Category: 2. Values & principles of the European Union

Police et justice à l’échelle de l’Union européenne, du désamour au divorce ? La Sécurité intérieure européenne contre l’Espace pénal européen

par Pierre Berthelet (*)

La police et la justice se portent un « amour réciproque » affirme le Professeur Labayle non sans ironie. Il suffit de se rappeler les relations parfois tendues entre les forces de sécurité intérieure d’un côté, et l’autorité judiciaire de l’autre. Il suffit aussi de se remémorer les relations de temps à autre houleuses entre le ministre de l’Intérieur et le Garde des Sceaux, et ce, quelle que soit d’ailleurs la couleur politique du gouvernement.

Même si la rivalité police-justice demeure une question toujours délicate à évoquer, elle est somme toute assez banale en France et dans bon nombre d’États membres de l’Union. Un élément reste néanmoins remarquable, ayant trait, en l’occurrence, à un déplacement à l’échelle européenne de cet affrontement existant au niveau national.

D’emblée, le déplacement de la problématique des rapports difficiles entre la police et la justice à l’échelon de l’Union peut sembler surprenant en raison du fait qu’il n’existe pas d’autorité judiciaire pénale européenne, du moins avant la création d’un Parquet européen dont les statuts sont encore actuellement en négociation.

Il n’y a pas non plus de police européenne. L’office européen de police, Europol, ne possède pas de pouvoirs coercitifs et le traité de Lisbonne de 2007 l’a clairement précisé, enterrant, s’il en est, les derniers espoirs d’un FBI européen.

Ensuite, les questions relatives aux rapports entre la police et la justice ont été abordées au niveau européen sous l’angle de la coopération. En effet, les États souverains ont accepté de mettre en commun certaines de leurs compétences dans ce domaine. Néanmoins, étant donné la sensibilité des matières évoquées (liées intimement aux prérogatives régaliennes du droit de punir et du droit de protéger), ils ont consenti uniquement à la création de mécanismes destinés à faciliter l’entraide entre services policiers d’États différents, de même qu’entre autorités judiciaires.

Pour ces deux raisons, un affrontement police-justice peut paraître en décalage avec le regard porté sur l’Union européenne en tant que projet politique et sur son action dans le domaine des politiques pénales et de sécurité. Elle l’est d’autant plus que police et justice cohabitent sous le même toit, c’est-à-dire dans le cadre d’un même projet, à savoir l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice (ELSJ) qui, comme son nom l’indique, associe étroitement la sécurité à la liberté et à la justice.

Reste que depuis la création de la « justice et affaires intérieures » (JAI) par le traité de Maastricht de 1992 et l’instauration de cet ELSJ par le traité d’Amsterdam de 1997, beaucoup d’eau a coulé. En premier lieu, le cadre institutionnel a changé et même fondamentalement.

Le traité de Lisbonne a substitué la méthode communautaire à la méthode intergouvernementale. L’ELSJ relève, à présent, du mécanisme de procédure législative ordinaire : le Parlement européen est co-législateur avec le Conseil de l’UE et la Commission européenne dispose d’un quasi-monopole d’initiative législative, tandis que la Cour de justice de Luxembourg peut statuer pleinement sur les actes adoptés.

En deuxième lieu, et ce point mérite d’être souligné, police et justice ont noué des rapports de concurrence depuis le début. La JAI était déjà marquée par des tensions entre les avancées de la coopération policière et les retards de la coopération judiciaire.

La création d’Europol en 1995 a été l’un des éléments justifiant, à côté du souci de ne laisser aucune zone d’impunité aux délinquants au sein du territoire européen, la création d’Eurojust en 2002. Cependant, cette compétition prenait les atours d’une émulation : l’intégration en matière policière s’accompagnait d’une intégration dans le domaine judiciaire.

À l’heure actuelle, la situation est différente. La concurrence se transforme en rivalité et l’émulation en séparation. En effet, l’action de l’Union européenne en matière policière et judiciaire s’organise autour de deux projets distincts : l’Espace pénal européen et la Sécurité intérieure européenne. L’objectif de cette contribution est de montrer que le développement de ces deux projets n’est pas complémentaire et que ceux-ci sont sous-tendus par des logiques distinctes, promus par des communautés rivales, chacune essayant d’imposer ses conceptions à l’autre concernant le rapport liberté/sécurité.

Deux projets différents

Prenant le relais de la Justice et des Affaires intérieures (JAI), l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice (ELSJ) connecte étroitement diverses problématiques : lutte contre le terrorisme et les formes graves de la criminalité (criminalité organisée, blanchiment, drogue, corruption, traite des êtres humains, etc.), gestion des migrations et des frontières de l’UE, entraide policière et judiciaire civile et pénale.

Cet espace a constitué le terreau sur lequel sont nés plusieurs projets dont le degré de maturation est variable, notamment l’Espace pénal européen et la Sécurité intérieure européenne, chacun d’eux étant mu par des logiques distinctes, l’un tendant à accorder une place de plus en plus prioritaire à la « liberté », alors que l’autre offre clairement une place prééminente à la « sécurité ».

L’Espace pénal européen est bien connu des pénalistes et même au-delà. Il dérive des travaux menés en matière de collaboration judiciaire européenne, initiés dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Europe et prolongés dans celui l’Union européenne à partir du traité de Masstricht. Les actions menées par l’Union consistent à améliorer les dispositifs d’entraide entre les autorités judiciaires nationales. L’objectif de cet Espace pénal européen vise, à travers différents mécanismes, tels que la reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires nationales et le rapprochement des législations pénales des États membres, à faire émerger une solidarité judiciaire à l’échelle européenne.

Au-delà de l’idée d’un renforcement de l’arsenal pénal destiné à mieux lutter contre la criminalité et à faire en sorte que les frontières entre États membres ne soient plus un obstacle pour les autorités judiciaires des différents pays, le projet d’Espace pénal revêt un caractère politique au sens où il s’agit d’un projet d’intégration tendant vers l’émergence d’une justice pénale européenne. Les projets menés, dont le plus emblématique est, sans nul doute le mandat d’arrêt européen, ont pour but de conférer aux autorités judiciaires nationales un sentiment d’appartenance à un ensemble supranational. L’Espace pénal européen a une dimension à la fois juridique (à travers divers outils mis en place pour lutter contre la criminalité transnationale) et symbolique (en référence à l’adhésion aux valeurs communes, en premier lieu la justice entendue comme un idéal).

La Sécurité intérieure européenne est, quant à elle, plus récente. Mentionnée ponctuellement dans les textes adoptés dans la foulée des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, elle émerge formellement seulement quelques années plus tard. Envisagée par le programme de Stockholm, en tant que document directeur de l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice pour la période 2009-2014, elle repose sur un document que le Conseil de l’UE a approuvé les 25 et 26 février 2010. Il s’agit en l’occurrence de la stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure qui énonce les menaces et les risques pesant sur l’Union et ses États membres.

Cette stratégie détermine les orientations d’une action européenne dans le domaine de la sécurité intérieure et structure la réponse à donner. Elle est un document politique préconisant une approche transversale et intégrée. Il s’agit d’apporter une réponse qui dépasse les politiques de l’UE existantes. À côté de cette dimension intersectorielle, la stratégie entend également transcender les clivages culturels et/ou nationaux. Il est question de mettre en commun les connaissances et les savoir-faire d’acteurs émanant d’horizons différents. Elle vise donc à inclure les organismes publics et privés, à caractère lucratif ou non, de même que les organisations non gouvernementales. Enfin, la stratégie entend développer une approche fondée sur l’information, et ce, sur un mode proactif, le but étant d’intervenir de manière précoce à l’encontre des menaces et des risques identifiés.

La Commission européenne a réalisé, à plusieurs reprises, un bilan de l’action menée. Dans tous les cas de figure, elle a considéré que les avancées étaient conséquentes et que la Sécurité intérieure européenne prenait forme.

Des projets aux logiques distinctes

La stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure est fondée essentiellement sur l’idée d’un monde dangereux, l’objectif étant de mieux protéger l’Union et ses citoyens, et de préserver plus efficacement ses États membres vis-à-vis de menaces évolutives dans une Europe en pleine mutation. Les préoccupations sont donc de parer les menaces et de faire face aux risques en évitant que des attaques ou des catastrophes surviennent et, lorsque celles-ci ont lieu, de gérer les conséquences.

L’Espace pénal européen repose sur une logique différente. Historiquement, le droit pénal européen tire sa légitimité de cette conception « épée » (sur cette image, voir les travaux d’Anne Weyembergh), de nombreux instruments ayant été adoptés en ce sens au cours des années 1990 et 2000. Les rapports entre répression et droits de l’homme sont incarnés par deux images, d’un côté, le glaive de la justice, figurant l’imperium et la sévérité de la réponse pénale à l’égard des auteurs d’infraction, et de l’autre côté, le bouclier, représentant une justice faisant preuve de modération dans la fixation des peines, se montrant proportionnée dans la détermination du quantum de la santion au regard de la gravité des actes, et surtout protectrice des droits dont jouissent ces mêmes auteurs dans la procédure pénale.

