Category: 3. Fundamental rights – Charter

La politique européenne d’asile : Strange fruit ? (II)

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE HERE  (10 SEPTEMBRE 2015)

 par Henri Labayle, 

II – Etat de crise

Ouverte au lendemain de la publication de l’Agenda européen sur la migration (COM (2015) 240), la crise affectant la politique commune d’asile de l’Union est en réalité une crise beaucoup plus importante qu’on ne l’imagine, aux racines profondes. Elle est à la fois morale et institutionnelle.

1. Une crise morale

La déconvenue faisant suite au Conseil des ministres JAI du 20 juillet a entraîné une crise ouverte, d’autant plus grave qu’en parallèle l’exode meurtrier en Méditerranée se poursuivait. Aux abonnés absents pendant l’été, les institutions de l’Union ont laissé place aux égoïsmes nationaux, sans grande réaction.

Le Conseil s’était en effet accordé sur le principe d’une aide à l’Italie et la Grèce en admettant le principe d’une « relocalisation » de 40 000 personnes ayant manifestement besoin d’une protection internationale. Une proposition de décision du Conseil en ce sens traduisait ce principe sous la forme d’un « mécanisme temporaire et exceptionnel ». Simplement « volontaire », cette position était largement en deça du souhait d’établir une contrainte du Président de la Commission, ce dernier n’ayant pas mâché ses mots pour stigmatiser une Union européenne incapable de montrer « à la hauteur ».

Une « résolution des représentants des gouvernements des États membres réunis au sein du Conseil » traduisait en effet ce demi-échec, incapable d’atteindre le chiffre symbolique proposé de 40 000 bénéficiaires. Le refus de certains Etats membres bloquait la barre à 32 256 personnes « relocalisables » à partir de l’Italie et de la Grèce, au nom d’une solidarité mesquine. La promesse d’atteindre le but, en décembre 2015, n’était donc ni à la mesure de l’augmentation de la pression migratoire ni à la hauteur de l’ambition d’engager l’Union sur le terrain de la solidarité. A cette occasion, des lignes de fracture préoccupantes apparurent au grand jour.

Un front du refus s’est ainsi constitué, facile à dessiner en lisant les statistiques d’Eurostat concernant les demandes d’asile et les décisions nationales positives de protection. Il n’a pas été franchi, les chiffres nationaux de la protection expliquant tout. La Pologne accueille du bout des lèvres 720 réfugiés en 2014 et les Etats baltes ne sont pas plus concernés (Estonie 20, Lettonie 25, Lituanie 75), République tchèque (765), Slovénie (45). Y ajouter l’Espagne et ses 1585 décisions positives complète le tableau. Cas à part, la Hongrie faisait, elle, de la question un enjeu politique à proprement parler.

Cette situation mise en perspective avec celle d’une Bulgarie dépassée par les faits (7 020) mais surtout avec les 8 045 décisions positives belges et les 30 650 réfugiés acceptés en Suède, tout conduisait à l’impasse du début de l’été.

Courageusement, alors, la chancelière allemande a pris ses responsabilités au cœur du mois d’août, seule et face à un silence français révélateur des réticences de ses dirigeants. Son coup de force a pris deux formes, significatives l’une comme l’autre. De façon très politique, d’abord et enfin serait-on tenté d’ajouter, l’Allemagne a souligné que la question était d’une extrême gravité et qu’elle devait être abordée avant tout sur le plan des principes et des valeurs qui fondent le projet européen. D’autre part, elle a délibérément accentué la crise en affirmant que l’impuissance à surmonter cette épreuve était susceptible de remettre en cause l’espace de libre circulation de l’Union.

La question se pose exactement sur ce terrain. Les valeurs de l’Union, en particulier en matière d’asile, sont aujourd’hui un vain mot. Rivés sur leurs agendas politiciens nationaux, nombre d’Etats membres refusent délibérément de faire face à leurs responsabilités. Ignorer les causes de l’exode liées à une politique étrangère commune inexistante, tolérer la complicité active des Etats voisins de ces persécutions, de la Turquie à la Libye, fermer les yeux sur les défaillances nationales dans la gestion de la frontière commune comme dans l’accueil des candidats au refuge, ne pas engager de véritable lutte contre ces nouvelles formes d’esclavage que sont les trafics d’êtres humains ont fait office de politique commune.

Faisant tomber les masques, le positionnement de la Chancelière allemande met à jour la sourde opposition séparant les Etats membres de l’Union concernant la politique migratoire et plus exactement ici l’exercice du droit d’asile. Ainsi qu’Angela Merkel l’a fait remarquer devant le Bundestag, l’Union et ses membres n’ont pas tiré les leçons du passé. Plus précisément ici, l’ambiguïté initiale ayant accompagné l’élargissement à l’Est n’a jamais vraiment été levée concernant la gestion des frontières, la présence de ressortissants de pays tiers et la politique d’asile.

L’inflexion des couloirs de migration de la Méditerranée vers l’Europe centrale et les Balkans a crevé l’abcès, au coeur de l’été. Le sens et la portée des termes du traité vis-à-vis d’une partie non négligeable des Etats membres demeurent incertains, dès lors que l’on évoque les « valeurs » des articles 2 et 3 TUE ou la « solidarité » des articles 67 et 80 du TFUE …

Si ces Etats membres ne sont pas ignorants des phénomènes migratoires, soit qu’ils les nourrissent vers l’Ouest de l’Union, soit qu’ils en soient l’objet depuis l’Est du continent et notamment de l’Ukraine et de la Russie, le fossé culturel creusé par leurs histoires nationales n’est pas comblé. Qu’il s’agisse de la surveillance de leur frontière extérieure, confisquée par d’autres pendant un demi-siècle, ou bien d’une protection internationale au nom des droits fondamentaux largement étrangère à leur culture, le débat restait passablement théorique au plan interne et au sein de leurs institutions publiques. Le passage à l’acte imposé par la crise de juillet a donc fait office de déclencheur dès lors qu’il ne s’agissait plus de bénéficier des fonds de l’Union relatif à la pré-adhésion et au renforcement des instruments de la JAI. A fortiori quand, comme certains Etats, ils étaient tenus à l’écart de l’espace Schengen par leurs partenaires depuis 7 ans …

