La nouvelle Commission Juncker et la JAI : que tout change pour que rien ne change ?

by Henri LABAYLE (CDRE)

Original published HERE

La composition de la nouvelle Commission a suscité nombre de commentaires dans les médias, souvent bienveillants sinon flatteurs. L’a priori favorable dont bénéficie son Président, Jean Claude Juncker, n’empêche pas de douter de leur bien-fondé en matière de Justice et d’affaires intérieures, à supposer d’ailleurs que ces commentaires se vérifient dans les autres domaines d’action de l’Union.

Après des discours encourageants semblant indiquer que les thèmes des valeurs de l’Union et de l’urgence migratoire avaient été pris en considération par le programme du candidat à la Présidence, le retour à la réalité est moins enthousiasmant. Sans procès d’intention, il faut se résoudre à penser que, non seulement le changement ici aussi n’est pas pour maintenant, mais qu’il n’est pas davantage dans l’esprit des dirigeants de l’Union.

On fera litière d’abord des éléments de communication habilement distillés dans les rédactions des grands médias européens, notamment via un document de presse intelligemment construit. En résumé, la nouvelle Commission serait aujourd’hui un animal « politique », par opposition à sa composition technocratique précédente. Cette option est résumée ainsi par son président : « les commissaires ne sont pas des fonctionnaires ». Est-on bien certain que l’inverse n’est plus vrai ?

Soit, même si à l’examen il est aisé de se rendre compte que nombre de ces politiciens ont plutôt leur avenir politique derrière eux (5 anciens premiers ministres, 4 vice-premiers ministres, 19 anciens ministres, 7 commissaires sortants, nous dit-on), à supposer parfois qu’ils en aient eu un. Reste alors l’habileté manœuvrière qui, si l’on se penche plus précisément sur la JAI, réclamera vraisemblablement davantage de solliciter celle de Jean Claude Juncker que de compter sur le dispositif proposé.

Quelle délimitation des composantes de l’Espace de liberté ?

Continue reading “La nouvelle Commission Juncker et la JAI : que tout change pour que rien ne change ?”

The new Juncker  Commission: an “Echternach procession” for the freedom security and justice agenda ?

by Emilio DE CAPITANI

Text Updated on September 11, 2014 

1. Jean-Claude Juncker, President-elect of the European Commission which should start working from November 1st has unveiled today its team, its main priorities and its new method. As far as the Freedom security and justice area related policies are concerned there are some interesting and some worrying messages arising notably from the “mission” letters sent to the vice-president and to the two Commissioneers which will be in charge of this sensitive domain.

Vice President Timmermans :the “right hand” of the King ?

2. The most interesting (and promising?) is the fact that the respect for the rule of law and of the Charter will be the main mission of the first vice President (M. Timmermans) who will be the “right hand”  of the Commission President and who will have a veto power on the legislative initiatives presented by anyone of the members of the College.

3. The future will tell us if the Vice Presidents coordinating role will be a serious one (as the Juncker formula seems to suggest) or will only be a cosmetic formula as it was when under the Prodi Commission, for the first time this organisational model was launched. For the VP it will not be an easy task as it will not be served by a General Directorate. Within an institution where more than 80% of the decisions are taken by written procedure and where the real coordination/negotiation is done at head of Cabinet’s level the lack of administrative troops could be a serious handicap. That having been said it is more than likely that VP Timmermans will be supported by the Commission Secretary General and by the Legal Service (even if both are directly linked to Mr Juncker). Again who between them will be the real leader is still to be verified.

Three steps forward…

4. Unlike his predecessor Sefcovic in the Barroso Commission who was also in charge of the “Better Regulation” policy Vice President Timmermans should ensure that every Commission proposal or initiative will comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover the mission letter fix a six months deadline to revise the consistency of the current legislation and states that  the new Vice President should “ensure that every Commission proposal or initiative complies with the Charter of Fundamental Rights”. Maybe this is a positive consequence of the fact that the Court of Justice does no more hesitate from striking down EU legislation when in contrast with the Charter (as it has been the case for the recent Data Retention Ruling). However some hot potatoes are already on the table such as the EU-PNR or the Smart Border package (Entry-Exit and registered traveller program) which will be hard to consider compliant with the principles of non discrimination and of data protection as outlined by the CJEU.

5. Moreover the mission letter establish a six months term to revise the legislation to be “RE-FITTED” in compliance with the new criteria set by President Juncker. Again, it will not be easy as already one month after the envisaged entry into force of the new Commission will end the transitional period for hundred measures in police and judicial cooperation adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (European Arrest Warrant, Prum Decisions and several framework decisions…) without any serious impact evaluation on fundamental rights.

6. VP Timmermans will also be in charge the accession of the EU to the ECHR and of the coordination of the Commission’s work related to the Rule of Law as well as on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania. These tasks in the previous Barroso Commissions were very often treated only at the legal service level and raise at political level only in very exceptional cases (as it has been the case with Hungary). The fact that the Juncker  Commission does not intend to hide under the carpet the tensions which could arise with some Member States when the rule of law is at stake (even if  this “..is also an area where we need to be sensitive to the diversity of constitutional and cultural traditions in the 28 Member States”) should then be welcome.

7. Again, unlike his predecessor Sefcovich, the new first vice president  Timmermans will also “.. guide the work of the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality and the Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs” and will “manage and coordinate the participation of the Commission in the Justice and Home Affairs Council“ which means that coordination will not be avoid formula. Let’s hope that thanks  to this coordinating role the tensions which have arisen between the two commissioners on Home and Justice in the previous legislature will remain a thing of the past.

..and two steps back..

8. That having been said the message arising from the missions of the two candidate Commissioners in charge of Justice, Home affairs and migration is more ambiguous.

9. First and foremost the mission of the Justice minister  which was in the previous mandates focused on the core of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (as it is the case in the Member states) is now much more oriented to civil justice, consumer protection and ..the digital market. These are all important issues but not exactly the core of the Justice policy which, in the Juncker vision looks ancillary  even to “…our jobs and growth agenda, including through an assessment of the performance of judicial systems in the context of the European Semester of economic policy coordination.” Is the new Commission afraid (as the European Council in its recent guidelines) of the judicial area of criminal law ?  In theory this should not be the case because the Justice Commissioner will also be in charge of “all the Commission’s work in criminal matters and reinforcing judicial cooperation in this field. Putting an independent European Public Prosecutor’s Office in place by 2016 will be a significant step forward to protect the EU budget from fraud.”

10. However this declaration is contradicted by the mission of the Commissioner in charge of  “Migration and Home Affairs” who should “robustly address the challenge of irregular migration”,  “step up the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism” and focus “… on the fight against crime with a clear link to EU policies, such as human trafficking, smuggling and cybercrime and helping to tackle corruption, also by strengthening police cooperation”.

11. Do all these objectives fall outside judicial cooperation in criminal matters ? Will the Home Commissioner be in charge of the future legislation on euro crimes as it has been the case already in the previous Barroso Commission when the legislative proposal on trafficking of human beings, confiscation , and sexual abuse have been proposed by the Home Commissioner instead of the Criminal Justice commissioner ?

11. Instead of a patchwork of partially overlapping competencies in criminal law would had not been much wiser to link more clearly the competencies of the two “operational” commissioners to the relevant legal basis in the Treaty (where judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters are dealt by articles 81-86 and  police cooperation is dealt with by articles 87-89) ?