Répression et protection sont en tension, mais dans un État de droit, le souci d’une sanction efficace est toujours contrebalancé par une volonté de respecter les règles définissant avec minutie le cadre procédural à respecter et octroyant un ensemble de droits à la personne mise en cause.

Cela étant dit, les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont accentué la dimension répressive du droit pénal. Le mandat d’arrêt européen, dont le projet a été approuvé dans le sillage des attaques, est une illustration du phénomène selon lequel, selon la formule de Thierry Balzacq, la « sécurité » a conquis la « justice ».

Néanmoins, un mouvement inverse s’est opéré en réaction aux mesures sécuritaires prises après les attaques de New York. En germe avec l’adoption de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux proclamée au cours du Conseil européen de Nice, le 7 décembre 2000, ce mouvement s’est développé au cours des années 2000 et il s’est prolongé au début des années 2010. Une mobilisation des pénalistes a eu lieu à compter de l’adoption de ces mesures sécuritaires, manifestant une critique des effets d’une vision trop répressive jugée néfaste à la préservation des libertés. Elle résulte aussi de la prise de conscience, avec l’adoption du texte instituant le mandat d’arrêt européen en 2002, de l’impact du droit pénal européen sur le droit national.

Une opposition autour de deux communautés sectorielles

Sécurité intérieure européenne et Espace pénal européen associent chacun des acteurs aux origines multiples. Le projet de Sécurité intérieure européenne permet, à travers la dimension « sécurité » de l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice, d’associer les services nationaux variés allant des services de renseignement aux gardes-frontières en passant par la police judiciaire, cette dernière étant amenée progressivement à modifier ses techniques d’enquête, au nom de la lutte contre la menace dans une « Europe des insécurités », autour d’une approche davantage proactive.

Le projet d’Espace pénal européen contribue, quant à lui, à mettre à l’agenda la protection des droits fondamentaux. Il rassemble les acteurs mettant l’accent sur la dimension « liberté » et « justice » de l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice.

Les communautés sectorielles promouvant respectivement la Sécurité intérieure européenne et l’Espace pénal européen se caractérisent par leur forte hétérogénéité.

Il y a d’un côté des magistrats, certains universitaires, notamment des pénalistes favorables à la sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux, des hauts fonctionnaires nationaux et des membes des cabinets de la Justice, la direction générale « Justice » (DG Justice) pour la Commission européenne, des ONG défendant les droits de l’Homme, dans une certaine limite la commission des libertés civiles du Parlement européen (LIBE), le Contrôleur européen à la protection des données soucieux de préserver les citoyens européens de toute atteinte à la vie privée, la Cour de justice de l’Union (CJUE), gardienne de l’État de droit et garante du respect du droit de l’Union européenne, en particulier les dispositions de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux, et l’Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (FRA) dont la mission est de protéger à l’échelle de l’Union, aux côtés de la Cour de justice, les libertés des citoyens européens.

Il y a de l’autre, les « sécuritaires », à savoir les services de sécurité des États membres (services de renseignement, garde-frontières, police, douane), des hauts fonctionnaires nationaux et des membres du cabinet de l’Intérieur, la direction générale « Affaires intérieures » (DG HOME) pour la Commission européenne, les agences de sécurité (Europol et Frontex) et le secteur privé (en particulier l’industrie de la sécurité et notamment, les entreprises spécialisées dans le data mining, de même que les sociétés productrices de nouvelles technologies de surveillance des frontières).

Sécurité versus liberté et justice

Les divergences de vues entre les partisans de la Sécurité intérieure européenne et ceux de l’Espace pénal européen constituent une opposition de principe sur les rapports entre la liberté et la sécurité. Elle procède de l’affrontement d’acteurs aux cultures professionnelles distinctes, aux logiques d’action différentes et aux conceptions divergentes, voire antagonistes.

Il existe d’un côté, la conception des participants à l’élaboration de l’Espace pénal européen auquel appartiennent les magistrats, du moins ceux qui se considèrent comme protecteurs des droits fondamentaux et comme gardiens de l’État de droit, et pour qui l’entraide policière doit s’intégrer dans le projet d’Espace pénal européen. Cet espace doit déboucher à long terme, sur l’édification d’une justice pénale européenne organisée autour d’un parquet européen, et reposant sur un ensemble juridique composé de normes pénales européennes harmonisées. L’intervention de l’Union préconisée par les partisans de l’Espace pénal européen repose sur un ensemble de principes d’action tels qu’« il faut lutter contre la criminalité dans le respect des garanties offertes aux mis en cause », « la sécurité ne doit pas constituer une atteinte excessive aux libertés fondamentales », « l’Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice est un espace de droit ».

Il existe de l’autre côté, les acteurs appartenant à la Sécurité intérieure européenne estimant peu ou prou que l’entraide policière s’intègre dans un vaste ensemble organisé autour de la lutte contre les diverses formes d’insécurité identifiées. Cet ensemble se développe autour de principes d’action tels que « la manière de faire la sécurité doit se renouveler face à l’hybridation des menaces transnationales », « la réponse doit être globale à l’égard d’un monde de plus en plus mondialisé où les différentes formes de criminalité sont interconnectées », avec, en toile de fond, la nécessité de protéger l’Union vis-à-vis d’un ensemble de menaces et de risques : les réseaux de passeurs de clandestins, les trafiquants de drogue, les organisations criminelles venant notamment de Russie et des Balkans occidentaux, certaines formes particulières de radicalisation et de terrorisme comme les « loups solitaires ». Il s’agit aussi de se doter des moyens permettant de dépister de manière précoce le crime, devenu une question stratégique au même titre que le terrorisme ou la cybermenace, et ce, à partir de techniques permettant de travailler en amont des réalités criminelles. Il est question également d’améliorer le cycle de gestion de catastrophes en renforçant la collaboration entre États membres et en optimisant les différentes phases du cycle à travers des processus plus élaborés, par exemple dans le domaine de la protection des infrastructures critiques.

L’absence d’opposition rigide et monolithique

Les acteurs des communautés sectorielles s’affrontent par projets spécifiques. Néanmoins, l’opposition entre deux pôles antagonistes est en recomposition constante. Il n’y a pas en effet deux blocs figés et homogènes. Ainsi, le pôle des « sécuritaires » est loin de former un tout cohérent. L’élaboration de la Sécurité intérieure européenne est un enjeu entre participants, qu’il s’agisse des agences européennes, des États membres par l’entremise des représentants des cabinets ministériels, des hauts fonctionnaires nationaux et des services de police, de douane, de renseignement ou de surveillance des frontières, ou encore des entreprises privées désireuses de nourrir un marché européen de la sécurité en pleine croissance.

Quant aux promoteurs de la protection des libertés, tous ne sont pas sur la même ligne. Si les pénalistes sont soucieux de la préservation des garanties procédurales lors du procès pénal, le Contrôleur européen à la protection des données est plus attaché à la défense de la vie privée contre diverses formes d’atteintes, et ce, indépendamment de la dimension pénale de celles-ci.

De leur côté, les hauts fonctionnaires et les membres de cabinets de la Justice des États membres ont une sensibilité diverse concernant l’amplitude de la protection des libertés à accorder, liée notamment aux différences culturelles, en particulier selon que leur tradition juridique s’inscrit dans le champ de la Common law ou de la Civil law.

Le Parlement européen est, de son côté, préoccupé par la défense des droits fondamentaux, mais également par ses prérogatives de colégislateur, et il arrive qu’il doive arbitrer entre ces deux types de préoccupation, parfois au détriment de la sauvegarde des libertés. Quant à la Cour de justice de l’Union de Luxembourg, elle doit parvenir à s’imposer dans un domaine, la sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux, dans lequel la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme de Strasbourg a dégagé une jurisprudence abondante depuis des décennies, notamment concernant les garanties procédurales.

(*) Cet article est une version allégée et simplifiée de l’article publié dans les Cahiers de la sécurité et de justice, n° 31, 2015, pp 39-49. Voir aussi alias securiteinterieure.fr

Economic challenges and prospects of the refugee influx

THE FULL TEXT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERVICE IS ACCESSIBLE HERE 

SUMMARY
The current refugee influx represents the largest population movement in Europe since World War II. Its size and complexity make it difficult to draw conclusions on the economic challenges and prospects valid for each Member State of the European Union (EU).
Many experts agree that, in the short term, the refugee influx will lead to rising costs, arising from the need to provide food, shelter and first aid. In the longer term, the refugee influx could be positive for the European economy by, for example, addressing the EU’s alarming demographic trends. Depending on their education, skills and willingness to work, refugees might improve the ratio of active workers and also contribute to innovation, entrepreneurship and GDP growth. Regarding the labour market, migrants can fill important niches both in fast-growing and declining sectors of the economy, and contribute to labour-market flexibility.
Refugee, migration and asylum policy is largely under the auspices of the Member States and intergovernmental EU policy-making. The uncontrolled mass arrival of refugees has highlighted the different views in the Member States on migration and immigration, driven by economic, social and cultural divergences and spurred the debate on a new EU migration policy.
According to the European Parliament, the EU and its Member States should target the potential gains from the current influx by, inter alia, successful economic and social integration of the refugees.