Hostiles à une quelconque solidarité entre Etats dans une matière où ils ne se sentent pas vraiment concernés, quand ils n’y sont pas radicalement opposés comme la Hongrie, ces Etats ont multiplié les signes de défiance et se sont regroupés au sein du groupe dit « de Visegrad ». Menés par la Hongrie, ils ont été rejoints par la République tchèque, la Pologne, la Slovaquie et discrètement appuyés par les Etats baltes et l’Espagne. Acculés à la défensive, ils ont alors exprimé des opinions et adopté des comportements posant clairement la question de leur adhésion à un projet et à des valeurs communes. La crainte de « l’invasion » ou la mise en avant de « l’identité chrétienne » confortés par le traitement médiatique de la crise, la construction de « murs » ou les comportements des forces de l’ordre sur le terrain ont suffi à en prendre conscience. La réunion du groupe, le 4 septembre, a abouti à un refus clair du partage des charges, tous le jugeant « inacceptable », la Hongrie estimant même qu’il s’agissait là exclusivement d’un « problème allemand ».

En parallèle, la fin de l’été a été le théâtre de la résurgence des tensions migratoires à la frontière franco-britannique, Calais et le terminal d’Eurostar ayant succédé à Sangatte. Au delà de la curiosité consistant à voir la France garder les frontières d’un Etat tiers à l’Espace Schengen et bénéficier à cet égard d’une aide financière de la Commission, l’occasion pour les autorités britanniques de se démarquer de la politique de l’Union et du dispositif Schengen qui les protège pourtant était trop belle pour qu’ils manquent de la critiquer et d’en tirer justification à leur « opt-out ».

Aussi et devant la désunion des Etats membres, la menace explicite allemande de remettre en cause le fonctionnement sinon l’existence de l’espace Schengen doit-elle être prise au sérieux. Conçu pour des périodes de calme, le système Schengen ne résiste plus aux coups de boutoir d’une crise majeure, qu’il s’agisse d’y pénétrer, de l’Europe des Balkans à celle du Sud, ou même d’en sortir, à Calais. Certains de ses principes majeurs, notamment celui du traitement Dublin des demandeurs, pourraient bien ne pas y résister à en lire la lettre des ministres des affaires étrangèresà leurs homologues de l’Union. Pourtant, y remédier réclame un système institutionnel efficace et non en pleine crise lui même. En effet, courageusement, la présidence luxembourgeoise s’est attachée à tenter une sortie de la crise « par le haut ».

2. Une crise institutionnelle

La proposition de la Commission de répartir les charges en matière d’asile, au printemps, est donc tombée dans l’impasse, à la fois quant à sa portée non obligatoire et quant à ses objectifs chiffrés. L’autisme de l’Union face à la question migratoire et aux conflits ouverts à sa périphérie ne pouvait s’en accommoder.

Le ralliement d’une majorité d’Etats membres à l’initiative courageuse de Jean-Claude Juncker s’est pourtant concrétisé dans la difficulté. Ultime avanie pour une prétendue « politique commune », cet accord minimal a pris la forme passablement intergouvernementale d’une « résolution des représentants des gouvernements réunis au sein du Conseil », attitude identique pour la question de la réinstallation. Elle témoigne de l’impuissance de la Commission à forcer la porte des Etats et de l’incapacité totale du Parlement européen à jouer le rôle d’un contrepoids que la soumission de la matière à la majorité qualifiée pouvait laisser espérer.

A cet égard, le débat sur les bases juridiques de la proposition de la Commission mérite un rappel, même s’il a été escamoté rapidement au Parlement européen lors du vote de la proposition le 9 septembre.

Ayant pour objectif d’instituer des mesures provisoires (24 mois) au profit de l’Italie et de la Grèce dans le domaine de la protection internationale, la proposition de décision présentée par la Commission implique par nature une dérogation temporaire au règlement Dublin n° 604/2013. Mettant en avant une « situation d’urgence caractérisée par un afflux soudain de ressortissants de pays tiers » justifiant « d’adopter des mesures provisoires » ainsi que l’article 78.3 TFUE le signifie, la Commission a retenu cette base juridique pour agir, impliquant une simple consultation du Parlement.

Or, le même article 78 du TFUE, dans son paragraphe 2 point c) identifie « la protection temporaire … en cas d’afflux massif » comme un élément constitutif du système commun d’asile et … le soumet à la procédure législative ordinaire.

On aurait pu en débattre si, précisément, l’aggravation de la situation n’avait pas poussé des parlementaires européens peu téméraires à faire l’économie d’une querelle juridique, quitte à y perdre leur qualité de co-législateur. En effet, la « situation d’urgence » et le caractère « soudain » de l’afflux de demandeurs étaient, en mai 2015, tout sauf inconnus des institutions de l’Union et de ses membres. Depuis de longs mois, de Conseils des ministres en Conseils européens, la sinistre litanie des morts en Méditerranée faisait la une de l’actualité et ce scandale provoquait des crises internes récurrentes  dans l’Union, comme par exemple lors du printemps arabe. Les statistiques de 2014 produites opportunément par Eurostat confirment bien qu’en fait c’est l’inaction de l’Union qui a commandé une réaction au mois de juillet davantage que la survenance d’un évènement imprévu, au premier semestre 2015.

Conscient de son impuissance à engager une bataille perdue d’avance, le Parlement a donc voté une résolution approuvant l’initiative, quitte, en annexe, à souligner qu’il « ne peut accepter l’article 78, paragraphe 3, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne comme base juridique qu’en tant que mesure d’urgence, qui sera suivie d’une proposition législative en bonne et due forme visant à réagir de manière structurelle aux futures situations d’urgence ».

L’impasse dans laquelle la Commission s’est trouvée au début de l’été, et avant l’offensive de Jean Claude Juncker dans son discours général sur l’état de l’Union européenne du 9 septembre, s’est accompagnée d’une mise en cause sévère de sa capacité à s’acquitter de ses fonctions en matière migratoire.