12. But the worst suprise is the confirmation of the link between  police cooperation and migration policies. Why migration is still considered a threat for the European Union so that it has to be dealt by the Ministry of interior ? Would not had been better to link the announced “new” portfolio of migration policy within the neighbouring policy or with the social policy or even to a new objective of “human mobility” where as it happens within the Schengen cooperation the right to freedom of movement of EU citizens and third country nationals are de facto coming closer  ?

13. The real outcome of the current configuration is a the growing role of the EU homeland security policy which will not only drive most of the future  legislation in criminal matters but will also drive (or be driven by?) the EU external security policy which still remain the main intergovernamental policy area after the Treaty of Lisbon. Last but ,ot least DG Home will now  manage some hundreds of millions of euros of research in the security domain.

14. Would had not been more logic (and compliant with the EU Charter) bringing together police and judicial cooperation under a rule of law perspective (as it is the case in the European Parliament with the LIBE committee) instead of creating spurious links between consumers policy with criminal justice and police cooperation with migration.

15. Moreover is the latter still considered a threat for the European Union to continue to be dealt by the Ministry of interior ? Would not had been better to link the announced “new” portfolio of migration policy with the neighbouring policy or with the social policy ?

16. Even the best of the Vice president will not be able to right up something which has been so badly designed and which mirror a typical Luxembourg procession in Echternach where people advance by making three step forward and …two step back.

———————-

ANNEX (text emphasized by me)

First Vice-President Frans Timmermans(150 kB)

10 September 2014

Jean-Claude Juncker, President-elect of the European Commission

Mission letter for  Frans Timmermans: First Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights

Dear Frans,

You are becoming a Member of the new European Commission at a particularly challenging time for the European Union. With the start of the new Commission, we have an exceptional opportunity, but also an obligation, to make a fresh start, to address the difficult geo-political situation, to strengthen economic recovery and to build a Europe that delivers jobs and growth for its citizens.

I want the new Commission to be a strong and political team. And I want you, with your political skills and experience, to fully play your part in this team.

We will have a lot to do in the years to come and we will have to show a united and clear sense of purpose from our very first day in office. In the Political Guidelines for the new European Commission that I presented to the European Parliament on 15 July, I set out a new Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, focused on ten priorities.

I had discussed and developed this Agenda in detail in meetings with all the political groups in the European Parliament. The Political Guidelines are, therefore, somewhat akin to a political contract that I concluded with the European Parliament to mark the beginning of a new mandate and to prioritise the work of the new Commission.

I will be looking for your support, creativity and action to help deliver concrete results.

Following our recent discussions, I would like you to be my first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In this mission letter, I set out what I expect from you as a Member of the Commission as well as specific goals for which you will be responsible for reaching during our mandate.

A new way of working

Delivering the priorities of the Political Guidelines will require a reform of the way the Commission has operated up until now. Reform means change. I want us all to show that we are open to change and ready to adapt to it.

I want the Commission as a whole to be more than the sum of its parts.

I therefore want us to work together as a strong team, cooperating across portfolios to produce integrated, well-grounded and well-explained initiatives that lead to clear results.

I want us to overcome silo mentalities by working jointly on those areas where we can really make a difference. We cannot and should not do everything: I want the European Commission to be bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things.

I also want us to focus our energy and efforts on ensuring effective implementation and follow-up on the ground. I count on you to play your part in this new collaborative way of working.

To facilitate this, I have decided to organise the new Commission differently from its predecessors.

I will entrust a number of well-defined priority projects to the Vice-Presidents and ask them to steer and coordinate work across the Commission in the key areas of the Political Guidelines.

This will allow for a better focus and a much stronger cooperation amongst Members of the College, with several Commissioners working closely together as a team, led by the Vice-Presidents, in compositions that may change according to need and as new projects develop over time.

To empower them to deliver on their priority projects, the Vice-Presidents will act on my behalf and will help exercise my rights and prerogatives in their area of responsibility.

In particular, the Vice-Presidents will be in charge of:

  • Steering and coordinating work in their area of responsibility. This will involve bringing together several Commissioners and different parts of the Commission to shape coherent policies and deliver results.
  • Assessing how and whether proposed new initiatives fit with the focus of the Political Guidelines. As a general rule, I will not include a new initiative in the Commission Work Programme or place it on the agenda of the College unless this is recommended to me by one of the Vice-Presidents on the basis of sound arguments and a clear narrative that is coherent with the priority projects of the Political Guidelines.
  • Managing and organising the representation of the Commission in their area of responsibility in the European Parliament, the Council, national Parliaments and other institutional settings as well as at international level.
  • Promoting a proactive and coordinated approach to the follow-up, implementation, and communication of our priority policies across the Union and internationally.

Respect for the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and better regulation will be at the core of the work of the new Commission. We will concentrate our efforts on those areas where only joint action at European level can deliver the desired results. When we act, we will always look for the most efficient and least burdensome approach. Beyond these areas, we should leave action to the Member States where they are more legitimate and better equipped to give effective policy responses at national, regional or local level.

I will therefore pay particular attention to your opinion as my first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, before including any new initiative in the Commission Work Programme or putting it on the agenda of the College. You will also be entrusted with the regular monitoring of procedures linked to the preparation of delegated and implementing acts to ensure full political ownership.

I will also pay particular attention to the opinion of the Vice-President for Budget and Human Resources as regards the impact of our activities on the financial resources and staff of the European Commission. We will have the privilege of being supported by an excellent, highly motivated European civil service and a professionally well-run administration, but its resources are limited and have to be used to best effect. This is also why I will want resources to be allocated to our priorities and to make sure that every action we take delivers maximum performance and value added.

I also want all Commissioners to ensure sound financial management of the programmes under their responsibility, taking all necessary measures to protect the EU budget from fraud.

Under my supervision, Vice-Presidents will be supported by the Secretariat General in their tasks but will primarily rely on close cooperation with the relevant Commissioners and the services that report to them.

In addition, Vice-Presidents will be able to draw on any service in the Commission whose work is relevant for their area of responsibility, in consultation with the relevant Commissioner.

With regard to the Union’s external action, I have launched a pragmatic partnership with the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who, according to the Treaties, is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission.

The new High Representative and I have agreed that she will play her role as a Commission Vice-President to the full. She will notably steer and coordinate the work of all Commissioners with regard to external relations through a Commissioners’ Group on External Action to develop a joint approach.

This Group will meet at least once a month in varying thematic and/ or geographic formats, according to the needs identified by the High Representative/Vice-President or by me.

The High Representative/Vice-President will regularly report back to me and the whole College about geopolitical developments. To liaise more effectively with the other Members of the College, we agreed that she will have her Headquarters in the Berlaymont, and that the Commission will put a Cabinet of an appropriate size at her disposal, about half of which will be Commission officials.

We also agreed that, whenever she sees the necessity to do so, she will ask the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and other Commissioners to deputise in areas related to Commission competence.

Working together in this new way across the Commission should help ensure that the final decisions we take as a College are well-prepared and focused on what is important and that we are all equipped to explain and defend them. We will have to show a team spirit to make the new system work. Our success will depend on each and every one of you: on the team leadership of the Vice-Presidents and on the readiness of Commissioners to be strong team players. I would ask you all to work together to ensure that this new system works well.