Continue reading…

NE BIS IN IDEM : interesting conclusions of Advocate General BOT

Without prejudice of the future Ruling of the Court on the subject, the  Advocate General Yves BOT conclusions published yesterday (FRENCH version HERE  ) are worth reading as they try to address  for the first time the compatibility of the Schengen Acquis with the european area of freedom security and justice as newly framed by the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 

EDC 

CONCLUSIONS DE L’AVOCAT GÉNÉRAL YVES Bot présentées le 15 décembre 2015 (1)

Affaire C‑486/14 Procédure pénale contre Piotr Kossowski

[demande de décision préjudicielle formée par le Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (tribunal régional supérieur de Hambourg, Allemagne)] «Renvoi préjudiciel – Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice – Convention d’application de l’accord de Schengen – Articles 54 et 55, paragraphe 1, sous a) – Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne – Articles 50 et 52, paragraphe 1 – Principe ne bis in idem – Validité de la réserve à l’application du principe ne bis in idem – Acquis de Schengen – Principe de reconnaissance mutuelle – Confiance mutuelle – Poursuites pénales dans un autre État membre contre la même personne et en raison des mêmes faits – Notion de ‘même infraction’ – Notion de ‘jugement définitif’ – Examen au fond – Droit des victimes»

  1. La présente affaire pose, pour la première fois, la question de la validité des réserves à l’application du principe ne bis in idem, prévues à l’article 55 de la convention d’application de l’accord de Schengen (2), au regard de l’article 50 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (ci-après la «Charte»).
  2. En particulier, le Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (tribunal régional supérieur de Hambourg) demande si la possibilité offerte aux États membres, inscrite à l’article 55, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la CAAS, de ne pas appliquer ce principe lorsque les faits visés par le jugement étranger ont eu lieu soit en tout, soit en partie sur leur territoire constitue une limitation à l’article 50 de la Charte autorisée par l’article 52, paragraphe 1, de celle-ci.
  3. Cette affaire est, également, l’occasion pour la Cour de préciser sa jurisprudence sur la notion de «jugement définitif», au sens des articles 54 de la CAAS et 50 de la Charte.
  4. Dans les présentes conclusions, nous exposerons les raisons qui nous amènent à faire valoir que la réserve prévue à l’article 55, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la CAAS doit être déclarée invalide. Puis, nous expliquerons pourquoi, selon nous, le principe ne bis in idem énoncé aux articles 54 de la CAAS et 50 de la Charte doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une ordonnance de non-lieu adoptée par le ministère public et clôturant la procédure d’instruction ne peut pas être qualifiée de «jugement définitif», au sens de ces articles, lorsqu’il ressort manifestement de la motivation de celle-ci que les éléments qui constituent la substance même de la situation juridique, tels que l’audition de la victime et celle du témoin, n’ont pas été examinés par les autorités judiciaires concernées.

I –    Le cadre juridique

A –    Le droit de l’Union Continue reading “NE BIS IN IDEM : interesting conclusions of Advocate General BOT”

Can Schengen be suspended because of Greece? Should it be?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Steve Peers

A leaked Council document (see separate blog post) suggests in effect that the Schengen system should be suspended for up two years, due to ‘systemic deficiencies’ in the control of external borders by Greece. That would allow any Schengen States which wish to do so to maintain or introduce border checks on their ‘internal’ borders with each other. Probably not all Schengen States would take this opportunity, but many would (especially since a number of them already do so). This follows a recent press report in the Financial Times (paywalled), which states that some Member States are considering threatening to throw Greece out of the Schengen system, due to its management of refugees and migrants at the external borders.

It’s possible that the general threat to suspend Schengen is intended as a threat to suspend Greece only, but is simply badly drafted. Or perhaps the idea is to threaten to suspend the whole of Schengen, and pin the blame on Greece. Either way, in my view, this threat is seriously mistaken, for both legal and political reasons.

The Legal Framework

In principle, the Schengen system can’t be scrapped completely without amending the EU Treaties, since the Treaties refer to it several times. Instead, there are two types of possible suspensions: short-term (up to three months) and long-term (up to two years). The leaked Council document refers to use of the long-term suspension.

The short-term waiver rules have always formed part of the Schengen system. They allow individual Member States to reimpose checks on internal borders  for a short time, for reasons of public policy and public security. Over the years, those provisions have often been invoked by Member States, usually for a few days during an international summit or football tournament. This autumn, they have been invoked more often and for longer periods, as a response to the refugee crisis affecting the continent. Since this reintroduction is only allowed for a maximum period of six months, there is an upcoming legal problem if Member States with to prolong these controls past next spring.

But a newer, different set of rules apply to suspending a Member State from the Schengen system. As a response to the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, and a spat between Italy and France over responsibility for some Tunisians, the Schengen rules were amended in 2013 in order to provide for the collective reimposition of internal border controls for up to two years. Those amendments need to be read in conjunction with the rest of the rules which they amended. So I suggest you read them in the codified version (showing the amendments), which is set out in an Annex to the report which I wrote for the SIEPS thinktank on the revised rules (start on page 121).

These amendments were generally understood as providing in effect for the possible suspension of individual Member States from the Schengen system. However, that is not expressly set out in the rules, and the leaked Council document clearly intends something broader, since it refers explicitly to continuation of existing border checks, ie between Germany and Austria, not (only) between other Member States and Greece. But the role of individual Member States is still relevant, because this collective suspension of Schengen can only be triggered if there are ‘serious deficiencies’ in how one Member State applies the Schengen external borders rules.

The process would start with a Commission recommendation following a Schengen evaluation, according to the separate rules (also amended in 2013) on the process of assessing whether Schengen states comply with their obligations. If the Commission finds in its report that there are ‘serious deficiencies’ in a Member State complying with its external border control obligations, then it can recommend that this country take ‘specific measures’, including accepting assistance from the EU’s border agency, Frontex, and submitting plans for Frontex to assess.

If there is not enough action on settling these problems within three months, the process can escalate. In ‘exceptional cases’ where there is a ‘serious threat to public policy or public security’ in the Schengen area or parts of it, the Council can recommend ‘as a last resort’ to Member States that they reimpose border controls against that Member State for periods of six months, renewable up to the two-year maximum. It’s arguable that this process can be fast-tracked and be applied even without giving the Member State three months to fix its problems.  Since Member States would have to vote in favour of it in the Council (by a qualified majority), it can be assumed that most Member States would then follow this recommendation. The Council has to act on a proposal from the Commission, but Member States can request the Commission to make such a proposal.

In adopting this recommendation, the Council has to assess whether it will ‘adequately remedy’ the threat to public policy, as well as the ‘proportionality’ of the measure in relation to the threat. This must be based on detailed information, and consider the EU assistance which was provided or which could have been requested, the likely impact of the deficiencies in border control upon the threat to public policy or public security, and the impact on the free movement of persons.

The legality of suspending Schengen and/or sanctioning Greece

It’s not clear exactly where we stand in the process as regards Greece. The Commission has recently adopted a Schengen evaluation report, but it’s not public. It’s not even clear if that report concerns Greece (all Schengen states are evaluated). So it would take a while (three months after a formal finding of ‘serious deficiencies’, which hasn’t happened yet as far as I know) before Greece could be sanctioned, unless the process is fast-tracked.

Indeed, the Council document seems to be aiming to fast-track the process. It wants the Council already to request a Commission recommendation to suspend the abolition of border controls for up to two years. Since (as far as I am aware) there’s not even a finding of Greek ‘serious deficiencies’ yet, there’s obviously not yet a three month period during which those problems continued. And the Council document doesn’t even attempt to assess whether the substantive criteria apply; the intention simply seems to be to find some way to justify a longer period to continue the internal border checks which Member States have reintroduced recently.

If the current threats get to the stage of a Council Recommendation that border controls be reimposed, it’s not clear if Greece could sue the Council in the EU Court of Justice (since technically Recommendations are not binding), or would have to sue Member States for following the Recommendation instead. Individual travellers could also sue Member States in national courts for imposing border controls, indirectly challenging the legality of the Recommendation; national courts could then send the issue to the Court of Justice.

Procedural issues apart, is there a substantive case for suspending Schengen rules and reimposing border controls, because of ‘serious deficiencies’ due to Greek control of the external border? In my view, there are serious doubts that there is such a case, for two main reasons.

First of all, according to the Financial Times article, other Member States are annoyed because Greece did not accept the support of Frontex, register enough asylum-seekers, or request humanitarian aid to assist them. While the failure to request support from Frontex is referred to in the EU border controls legislation, the other issues are not. And for very good reason: because the failure to control the numbers of refugees at the external borders is NOT a breach of the Schengen rules.

