The issue is still pending but risks to have some interesting developments… Continue reading “How the EU “legislative triangle” is becoming a “Bermudes, triangle “…”

THE LAW OF GREXIT: WHAT DOES EU LAW SAY ABOUT LEAVING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS  on Sunday, 28 June 2015

by Steve Peers 

A Greek referendum on whether to accept its creditors’ offer is currently scheduled for next week. It’s not clear at this point whether the Greek voters’ refusal to accept the offer would necessarily lead to Greece leaving the EU or EMU, or at least defaulting on its debts. In fact, it is not clear what would happen if Greek voters decided to accept the offer, since it was still under the process of negotiation when the referendum was announced, and may no longer be on the table at the time of the referendum.

However, since a wide range of outcomes are possible, it’s useful at this stage to look at the legal framework for departure from economic and monetary union (EMU) – and in particular whether Greece would have to leave the EU if it left the single currency. (See also my previous blog posts, before and after the last Greek election, and Ioannis Glinavos’ recent analysis of whether Greece could be forced out of the euro).

The starting point is that the EU Treaties contain detailed rules on signing up to the euro, which apply to every Member State except Denmark and the UK. Those countries have special protocols giving them an opt-out from the obligation to join EMU that applies to all other Member States. (I’ll say that again, more clearly, for the benefit of those who claim otherwise: there is absolutely no way that the UK can be required to sign up to the single currency. That would not change in any way if British voters decided that the UK should stay in the EU).

But there are no explicit rules whatsoever on a Member State leaving the euro, either of its own volition or unwillingly, at the behest of other Member States and/or the European Central Bank (ECB).  There’s an obvious reason for this: the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty wanted to ensure that monetary union went ahead, and express rules on leaving EMU would have destabilised it from the outset. Put simply, legally speaking, Greece can’t directly jump or be pushed from the single currency. Continue reading “THE LAW OF GREXIT: WHAT DOES EU LAW SAY ABOUT LEAVING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION?”

Meijers Committee : Promoting Intra EU labour mobility of international protection beneficiaries

Original published on the Meijers Committee (*) site

Summary : The Meijers Committee proposes to enhance the opportunities for employment of international protection beneficiaries across the EU by allowing them to work in another Member State after two years of legal residency and under more favourable conditions than current EU directives allow. This incentive for achieving economic independence corrects the current legal regime under which socioeconomic criteria play no role in sharing the responsibility for asylum-seekers and international protection beneficiaries. It also allows for greater personal freedom of the people concerned and gives them a better chance of building a stable future. The proposed measure draws largely from that existing framework in terms of rights and obligations of individuals and Member States.

    1. Introduction

The Council of the EU is currently discussing new approaches to sharing the responsibility for asylum seekers and international protection beneficiaries among Member States. The Meijers Committee advises that these discussions should move beyond the issue of distributing asylum seekers and also explore the possibilities of enhancing intra-EU movement for persons who have been granted asylum.
In this note, the Meijers Committee proposes to allow international protection beneficiaries recognised in one Member State to take up a confirmed job offer in another Member State.
Granting beneficiaries of international protection free movement within the EU on objective conditions of having work and not becoming a burden on the social assistance system of another Member State contributes to the economic dynamism of the Union and helps relieve the pressure on those Member States whose asylum systems are particularly burdened and where socioeconomic conditions are generally less then favorable. It also enhances the prospects that the beneficiaries of international protection will better integrate by increasing their economic opportunities.

Finally, it stresses that these third-country nationals may be an asset to the EU rather than a burden or a problem.

To that purpose, the Meijers Committee proposes to apply elements of the free movement regime for EU workers to international protection beneficiaries and to complement these with certain conditions which have already been worked out in the regime for conditional labour mobility of international protection beneficiaries who have acquired EU long-term resident status and other relevant EU instruments. This note sets out the main features of such a measure.

2. Subject of the proposal

Introduce a supplementary measure to the existing system of distribution of asylum seekers and international protection beneficiaries or to a possible quota system, which permits international protection beneficiaries recognised in one Member State to take up a confirmed job offer in another Member State. This allows a distribution of beneficiaries of international protection between Member States on the basis of employer’s needs and the economic activities of third-country nationals.

The beneficiaries may gain a confirmed job offer in a second Member State by looking in EURES  or by using his or her right to travel up to three months within a single period of six months in the Schengen area. Most likely the people involved will look for work in Member States where family or contacts reside.
Permit vacancies in other Member States be taken up by third-country nationals already lawfully in the EU, rather than introduce new third-country nationals from outside the EU.
Avoid or diminish long-term unemployment, dependence on social benefits or irregular employment in the Member State that granted international protection by granting the beneficiaries conditional mobility within the Union.