The portfolio of the first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights

As my first Vice-President, you will steer and coordinate the Commission’s work in the areas of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

You will work closely with the other Vice-Presidents, and all Commissioners will liaise closely with you when it concerns the implementation of our better regulation agenda.

In addition, for initiatives requiring a decision by the Commission in their area of responsibility, you will guide the work of the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality and the Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs.

You will drive the Commission’s work on better regulation in order to maximise its contribution to our jobs and growth agenda, both by coordinating the Commission’s work and by promoting the principles of better regulation in the EU institutions and at national level.

You will also be responsible for strengthening and deepening the Commission’s relations with the other institutions and national Parliaments.

During our mandate, I would like you to focus on the following, in your role as Vice-President:

  • Coordinating the work on better regulation within the Commission, ensuring the compliance of EU proposals with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and working with the European Parliament and the Council to remove unnecessary “red tape” at both European and national level. This includes steering the Commission’s work on the “Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme” (REFIT) of EU legislation and ensuring the quality of impact assessments underpinning our activities. I will ask you to take stock of experience and report to the College within twelve months on how our approach to better regulation could be strengthened.
  • Ensuring that the special partnership with the European Parliament, as laid down in the Framework Agreement of 2010, is pursued with full commitment, and coordinating, on behalf of the Commission, the inter-institutional work on policy programming and better law-making.

I will ask you to discuss, within the first three months of the mandate, with the European Parliament and the Council, the list of pending legislative proposals and to determine whether to pursue them or not, in accordance with the principle of “political discontinuity”.

  • Coordinating and strengthening the interaction of all Commissioners with national Parliaments as a way of bringing the European Union closer to citizens and forging a new partnership with national Parliaments.
  • Ensuring that every Commission proposal or initiative complies with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
  • Leading the dialogue between the European Commission and churches and religious associations or communities, as well as with philosophical and non-confessional organisations, in a transparent and regular manner.
  • Concluding the process of accession of the EU to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe.
  • Coordinating the Commission’s work related to the Rule of Law.
  • Coordinating the Commission’s work on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania.
  • Coordinating the work on transparency and preparing a proposal for an Inter-Institutional Agreement creating a mandatory lobby register covering the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.

You will represent the Commission in the General Affairs Council and in negotiations on institutional issues. You will also manage and coordinate the participation of the Commission in the Justice and Home Affairs Council.

You will be responsible for the Commission’s relations with the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, as well as with the European Ombudsman.

You will coordinate the work on audit and chair the Audit Progress Committee (APC). To help you fulfil these responsibilities, the Internal Audit Service (IAS) will report to you. The IAS should be gradually reinforced through the integration of the Internal Audit Capacities of individual Commission services.

Our principles: ethics and transparency

We must abide by the highest possible professional and ethical standards at all times. I want the European Commission to lead the way as a modern, efficient and transparent public administration, open to all input that helps us deliver work of a consistently high quality, in full independence and impartiality. Our conduct must be unimpeachable. You have received the Code of Conduct of the Members of the European Commission. I expect all of us to honour both the word and the spirit of the Code.

You will have seen that the Political Guidelines include a new commitment to transparency. Transparency should be a priority for the new Commission and I expect all of us to make public, on our respective web pages, all the contacts and meetings we hold with professional organisations or self-employed individuals on any matter relating to EU policy-making and implementation. It is very important to be transparent where specific interests related to the Commission’s work on legislative initiatives or financial matters are discussed with such organisations or individuals.

Working in partnership for Europe

The Commission’s partnership with the other EU institutions and the Member States, as defined in the Treaties, is fundamental. The Union only succeeds when everyone is pulling in the same direction: this is why we should work in the months to come to forge a common understanding between the institutions about what we want to achieve and how we will go about it.

The Commission’s relationship with the European Parliament is the source of our democratic legitimacy. This must, therefore, be a political and not a technocratic partnership. I expect all Commissioners to invest in this relationship and to make themselves available for and to take an active part in plenary sessions, committee meetings and trilogue negotiations.

The meetings with the parliamentary committees over the weeks to come will be an opportunity for you to lay the foundations for a productive working relationship, to explain how your work will contribute to joint political priorities, and to demonstrate your commitment and suitability for your broader role as a Member of the College.

Effective policy-making also requires a deep understanding of every one of the Member States, of their common challenges and of their diversity. While fulfilling your obligation to participate in Commission meetings and engage with the European institutions, I want you all to be politically active in the Member States and in dialogues with citizens, by presenting and communicating our common agenda, listening to ideas and engaging with stakeholders.

In this context, I want all Commissioners to commit to a new partnership with national Parliaments: they deserve particular attention and I want, under your coordination as my first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, important proposals or initiatives to be presented and explained in national Parliaments by Members of the Commission. This should also allow us to deepen the country-specific knowledge within our institution and to build mutual understanding and effective channels of communication between the national and the European level.

***

The European Union has come through one of the most testing periods in its history.

The effects of the economic and financial crisis are still causing great hardship in many parts of Europe. We live in a Union with a 29th state of unemployed people, many of them young people who feel side-lined. Until this situation has changed, this 29th state must be our number one concern, and we have to be very determined and very responsible in carrying out our work as Members of this Commission.

I am looking forward to working with you on the new start that our European Union needs now.

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

Annex: Table of allocation of portfolios and supporting services 

As first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Mr Timmermans will work closely with the other Vice-Presidents, and all Commissioners will liaise closely with him when it concerns the implementation of the better regulation agenda. In addition, for initiatives requiring a decision by the Commission in their area of responsibility, he will guide the work of the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality and the Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs.

Internal Audit Service (IAS)

————————————————

Jean-Claude Juncker, President-elect of the European Commission

Mission letter  for Vêra Jourová Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality

(EXCERPTS)

Dear Vêra,

You are becoming a Member of the new European Commission at a particularly challenging time for the European Union. …(see  general part of VP Timmermans letter)…

The Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality portfolio

You will be the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality.

You will, in particular, contribute to projects steered and coordinated by the first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as the Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness and the Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue.

For other initiatives requiring a decision from the Commission, you will, as a rule, liaise closely with the first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In the Political Guidelines, I underlined that our shared values are the foundation of the EU.

These are spelled out in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which underpins all our work. The EU needs to consistently respect and uphold the rule of law and fundamental rights. This is also an area where we need to be sensitive to the diversity of constitutional and cultural traditions in the 28 Member States.

A strong EU justice and consumer policy can build bridges between national legal systems and be a key part of reaping the full benefits of the Single Market, cutting red tape and facilitating cross-border business.

A sound and predictable justice system is also a prerequisite for economic growth and a business friendly environment.

During our mandate, I would like you to focus on the following:

  • Supporting the first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in concluding the process of accession of the EU to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, in making sure that all Commission proposals respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights and in consolidating the Commission’s role in protecting the Rule of Law. You will also work with the High-Representative for the Union’s Foreign Policy and Security/Vice-President to promote our values in our external relations.
  • Ensuring that, within the scope of EU competences, discrimination is fought and gender equality promoted, including by exploring how to unblock negotiations on the Commission proposal for the Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive.
  • Contributing, as part of the project team steered and coordinated by the Vice-President for the Digital Single Market, to the realisation of a connected digital single market by ensuring the swift adoption of the EU data protection reform and by modernising and simplifying consumer rules for online and digital purchases.
  • Concluding negotiations on a comprehensive EU-U.S. data protection agreement which provides justiciable rights for all EU citizens, regardless of where they reside, as well as reviewing the Safe Harbour arrangement.
  • Reinforcing, as part of the project teams steered and coordinated by the Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness and the Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue, the contribution of EU justice policies to our jobs and growth agenda, including through an assessment of the performance of judicial systems in the context of the European Semester of economic policy coordination.
  • Coordinating all the Commission’s work in criminal matters and reinforcing judicial cooperation in this field. Putting an independent European Public Prosecutor’s Office in place by 2016 will be a significant step forward to protect the EU budget from fraud.