This assertion may seem surprising, because the critics of the EU’s response to the refugee crisis – on either side of the argument – often assume that EU law requires refugees and asylum-seekers to be refused entry at the borders. From one side, the EU is criticised for letting refugees and asylum-seekers in, and therefore ‘not protecting its borders’. From the other side, the EU is criticised for establishing a ‘Fortress Europe’.

Both sides are clearly wrong – at least, on this specific legal issue. This follows from the Schengen Borders Code itself, which expressly exempts refugees from the rules on penalising non-EU citizens for unauthorised entry across the borders, and includes an exemption from the usual conditions on border crossing if the non-EU citizen is claiming asylum. It equally follows from the EU’s asylum procedures Directive, which requires Member States to process not only asylum applications made on the territory, but also those made at the border. (Of course, Member States don’t always fully comply with their EU legal obligations).

So it’s really the border crossing rule itself which is controversial, not Greece’s failure to apply it. There’s a political problem with the rule in practice, either because (from one side’s perspective) it is no longer keeping out enough people, or (from the other side’s perspective), it is too difficult for genuine refugees to reachEU territory without the risk of drowning or paying money to smugglers.

But for the purposes of finding that there are ‘serious deficiencies’ in Greek control of the external border, the point is that Greece is not failing in any obligation to stop asylum-seekers crossing the external borders – quite simply because there’s no such obligation. Just the opposite. Of course, due to the sheer scale of the numbers involved, it’s difficult for Greece to operate an effective asylum system, but that failure is subject to a wholly separate process. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU have already said that Member States cannot send asylum-seekers back to Greece, because the asylum system has effectively collapsed there. The Dublin III Regulation sets out rules which apply in the event that the Dublin system has to be suspended for those reasons, and the EU has recently adopted Decisions (discussed here) to relieve the burden on Greece a little by relocating some asylum-seekers from that country.

Of course, some of those who cross the Greek border do not apply for asylum immediately, or later fail in their asylum applications. According to UNHCR statistics, about half of those recently arriving in the Greek island of Lesvos (the main destination) are coming from Syria and Iraq (countries with high refugee recognition rates) and half are coming from other countries, with lower recognition rates. In that context, it is legitimate to suggest that Greece ought to accept assistance from Frontex and other EU agencies, and that Frontex in particular has a role coordinating the fingerprinting and registration of people when they first arrive. (Fingerprinting of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers isn’t a panicked authoritarian response to the refugee crisis, as is sometimes suggested, but a long-standing EU law obligation, going back to 2003).

The second problem is the link between the Greek ‘deficiencies’ and the reimposition of border controls, either against Greece or between other Schengen states. There’s certainly no link between the deficiencies and the borders between Greece and other Schengen States, since none of those are land borders, and (would-be) asylum-seekers and refugees travel by land between Greece and other Member States. So checking people flying between Greece and other Schengen States would be hugely disproportionate to the relevant deficiencies.

What about border controls between other Schengen States? These are the controls that the Council document expressly wants to continue. Here there is a link between the people originally entering via Greece and later trying to cross the Austria/Germany border, for instance. But again, the real deficiencies are with the EU’s asylum system, not Greek border controls, since EU rules provide for admission of asylum-seekers. Asylum-seekers move on to other Member States because the Dublin rules were not drawn up with today’s increased numbers of asylum-seekers in mind, and Greece can’t manage the numbers that it would be responsible for under the rules. That’s certainly a problem – but that problem is notcaused by Greek deficiencies in external border controls. The EU has to use the legal instruments available under its asylum policy to try to fix it.

Political context

Although it’s not evident from the face of the document, the political context of the Council paper may be an attempt to convince Greece to agree to further measures relating to border control. That’s evident from the Financial Times article, which conveys several Member States’ allegations against Greece (summarised above). In turn, the Greek government has defended itself and made counter-allegations against the EU, which are summarised in a Guardian article.

In some ways, this resembles the attempt by some Member States this summer to coerce Greece to leave the euro ‘temporarily’. As I argued at the time, this process did not have a shred of legality, unless we use the creative argument that Greece had never legally joined the euro.

However, there are differences as regards Schengen. There is on paper a process to suspend Schengen rules temporarily; the only question is the correct interpretation of those rules. Undoubtedly some will not share my interpretation above, and would argue that defects in the asylum system are implicitly part of the assessment of whether there are ‘serious deficiencies’ in external border control. In the absence of case law to date, it’s an open question which of us would be correct. It’s also an open question whether the Commission – which has made much of its strong support for Schengen – would be willing to suggest a suspension for two years.

Even if it’s legal to threaten Greece this way, is it wise? The EU was heavily criticised for trying to strong-arm Greece as regards the euro – although technically it wasn’t the EU institutions making the threats last summer, but rather the parallel ‘Eurogroup’ bodies which are not an ordinary part of the EU’s political system.

Far better for the EU to redouble its efforts to help both Greece and the people concerned, by ensuring that there are decent reception centres and living conditions in the country, by making greater effort to ensure that the relocation system works, and by working with Turkey to genuinely improve the living conditions of refugees there, so that fewer of them want to leave (more on that recent EU/Turkey deal in a later blog post).

As regards Schengen itself, if a temporary suspension is strongly desired, it might be better to provide for it by means of a legislative amendment to the Schengen Borders Code (with a ‘sunset clause’ providing for its expiry, since permanent suspension would violate the Treaties) rather than by the indirect means of threatening Greece. Or an amendment to the rules on checks near the internal borders could justify some occasional checks in the event of dysfunctional applications of EU asylum rules, if fixing those rules proves politically impossible – as well it might.

Supreme allies: Top national courts and the implementation of EU law

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON “DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES”

by Daniel Sarmiento, (*)

In a short time-frame, two high courts of two Member States, the French Cour de Cassation and the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional, have delivered two important judgments on the implementation of EU Law by lawyers and domestic courts. The two decisions touch different subject-matters and deal with different claims, but they are equally relevant for what they represent for the correct implementation of EU Law. As I said a few weeks ago in a previous post, national high courts are becoming key players in EU Law, and the Court of Justice should cherish and look after this highly valuable ally.

Last May, the French Cour de Cassation ruled in favor of a former worker who had sued his lawyer for not making a proper defense of his client (see the judgment here). The lawyer did not invoke the Court of Justice’s case-law stated in the well-known cases of Mangold, Kücükdeveci, Petersen, etc., on discrimination on the grounds of age. As a result of it, the worker lost his case against his former employer. The Cour de Cassation stated that the claimant’s chances of success in case of having invoked the Court of Justice’s case-law were up to 80%. Therefore, the certainty of the loss suffered entitled the claimant to successfully claim damages from his lawyer.

Yesterday, the Spanish Constitutional Court, in plenary formation, ruled in favour of another worker whose claim based on EU Law was plainly ignored by the High Court of Madrid (see the judgment here). Following the Court of Justice’s case-law in the cases of Gavieiro Gavieiro, Lorenzo Martínez and others, which solved a series of cases identical to the one of the claimant, it was obvious that this case-law applied and solved the case. However, the High Court of Madrid ignored this and dismissed the claimant’s appeal.

The Spanish Constitutional Court has now stated that any jurisdiction in Spain that ignores a judgment of the Court of Justice is breaching the fundamental right to a fair trial, as provided by article 24 of the Spanish Constitution. This gives any claimant in such circumstances the chance of invoking another ground of appeal, and, above all, the use of the special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights before the Constitutional Court (recurso de amparo).

These two judgments impose considerable responsibilities on lawyers and judges. The French decision sets a high standard of professional expertise on practitioners, especially on those who are highly qualified and (as in the case of France) allowed to plead before the highest courts of the country. The Spanish judgment is a nice reminder for all courts in Spain that the case-law of the Court of Justice is binding in the strongest possible way, and therefore binding for all courts. Both cases have in common a total absence of reference to EU Law, by the lawyer in his submissions in one case, and by a court in its judgment in another.

Therefore, the sum of both decisions is not revolutionary, because it is obvious that a total lack of reference to the applicable law, whether it is national or EU Law, raises serious issues about the decision at stake. However, it is important that the highest courts of Member States are assuming the task of ensuring the correct application of EU Law. This is of course a matter for the Court of Justice, but also for its domestic counterparts too. And it is nice to see that these cases have been solved without the need to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. High courts know what their role is and how it must be put into practice under national law. Now it is time for lawyers and for the remaining domestic courts to act accordingly.

*Professor of EU Law at the University Complutense of Madrid

Schengen, un coupable idéal ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE (25 NOVEMBRE 2015)

par Henri Labayle, 

Les réalisations européennes servent de bouc émissaire aux crises nationales. Ce n’est pas chose nouvelle. Après l’Euro, l’espace « Schengen » de l’Union est aujourd’hui sur la sellette. Les attentats terroristes lui auraient donné le coup de grâce, après ceux de la crise des migrants. Est-ce bien réaliste, est-ce vraiment opportun ?