3.Existing framework for labour mobility within the EU

There are at present several EU regimes for labour mobility for different categories of persons:

  • Free movement of EU workers and their Non-EU family members under Directive 2004/38 (Citizenship).
  • Conditional labour mobility of third-country nationals who acquired the status of an EU long-term resident in one Member State by allowing them to accept a job in another Member State under Directive 2003/109 (Long Term Residents). The latter State may refuse a work permit and admission during the first year on labour market grounds. Since 2013, beneficiaries of international protection have been covered by this Directive on the basis of Directive 2011/51.
  • Directive 2009/50 (Blue Card) for highly qualified workers from outside the EU.
  • Directive 2014/66 (Intra Corporate Transfer) for third country nationals.
  • Proposal to recast and merge the Students and Researchers Directive (COM(2013) 151 final), including a period for a third-country national to search for employment after graduation from a European education institute.

Although Directive 2011/51 has provided international protection beneficiaries with a right to reside in a second Member State to exercise an economic activity, this right is subject to strict conditions. It is only acquired after five years of lawful residence in the first Member State.

Further, the second Member State may, during the first year, apply a labour market test, under which preference may be given to Union citizens and third-country nationals who are legally resident and receive unemployment benefits in the second Member State. However, there are good reasons to allow free movement of international protection beneficiaries on more favourable terms.
Other third-country nationals are normally only admitted to a first Member State if they meet conditions of having work, resident family members with sufficient income, or have been admitted as a student, in short because of their socioeconomic bond with the destination country. International protection beneficiaries, on the other hand, often do not have self-evident bonds with the first Member State due to the nature of their residence (asylum) and the Dublin criteria for allocating asylum seekers.
The measure proposed by the Meijers Committee would help correct this effect.

4.Growing experience with labour mobility of third-country nationals within the EU

Actual, large-scale use of the Long-term residents Directive 2003/109 started only five years after the directive had to be implemented in national law of the 25 Member States bound by it.
Italy and Spain had both issued permits to more than 1.8 million EU long-term residents by the end of 2013. Mobility to another Member State commenced only recently. Germany issued 1,500 residence permits to third-country nationals who had acquired the EU long-term resident status in 2012, and 3,000 in 2013. At the end of 2013 Germany had issued more than 5,500 residence permits to third-country nationals who had acquired the EU long-term resident status in another Member State, and at the end of 2014 almost 10,000 such permits had been issued, mainly to third-country nationals arriving from Italy, Slovenia, Spain and the Czech Republic.1

5. Legal elements

Is there a legal basis in the Treaties?
Yes, Article 78(2)(a) TFEU obliges the Union to provide a uniform status of asylum for nationals of third countries, valid throughout the Union. The exception of Article 79(5) TFEU (“Member States may determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work”) does not apply, since the third-country nationals are already lawfully resident in the EU.

 Does the proposal satisfy the subsidiary requirements?
The legal position of international protection beneficiaries regarding labour mobility is already regulated by Directive 2011/51, provided they are long term residents pursuant to Directive 2003/109. The proposed mobility between Member States requires a common action. The EU is currently looking for a common solution to the question of responsibility for asylum seekers and international protection beneficiaries. This measure would address part of that question.

 Is this proposal proportionate?
The proposed measure is simple and relatively easy to achieve: it requires a limited amendment of the existing legal framework, which consists primarily of directives or a short new directive. The competence to check whether the   proposed employment conditions are   in conformity with national law remains with   Member States.

 What should the personal scope be?
Given the similarity of their status, both refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries should be covered. Beneficiaries of forms of national protection cannot be covered by an instrument under EU law as there is no legal basis for such in the TFEU. But they could be covered on the basis of national law of the second Member States.

 What should the personal scope be? (II)
For workers only. The right to move arises only if a labour agency of the second Member State confirms the existence and conditions of the job offer and that job provides sufficient resources for the third-country national to sustain himself, without recourse to social assistance in the second Member State.

When can an international protection beneficiary apply for a job in another Member State?
After a minimum of two years of lawful residence in the first Member State, rather than the five years under the revised Directive 2003/109. In those two years the beneficiaries will have an opportunity to settle in a Member State and, if necessary, supplement their professional qualifications. Moreover, this waiting period reduces the chances that the protection status is granted primarily to allow onward mobility within the EU.

Is transfer of international protection status necessary?
The proposal requires no rules on automatic transfer of international protection between Member States, similar to Directive 2011/51 revising Directive 2003/109.