To help you to fulfil these responsibilities, the Directorate-General for Justice (DG JUST) will report to you, with some adjustments, as indicated in the table annexed to this letter.

Our principles: ethics and transparency… (see correspondent chapter of Timmermans mission letter)…

———————–ANNEX

DG Justice (JUST)

The relevant parts of the Consumer, Health and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA)

Responsible for relations with: The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) The European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)

Changes for DG JUSTUnit MARKT F2 (Corporate Governance, Social Responsibility) moves from DG Internal Market and Services (MARKT) to DG JUST. – Directorate SANCO B (Consumer Affairs) moves from DG Health and Consumers (SANCO) to DG JUST, except for Unit SANCO B2 (Health Technology and Cosmetics), which moves from DG Health and Consumers (SANCO) to DG Enterprise and Industry (ENTR). – Unit JUST B3 (Anti-Drugs Policy) moves from DG JUST to DG Home Affairs (HOME). – Unit JUST D3 (Rights of Persons with Disabilities) and the part of Unit JUST D1 (Equal Treatment Legislation) dealing with the Directive establishing a general Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, move from DG JUST to DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL

—————————————–

Mission letter for Dimitris Avramopoulos Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs

Dear Dimitris,

(see first part of  mission letter to Vice President Timmermans )

The Migration and Home Affairs portfolio

You will be the Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs. You will, in particular, contribute to projects steered and coordinated, in particular, by the first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as to the work of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President. For other initiatives requiring a decision from the Commission, you will, as a rule, liaise closely with the first Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Migration is one of the pressing challenges I have highlighted in my Political Guidelines. Europe needs to manage migration better, in all its aspects. A successful migration policy is both a humanitarian and an economic imperative. We need to show that the EU can offer both a compelling case to attract global talent, and a vision of how to robustly address the challenge of irregular migration. We need a new policy on migration that will address skill shortages and the demographic challenges the EU faces and that will modernise the way the EU addresses these challenges.

The other priority of your portfolio will be to help the Member States to manage and secure Europe’s borders. The Common Asylum EU framework needs to be fully applied and operational.

We also need to step up the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism. The EU can make a key contribution to citizens’ security in an area with clear ramifications for freedom of movement and fundamental rights.

The focus should be on concrete operational measures where the action of the EU can have an impact – and where we can show that this does not compromise our commitment to fundamental rights and values.

During our mandate, I would like you to focus on the following:

  • Developing a new European policy on regular migration. Such a policy should help Europe address skills shortages and attract the talent that it needs. A first step will be to address the shortcomings of the “Blue Card” Directive: I would ask for a first review to be concluded within six months of the start of the mandate. Further steps will require reflection on the best ways to make the EU an attractive place for migration destination, on the basis of other existing models.
  • Boosting the effectiveness of the European border agency FRONTEX by developing a system to pool resources from Member States. We need to be able to put European Border Guard Teams into action quickly, with the participation of all Member States as a rule.
  • Working to ensure the full and consistent implementation of the Common European Asylum System. We should look at an extended role for the European Asylum Support Office, with a particular focus on working with and in third countries. We should also develop a strategy for improving our response to emergency situations.
  • Working with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/VicePresident and the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development on ways to improve cooperation with third countries on these aspects, including on readmission.
  • Focusing on the fight against crime with a clear link to EU policies, such as human trafficking, smuggling and cybercrime and helping to tackle corruption, also by strengthening police cooperation.
  • Identifying where the EU can make a real difference in fighting terrorism and countering radicalisation, ensuring the respect of fundamental rights. We should be able to define operational measures which can have a concrete impact on issues such as “foreign fighters”.
  • Working closely with the High-Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President, the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development and the Commissioner for Trade to strengthen the EU’s strategic partnership with Africa.

To help you fulfil these responsibilities, the Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG HOME) will report to you, with some adjustments, as indicated in the table annexed to this letter.

Our principles: ethics and transparency …(see third part of the general letter)…

 ANNEX – (Administrative adjustments)

DG Home Affairs (HOME) The relevant parts of the Research Executive Agency (REA)

Responsible for relations with: The agency for the management of large IT systems (EU-LISA) The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) The European Police Office (EUROPOL) The European Police College (CEPOL)

Changes for DG HOMEUnit ENTR G4 (Policy and Research in Security) moves from DG Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) to DG HOME. – Unit JUST B3 (Anti-Drugs Policy) moves from DG Justice (JUST) to DG HOME.

Two Codes to rule them all: the Borders and Visa Codes

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS HERE

Written by Steve PEERS

In today’s judgment in Air Baltic, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken the next logical step following its judgment late last year in Koushkaki, where it ruled that the EU’s visa code set out an exhaustive list of grounds for refusing a visa application.  Today the Court has confirmed that the same is true of theSchengen Borders Code. Moreover, the Court has clarified a number of general and specific points about the nature and interpretation of the two codes.

Facts and judgment

This case concerned an Indian citizen who flew from Moscow to Riga. He had a valid multiple-entry Schengen visa, which was attached to a cancelled Indian passport. He also had a second Indian passport, which was valid but which did not contain a visa. The Latvian border guards then refused him entry into Latvia, on the grounds that the valid visa had to be attached to the valid passport, not to the cancelled passport.

For good measure, the Latvian authorities also fined the airline, Air Baltic, for transporting him without the necessary travel documents. The airline appealed the fine, and lost at first instance. But an appeal court then sent questions to the Court of Justice to clarify the legal position.

The CJEU ruled first of all that the cancellation of a passport by a third country did not mean that the visa attached to the passport was invalid. This was because only a Member State authority could annul or revoke a visa, and because the visa code did not allow for the annulment of a visa in such cases anyway. The Court extended its ruling in Koushkaki to confirm that the grounds for annulling a visa were exhaustive; the same must be true of the grounds for revoking a visa.

Secondly, the Court ruled that the Schengen Borders Code did not require entry to be refused in cases like these. The different language versions of that code suggested different interpretations, but as always, the Court seeks a uniform interpretation of EU law regardless. In this case, the standard form to be given to persons who were refused entry at the border to explain why they were refused does not provide for refusal on the grounds that a valid visa was not attached to a valid passport.

Also, the Court pointed out that the idea of separate visas and passports was not unknown to EU law, since the visa code provides that in cases where a Member State refuses to recognise a passport as valid, a visa must be issued as a separate document. Checking two separate documents was not a huge burden for border guards, and refusing entry simply on the grounds that the valid passports and visas were in two separate documents would infringe the principle of proportionality.

Finally, the Court ruled that the national authorities of Member States do not have any residual powers to refuse entry to third-country nationals on grounds besides those listed in the Schengen Borders Code. The Court reached this conclusion, by analogy with Koushkaki, because: the standard form giving the grounds for refusing entry contains an exhaustive list of grounds for refusal; the nature of the Schengen system ‘implies a common definition of the entry conditions’; and this interpretation would support ‘the objective of facilitating legitimate travel’ referred to in the preamble to the visa code.