Les discours officiels relèvent ici de la vieille fable de la paille et de la poutre. C’est aux Etats membres eux-mêmes que le conseil du ministre de l’Intérieur français de « se reprendre » devrait être donné tant la construction de Schengen est dépendante de leur volonté. Néanmoins, le réalisme interdit l’optimisme. Ayant perdu de vue ses caractéristiques initiales, Schengen n’échappera pas à une remise en question profonde.
Le fabuleux destin de l’espace Schengen, sa « success story », enregistrent incontestablement au coup d’arrêt, dont il conviendra de mesurer l’impact réel. Il y a des explications à cela.

1. Une construction datée

Les principes de Schengen sont inscrits désormais dans les traités : abolition des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, reportés là où l’espace commun est en contact avec les pays tiers. Sont-ils toujours à la hauteur des défis ? Répondent-ils à la menace terroriste comme à la pression migratoire ? A trop raisonner à logiciel constant, on peut en douter.

Le contexte de la création de Schengen, en 1985, a été oublié. Fruit d’un accord bilatéral franco-allemand, rejoint par les Etats du Bénélux, Schengen s’inscrivait dans un paysage aujourd’hui disparu : peu de participants, ensemble homogène animé des mêmes buts. Au point d’être scellé dans une convention d’application dont la date n’est pas indifférente : 1990, au lendemain de la chute du mur de Berlin …

En attendre une réponse efficace à des défis qui n’existaient pas lors de sa conception est un peu simpliste.
Que Schengen n’ait pas été à même, en 2015, d’arrêter les flots de réfugiés remontant le ventre mou du couloir des Balkans s’explique : il a été conçu en 1990 dans la logique d’un continent fermé, d’une Europe coupée en deux par le rideau de fer, ignorant les 7700 kilomètres de frontières terrestres devenues les siennes aujourd’hui. Figée dans une problématique Nord/Sud, l’Europe de l’époque n’avait aucune idée de la dimension Est/Ouest qui s’y est surajoutée.
Le contexte géopolitique de l’époque le confirme. L’environnement de Schengen était fait de l’Union soviétique de Gromyko au Maroc d’Hassan II en passant par la Tunisie de Ben Ali et la Libye de Kadhafi, sans parler de la Syrie ou de la Yougoslavie de Tito. Les dictateurs qui l’entouraient étaient ses meilleurs garde-frontières et la vague migratoire de 2015 inimaginable …

L’argument vaut aussi en matière terroriste. Oubli ou mauvaise foi des partisans d’un retour aux frontières nationales, celles-ci font obstacle à la lutte anti-terroriste. D’ETA réfugié en France à l’IRA en République d’Irlande ou à la bande à Baader en France, les exemples ne manquent pas. Leur maîtrise nationale empêcha-t-elle la vague d’attentats des années 80 en France ? Evidemment non.
Pour autant, « l’obsession » de la frontière justement décrite par Michel Foucher n’a pas disparu. En fait, Schengen se borne à déplacer le lieu où la frontière joue toujours son rôle de barrière, de protection. Il est un compromis entre l’ouverture d’un continent, notamment pour des besoins économiques, et sa fermeture, pour des raisons sécuritaires.

La crise de 2015 met ouvertement en question l’équilibre de ce compromis, sa capacité à assumer la fonction sécuritaire de la frontière commune. Les Etats, en trente ans, l’ont construit et maintenu envers toute logique, d’où leur responsabilité centrale.

2. Des compromis boiteux

Habillé d’un prétexte sécuritaire, ce que l’on appelait à l’époque le « déficit sécuritaire », Schengen répondait en fait à une autre réalité : celle du besoin économique d’un continent asphyxié, cloisonné en Etats aussi nombreux que petits. Le marché intérieur, lancé exactement à la même période, ne pouvait s’en satisfaire.
Le détour par la case « sécurité » dissimule à peine cette vérité. Ouvrir l’espace intérieur était d’abord un impératif économique, satisfaisant les opérateurs mais plus facile à assumer en mettant en avant la lutte contre l’immigration ou le crime. La réinstauration des contrôles provoquée par la crise des attentats de Paris confirme l’impact économique de cette ouverture : retards dans les aéroports, kilomètres de bouchons sur les autoroutes aux passages frontaliers avec l’Espagne ou l’Italie… Le compromis entre mobilité et sécurité, pourtant exclusivement au cœur du projet initial Schengen, s’est réalisé au détriment de la seconde. Quitte à ignorer les aspirations des citoyens européens.
D’autant que, dans sa quête de points d’appui, la construction européenne s’est emparée de Schengen pour en faire un symbole. Curieux retournement des choses, Schengen vilipendé lors de sa création, stigmatisé parce que qualifié de « liberticide » et que « l’Europe des polices » était alors un gros mot, fut ensuite présenté comme l’acquis principal de la liberté des citoyens européens. Avant aujourd’hui d’être à nouveau accusé de tous les maux d’une intégration européenne qu’il ne réalise pourtant pas.

La vérité se cache ailleurs. A force de non-dits et de compromis étatiques, la démarche sécuritaire quasi-exclusive sur laquelle reposait Schengen initialement s’est progressivement banalisée.
Elle imposait le respect d’un certain nombre de principes. Avant toute autre chose, celui de la responsabilité de chaque Etat, garant par son sérieux de la sécurité de tous. D’où le refus initial de l’ouvrir à des partenaires jugés peu fiables, de l’Italie à la péninsule ibérique ou à la Grèce.
La logique communautaire, celle des élargissements, l’a emporté sur ce paramètre. Une prétendue « confiance mutuelle » entre Etats a été vantée dans un univers où la méfiance demeure la règle, peu sensible au credo du monde libéral.

Puisque, depuis des années, la Grèce était une passoire et ne remplissait plus ses obligations, comment s’étonner que le système ait volé en éclat au début de l’été ? Puisque, depuis des années, le système dit de « Dublin » (imaginé à Schengen) ne remplissait pas son office, pourquoi s’étonner de l’abcès de fixation ouvert hier à Sangatte, aujourd’hui à Calais ? Enfin, faute de donner un sens au mot « sanction », pourquoi l’Union européenne ne s’est-elle pas préoccupée d’une réaction vigoureuse, réservant ses foudres aux eaux de baignade et aux aides d’Etat …

Arbitrant au moyen de compromis médiocres, quand il aurait sans doute fallu établir publiquement et respecter des priorités politiques, l’Union s’est donc trouvée démunie lorsque la bise est venue, lorsque les urnes nationales et européennes se sont emplies de votes protestataires. Faisant l’aubaine de partis extrémistes dépourvus de toute réponse réaliste, elle s’est ainsi placée sur la défensive.
L’impasse faite sur la dimension économique du contrôle des frontières illustre cette absence de pilotage. Le mirage des solutions technologiques de demain, les « smarts borders » et la biométrie, ajouté au lobbying des grandes multinationales désireuses d’obtenir les marchés publics y sacrifiant, ne peut dissimuler l’aberration consistant à confier la sécurité de tous à un Etat membre, la Grèce, étranglé financièrement et budgétairement pour les raisons que l’on sait …

S’il est exact que les Etats Unis consacrent 32 milliards de dollars à leur politique migratoire dont la moitié au contrôle des frontières, comment comprendre les 142 millions d’Euros du budget de Frontex ?

Dilué, Schengen a perdu de vue l’originalité de sa charge pour être appréhendé comme une politique ordinaire. Sauf que les Etats membres n’ont en rien abdiqué.

3. Une logique intergouvernementale

Laboratoire de la construction européenne, Schengen demeure une construction aux mains des Etats.
Au prix d’une certaine schizophrénie, les Etats ont en effet prétendu à la fois intégrer leur action mais en conserver la maîtrise. Entre ceux qui voulaient mais ne pouvaient pas en faire partie (la Bulgarie, la Roumanie), ceux qui pouvaient mais ne le voulaient pas (les iles britanniques), ceux qui ne pouvaient pas mais que l’on a voulu (la Suisse, la Norvège, l’Islande) et ceux qui ne pouvaient pas et dont on aurait pas du vouloir (la Grèce), Schengen est devenu un véritable patchwork.

La greffe aurait pu prendre. Elle n’a été qu’imparfaite.
D’abord car la diversité des situations nationales n’a pas disparu. D’une part, les législations et pratiques nationales demeurent suffisamment éloignées pour que l’effet « vases communicants » ne joue pas. Migrants comme criminels ont parfaitement identifié ces points faibles. D’autre part car le degré d’attraction des Etats membres de cet espace ne s’est pas réduit, rendant inutile le souhait de responsabiliser l’ensemble. Convaincus que l’Allemagne et la Suède étaient des eldorados, les demandeurs de refuge n’envisagent pas d’autre destination, pour la plus grande satisfaction des Etats membres qu’ils traversent et qui vont jusqu’à leur faciliter la tâche.

Ensuite, parce que les Etats refusent toujours la contrainte. En indiquant clairement dans son article 4 que « la sécurité nationale relève de la seule souveraineté de chaque Etat membre », le traité sur l’Union fixe une barrière infranchissable.