What terms regarding health insurance apply?
Health insurance coverage maybe be required by the second Member State, similar to Article 15(2)(b) of Directive 2003/109.

Are integration requirements allowed?
No integration conditions before admission to the second Member State. Such conditions are also absent from the Qualification Directive 2011/95.

6.Rights in the second member state

Protection against refoulement
Protection status is granted on the basis of similar rules as in Directive 2011/51. Similarly, the rules of Directive 2011/51 on protection against expulsion to third countries, the right to return to the first Member State until long-term resident status in the second Member State is obtained, and the concomitant obligation of the first Member State to take the third-country national back will apply.

Equal treatment
The equal treatment clause of Article 11 of Directive 2011/98 (Single Permit) will apply automatically to these third-country nationals admitted to employment.

Family reunification
Family reunification should take place on the basis of the same rules as Article 16 of Directive 2003/109, i.e. if already reunited in the first Member State, admitted family members may accompany or join; if not yet reunited in the first Member States, the rules of Directive 2003/86 apply, such as a residence permit for at least one year and sufficient income.

Public assistance
No right to public assistance during the first three years, and after that transitional period access to public assistance as provided in Article 11 of Directive 2003/109.

Recognition of professional qualifications
Recognition of professional qualifications acquired in another Member State by the second Member State should take place on the basis of a regime similar to Directive 2005/36.

Consequences of dismissal or unemployment
The worker will be permitted to look for another job and is entitled to equal treatment on the basis of national law concerning unemployment benefits in accordance with the Single Permit Directive 2011/98. In case the worker complies with the conditions of Directive 2009/50 on entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment he may, in accordance with Article 10(2) of that directive, apply for a Blue Card in his Member State of residence or in another Member State. Before the worker has acquired the long-term residence status in the second Member State, the first Member State will be obliged to take the third-country national back if entitlement to unemployment benefits ends and no new job is found.

7.Risk that Member States grant asylum more often

The Meijers Committee has no reason to expect that increased possibilities of free movement will encourage Member States to grant asylum more often, because i) the right to move to another Member State is conditioned on two years of lawful residence in the first Member State, ii) the right only accrues to international protection beneficiaries who find work in another Member State, and iii) the first Member State remains responsible for taking the person back if the conditions for residence in the second Member State are no longer fulfilled until long-term resident status in the second Member State is obtained.

NOTE
1 See Bundesministerium des Innern, Migrationsbericht 2013, p. 100ff and reply of the German government of April 2015 (no. 4/132) to a written parliamentary question in the Bundestag.

About
The Meijers Committee is an independent group of legal scholars, judges and lawyers that advises on European and International Migration, Refugee, Criminal, Privacy, Anti-discrimination and Institutional Law. The Committee aims to promote the protection of fundamental rights, access to judicial remedies and democratic decision-making in EU legislation. The Meijers Committee is funded by the Dutch Bar Association (NOvA), Foundation for Democracy and Media (Stichting Democratie en Media) the Dutch Refugee Council (VWN), Foundation for Migration Law Netherlands (Stichting Migratierecht Nederland), the Dutch Section of the International Commission of Jurists (NJCM), Art. 1 Anti-Discrimination Office, and the Dutch Foundation for Refugee Students UAF.

Contact info: Louis Middelkoop Executive secretary post@commissie-meijers.nl +31(0)20 362 0505

Please visit www.commissie-meijers.nl for more information.

WHAT IF A REFUGEE ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTS TERRORISM? THE CJEU JUDGMENT IN T

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Wednesday, 24 June 2015)

by Steve Peers

What happens if a refugee allegedly supports terrorism? The most obvious answer is that the person concerned might be excluded from getting refugee status in the first place, in accordance with Article 1.F of the Geneva (UN) Convention on Refugees, as reflected in the EU’s qualification Directive and interpreted in the CJEU’s B and D judgment of 2010. However, the situation is more complicated if the person already has refugee status, and his or her alleged support for terrorism begins or comes to light only later. This issue was addressed for the first time in today’s CJEU judgment in T.

Background

The qualification Directive offers three possible responses to a situation like this.

First of all, a Member State may revoke refugee status where there are ‘reasonable grounds for regarding [a refugee] as a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present’, or where the refugee was ‘convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime’ so ‘constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State’.

Secondly, it is possible to refoule a refugee (ie return the refugee to an unsafe country) on the same two grounds (which are also the exceptions to non-refoulement set out in the Geneva Convention), if that is not ‘prohibited’ by Member States’ international obligations. In that case, Member States may revoke or refuse to renew the refugee’s residence permit.