Là encore, les autorités allemandes ont été à la manœuvre, soulignant la lenteur avec laquelle les décisions prises s’appliquent et la curieuse impunité avec laquelle un certain nombre d’Etats, de la Grèce à la Hongrie en passant par l’Italie, se soustraient à leur obligation de transposition et d’application des règles communes. La critique est largement fondée, tant en ce qui concerne la lenteur de la mise en place des options arrêtées qu’à propos du contrôle de l’application de la législation de l’Union en matière d’asile et d’immigration qui incombe exclusivement à la Commission.

Pour être distinctes, les deux critiques font néanmoins mouche. Outre la lenteur technocratique avec laquelle la moindre décision se met en place, la défiance est au cœur des relations internes à l’espace de liberté. La suspicion des Etats de destination selon laquelle les Etats de première réception ne jouent pas le jeu de leurs obligations propres, en matière de contrôle des personnes, d’accueil comme en matière d’enregistrement, n’est pas dépourvue de fondement. De l’attitude hongroise à l’impuissance grecque ou l’ambiguïté italienne, les dossiers sont nombreux et ce d’autant plus que si l’on se penche sur la transposition et l’application de la législation dérivée, il saute aux yeux que le patchwork antérieur demeure.

L’exécutif est parfaitement conscient de cet état de fait et multiplie les preuves de bonne volonté, par exemple en soulignant que 32 procédures en infraction relatives au « Paquet asile » ont été enclenchées mais sans beaucoup convaincre lorsque l’on connaît le caractère très formaliste de telles procédures. Avec une intelligence certaine, la publication d’un encart positivant son action, le jour du discours de son Président, s’efforce de contenir la montée des critiques. Car l’enjeu est n’est pas mince : la prise de pouvoir des Etats qu’exprime le leadership allemand ici a pour conséquence de renvoyer la Commission au simple rôle d’un exécutant. Les querelles d’il y a peu relatives à l’évaluation de l’ELSJ dans le cadre de Schengen ont-elles déjà été oubliées par les différents protagonistes ?

La troisième source de trouble institutionnel est plus anecdotique, sauf si l’on se souvient de la place qu’on prétendait lui accorder au lendemain du traité de Lisbonne. Elle concerne le rôle du Président du Conseil européen.

Confronté à une crise où le souvenir de sa nationalité l’a manifestement emporté sur le poids de sa fonction, Donald Tusk avait jugé bon au début de l’été de freiner l’initiative de la Commission en mettant l’accent sur le renvoi davantage que sur l’accueil des demandeurs de protection. Loin de « l’honnête courtier » qu’avait tenté d’être son prédécesseur, il avait ainsi apporté sa pierre à l’échec de la proposition. L’entendre trois mois après défendre une proposition triplant le nombre des réfugiés dans l’Union lors de la conférence annuelle des ambassadeurs de l’UE, au nom des valeurs, laisse perplexe quant à la valeur ajoutée de l’institution …

Dès lors, le discours de Jean Claude Juncker et sa réaction à l’aggravation de la crise étaient attendus pour esquisser les voies d’une sortie de crise.

The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Steve Peers

Last week’s pictures of the tragic death of a refugee toddler brought into focus the ongoing crisis facing Syria and other conflict zones, which have given rise to increased numbers fleeing persecution worldwide, and in the European Union. The events of recent weeks (increasing numbers landing in Greece, the journey of many via the Western Balkans, Hungary and Austria to Germany) demonstrate that the Schengen and Dublin systems are coming under strain as a result.

How should the EU address this issue next? Should it abolish or reform the Schengen and/or Dublin rules? Are Member States complying with EU and international law in their response?

To answer these questions, I will examine in turn (a) the international law framework; (b) the EU law framework; (c) whether Schengen is at ‘fault’; (d) whether Dublin is at ‘fault’; and (e) what the EU should do next.  My main purposes are to explain the legal background, to point out some legal errors, and to suggest the best way forward in light of the international refugee law framework.

International law framework 

While it is often strongly asserted that ‘international law requires refugees to apply for asylum in the first safe country they enter’, in fact the position is rather vaguer than that. The United Nations (Geneva) Convention on the status of refugees does not contain any express rule to that effect in the rules on the definition of refugee, or on the cessation (loss) or exclusion from being a refugee, as set out in Articles 1.A to 1.F of that Convention.

However, there are some indirect suggestions in the Convention that the number of countries which a refugee has crossed through might be relevant. Article 31 of the Convention bans States from imposing penalties upon refugees for entering a country illegally – a rule which contradicts some of the rhetoric about refugees being ‘illegal immigrants’. The drafters of the Convention clearly recognised that it might be necessary and legitimate in practice for a refugee to breach another country’s immigration laws to escape threats to his or her life or freedom. So it is not necessary to be on the territory legally in order to qualify as a refugee.

This rule is, however, subject to several conditions – including the requirement that the refugees were ‘coming directly’ from the country which they had to flee. If that rule is interpreted narrowly, then refugees can only benefit from the exemption from penalties for breaching immigration law in neighbouring states, not states further afield. But refugees’ failure to satisfy this condition only permits States to prosecute them for breach of immigration law; it does notallow those States to exclude the refugees from protection. As I pointed out already, the rules on definition and exclusion of refugees in the Convention are quite separate from the rule on non-prosecution for breach of immigration law. And it is also possible to interpret this condition more generously – in the sense that the ‘coming directly’ requirement does not exclude all refugees who have merely transited through other countries, but only those who have stopped andobtained protection in another State already.

Another relevant provision is the ‘non-refoulement’ rule in Article 33 of the Convention, which prevents States removing refugees to an unsafe State. But it does not prevent refugees from being removed to a safe State. Furthermore, the restrictions in the Convention on expelling refugees to any State, and many of the substantive benefits which the Convention gives to refugees (such as welfare and access to employment) are reserved for those who are lawfully resident or present in the territory; and the Convention does not require States to give refugees a lawful status under national immigration law.

So overall, the Geneva Convention gives States a degree of flexibility to insist upon a ‘safe third country’ requirement, but there is no absolute rule that refugees must always apply in a safe third country. If the Convention had intended to impose a firm rule in that regard, it would surely have said so expressly and provided for obligations for the first safe country to readmit the refugee. Moreover, the preamble to the Convention refers to the heavy burden which the grant of asylum may place upon some countries, and the need for international cooperation to avoid refugees becoming a source of tension between States. Taken as a whole, then, the drafters of the Convention recognized that a strict safe third country rule could impose undue burdens on countries neighbouring a conflict in some cases, but left it to States to work out the details of how to address such burdens when they occur.