Les enseignements des commissions d’enquête au lendemain des attentats de Charlie Hebdo le confirment. Le dispositif européen est moins en cause que les conditions de sa mise en œuvre. La faillite de Schengen n’est pas dans la poursuite mais dans la prévention, dans le renseignement en amont des attentats et l’alimentation des outils communs qui n’est pas obligatoire. La qualité remarquable de l’action policière et judiciaire, y compris par delà la frontière franco-belge, ne dissimule la faillite de la prévention politique et policière, des deux cotés de cette frontière.
Comment Mehdi Nemmouche hier, Abaaoud ou les frères Abdeslam cette semaine, ont-ils pu perpétrer leurs crimes sans obstacle réel, échappant aux contrôles Schengen autant que nationaux ? Qui refusait jusqu’au Conseil de vendredi dernier d’inclure les « combattants étrangers » dans le SIS et pourquoi 5 Etats seulement fournissent-ils plus de la moitié des informations sur leurs déplacements au Système d’information d’Europol de l’aveu du coordinateur européen de la lutte contre le terrorisme ?

L’absence de transparence de l’Union ne facilite pas la réponse. La responsabilité des Etats membres est pourtant au cœur de ce fiasco, constat déjà posé après Charlie Hebdo, sans réelle suite.

La France n’y échappe pas, étonne par l’arrogance de notre discours public. Des failles de son contrôle judiciaire aux pannes de son système de fichier Chéops, à sa gestion des documents d’identité, aux  erreurs de ses services de renseignements ou aux moyens alloués et à l’autisme de ses gouvernants qui qualifient de simples « complicités françaises » l’action des terroristes de Paris, elle n’est pas en situation d’administrer les leçons qu’elle prétend donner à la Belgique et à l’Union.

Celle-ci doit pourtant se remettre en question.

Quant au périmètre de son action d’abord. Malgré le politiquement correct, la composition de l’espace commun où contrôles comme échanges de renseignement s’effectuent est une question ouverte. Les Pays Bas, comme d’autres, semblent réfléchir à un redimensionnement effectué soit par un repli, sur un petit nombre de partenaires performants, soit par une mise à l’écart, de membres jugés non fiables.

Quand au fond ensuite. Les principes d’organisation sur lesquels Schengen repose, frontières intérieures/extérieures demeurent aussi pertinents qu’hier. En revanche, ils ne peuvent plus se satisfaire du vide politique actuel. La cohérence exige de percevoir l’asile comme un même devoir, réclame de criminaliser le radicalisme et le terrorisme de façon identique. Ce préalable n’est pas satisfait aujourd’hui dans l’Union. De même que la « solidarité » doit avoir un sens concret pour les Etats membres, ces derniers doivent partager l’accueil des réfugiés et privilégier la coopération et la police judiciaires et la coordination des poursuites à l’action exclusive des services de renseignement. Dans tous les cas, il faut y mettre le prix.

Alors, pourquoi n’entendons nous pas les mots de « parquet européen », « d’équipes communes d’enquête », « d’Eurojust » ? Pourquoi l’essentiel du contingent de la relocalisation est-il encore vacant ? Parce que nous n’osons pas lever le tabou de l’action commune, de la quasi-fédéralisation qu’impliquent le développement des agences se substituant aux Etats défaillants, que nous prétendons que l’administration nationale des politiques européennes est toujours l’alpha et l’oméga de la construction européenne ?

L’hypothèse de l’avancée, même si celle du repli est peu crédible sinon impossible, est donc incertaine. A l’image de celle du projet européen tout entier dont Schengen demeure bien, toujours, un « laboratoire ».

Data retention and bulk data: sometime the Council raises some good questions. But what about the answers ?

It does not happen very often but in a PUBLIC document diffused yesterday the Council Presidency raises some very interesting questions arising from the 2014 CJEU ruling on data retention (see below). It is worth recalling that already at that time the Court justified its decision with reference not only to art. 8 of the Charter (protection of personal data) but also to art. 7 (protection of privacy). The same happened this year with the Schrems case which deals with a similar situation (even if referred to a third country). Quite surprisingly the Council Presidency does not make reference to this ruling even if , according some doctrine (see the Martin Scheinin position published here)  it contain already an answer to the first question. According to Martin Scheinin the Court by referring to Article 7 of the Charter makes clear that:  In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter…

When the “essence” itself of a fundamental right is threatened, according to art.52 of the Charter is no more question of verify the “proportionality” of this kind of measures as they would be per se against the Charter (and the Treaty)

Let’s see what will be the MS (and judiciary) reaction and if they will take this occasion to re-examine some wide ranging legislative proposals which foresee a generalised collection of personal data (PNR, Entry-exit systems, not to speak of the monthly bulk transmission of EU citizens personal data to the US administration within the EU-USA TFTP (“SWIFT”) agreement…).

EDC

 

DOC  14246/15 24 November 2015 NOTE
From:Presidency
To:Permanent Representatives Committee/Council
No. prev. doc.:14369, 13085/15, 11747/1/15 REV 1
Subject: Retention of electronic communication data – General debate

1. The invalidation of the Data Retention Directive 1 by the Court of Justice of the EU 2on the grounds that it disproportionately restricted the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data, has given rise to questions in the Member States, in particular as regards national transposition legislation and the availability of electronic communication data collected for access by law enforcement authorities and their use as evidence in criminal proceedings.

2. Member States had been given a wide margin of discretion in the implementation of the Data Retention Directive. This lead to considerable differences in the national legal frameworks3, which are compounded by the varying consequences of the assessment of the national data retention schemes by national parliaments and courts, especially in view of the Data Retention Judgement and the pending “Tele2” case 4.

3. The Data Retention Judgement has not directly affected national implementing legislations of the Data Retention Directive and these remain valid until amended, or repealed by national parliaments, or invalidated by national courts, provided that they comply with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Member States thus find themselves in a situation where they no longer have an obligation deriving from a specific Union legal instrument to introduce or maintain a national data retention regime providing for the mandatory storage of electronic communication data by providers for the purposes of detecting, investigating, and prosecuting serious crime. However, Member States retain the possibility to do so under Article 15(1) of the “E-privacy Directive” 5.

4. Opinions diverge on the interpretation of the Court’s judgement and thus on the legality of schemes for retaining bulk electronic communication data without specific reason. This has inter alia resulted in a large variety of situations at national level6. Some Member States have already adopted or are in a process of preparing new legislation on data retention, that, according to the information received by delegations, aims at ensuring strengthened procedural guarantees and safeguards in compliance with the Charter and in line with the ruling of the Court (EE, ES, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL), including some Member States where the national law has been invalidated by the constitutional Court (DE, BG, NL).

5.Eurojust’s analysis of the current situation7 and expert debates held during the Luxembourg Presidency8 highlight that this fragmentation of the legal framework on data retention across the Union has an impact on the effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions at national level, in particular in terms of reliability and admissibility of evidence to the courts based on the collection of electronic communication data, as well as on cross-border judicial cooperation between Member States and internationally.

6 In view of these challenges and the legal, procedural and practical problems they pose for investigations and prosecutions of all kinds of crime, not in the least in relation to counter-terrorism, the Presidency invites Ministers to address the following questions:

  • Is the Data Retention Judgement to be interpreted in the sense that retaining bulk electronic communication data without specific reason is still allowed ?
  • Considering the current fragmented situation throughout the Union, and the consequences it entails, should an EU-wide response be considered or should it be up to individual Member States to address the issue ?
  • Should the Commission be invited to present a new legislative initiative and if yes in what timeframe ?

 

NOTES

1        Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC
3        It is recalled that the transposition did not go easily in certain Member States, as a number of national constitutional courts annulled the national transposition laws for being contrary to the Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights and certain national parliaments raised serious concerns.
2        Judgement of the Court of justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Grand Chamber) “Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and others” of 8 April 2015 in joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12
4        The CJEU currently examines a preliminary ruling (pending Case C-203/15, lodged on 4 May 2015, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen ) on the compatibility of a national legislation (Swedish law in this case) to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data for the purpose of combating crime, with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC (the e-privacy Directive), taking account of Articles 7, 8 and 15(1) of the Charter.
5        Directive 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector
6        The current state of play is as follows: the transposition law of the Data Retention Directive has been invalidated in at least 11 Member States (AT, BE, BG, DE, LT, NL, PL, RO, SI, SK, UK). Amongst these, 9 countries have had the law invalidated by the Constitutional Court (AT, BE, BG, DE, SI, NL, PL, RO, SK). In 15 Member States (CY, CZ, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LU, LV, MT, PT, SE) the domestic law on data retention remains in force, while they are still processing communication data.
7        Doc. 13085/15 and 13689/15
8        Doc. 11747/1/15 REV 1

Immigration detention in Europe

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON 02.11.2015 ON EUTOPIA 
by Mary Bosworth
Well before the current mass arrival of refugees, Europe has been busy closing its borders. As part of this attempt to ‘manage migration’, most member states have witnessed a growing intersection between criminal justice and immigration policy, introducing a host of new legislation criminalising matters that used to be purely administrative.

Police have acquired new roles and responsibilities related to border control, while prisons have paid far more attention to the citizenship of prisoners than ever before.