Finally, Member States must issue refugees with a residence permit and renew it, ‘unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require’.

Also, a Member State is obliged to revoke refugee status if the refugee ‘should have been’ excluded from refugee status in the first place, but presumably this only applies where the activity justifying exclusion took place before the refugee status was granted. All of the same rules apply to the parallel status of ‘subsidiary protection’, which exists for persons who don’t qualify for refugee status but who otherwise need international protection because they are fleeing torture, the death penalty or a civil war.

Judgment

This case concerned a Turkish national who moved to Germany back in 1989 and obtained refugee status there in 1993, on the basis of his activities in support of the PKK, the Kurdish group which Turkey (and subsequently also the EU) regards as a terrorist organisation. However, those links later led to a conviction for supporting terrorism, due to his collection of money for the PKK and distribution of PKK literature. His residence permit was revoked but he retained refugee status, and he was not expelled from the country. Nevertheless, he still challenged the revocation of his residence permit.

The CJEU’s judgment considers the second and third of the two issues above: refoulement (which might lead to the loss of a residence permit) and the loss of the residence permit as such. First of all, the Court explains the relationship between these two overlapping rules. If the criteria to refoule a refugee are satisfied, a Member State can either (a) refoule the refugee; (b) expel the refugee to a safe country; or (c) allow the refugee to stay. In the event that Member States can refoule the refugee, then they can also revoke a residence permit. But conversely, if the criteria to refoule the refugee are not satisfied, then the Member State cannot withdraw a residence permit on this ground.

In that case, the Court ruled, the question arises whether the rules on granting residence permits apply. Those rules don’t expressly refer to revoking a permit which has already been issued, but the Court ruled that this possibility was implicit.

The Court then moved on to interpret the two sets of grounds for loss of a residence permit at issue in this case: the ‘reasonable grounds’ that the refugee is a security risk, and the ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’. These concepts aren’t further defined in the Directive, and the language versions of the Directive differ. So the Court proceeded to interpret these rules in the overall context of the Directive – protecting human rights and developing a common policy. In the Court’s view, refoulement of a refugee is a ‘last resort’ in the event that there is no other option to protect national security or the public. Since it could have a ‘drastic’ impact on the refugee, it was subject to ‘rigorous conditions’.

In contract, the mere loss of a residence permit did not lead to refoulement, and so the threshold for the application of the relevant rules was lower. The rules on loss of a residence permit ‘only’ apply where the refugee’s actions ‘cannot justify loss of refugee status, let alone the refoulement of that refugee’, and so did not ‘presuppose the existence of a particularly serious crime’.

So does support for a terrorist group meet the threshold to be one of the ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’? The Court ruled that the concept should be interpreted consistently with the public security exceptions in the EU’s citizens’ Directive, because ‘the extent of protection a company (sic) intends to afford to its fundamental interests cannot vary according to the legal status of the person that undermines those interests.’ So terrorism is covered by that concept, and there must be a ‘genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’. Moreover, the EU has listed the PKK as a terrorist group, which is a ‘strong indication’ that must be ‘taken into account’. Since the CJEU had already ruled (in B and D) that terrorist acts could lead to exclusion from refugee status, it must follow that they could equally justify revocation of a residence permit.

But that was not the end of the matter. The national court has to go on to a second step, to consider whether the specific actions of a refugee in fact constitute support for terrorism so as to justify revocation of a residence permit. Not all forms of support for an organisation which the EU considers to be terrorist can lead to revocation of a refugee’s residence permit. As with the exclusion clause (see B and D), it was necessary to look at the individual’s behaviour, examining ‘in particular whether he himself has committed terrorist acts, whether and to what extent he was involved in planning, decision-making or directing other persons with a view to committing acts of that nature, and whether and to what extent he financed such acts or procured for other persons the means to commit them’.

In this case, Mr. T had participated in legal meetings, celebrated the Kurdish New Year and collected money for the PKK. The Court asserted that this ‘does not necessarily mean that he supported the legitimacy of terrorist activities’. Indeed, such acts ‘do not constitute, in themselves, terrorist acts’. The national court also had to consider the ‘degree of seriousness of danger’ Mr. T posed. It could take into account his criminal conviction but also had to consider that he was only sentenced to a fine. Also, the principle of proportionality (which the Court stated was not relevant when applying the exclusion clause, in B and D) was relevant here: the national court had to consider if Mr. T was still a threat to public security at the time the decision to revoke the permit was taken.