EU law framework  Continue reading “The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next?”

The Calais crisis: which Member State is responsible?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (31 July 2015)

by Steve Peers

Several thousand migrants are living in poor conditions near Calais, many apparently intent on making it to the UK. Their attempts to find passage via the Eurotunnel are severely delaying travel on both sides of the border. Which country is responsible for them: the UK or France?

At the outset, we should note that this is in a way a clash between two different types of movement within the EU. On the one hand, we have the free movement that the EU specifically tries to encourage: the free movement of goods in the lorries, persons in the trains, and transport services in either context. On the other hand, we have what the EU calls ‘secondary’ movements of (potential) asylum-seekers, which it specifically tries to discourage. EU internal market law is adopted to facilitate the first type of movement, while EU asylum law is harmonised to reduce the incentive for the second type.

Of course, the migrants don’t actually want to shut EU free movement down, since that would defeat their whole purpose. They merely want the lorries to slow down long enough to stow away on board, then continue on their journey – in effect bringing the two types of movement together. It’s the government attempts to prevent this that leads to near-gridlock.

But which of those governments is responsible? Let’s examine the issue first from the migrants’ perspective, and then from the free movement perspective. (While some consider the word ‘migrant’ offensive, I will continue to use it. In my view, it simply refers to a category of people, like teachers or nurses. It would make sense to refer to them as ‘asylum-seekers’ or ‘refugees’ only if it were clearly the case that almost all of them had applied for asylum or qualify as refugees; the available information doesn’t indicate this clearly enough. The word ‘migrant’ doesn’t deny their humanity; it simply explains their situation.)

Immigration and asylum law

Some of the migrants have applied for asylum in France, and so their position is governed by EU asylum law. This includes the Dublin Regulation, which determines which Member State is responsible for their application. That may not be France, but rather the Member State which they first entered – if France can prove that they entered there. If France cannot prove that another Member State is responsible, then it must assume responsibility. The UK would only be responsible for their applications if they have close family members in the UK, living there as refugees or asylum-seekers.

In the meantime, while the asylum-seekers are on French territory, the EU’s Directive on reception conditions for asylum-seekers applies. The EU Court of Justice has specifically ruled, in a case involving France, that this Directive applies to the State where asylum-seekers are currently located, even if the Dublin rules say those asylum-seekers should be transferred to another Member State. It only applies to that other Member State once the asylum-seekers are actually transferred there. This ruling obviously applies a fortiori to asylum-seekers who simply want to travel to another Member State and apply there instead. The whole point of the Dublin Regulation is to deny asylum-seekers exactly that choice. Although the Regulation fails epically in practice to stop asylum-seekers trying to choose the State they would like to apply in, the Directive still applies to ensure minimum living standards for asylum-seekers in the State they are present in.

What does that mean in practice? The Directive requires the Member State where the asylum seekers are present to ensure basic standards as regards welfare and accommodation, among other things. It appears from press reports that these standards are not respected as regards the migrants near Calais.

Furthermore, the latest EU Directive on asylum procedures, which applied from last week, sets deadlines to deal with asylum claims. That part of the Directive doesn’t apply until 2018, but it could be argued in the meantime that the principle of effectiveness of EU law (which the CJEU has frequently applied in immigration law cases) requires asylum claims to be dealt with efficiently, not just ignored.  As for the substance of asylum law, some press reports suggest that France gives asylum to Eritreans much less often than the UK (and much of the rest of the EU). This may be due to a flawed application of the EU’s Qualification Directive. If this is not being fixed in the French courts by an asylum-seeker’s appeal or a judicial review by NGOs, then the Commission should identify the specific error in interpretation of the law and bring infringement proceedings against France.

But not all of those migrants have applied for asylum. For those people, since it seems unlikely that any of them are legal migrants, this must mean that they are irregular migrants. Their position in France is therefore governed by the EU’sReturns Directive, which specifies that the Member States must issue irregular migrants with a return order and try to enforce their expulsion to a country of origin or transit as soon as possible. The EU Court recently ruled that Member States could not simply issue irregular migrants with a fine and make no effort to remove them. It must equally follow that Member States cannot turn a blind eye to their existence, when (as in the Calais case) a large number of them are openly staying on Member States’ territory.

The Returns Directive does not create an absolute obligation to remove irregular migrants. First of all, a Member State can choose to regularise their position at any time. Secondly, if they apply for asylum, EU asylum law applies, until the end of the asylum process, when they are either recognised as needing protection or their application fails its final appeal. In the latter case, the Returns Directive then applies again. Thirdly, it may prove impossible in practice to remove them to their State of origin or transit, because there is not enough proof of where they come from.  In that case, they remain in a kind of limbo, unless the State chooses to regularise them. Irregular migrants are entitled to emergency health care and essential treatment of illness during their stay. As far as we can tell from press reports, it does not appear that the French authorities are making any active effort to return the irregular migrants in Calais to their countries of origin or transit pursuant to the Directive.

Free movement law

The CJEU has ruled, in a case involving France, that Member States have a responsibility to prevent free movement of goods being disrupted by private individuals. While States have a margin of discretion exactly how to deal with that private behaviour, it is not unlimited. In that case, farmers’ groups had been vandalising lorries full of other Member States’ produce for years on a regular basis, and many of the perpetrators were known to the police. France was therefore liable for doing nothing very effective to stop this. It was compensating the victims, but this was not enough.

On the other hand, in the case of Schmidberger, Austria was not liable for allowing a disruption to trade by private protesters who briefly blocked a transit route. According to the CJEU, the protesters’ right to demonstrate overrode the free movement of goods, given that the disruption didn’t last very long.

What about industrial action? This is also a separate source of the current restrictions on movement between the UK and France. On this point, the CJEU has been quite critical of trade union action that restricts free movement: in the controversial cases of Viking Line and Laval, it ruled that while EU law recognized trade unions’ right to strike and take other collective action, these rights were easily overruled by EU free movement rules. But those cases concerned the freedom of establishment and free movement of services; the current strikes in France affect the free movement of goods. An EU Regulation adopted after the earlier French case states that while States have an obligation to deal with private disruptions to the movement of goods, this is without prejudice to the right to strike.