Comments

The Court’s ruling that the Schengen Borders Code provides for complete harmonisation of the rules on refusal of entry is not really surprising, particularly after the judgment in Koushkaki reaching the equivalent conclusion regarding the visa code. However, it should be noted that in today’s judgment, the Court does not repeat its qualification in Koushkaki that national authorities had wide discretion to interpret the common rules in question. Furthermore, the Schengen Borders Code is relevant not only to those third-country nationals who need visas for entry, but also those who do not, such as visitors from the USA, Canada and most of the Western Balkans.

In effect, the Court’s ruling confirms that the Schengen zone is in effect the equivalent of the EU’s customs union, as regards the movement of people. Of course, the customs union and the Schengen zone do not apply to the same countries, due to opt-outs from Schengen (UK and Ireland), the deferred admission to the Schengen system (Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia), and the rules on association with each system (Turkey is part of the EU’s customs union, while Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland apply the Schengen rules). But the basic concept is the same, with the obvious implications as regards exclusive external competence of the EU (although a Protocol to the Treaties conserves some external competence over borders for Member States), and uniform interpretation of the rules in the respective codes.

As to the more detailed aspects of this case, the Court is surely right to rule against the pedantry of insisting that where a person holds a valid visa and a valid passport, the visa must always be attached to the passport. The underlying objective to ensure that the person concerned meets the conditions of entry is satisfied regardless of whether the visa is attached to the passport or not. Also, the Court’s ruling that the Borders Code has to be interpreted in accordance with the principle of proportionality, and in light of the objective of facilitating legitimate travel, could have broader implications in other cases.

Finally, the necessary corollary of the judgments in Koushkaki and Air Baltic is that a third-country national who meets the conditions to obtain a visa and/or cross the external borders has the right to that visa and/or to cross those borders. So these issues are not governed by national administrative discretion, but by uniform EU rules. The strengthening of the rule of law in this field is very welcome.

PEERS : Data protection rights and administrative proceedings

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS
Thursday, 17 July 2014

Steve Peers

What rights do asylum-seekers have as regards data protection law? This issue was clarified in today’s CJEU judgment in YS and M and S, which could also have broader relevance for any case which involves access to documents in the context of administrative procedures.

Both cases involved asylum-seekers in the Netherlands, who sought access to file notes concerning their case. However, they did not rely on the EU’s asylum procedures Directive, which states that asylum-seekers must be given the reasons for negative decisions and are entitled to access reports about the interviews held with them, but does not make mention of access to any other document. The second-phase procedures Directive, applicable to applications made after 20 July 2015, adds a right of access to country-of-origin information and expert advice which was used in making a decision on the asylum-seeker’s case, but still does not extend to a right to the entire file.

So they invoked the data protection Directive instead. The first question in this respect was whether the legal analysis in the file concerning their case was ‘personal data’ within the meaning of the Directive. According to the CJEU, it was not, for although that analysis ‘may contain personal data, it does not in itself constitute such data within the meaning of’ that Directive. That analysis ‘is not information relating to the applicant for a residence permit, but’ rather ‘information about the assessment and application by the competent authority of that law to the applicant’s situation’, based on the personal data available to the authorities.

The Court further opined that this was consistent with the purpose of the Directive, which was to ensure the right to privacy, including the check on the accuracy of the data and the correction of inaccurate data. A different approach would amount to ‘the right of access to administrative documents’, which was not the point of the Directive. It justified its analysis by analogy with the Bavarian Lager judgment, in which it had ruled that the Directive did not have the purpose of opening up the transparency of EU decision-making.

The second point was the extent of access to the personal data (as defined by the Court) which was being processed. On this point, the CJEU rejected the argument that the entire file document had to be made available, and instead stated that it was sufficient to give data subjects an intelligible summary of the personal data being processed.

Finally, the national court had asked about the possible application of Article 41 of the Charter, which sets out the right to good administration. The CJEU distinguished its prior case law, and asserted that this Charter right applied only to EU bodies, not to national administrations. But the right to good administration could still be invoked against national authorities as a general principle, as distinct from a Charter right.

Comments

The Court’s analysis of the main data protection issues here is not very convincing. There is nothing in the text of either the data protection Directive or the asylum procedures Directive that would suggest a distinction between administrative documents which contain personal data, and other types of collection of personal data. Quite clearly asylum-seekers do have an interest in knowing how their personal data is being processed in respect of an analysis of their application, and of correcting that personal data if it is correct.

To argue that the data protection Directive does not give access to administrative documents is a straw man argument. The question is not whether it aims to give access to all administrative documents, but only whether it gives access to those which contain personal data. The comparison with the Court’s Bavarian Lager judgment makes no sense either, for in that case data protection formed an express exception to the EU legislation on access to documents, and the two rights were in conflict.

The Court’s judgment on the second point is more convincing, in light of the wording of the data protection Directive, which only requires an intelligible summary of the personal data being processed to be made available.

Finally, the Court’s analysis of Article 41 of the Charter is a brave attempt to clear up the prior inconsistencies and confusion on this point, for instance in its recent judgment on procedural rights as regards subsidiary protection applications. Undeniably the Charter provision does only apply to EU bodies, not to Member States, but the Court nevertheless guarantees that the right to good administration can be claimed against the latter by clarifying that the right to good administration is nonetheless a general principle of EU law.

This is, apparently, the first time that the Court has confirmed that some rights are not in the Charter, but are protected as general principles of EU law. This raises important questions as to which other rights might be protected in that way, what the difference between the parallel rights to good administration might be, and whether the general principles have a different legal effect than Charter rights. But in the specific context of asylum proceedings, and more generally in many other areas of EU law, it is useful that the Court confirmed that applicants can still enforce (by a different means) the right to good administration against national authorities.

1rst December 2014 is approaching: will the EU’s “creative ambiguity” on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters finally draw to an end ?

Also published on EU Blog analysis as :“Metamorphosis of the third pillar: The end of the transition period for EU criminal and policing law”

by Emilio De Capitani

On 1st December 2014, after five years of “legal gestation”, the previous “third pillar” of EU law will finally transform itself from an intergovernmental larva into a supranational butterfly. But will this really ensure a coherent policy, correctly applied by Member States and in full compliance with human rights?

More precisely, in compliance with Article 10 of Protocol 36 to the Treaties (1), added by the Lisbon Treaty, all the EU measures dealing with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will be treated like all the other EU legislative measures as far as the jurisdiction of the CJEU is concerned. Their transposition should be verified on the ground and, in case of problems, the Commission will be entitled to bring the Member States to the CJEU, which will also have the power to interpret these measures following references for a preliminary ruling from all national courts (only some national courts can send questions at present).

Moreover, with the end of the last transitional period for the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) it will be possible on the basis of real and transparent data to decide if dozens of measures (such as the European arrest warrant or the PRUM decision) which have been negotiated in a different political and legal context should be revised to comply with the new EU constitutional framework.
Quite surprisingly the aforementioned deadline – which will inevitably have a profound impact on the Member States’ policies and on the rights of the EU citizens – is approaching without any sort of public debate by the civil society, the national parliaments or the academia.