IN BRIEF

  • Although seeking asylum should not lead to a period of detention, due to the Dublin Conventions, asylum seekers are sometimes detained before removal to a third country
  • The uncertainty of detention is more than just a personal tragedy or a cause of momentary confusion; it is a constitutive part of this form of confinement
  • In Britain Immigration Removal Centres offer art and crafts, English as a second language, gym, IT training and access to the internet

Alongside these criminal justice initiatives, most European Union member states have opened new sites of administrative detention. These immigration detention centres hold foreigners under immigration powers either as they arrive or to enforce their departure. They may take a variety of forms, from temporary camps to purpose-built institutions.

As we witness growing numbers of new arrivals seeking sanctuary within Europe, we need to be very clear about the personal and moral impact of detention, both for those behind bars, but also for society as a whole.

Although states have long had powers to deport foreigners from their territory, and have confined them for various reasons, administrative sites related to processing asylum claims and/or detaining failed asylum seekers prior to deportation are more novel. At times of war, most states deploy custodial practices of some kind to hold suspect foreigners.

From the internment camps created in France for exiles fleeing the Spanish civil war in the mid-1930s to concentration camps of WWII, such practices overlap with more violent ideologies. So, too, the post-war post-colonial era has left its mark.

In Britain, the contemporary immigration detention system dates to 1970, when the first purpose-built institution, the Harmondsworth Detention Unit, was established. Opened in response to the Immigration Appeals Act of 1969, which gave Commonwealth citizens who were denied entry at the border the right to an in-country appeal, this preliminary institution laid the foundations for the far more complex and larger system that exists today.

In France, the chronology is similar, with the original target being migrants from Algeria. There it was not until the 1980s that legal safeguards were developed.

Today, a vast array of institutions can be identified in Europe as sites of detention. Many are concentrated in the southern states, reflecting the distribution of arrivals. There are a range of possible forms of accommodation including tents and shipping containers.

According to the EU Returns Directive, nobody should be detained for immigration matters for longer than 18 months. Most countries have agreed on a much shorter time frame, from 45 days in France to 90 days in Italy.

Although seeking asylum should not lead to a period of detention, due to the Dublin Conventions, asylum seekers are sometimes detained before removal to a third country. A high proportion of those confined are people whose asylum claim has been denied.

Continue reading “Immigration detention in Europe”

THE NEW DIRECTIVE ON IMMIGRATION OF STUDENTS AND RESEARCHERS: A SMALL STEP OR A BIG LEAP FORWARD?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Monday, 23 November 2015)

by Steve Peers

For a number of years, the EU has aimed to attract highly-skilled non-EU migrants to its territory. However, the existing legislation on this issue – the researchers’ Directive, adopted in 2005, and the students’ Directive, adopted in 2004 – have only had a modest impact on attracting more students and researchers to the EU, according to the Commission’s reports (see here and here) on the two Directives, issued in 2011.

Consequently, the Commission proposed an overhaul of this legislation in 2013. The European Parliament (EP) and the Council recently agreed on the text of this proposal (for the text of the provisional version of the future Directive, see here; the final version will be ‘tidied up’ a little legally). As you would expect, the EP and the Council compromised between their respective positions (for those positions, see here and here), which I discussed in an earlier blog post.

I’ll examine first the background and content of the new Directive, then look at how effective it is likely to be in its objective on increasing the numbers of researchers and students coming from third States.

Background

The current students’ Directive also applies to the admission of school pupils on exchange programmes, unpaid trainees and volunteers, although Member States have an option to apply it to the latter three groups of migrants. The CJEU has ruled twice on the interpretation of this Directive. In  Sommer it ruled that Member States could not apply a labour-market preference test for students; in Ben Alaya case (discussed here), it ruled that Member States must admit students who comply with the rules on admission in the Directive. The same logically applies to the current researchers’ Directive. The UK and Denmark opted out of both Directives, while Ireland opted in to the researchers’ Directive. All three countries have opted out of the new law.

The new law

The new Directive merges the students’ and researchers’ Directives, making major changes to them both. First of all, the Commission proposed that Member States would be obliged to apply the currently optional rules relating to school pupils, unpaid trainees and volunteers, as well as rules on two new groups of migrants: au pairs and paid trainees. The EP agreed with this idea, while the Council rejected it entirely. Ultimately, the two institutions compromised: the new Directive will have binding rules on (paid and unpaid) trainees and some volunteers (those participating in the EU’s European Voluntary Service), although stricter conditions will apply to the admission of trainees (more on that below). However, the rules on other volunteers and school pupils will remain optional, along with the new rules on au pairs.

Next, the Commission proposed to limit Member States’ current power to apply more favourable rules for students and researchers, confining that power to only a few provisions relating to the rights of migrants, while fully harmonising the rules on admission. The final Directive accepts the basic principle that the power to set more favourable standards should be more limited that at present, but imposes fewer such constraints than the Commission wanted. Member States will be allowed to apply more favourable rules for the persons concerned as regards the time limits on their residence permits. Many of the conditions relating to admission and withdrawal or non-renewal of the right to stay will be optional, not mandatory (as the Commission had proposed), and the Council insisted on many additional options being added. A clause in the preamble sets out the Council’s wish to provide expressly that Member States can have rules on admission of other categories of students or researchers.

Against the Commission’s wishes, the final Directive provides that the current rules on delegating decision-making to research institutions or universities will remain. Furthermore, it adds that Member States can optionally delegate such powers as regards volunteers or trainees as well.

Trainees are defined (more restrictively than the current law) as those who have recently completed a degree (within the last two years), or who are currently undertaking one. Their time on the territory is limited to six months, although this can be longer if the traineeship is longer, and the authorisation can be renewed once. But Member States retain the power to set more favourable standards as regards these time limits.

One striking feature of the agreed Directive is a new right for students and researchers to stay after their research or study to look for work or self-employment. The EU institutions agreed on the principle of this right, but disagreed on the details. According to the Commission, the right should apply for a period of 12 months, although after 3 months Member States could check on the genuineness of this search, and after 6 months they could ask the migrant to prove that they have real prospects. The EP wanted to extend the period to 18 months, and to make Member States wait longer to check on the genuineness of the job search or likelihood of employment. On the other hand, the Council wanted several restrictions: to reduce the stay to 6 months; to allow Member States to limit students’ possibility to stay to those who have at least a Master’s degree; to check on the likelihood of employment after 3 months; and to give Member States an option to limit the job search to the areas of the migrant’s expertise. The final deal splits the difference on the period of extra stay (it will be 9 months), and accepts the various optional limits on the right which the Council wanted.

As for students’ right to work, the current Directive allows them to work for at least for 10 hours a week. The Commission proposed to let them work for 20 hours a week, and to drop the option to ban students from working during their first year of studies. The EP agreed with this, but the Council wanted to revert to the current 10-hour a week limit, and introduce a possible labour-market preference test (overturning Sommer). Again, the final deal splits the difference: 15 hours’ of work allowed per week, with no labour market preference test.

Another issue was equal treatment of those who work. Currently, the EU’s single permit Directive provides for equal treatment of most third-country nationals who are allowed to work, even if (like students) they were not admitted for employment. However, that Directive excludes au pairs from its scope, and only applies where the relationship is defined as ‘employment’ under national law; this will not always be the case for researchers. The new Directive will extend the equal treatment rules to students and researchers, even if they are not considered employees, and to au pairs whenever they are considered employees. Even non-employees will have equal treatment for goods and services (besides housing and public employment offices). But the new Directive will not waive any of the various exceptions to equal treatment that the single permit Directive currently provides for, besides a few minor exceptions for researchers.

Also, the new Directive will replace the weak rules on family reunion in the current researchers’ Directive with a fully-fledged right to family reunion. The EU’s family reunion Directive will apply to Directive will apply to researchers, and many of the restrictions in that Directive will be waived: the minimum waiting period; the need to show a reasonable prospect of permanent residence; the need to show integration requirements for family members before entry (those rules can still be applied after entry; on the CJEU’s interpretation of those rules, see here). There will also be a shorter deadline to process applications, and family members will have a longer period of authorised stay. The EP and Council compromised on the Commission’s proposal to waive the waiting period before family members could access the labour market: the Council wanted to delete this proposed rule entirely, but it agreed to it with a derogation for ‘exceptional circumstances such as particularly high levels of unemployment’. However, the EP got nowhere with its suggestion to extend these more favourable rules to the family members of students as well.

The Commission aimed to simplify the current rules on the movement (‘mobility’) of researchers and students between Member States for the purpose of their studies and research. It also proposed to extend those rules to paid trainees, while the EP wanted to extend those rules to cover unpaid trainees and volunteers as well. However, the Council prevailed on this issue, restricting the scope of these rules to researchers and students (as at present), and adding very complicated details to the proposal on this issue.