Applying these cases to the current problems at the UK/France border, it’s not clear whether the disruptions caused by strikes are an unjustifiable restriction on free movement.  The strikes seem only to concern pay and conditions, whereas in Lavaland Viking Line, while the disputes were also indirectly about pay and conditions, they were mainly directed at shutting down free movement due to perceived ‘social dumping’.

What about the disruptions linked to the migrants’ attempts to travel to the UK?  While EU law does recognize a right to asylum, it’s possible to apply for that right in any Member State, and so it is not necessary to travel to the UK to that end. The number of migrants would surely be reduced if France applied its obligations to: process asylum applications; decide on Eritrean claims correctly; and remove irregular migrants who had not applied for asylum. France must also extend basic standards of welfare and housing to asylum-seekers, whether that acts as a ‘pull’ factor or not.

Is the UK liable in any way? The UK does exercise border controls on French territory, pursuant to a treaty between the two countries on ‘juxtaposed controls’, agreed in the context of the Channel Tunnel. But the UK’s obligations under that treaty do not extend to admitting asylum-seekers or other irregular migrants who want to use the tunnel to travel to the UK. More broadly, the UK’s border checks in France don’t turn any part of France into British territory, just as the reciprocal French border checks in the UK don’t turn any bits of Kent French, or transfer St. Pancras station to the Paris metro system.

So France is responsible for the impact on free movement, due to its separate breaches of EU immigration and asylum law. This shouldn’t be seen as a selfish or parochial conclusion; after all, it’s not really radical to say that States are generally responsible for what happens on their territory. That’s the normal rule of public international law, and it’s linked to the basic principle of State sovereignty. The EU rules in this case reflect that principle.

Having said that, allocating responsibility does not as such solve the problem. It would be open to the French government to denounce the treaty on juxtaposed controls, with a negative impact on the UK. So it makes sense for the UK government to offer a contribution to solve the problem, even if it is not obliged to do so. The government has already accepted this principle, paying for the construction of a security fence. And it would equally make sense to make a contribution as regards immigration issues, for instance the costs of removal or basic support, linked to a requirement to move to other parts of France to receive that support.

The General Principles of EU Administrative Procedural Law

THE TEXT BELOW IS AN EXCERPT OF A STUDY ACCESSIBLE HERE 

Nota Bene: Upon request by the European Parliament JURI Committee this in-depth analysis explains what general principles of EU administrative procedural law are, and how they can be formulated in  the recitals of a  Regulation   on  EU  administrative  procedure.
Authors:  Diana-Urania Galetta, Professor of Administrative Law and European Administrative Law, University of Milan, , Herwig C. H. Hofmann,   Professor   of   European   and   Transnational   Public   Law,   Jean   Monnet Chair, University of Luxembourg,  Oriol  Mir Puigpelat,  Professor  of  Administrative Law,  University of Barcelona and  Jacques Ziller,  Professor of  EU  law, University of  Pavia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Background
The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament has requested an In-depth Analysis on “The general principles of EU administrative procedural law”. The In-depth Analysis is intended to be presented at a meeting of the Working Group on Administrative Law.
Aim
. The Analysis puts forward drafting proposals for the general principles of EU administrative procedural law to be included in the Recitals of a draft Regulation on EU Administrative procedures. More specifically, the Analysis tries to clarify the content of the general principles of EU administrative procedural law and suggest the most accurate formulation for the corresponding recitals.
The following general principles, which are related to the Right to good administration embedded in Article 41 Charter, to the principle of an open, efficient and independent European administration enunciated in Article 298 TFEU are translated into recitals: 1 Access to information and access to documents; Access to the file ; Duty of care; Data protection; Data quality; Effective remedy; Equal treatment and non-discrimination; Fair hearing; Fairness; Good administration; Impartiality; Legal certainty; Legality; Legitimate expectations; Participatory democracy; Proportionality; Reason giving; Rule of Law; Timeliness; Transparency.
(…)
2.2.   Structure and wording of recitals

Which general principles of EU law need to be referred to in the recitals of an EU regulation on Administrative Procedures depends on the content of the substantive provisions of the regulation.   The   purpose   of   establishing   an   EU   regulation   on   administrative   procedures   is   to improve the quality of the EU’s legal system by fostering compliance with the general principles of EU law in the reality of fragmentation between sector-specific procedures and the reality of the multi-jurisdictional nature and pluralisation of actors involved in the implementation of EU policies.
Fragmentation has often resulted in a lack of transparency, predictability, intelligibility and trust in EU administrative and regulatory procedures and their outcome, especially from the point of view of citizens.
A codification of administrative procedures can contribute to simplifying the legal system of the Union, enhancing legal certainty, filling gaps in the legal system and thereby ideally contributing to compliance with the rule of law. Overall, it can be expected that establishing enforceable rights of individuals in procedures that affect them, contributes to compliance with principles of due process  and  fosters procedural  justice.
Adopting such a regulation further has the potential to contribute not only to the clarity of the legal rights and obligations of individuals and participating institutions, offices, bodies and agencies, but also to the transparency and effectiveness of the legal system as a whole. An EU Regulation on Administrative Procedures has the potential to contribute to the objectives of clarification of rights and obligations. It also contributes to simplification of EU law by ensuring that procedures can follow one single rule-book and better regulation by allowing  to  improve the  overall  legislative quality.
The recitals of an EU regulation on administrative procedures will therefore contain various principles of EU law.
When identifying the principles of EU law which should be referred to in the recitals not only is it important to provide a list of principles but also to give them some order. In establishing such order, it has to be taken into account that there is neither an established ‘hierarchy’ of principles, nor do all general and foundational principles of EU law work in the same way. The important aspect of general principles is that they serve to guide the interpretation of legal rules of all levels of the EU’s legal system and fill gaps. In that context, the reference to a general principle of EU law in the recitals serves to reiterate its importance in interpreting a legal text such as the regulation on EU administrative procedure. It also serves to clarify which principles have been balanced by the legislature in establishing  specific  provisions  of  the regulation.