Even at EU level during the last Justice and Home affairs Council where the point was on the agenda no delegations took the floor nor the recent European Council referred to it in the Guidelines framing the future of the freedom security and justice area.

UK opt-in, opt-out and re-opt-in…

Why this silence? It is more than likely that such a “diplomatic” reserve and understatement are due to the fact that the UK is currently negotiating with the Council and the Commission which will be its final position on the former EU third pillar measures. (see here) It is was indeed to comply with the UK’s “red lines” that in October 2007 in the final phase of the Lisbon Treaty negotiations, a five year period freezing the Commission and CJEU enforcement powers was inserted in Protocol 36 (transitional measures).

At that time the UK government’s aim was (and probably still is) to protect its common law systems, and its police and judicial processes from the risk of the CJEU’s “judicial activism”. According to a House of Lords report, the UK Government asked it because the “vast majority” of pre-Lisbon police and judicial cooperation (PCJ) measures were not drafted with CJEU jurisdiction in mind and had often been agreed at the “lowest common denominator” in order to secure unanimity. As a result, much of the drafting was “not of a high standard and may be open to expansive interpretation by the ECJ” (see point 91 of House Of Lords Report “EU police and criminal justice measures: The UK’s 2014 opt-out decision” HL Paper 159).

Very skilfully the UK also obtained in the same Protocol the right to opt out from all the former third pillar measures before May 2014 as well as the possibility of a second thought, after December 1st 2014 of agreeing with the Council (for Schengen related measures) and with the Commission a new opt-in on some (or all) the former third pillar measures. However, according to Protocol 26 the UK re-opt-in could be granted only “without seriously affecting the practical operability” of the third pillar measures and by “respecting their coherence”.

Last year the UK Government submitted to the Council its Opt-Out decision and is now informally negotiating the possible re-opt-in for around 35/37 third pillar measures (see here)

It is too early to know which will be the result of the EU-UK negotiations. However if the Council and the Commission will accept the UK re-opt-in request (which for some measures can be delayed after the end of 2015) the situation will not be extremely different from the one existing before the block opt-out – except that the UK will now be subject to the Commission and CJEU enforcement powers.

The difficult quest of the former third pillar acquis ….

The UK’s (and Denmark’s) peculiar situation aside, the definition of the pre-Lisbon acquis for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters will be extremely important also for the other EU member States and, quite probably for the European Parliament (EP) and for the national parliaments. The EP is, since the end of 2009, a co-legislator also for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters but will not be associated with the implementation of Protocol 36. As for national parliaments, they will now share with the EP wide scrutiny powers (Articles 70, 71 85 and 88 TFEU) on these policies, and will at last have the opportunity to check what happened in the EU outside their national borders and even more inside their national territory. Maybe the December 1st deadline could then be an occasion at least for some of them to verify if these EU measures have been correctly transposed and, if they have to be amended (as it still possible for measures such as Europol and Eurojust which are currently renegotiated at EU level).

A revised list of the former third pillar measures has been recently established by the Commission in cooperation of MS representatives. The 123 measures currently covered by Protocol 36 are very diverse: some of them are of quasi legislative nature (such as the Framework Decisions) some others (such as the international agreements or Conventions, and the Council Decision) even if not legislative, are binding, and some others are of uncertain nature as it is the case for the “Joint Actions” adopted under the Maastricht Treaty regime.

As far as the content is concerned these measures deal with:

– mutual recognition of national decisions (such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) the European Supervision Order, the mutual recognition of freezing orders; fines; confiscation orders, probation orders; and of prison sentences…);
– harmonization of the definitions of certain criminal offenses and minimum penalties;
– criminal procedures;
– cross-border cooperation, in particular between police and law enforcement agencies, including the exchange of information and the investigation of crime;
– EU agencies (Europol, Eurojust and the European Police College (CEPOL));
– agreements with third countries on information sharing, mutual legal assistance and extradition
The Commission’s list is not final because between now and December 1st some of the measures could still be replaced by texts currently under negotiation. Moreover the Commission has also announced that some of them – which can be considered obsolete – will be repealed.

…the problem of their transposition and operability …

To assess the “operability” of these measures the European Commission has to verify if they have been correctly transposed by the Member States. The Commission is already collecting the relevant information even if it is not yet entitled to open infringement procedures in case of non compliance by the Member States.

It is worth recalling that in some cases (such as for the European Arrest Warrant) the Commission has already submitted several implementing reports. For other cases, the Commission has only recently adressed to the Member States some pre-alert communications which should be taken in account to avoid judicial proceedings after December 1st 2014.

The first pre-alert Commission report deals with the Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention. These Framework Decisions (FD) have to be seen as a package of coherent and complementary legislation that addresses the issue of detention of EU citizens in other Member States and has the potential to lead to a reduction in pre-trial detention or to facilitate social rehabilitation of prisoners in a cross border context (see here).

The first FD (transfer of Prisoners) allows a Member State to execute a prison sentence issued by another Member State against a person who remains in the first Member State. On the other hand, it establishes a system for transferring convicted prisoners back to their Member State of nationality or habitual residence (or to another Member State with which they have close ties) to serve their prison sentence. Article 25 of the Transfer of Prisoners FD in conjunction with Article 4(6) and 5(3) of the European arrest warrant, allows a Member State to refuse to surrender its nationals or residents or persons staying in the latter if the other Member State undertakes to enforce the prison sentence in accordance with the same FD.

The second FD (Probation and Alternative Sanctions) applies to many alternatives to custody and to measures facilitating early release (e.g. an obligation not to enter certain localities, to carry out community service or instructions relating to residence or training or professional activities). The probation decision or other alternative sanction can be executed in another Member State, as long as the person concerned consents.

The third FD (European Supervision ) concerns provisional release in the pretrial stage. It will enable a non-custodial supervision (e.g. an obligation to remain at a specified place or an obligation to report at specified times to a specific authority) to be transferred from the Member State where the non resident is suspected of having committed an offence to the Member State where he normally resides. This will allow a suspected person to be subjected to a supervision measure in his home Member State until the trial takes place in another Member State, instead of being placed into pre-trial detention.

It is worth recalling that at the time of the Commission Communication, well after the relevant deadlines, respectively 10, 14 and 16 Member States have not yet transposed the Framework Decisions.

Another pre-alert Commission report deals with the implementation of the Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking into account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings. This Framework Decision aims to ensure that similar legal effects are given to domestic convictions and convictions from other Member States. Its article 3 is based on the principle of simple assimilation of convictions and imposes as a matter of principle that the legal effects of foreign convictions must be equivalent to the legal effect of domestic convictions. More than 3 years after the implementation date, 6 Member States have yet to notify the measures transposing the obligations of this Framework Decision: BE, ES, IT, LT, MT and PT.

A third pre-alert Commission report deals with the Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings. This FD addresses the situations where potentially several Member States are competent to conduct criminal investigations in respect of the crime and proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. This poses challenges not only in terms of coordination and effectiveness of criminal prosecutions, but also with regard to respect for the fundamental principle of criminal law, also enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”), that a person may not be prosecuted and convicted twice for the same offense (Ne bis in idem). More than 1 year after the implementation date, 13 Member States yet to notify the measures transposing the obligations of this Framework Decision: BG, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, MT, SE and the UK. Seven Member States informed the Commission of the process of preparing relevant transposition measures at national level (BG, EL, ES, FR, LT, MT and SE). However, none of these Member States adopted the measures or notified the Commission at least before April 2014.