Finally, the Court ruled on the consequences of the loss of a residence permit. The person concerned retained refugee status and so was still entitled to all of the rights granted to a refugee, including access to employment, education, welfare, healthcare and housing. Although a clause in the preamble to the Directive stated that a residence permit could be made a condition of obtaining such benefits, the Court said that this clause was irrelevant since it was not reflected in the main text. Those rights could ‘only’ be restricted in accordance with the conditions in the Directive, and Member States ‘are not entitled to add restrictions not already listed there’. This was directly relevant to Mr. T, since Germany had indeed restricted his access to all of those benefits. But this is ‘incompatible’ with the Directive.

Comments

This was the first chance for the Court to rule on the status of refugees, ie the various benefits attached to refugee status, since its previous judgments on the qualification Directive have essentially concerned the definition of refugee or subsidiary protection status (or the linked issues of exclusion from or cessation of that status). Broadly speaking, the judgment does a good job clarifying the points which the Court set out to tackle – but inevitably the Court could not deal with every possible issue, and some of its answers raise further questions of their own.

First of all, the Court provides a useful clarification of the distinction between the non-refoulement rules and the rules on residence permits as such. The crucial point here is that the latter rules apply only when the former do not. While this makes the residence permit rules sound as if they have secondary importance, in fact the reverse is true. In practice, the residence permit rules are more important, since it is rarely if ever possible to refoule a refugee consistently with international obligations. This is because the case law on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) makes clear that even if a person has done things awful enough to justify refoulement under the Geneva Convention, he or she cannot be removed to face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR – since that provision is not subject to any exception relating to the behaviour of the person concerned (or any other exception either). It was not necessary for the CJEU to rule on this point in the T case, since Germany was not seeking to remove him, but it would surely be willing to do so if the case arose (see the judgment in Abdida, discussed here, where the CJEU relied upon another strand of the Article 3 case law).

In the unusual event that refoulement might be possible, the CJEU’s ruling leaves some questions to ponder. It refers to the possible removal of a refugee to a safe third country. Presumably the criteria to determine the meaning of that concept are those in the asylum procedures Directive. It is also possible that the Court would be willing to rule on the interpretation of Article 32 of the Geneva Convention – which regulates the substance and procedure of the expulsion of refugees to safe countries (if the refugees are legally resident) – in this context. The CJEU might also be called upon to elaborate further what it means by saying that refoulement is a ‘last resort’ in the event that no other alternatives are available.

As for the main thrust of the Court’s ruling, on the ‘compelling reasons’ exception to the grant of residence permits, it is striking that the Court continues its recent trend of applying its case law on the EU citizens’ Directive to the ‘public policy’ clauses in EU immigration and asylum law. It did the same thing just a few weeks ago as regards the voluntary departure rules in the EU Returns Directive (see the Zh and O judgment, discussed here), and the broad wording of its judgment in T on this point suggests that all public policy clauses (they appear in swathes of EU legislation in this area) should have the same meaning. Having said that, the Court clearly accepts that the threshold for refoulement of a refugee is higher than for the normal public policy exception.

The Court also borrows most of its prior reasoning on the exclusion clause (with the addition of a proportionality element) to make clear that broad support of a group which the EU considers to be terrorist is not enough: there must be an active participation in violent acts or the funding of those acts. Presumably there must be a direct link with the funding of those acts, since the Court finds that Mr. T’s participation in collecting money for the PKK generally is not enough. Implicitly the Court shows little sympathy with recent EU and national moves against ‘radicalisation’ of Islamic communities (as very broadly defined), and it makes no reference to the Council of Europe measure (reflected in EU legislation) which criminalises ‘public provocation’ of terrorism. But nor does it refer to the countervailing case law of the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of speech, which requires States to allow the free expression of radical political beliefs and allows limits on that expression only where there is a direct incitement to commit violent acts. Nevertheless, the Court’s approach fits squarely into that latter line of case law.

Finally, the Court’s ruling on the consequences of loss of a residence permit are highly relevant, especially in Germany and any other Member States which do indeed make the receipt of benefits, access to employment et al dependent upon holding a residence permit. In effect, the judgment means that for many refugees the loss of a residence permit, even if justified, will have no real impact on their day-to-day life. It will only have an impact as regards journeys within the Schengen area (since holding a residence permit or long-stay visa is a condition of freedom to travel), or travels to non-Schengen and non-EU countries (since the criteria to revoke a residence permit also apply to the travel documents which refugees obtain from their host States in lieu of passports). It would also have an impact upon those refugees who do not yet have family living with them, since the EU’s family reunion Directive requires a third-country national to have a residence permit as a condition for family reunion. But that doesn’t matter to Mr. T, since he is already surrounded by his very large family in Germany.