However, in order to structure the approach to the reference to general principles of EU law in the recitals of the EU regulation on administrative procedure, the various principles can be grouped. Taking into account the very nature of recitals our proposal is mainly grounded in the idea that the recitals not only have a legal purpose (of interpreting the norms in the regulation), but should also have a ‘citizen friendly’ informative purpose. The principles in the recitals therefore need to be presented in a way that may prompt the non-expert to read  them.
(…)
The proposed recitals are not comprehensive: they are limited to the scope of clarifying the content of general principles of EU administrative procedure law, what other general principles are relevant to the implementation and interpretation of administrative procedure rules, and why those principles are important. Other components need to be added to the recitals such  as,  to name  one  example, the legal  basis  of  the act.

Recitals (1) to (5) are intended to explain to a broader public why those principles matter. Recitals (7) to (22) attempt to explain what the content and meaning of those principles are. Recital (6) briefly alludes to internal principles which are very important for the implementation of the principles mentioned in Article 298 (1) TFEU of an open, efficient and independent administration without necessarily creating enforceable subjective rights; contrary to the other principles those internal principles are not further developed in their enunciation in so far as they do not necessarily correspond to subjective rights. One or more specific recitals might be devoted to those principles once the articles of the operative part  of  the  Regulation  will  have been  drafted.
The order in which those principles are presented derives from grounds which are explained in section 1.2 of this note. The recitals include footnotes that are obviously not intended to remain in the proposal of a Regulation. Their purpose is to give the most useful references (mainly about case law)  to  the  reader  of this  note.
(…)
3.2. Proposed Recitals Continue reading “The General Principles of EU Administrative Procedural Law”

THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO ECB RESTRICTIONS ON GREEK BANK ACCOUNTS – AND HOW YOU CAN HELP

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by STEVE PEERS 

Many EU citizens have watched with sympathy and concern as Greek citizens have been limited to withdrawing €60 a day in the last two weeks. This restriction results from a restriction imposed by the European Central Bank (ECB) on the emergency liquidity assistance which it provides to Greek banks.

Apart from the human impact, there are grave legal, political and economic doubts about the ECB’s action. One of the central purposes of a central bank is to function as a lender of last resort to banks – and the ECB is signally failing to do that here. Also, the ECB’s actions give the impression that it is trying to influence the Greek political debate on austerity and membership of the Eurozone – a role which is well outside the Bank’s remit. The banking restrictions obviously damage the Greek economy, and so limit its ability to pay back its creditors in future.  They have nothing to do with the Bank’s task of fighting inflation, and they undermine its broader role in supporting the EU’s economic growth. (For a fuller critique, see here (paywalled); on the legal background, see here). Arguably these restrictions – or further restrictions which the ECB might impose – could lead toward a de facto ‘Grexit’ from monetary union, which is ruled out by EU law (see my discussion here).

It’s possible to challenge the ECB’s actions via the national courts, which can refer the issue to the CJEU, such as in the recent Gauweiler case (discussed here). They can also be challenged in the EU courts, such as in the UK’s recent successful challenge (discussed here). The case law takes a broad view of what ECB acts can be challenged, except where it acts as part of the ‘Troika’ which negotiates bailout conditions, when neither the Bank nor the Commission can be challenged in the EU courts. But the ECB’s restriction of assistance to Greek banks did not fall within the scope of its role in the Troika.

National governments such as Greece can go directly to the EU courts to challenge ECB actions. Other challengers besides the EU institutions would have satisfy standing rules: ‘direct and individual concern’, or (if they are challenging a non-legislative act which does not entail implementing measures) ‘direct concern’. Arguably it would be easy for a Greek bank to satisfy those rules.

In the absence of a legal challenge from a Greek bank or the Greek government, an individual depositor has brought a legal challenge to the ECB’s recent actions before the EU General Court. You can find the full text of the claim here. The ECB might restore assistance if there is a deal in the near future, but it is still worth challenging its actions, so it cannot do this (or threaten to do it) in future.

Obviously there is a possible problem with standing, although a parallel challenge could be brought in the Greek courts. The plaintiff welcomes any advice or support – contact info@alcimos.com. Or you can leave comments on this blog post.

“(EU’s) Laws are like sausages. You should never watch them being made…” (*)

by Emilio De Capitani

As denounced in several posts of this blog the distance between the daily practice of the EU institutions and the democratic principles enshrined in the Treaties is growing day by day.

I am not referring here to the way how representative democracy is framed at EU level. Suffice to remember how last year the voters have been tricked with the “spitzencandidate” game by four political families suggesting that each one of them was promoting alternative EU models. After the election three of them have become part of the same political majority in the European Parliament  so that left and right are now intertwined that you hardly distinguish whose strategy is prevailing. Moreover in the interinstitutional game such majority in the European Parliament mirrors the majority in the big EU countries and in this situation there is no has no real incentive for the EU citizens representatives in changing the situation in the EU or in its main member states.

No, what I am referring here is the way how the EU institutions are jeopardising day by day the Treaty rules which support participative or “input” democracy which aims to give everyone a ‘say’ notably when the EU legislation is initiated, negotiated and adopted.

This model of the “govern by the people” now enshrined in the Treaties is extremely important in a legal order which is very rightly perceived far from EU citizens and which looks still framed by bureaucrats and diplomats more incline to the so called “output democracy” or the “govern for the people” where the management needs prevail on the citizen (and national parliaments) participation. However this government by the elites has become even stronger since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding it is stated that:

“Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.” (art.10 TEU).

“(1) In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. (2). The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act. (3). Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph.” (art.15 p 1-3 TFEU)

As I have explained here these principles are circumvented by the daily practice of the EU institutions which have built a parallel world of the so called “trilogues” where they meet negotiate and decide without any transparency towards the European citizens or even the National Parliaments. The latter have just a say at the beginning of the “movie” but disappear immediately after and even if most of them could follow the EU legislative works are threatened by the Council of the European Union of not diffusing the legislative preparatory work because it is covered by the …”professional secrecy” rule (!).

To try to change this state of things I have then asked to the European Parliament, the institution which is deemed to take in account more than other the needs of participative democracy, the texts which are debated during the interinstitutional trilogues and which reflect the evolution of the position of the different institutions during the legislative negotiations.