In all these pre-alert Communications the Commission has abundantly made clear that the non-implementation of the Framework Decisions by some Member States is problematic since those Member States who have properly implemented the Framework Decisions cannot benefit from their co-operation provisions in their relations with those Member States who did not implement them in time. As a consequence, when cooperating with a Member State who did not implement in time, even those Member States who did so will have to rely on the random and often lengthy practice of traditional mutual legal assistance in criminal matters without a reliable guarantee of a timely detection of bis in idem cases, which should already take place at early stages of criminal proceedings. Such a practice increases significantly a risk of double jeopardy.

…and the problem of their “coherence” and compliance with the EU Charter.

But the priority for the EU legislator in the coming months should be to verify if the former third pillar measures which were negotiated without taking in account the now binding Fundamental rights Charter are consistent with the new EU institutional and legal framework.

Even if some scholars and politicians try to sell the idea that there is a substantial continuity between the pre Lisbon and Post Lisbon era this is certainly not the case for the AFSJ, where the entry into force of the Charter has marked a clear change of perspective. A proof of this has been recently offered by the recent CJEU jurisprudence in the asylum domain where the presumption of compliance with fundamental rights by another Member State has been considered rebuttable in circumstances where fundamental rights are under threat (CJEU Judgment in NS) or to recall the data retention judgment, where the EU data retention Directive was annulled for violation of the principle of proportionality and of the Charter. If this is the position of the CJEU how many of the 123 measures in the Commission list will require a substantial revision to be considered “coherent” with the new post – Lisbon legal and constitutional framework?

Please don’t throw out real rights for fake security…

Pre-Lisbon measures should also be subject to the parliamentary scrutiny at European and national level as it is required since five years by Article 70 of the TFEU (2) . They should also be effective as they can affect EU citizens’ security and fundamental rights. However it is difficult to ascertain if the interference with EU citizens’ rights has been proportionnate and effective. As the post-Snowden saga has now abundantly showed, “intelligence led policing” and “operational cooperation” cover practices which can be extremely intrusive without offering clear results to the European and/or to the national parliaments.
Moreover what is even more worrying is that parliamentarians do not examine whether their country is playing any role in the so called EU “Internal security strategy” (see the latest Commission report here) or in the so called “policy cycle” which are less transparent than the “joint actions” negotiated under the Maastricht regime… Are these “soft law” initiatives still justified forty years after the first TREVI cooperation was launched in these domains? Or, after Lisbon, can the EU citizens expect from the EU and its Member States a legislative framework which can at the same time deliver effective security and protect fundamental rights?

This was announced by the new treaties and by the Charter five years ago and what EU citizens are deemed to obtain; it is then the duty of the incoming Commission and of the newly elected European Parliament to do what the European Council didn’t dare to propose.

NOTES
(1) PROT. 36 (Transitional Measures) Article 10
1. As a transitional measure, and with respect to acts of the Union in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which have been adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the powers of the institutions shall be the following at the date of entry into force of that Treaty: the powers of the Commission under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall not be applicable and the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in the version in force before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, shall remain the same, including where they have been accepted under Article 35(2) of the said Treaty on European Union.
2. The amendment of an act referred to in paragraph 1 shall entail the applicability of the powers of the institutions referred to in that paragraph as set out in the Treaties with respect to the amended act for those Member States to which that amended act shall apply.
3. In any case, the transitional measure mentioned in paragraph 1 shall cease to have effect five years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
4. At the latest six months before the expiry of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 3, the United Kingdom may notify to the Council that it does not accept, with respect to the acts referred to in paragraph 1, the powers of the institutions referred to in paragraph 1 as set out in the Treaties. In case the United Kingdom has made that notification, all acts referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply to it as from the date of expiry of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 3. This subparagraph shall not apply with respect to the amended acts which are applicable to the United Kingdom as referred to in paragraph 2.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine the necessary consequential and transitional arrangements. The United Kingdom shall not participate in the adoption of this decision. A qualified majority of the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may also adopt a decision determining that the United Kingdom shall bear the direct financial consequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as a result of the cessation of its participation in those acts.
5. The United Kingdom may, at any time afterwards, notify the Council of its wish to participate in acts which have ceased to apply to it pursuant to paragraph 4, first subparagraph. In that case, the relevant provisions of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union or of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, as the case may be, shall apply. The powers of the institutions with regard to those acts shall be those set out in the Treaties. When acting under the relevant Protocols, the Union institutions and the United Kingdom shall seek to re establish the widest possible measure of participation of the United Kingdom in the acquis of the Union in the area of freedom, security and justice without seriously affecting the practical operability of the various parts thereof, while respecting their coherence.

(2) Article 70 TFEU

Without prejudice to Articles 258, 259 and 260, the Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, adopt measures laying down the arrangements whereby Member States, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies referred to in this Title by Member States’ authorities, in particular in order to facilitate full application of the principle of mutual recognition. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be informed of the content and results of the evaluation.

Steve PEERS :New EU rules on maritime surveillance: will they stop the deaths and push-backs in the Mediterranean?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Steve Peers

Introduction

A new EU Regulation, published on EU’s Official Journal of June 27th , sets out new rules on maritime surveillance and rescue operations coordinated by Frontex, the EU’s borders agency. What effect will these rules have on reducing the tragic death toll of migrants in the Mediterranean? And what will happen to the asylum claims of those rescued or intercepted in the high seas?

These new rules are a response to the continued argument that the EU must bear at least some of the blame for the deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Member States’ authorities and Frontex have often been blamed for violent behaviour or ‘push-backs’: the forced return of migrants’ vessels to unsafe countries, which were condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2012 judgment in Hirsi v Italy.

The Regulation replaces prior rules adopted by the Council alone in 2010, in the form of a Decision implementing the Schengen Borders Code,which was annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) after the European Parliament (EP) challenged it on procedural grounds. According to the Court, an EU act concerning human rights and coercive measures had to be adopted by means of the EU’s legislative process.

That meant that the European Commission had to propose a legislative measure, which it did in April 2013. At first, a hard-line group of Member States opposed most of the provisions in this proposal concerning search and rescue and disembarkation (ie the rules on the destination of migrants who were intercepted and rescued), even after the particularly tragic loss of 300 migrants’ lives in autumn 2013. However, these Member States relented, and the European Parliament also pressed to retain and improve upon the Commission’s proposal.

The new Regulation was subsequently agreed, and will come into force on 17 July. But does it mean that the EU will be doing enough to address the loss of life and push-backs in the Mediterranean?

This post addresses these issues in turn, and concludes with an assessment of the issue of the accountability of Frontex. It is an updated and amended version of a previous Statewatch analysis on the new rules.

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Europe v Facebook: the beginning of the end for NSA spying on EU citizens?

Original published on EU LAW ANALYSIS
Wednesday, 18 June 2014

by Steve Peers

Since the revelations about the extent of spying by the American National Security Agency (NSA) revealed by Edward Snowden, doubts have increased about the adequacy of the data protection regime in the United States, in particular as regards its impact on EU citizens, who are subject to the more favourable regime established by the Data Protection Directive. One aspect of these doubts concerns the ability of the NSA to examine the content of communications processed by social media companies based in the USA, such as Facebook.