Finally, the Commission proposed to introduce a 60-day deadline to decide on applications for admission, shortened to 30 days for those benefiting from EU mobility programmes. (The current laws have no deadlines to decide on applications at all). The EP supported an even shorter period to decide on applications (30 days), while the Council wanted to raise the time limit to 90 days. Yet again, these institutions split the difference, with a 90-day general rule and a 60-day rule where institutions have been delegated the powers to decide on applicants.

Comments

The agreed Directive should be appraised in light of the Commission’s impact assessment report for the proposed Directive, which made detailed arguments for the amendments which the Commission proposed. This report provided evidence that students or researchers are attracted to a job-search period after the end of research or studies, as well as by further employment rights for students and for researchers’ family members. Certainly the new Directive addresses all of these issues to some extent.

Conversely, would-be migrants are deterred by the great variety of national rules and the rules on mobility between Member States.  On this point, the new Directive will only reduce the variety of national rules modestly, and will install mobility rules more complex than those applying at present.

Presumably, it is also a deterrent for would-be students and researchers who are already legally present to leave the country to make their applications. To address this, the EP wanted to oblige Member States to consider in-country applications for researchers, but ultimately it could not convince the Council (or the Commission) to change the existing rules, which give Member States only an option to allow this.

As for the additional scope of the Directive, it is striking that the new binding rules on admission only apply to trainees who are undertaking or who have completed higher education, and to volunteers in the EU’s own programme. The latter change in the law is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of that programme, but the former change in the law is another example of the EU focussing its migration policy upon highly qualified employees. (Remember that according to the preamble to the new Directive, the admission of trainees who have not entered higher education is left entirely to national discretion). It’s unfortunate that at least the rules on equal treatment aren’t binding for all volunteers, school pupils and au pairs, to ensure that these migrants are not exploited and that domestic labour standards are not undercut.

Many of the changes in the Directive intending to attract qualified migrants would make even more sense if they were part of a ‘joined up’ policy – for instance, allowing trainees to make an in-country application for studies or research, or waiving some of the conditions in the EU’s ‘Blue Card’ Directive for highly-skilled migrants (reducing the income threshold, for instance) for graduate trainees, researchers, and students looking for work under this new Directive. Fortunately, there will be a chance to address this issue in the near future, as the Commission will soon be proposing an amendment to the Blue Card Directive (on the reform of that Directive, see here).

Overall, then, the new Directive has gone some distance towards accomplishing its intended objectives, but its effect could be further augmented in the near future by a broader reform of EU law on highly-skilled immigration in general.

After Paris : Justice and Home affairs Council draft Conclusions

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ACCESSIBLE ON STATEWATCH SITE

(NOTA BENE : Comments will follow on the text finally adopted) 

Draft Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism

  1. The Council is appalled by the heinous terrorist attacks which took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 and expresses its deepest condolences to the victims of these attacks, their families and friends. The Council emphasises its solidarity with the people of France and pays tribute to the courage and decisive actions of the French authorities. The attacks were an assault on the European values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This is not the first time that the EU has been confronted with a major terrorist attack and important measures have already been taken. The Council underlines the importance of accelerating the implementation of all areas covered by the statement on counter-terrorism issued by the Members of the European Council of 12 February 2015 and in particular of the measures outlined below.

PNR

  1. The Council reiterates the urgency and priority to finalise an ambitious EU PNR before the end of 2015, which should include internal flights in its scope, provide for a sufficiently long data period during which PNR data can be retained in non-masked out form and should not be limited to crimes with a transnational nature.

Firearms

  1. The Council:
  • welcomes the adoption of the Implementing Regulation on common deactivation standards on 18 November 2015,
  • welcomes the presentation by the Commission on 18 November 2015 of a proposal to revise the current Directive on Firearms,
  • is committed to increasing operational cooperation through Europol under the EU Policy Cycle on serious and organised crime, notably within the Operational Action Plan Firearms. All Member States affected by the problem are invited to join these efforts by the end of 2015,
  • invites Frontex and Europol to assist the Member States bordering the Western Balkans region with regard to increasing controls of external borders to detect smuggling of firearms.

Strengthening controls of external borders

4. Member States undertake to:

  • implement immediately the necessary systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, including on individuals enjoying the right of free movement,
    • on the bases of a quick identification of urgent needs and possible solutions, to be performed by the Commission before the end of 2015, upgrade the Member States border control systems (electronic connection to the relevant Interpol databases at all external border crossing points, automatic screening of travel documents) by March 2016,
    • in the context of the current migratory crisis, carry out a systematic registration, including fingerprinting, of all migrants entering into the Schengen area and perform systematic security checks by using relevant databases in particular SIS II, Interpol SLTD database, VIS and national police databases, with the support of Frontex and Europol, and ensure that hotspots are equipped with the relevant technology. Europol will deploy guest officers to the hotspots in support of the screening process, in particular by reinforcing secondary security controls,
    • strengthen the control at the external borders which are most exposed, in particular by deploying rapid border intervention teams (RABITs) and police officers in order to guarantee systematic screening and security checks.
    1. The Council reiterates its Conclusions of 9 November 2015 and invites the Commission to:
    • include EU nationals in the upcoming Smart Borders proposals and in this context present a proposal for the targeted revision of Art.7(2) Schengen Borders Code regarding systematic controls against relevant databases at EU external borders,
    • provide, in its proposal to update the Frontex Regulation, a solid legal basis for the contribution of Frontex to the fight against terrorism and organised crime and access to the relevant databases.
    1. Frontex will:
    • contribute to the fight against terrorism and support the coordinated implementation of the Common Risk Indicators (CRIs) before the end of 2015,
    • assist the Member States to tighten controls of external borders to detect suspicious travels of foreign terrorist fighters and smuggling of firearms, in cooperation with Europol,
    • work closely with Europol and Eurojust, in particular in the context of the hotspots, and exchange data with Europol on the basis of the cooperation agreement to exchange personal data. The latter should be concluded and become operational without delay.

    Information sharing

    7. The Council decides to step up law enforcement cooperation on counter-terrorism (CT):

    • Member States will instruct national authorities to enter data on all suspected foreign terrorist fighters into the SIS II under Article 36.3, carry out awareness raising and training on the use of the SIS and define a common approach to the use of the SIS II data relating to foreign fighters,
    • Europol will launch the European Counter Terrorist Centre (ECTC) on 1 January 2016 as a platform by which Member States can increase information sharing and operational coordination with regard to the monitoring and investigation of foreign terrorist fighters, the trafficking of illegal firearms and terrorist financing. The ECTC will provide national CT authorities with enhanced information sharing capacities notably via Focal Point Travellers, the Europol Information System and Europol’s SIENA system reserved for counter-terrorism cases. The new Europol Regulation, on which an agreement should be reached between the co-legislators before the end of the year, should be consistent with the mandate and objectives of the ECTC, including the IRU,
    • Member States will second CT experts to the ECTC to form an enhanced cross-border investigation support unit, capable of providing quick and comprehensive support to the investigation of major terrorist incidents in the EU. Eurojust should also participate,
    • The Commission is invited to ensure that Europol is reinforced with the necessary resources to support ECTC and to submit a legislative proposal in order to enable Europol to systematically cross-check the Europol databases against the SIS II as established by Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II),
    • Member States will make maximum use of these capabilities to improve the overall level of information exchange between CT authorities in the EU. Member States will instruct the relevant national authorities to further increase their contributions to Focal Point Traveller at Europol to reflect the threat and connect to relevant Europol information exchange systems.

     
    Terrorist financing

    1. The Council invites the Commission to present proposals to strengthen, harmonise and improve cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units (FIU’s), notably through the proper embedment of the FIU.net network for information exchange in Europol and ensure their fast access to necessary information, in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in conformity with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, to implement more quickly the asset freezing required by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1373), to strengthen controls of non-banking payment methods such as electronic/anonymous payments and virtual currencies and transfers of gold, precious metals, by pre-paid cards and to curb more effectively the illicit trade in cultural goods.

     Criminal justice response to terrorism and violent extremism

     9. The Council welcomes the signing in Riga on 22 October 2015 by the EU of the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of terrorism and of its additional Protocol on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and invites the Commission to present a proposal for a directive updating the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism before the end of 2015 with a view to collectively implementing into EU law UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) and the additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Convention.

     10. Member States will use ECRIS at its full potential. The Council invites the Commission to submit by January 2016 a proposal for the extension of ECRIS to cover third country nationals.

     11. The Council invites the Commission to allocate as a matter of urgency the necessary financial resources to implement the Council Conclusions on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. This should notably support the development of rehabilitation programmes as well as risk assessment tools in order to determine the most appropriate criminal justice response, taking into account the individual circumstances and security and public safety concerns.

     Funding

    1. The Council invites Member States to use the Internal Security Fund to support the implementation of these conclusions and to prioritise relevant actions under the national programmes to this effect, and calls on the Commission to prioritise the funding available under centrally managed funds to the priorities identified in these conclusions.

    Implementation

    1. In view of its role on strengthening internal security within the Union, COSI shall coordinate the role of the various Council Working Parties and of the EU agencies in the implementation of these Council Conclusions. The Counter Terrorism Coordinator will monitor their implementation.