After a first denial from the EP secretariat  I have submitted a confirmatory application  where I have tried to raise the attention of the European Parliament Bureau (which brings together the EP President and Vice Presidents), on the constitutional, institutional and operational arguments in favour of transparency during legislative negotiations (see here).

The answer I have just received (see below a version emphasized/notated  by me) is appalling because not only the European Parliament endorse the Council practice but declares that the protection of the effectiveness of the decision making process (which has no more standing in the treaties for legislative activity) overrides the right of the citizens to be informed and that confidentiality is necessary to avoid the risk of the EP Rapporteur losing the ‘trust’ of the Council Presidency (!?). Until now I was convinced that the EP main preoccupation was not to loose the trust of half billion citizens and to drive in a transparent way a political strategy which can also be supported at national level by the same political families in the national parliaments….
Will this be the position of the Ombusdman who has recently open an inquiry on the Trilogues interinstitutional practice ? Will this be the position of the Court ? It is too early to answer this question but this will arrive (better soon than later)

Emilio De Capitani

(*) Quoted from Otto Von Bismark

LETTER RECEIVED on 08.07.2015 from Ildiko GALL-PELCZ EP Vice-President in charge  of Access to documents Continue reading ““(EU’s) Laws are like sausages. You should never watch them being made…” (*)”

“DON’T MENTION THE EXTRA JUDGES!” WHEN CJEU REFORM TURNS INTO FARCE

PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS ON Friday, 3 July 2015

by Steve Peers

The classic British comedy Fawlty Towers derived its humour from the doomed attempts of the ill-tempered hotel owner Basil Fawlty to control the uncontrollable situations that developed around him, often taking out his frustrations on his waiter, Manuel. No one would seriously suggest emulating Basil Fawlty’s management style. But nevertheless, the debate over the reform of the Court of Justice is increasingly resembling a Fawlty Towers episode.

Let’s review. After several previous failed attempts at reforming the EU judicial system, the Court of Justice suggested that the lower EU court (the General Court) should have double the number of judges – two per Member State, instead of one. The EU’s civil service tribunal (with seven judges) would close down, merged into the General Court. The senior Court of Justice would retain one judge per Member State. For the background, further details and arguments in favour, see my earlierblog post.

This proposal was opposed by many staff in the General Court. So four General Court judges appeared before the European Parliament to object to this plan (let’s call them, collectively, ‘Manuel’). For discussion of Manuel’s counter-arguments, see the recent blog post by Professors Pech and Alemanno; and for Manuel’s written argument itself, see here.

Very recently the proposal was formally adopted by the Council. But it still has to be agreed with the European Parliament (EP), and some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) appear to have great misgivings, fuelled by the dissenting judges. Cue an angry response by the CJEU’s President Skouris (let’s call him ‘Basil’). As documented by Duncan Robinson in the Financial Times, hecomplained that the EP was willing to listen to the rebels, and threatened retaliationagainst the dissenting judge. Manuel might soon get whacked by that frying pan.

With the greatest respect, there are profound problems with Skouris’ approach. First and foremost, his response has become the story (it’s also been covered elsewhere). This diverts attention from the pros and cons of the argument for CJEU reform. I’m not criticising the journalists – it’s their job to report on his response, and he should have anticipated the effect it would have. Also, now that his response has become the story, it gives the impression that the proposal is a greedy grab for money by the judges. In fact. as I pointed out in my earlier post, the CJEU had previously suggested fewer extra judges. It only asked for doubling the number in despair, when it became clear that Member States could not agree on a more modest number, due to national egotism.

Secondly, Skouris’ angry letters give the impression that the CJEU is an authoritarian institution. Certainly, any ordinary employer would not take kindly to public criticism of its policy by its staff. For instance, if (entirely hypothetically) I had objections to the management of the University of Essex, I would not air them in a public forum. But the CJEU is a public body, in a political system whose legitimacy is clearly fragile. These attempts to silence dissent surely damage the Court’s authority more than the dissent itself would. Anyway, they gave that dissent far more publicity than it would otherwise have had (the well-known ‘Streisand effect’).

Thirdly, by attacking the dissenters instead of countering their arguments, it gives the impression that there is no good argument in favour of the Court’s proposals, since the brave truth-tellers are being silenced. And in tactical terms, it’s particularly hard to see how attacking the very MEPs whom Skouris needs to convince to support his proposals will win them round. Continue reading ““DON’T MENTION THE EXTRA JUDGES!” WHEN CJEU REFORM TURNS INTO FARCE”

Agenda européen pour les migrations et protection des réfugiés : « l’Europe n’est pas à la hauteur »

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE 3 JUILLET 2015

par Henri Labayle, CDRE

Ces fortes paroles du président de la Commission, à l’issue du Conseil européen des 25 et 26 juin, sont un reflet exact de la situation. La déception qu’elles traduisent est à la mesure du geste politique accompli par le chef de l’exécutif. Il convient de lui en rendre justice.

La tiédeur des conclusions adoptées par les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement est en effet symptomatique d’une Europe se berçant de mots, incapable de respecter les valeurs dont elle se réclame. En bref, en pleine crise d’identité comme de projet. Incapables de s’accorder sur un accueil obligatoire des demandeurs de protection (1), les Etats membres se sont satisfaits du simple principe de cet accueil (2).

1. Le refus de tout mécanisme contraignant

Il ne fallait pas être grand clerc pour deviner les suites réservées à la proposition courageuse de la Commission de donner, enfin, un sens concret à la solidarité entre Etats membres que ces derniers ont prétendu graver dans le marbre des traités. Au point qu’ici même, il y a un mois, on avait conclu à leur enterrement avant l’heure, sinon à une manoeuvre politique.

Il était en effet peu vraisemblable qu’une majorité se dégage en faveur des idées phares contenues dans la proposition faite au Conseil d’instituer des mesures provisoires en matière de protection internationale au profit de l’Italie et de la Grèce (COM (2015) 286). L’ambition était politique sinon numérique : les Etats étaient invités à réinstaller et relocaliser 60.000 demandeurs de protection dans l’Union européenne, de manière obligatoire, en deux ans et sur la base de critères de répartition.

Pour une fois, l’Union n’a pas déçu ceux qui l’observent : elle a été effectivement incapable d’assumer ses responsabilités, comme à l’habitude. La nouveauté, en revanche, provient des lignes de front qui se sont dessinées à cette occasion, allant au delà des surenchères verbales.

a. la lenteur des mesures opérationnelles Continue reading “Agenda européen pour les migrations et protection des réfugiés : « l’Europe n’est pas à la hauteur »”

Passenger Name Records, data mining & data protection: the need for strong safeguards

EXCERPTS FROM EXPERTS’ OPINION SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PUBLISHED ON THE STATEWATCH SITE)

by Douwe KORFF and Marie GEORGES (FREE-Group Members)

Introduction

Much has been said and written about Passenger Name Records (PNR) in the last decade and a half. When we were asked to write a short report for the Consultative Committee about PNR, “in the wider contexts”, we therefore thought we could confine ourselves to a relatively straightforward overview of the literature and arguments.

However, the task turned out to be more complex than anticipated. In particular, the context has changed as a result of the Snowden revelations. Much of what was said and written about PNR before his exposés had looked at the issues narrowly, as only related to the “identification” of “known or [clearly ‘identified’] suspected terrorists” (and perhaps other major international criminals). However, the most recent details of what US and European authorities are doing, or plan to do, with PNR data show that they are part of the global surveillance operations we now know about.

More specifically, it became clear to us that there is a (partly deliberate?) semantic confusion about this “identification”; that the whole surveillance schemes are not only to do with finding previously-identified individuals, but also (and perhaps even mainly) with “mining” the vast amounts of disparate data to create “profiles” that are used to single out from the vast data stores people “identified” as statistically more likely to be (or even to become?) a terrorist (or other serious criminal), or to be “involved” in some way in terrorism or major crime. That is a different kind of “identification” from the previous one, as we discuss in this report.

We show this relatively recent (although predicted) development with reference to the most recent developments in the USA, which we believe provide the model for what is being planned (or perhaps already begun to be implemented) also in Europe. In the USA, PNR data are now expressly permitted to be added to and combined with other data, to create the kinds of profiles just mentioned – and our analysis of Article 4 of the proposed EU PNR Directive shows that, on a close reading, exactly the same will be allowed in the EU if the proposal is adopted.

Snowden has revealed much. But it is clear that his knowledge about what the “intelligence” agencies of the USA and the UK (and their allies) are really up to was and is still limited. He clearly had an astonishing amount of access to the data collection side of their operations, especially in relation to Internet and e-communications data (much more than any sensible secret service should ever have allowed a relatively junior contractor, although we must all be grateful for that “error”). However, it would appear that he had and has very little knowledge of what was and is being done with the vast data collections he exposed.

Yet it is obvious (indeed, even from the information about PNR use that we describe) that these are used not only to “identify” known terrorists or people identified as suspects in the traditional sense, but that these data mountains are also being “mined” to label people as “suspected terrorist” on the basis of profiles and algorithms. We believe that that in fact is the more insidious aspect of the operations.

This is why this report has become much longer than we had planned, and why it focusses on this wider issue rather than on the narrower concerns about PNR data expressed in most previous reports and studies.

The report is structured as follows. After preliminary remarks about the main topic of the report, PNR data (and related data) (further specified in the Attachment), Part I discusses the wider contexts within which we have analyzed the use of PNR data. We look at both the widest context: the change, over the last fifteen years or so, from reactive to “proactive” and “preventive” law enforcement, and the blurring of the lines between law enforcement and “national security” activities (and between the agencies involved), in particular in relation to terrorism (section I.i); and at the historical (immediately post-“9/11”) and more recent developments relating to the use of PNR data in data mining/profiling operations the USA, in the “CAPPS” and (now) the “Secure Flight” programmes (section I.ii).

In section I.iii, we discuss the limitations and dangers inherent in such data mining and “profiling”.

Only then do we turn to PNR and Europe by describing, in Part II. both the links between the EU and the US systems (section II.1), and then the question of “strategic surveillance” in Europe (II.ii).

In Part III, we discuss the law, i.e., the general ECHR standards (I); the ECHR standards applied to surveillance in practice (II, with a chart with an overview of the ECtHR considerations); other summaries of the law by the Venice Commission and the FRA (III); and further relevant case-law (IV).

In Part IV, we first apply the standards to EU-third country PNR agreements (IV.i), with reference to the by-passing of the existing agreements by the USA (IV.ii) and to the spreading of demands for PNR to other countries (IV.iii). We then look at the human rights and data protection-legal issues raised by the proposal for an EU PNR scheme. We conclude that part with a summary of the four core issues identified: purpose-specification and –limitation; the problem with remedies; “respect for human identity”; and the question of whether the processing we identify as our main concern – “dynamic”-algorithm-based data mining and profiling – actually works.

Part V contains a Summary of our findings; our Conclusions (with our overall conclusions set out in a box on p. 109); and tentative, draft Recommendations. (…)

Conclusions Continue reading “Passenger Name Records, data mining & data protection: the need for strong safeguards”

How the EU “legislative triangle” is becoming a “Bermudes, triangle “…

by Emilio De Capitani

According to several scholars the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the implementation of the democratic principle in the EU as well as the framework for participative democracy. In theory with entry into force of the Charter the EU has become more accountable to its citizens and there has been a clear improvement of the legal framework for EU legislative and non legislative activity. Even if not perfectly sound) there is now a clear definition of what should be considered of “legislative” nature and there is now a clear obligation (at primary law level) to debate publicly both in the Council and in the European Parliament.

Needless to say, the latter has been for years the champion of legislative and administrative transparency  not only in the citizens interest but also in view of the definition of its own marge of maneuver during the negotiations with the Council. This former EP attitude was not particularly appreciated by the Council and the Commission when in 2001, before Lisbon, the three institutions negotiated the first EU legislation in this domain. (Regulation 1049/01). However at the time it was easy to say that time was needed to promote open debates and votes in the Council and in the Commission because it would had required a change of culture in an institution mainly structured as a bureaucratic machinery (the Commission) or in an other framed by a diplomatic approach (the Council).

Five years after Lisbon such a change of culture in the Council and the Commission is it under way or is the other way round for the EP?

Have a look to the exchange of messages below and make your own opinion. The issue is still pending but risks to have some interesting developments… Continue reading “How the EU “legislative triangle” is becoming a “Bermudes, triangle “…”