Today’s decision by the Irish High Court to send questions in the ‘Europe v Facebook’ case to the CJEU raises the possibility that the NSA’s access to EU citizens’ personal data might soon come to an end. But it’s not clear if the CJEU will address the most essential issues directly, because the case raises a number of complex legal issues that need to be examined in more detail.

As a starting point, the basic legal regime governing transfers to Facebook is the ‘Safe Harbour’ system, which takes the form of a Commission Decision finding that all American companies certifying their participation in a system for complying with basic data protection principles maintain an ‘adequate’ level of data protection. This is one of the ‘adequacy decisions’ that the Commission can make pursuant to the rules on the data protection Directive on transfers of personal data outside the EU (see further my recent blog post on the planned reforms to this system). Despite the doubts arising from the Snowden revelations, the Commission’s most recent report on the Safe Harbour system did not suggest that the system should be abandonned

Not everyone accepts these assertions, however. An Austrian citizen, Mr. Schrems, complained about the transfer of his personal data as a Facebook user pursuant to the Safe Harbour rules to the Irish data protection authority, which was competent in this matter because Facebook has a subsidiary in Ireland. The national authority argued that it could not take a decision on this complaint, because it was bound by the Commission’s decision. Moreover, it argued that the complaint was ‘frivolous’.

Mr. Schrems then challenged the authority’s decision before the Irish High Court. In its ruling today, the national judge therefore decided to send a question to the CJEU. Essentially, the question is whether the national data protection authority is bound by the Commission’s Decision, and whether that authority can conduct its own examination.

The first obvious question in this case is whether the American system infringes EU data protection law. Basing itself on the recent Digital Rights judgment of the CJEU, in which that Court ruled that the EU’s data retention Directive was invalid, the national court clearly believes that it does. While acknowledging the important anti-terrorist objectives of the law, the judge, when examining national constitutional law states that it is ‘very difficult’ to see how such mass surveillance ‘could pass any proportionality test or survive any constitutional scrutiny’. Indeed, such surveillance has ‘gloomy echoes’ of the mass surveillance carried out in ‘totalitarian states such as the [East Germany] of Ulbricht and Honeker’.

The judge equally believes that the US system is a violation of EU law, with no adequate or accessible safeguards available to EU citizens, and no consideration of EU law issues built in to the review process that does exist.

Is this analysis correct? There are two fundamental issues here which the national court doesn’t consider: the scope of the data protection directive, and the derogations from that Directive. On the question of scope, the CJEU previously found in its Passenger Name Records (PNR) judgment that the EU/US agreement which provided for the transfer of data from airlines to the US authorities was outside the scope of the data protection Directive, because it regulated essentially only the activities of law enforcement authorities, and the Directive does not apply to the ‘processing of personal data…in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope’ of EU law, such as…public security, defence, State security…and…criminal law’. On the other hand, the CJEU ruled that the data retention directive was correctly based on the EU’s internal market powers, since it essentially regulated the activity of private industry, albeit for public security objectives. While in this case, it might be argued that the American law in question falls within the first type of law, the Safe Harbour agreement clearly falls within the second. So it is a sort of hybrid question, but on balance the issue falls within the scope of the Directive, since the measure at issue is essentially the Safe Harbour agreement.

Secondly, the external transfer rules in the EU Directive do not refer expressly to the issue of derogations from data protection rights on public security grounds. Yet presumably some such derogations can exist, given that the Directive itself provides for public security derogations as regards the standard EU rules. Surely the security exceptions applied by third countries don’t have to be exactly the same as those applied by the Directive. But some form of minimum standard must apply. For the reasons set out by the national judge, however, there is a strong argument that the US rules fall below the standard of anything which the EU can accept as ‘adequate’.

Because the national judge takes these two issues for granted, there is no question sent to the CJEU on whether the American regime is either within the scope of the Directive, or violates the minimum standards of adequacy which the EU can accept as regards third states. But both these issues are absolutely essential in the debate over the post-Snowden relationship between the US and EU. It would therefore be desirable if the CJEU addressed them nonetheless.

Next, another problematic issue here is which set of EU data protection rules should apply: the external transfer rules, or the more stringent standard rules? The national court, along with the data protection authority, applies the external transfer rules, given Facebook’s certification under the Safe Harbour system. However, it is doubtful whether this is correct.

As is well known, in the recent Google Spain judgment, the CJEU ruled that the standard rules applied to Google’s search engine function, given that it had an ‘establishment’ in Spain, according to the Court’s interpretation of the rules. As I then argued on this blog, it probably follows from that judgment that the standard rules apply at least to some social networks like Facebook. In any event, the issue will arise again when the revised jurisdiction and external transfer rules, mentioned above, apply. However, the complainant and the national court assume that the external transfer rules apply. Perhaps the CJEU should also examine this issue of its own motion.

Another problematic issue is the question of how to challenge the inadequacy of data protection in practice in the US, which is the subject of the only question sent to the CJEU. The Safe Harbour agreement addresses this point directly, since it allows national data protection authorities to suspend data transfers as regards an individual company, in accordance with existing national law, if either the US government or the US enforcement system has found a violation of that agreement, or if:

there is a substantial likelihood that the Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not take adequate and timely steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to data subjects; and the competent authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to provide the organisation with notice and an opportunity to respond.

However, Irish national law does not provide for such a system, but simply sets out an irrebutable presumption that the Commission’s adequacy decision is sufficient. This rule may well have played a part in convincing Facebook and the subsidiaries of other US companies to set up in Ireland in the first place.
The challenge argued that the national data protection authority nevertheless had to exercise such powers, and so the national judge asked only whether this was possible. Logically, there can be only one answer, by extension from the NS judgment: Member States cannot create an irrebutable presumption that prevents the exercise of Charter rights, so the national data protection authority must have the powers in question.

In the alternative, or arguably additionally, it must be possible to challenge the validity of the Commission’s adequacy decision in the national courts, which would then have an obligation, if they thought that challenge was well-founded, to send questions on that point to the CJEU. (See the Foto-Frost judgment).

The next problematic issue is the role of the national constitutional protection for human rights. Clearly the national judge believes that the American system breaches the protection for the right to privacy guaranteed in the Irish constitution. Nevertheless, the national court proceeds to examine the issue primarily from the perspective of EU law. So if the CJEU rules against the challenge to the American law on the merits, or does not address those merits for procedural reasons, should the national court proceed to apply Irish law?

In principle, national constitutional law cannot apply here, since EU law, as the national court recognises, has extensively harmonised this issue. This means that, according to the Melloni judgment of the CJEU, only the EU’s human rights standards, in the form of the Charter, can apply. National constitutional standards cannot. But national courts in Ireland (and elsewhere) might be unwilling to accept that outcome.

National law would only apply if the CJEU rules that this issue falls entirely outside the scope of the Directive, as discussed above. If, on the other hand, the processing falls within a public security derogation from the Directive, the EU Charter would apply, by analogy with the CJEU’s recent judgment in Pfleger (discussed here), in which it ruled that the Charter applies to national derogations from EU free movement law. This parallels the argument (discussed here) that national data retention law falls within the scope of EU law, following the Digital Rights judgment, because it is a derogation from the EU’s e-privacy Directive.

Finally, the consequences of any future finding by the national data protection authority that transfers under the Safe Harbour decision must be suspended as regards Facebook must be considered. Assuming that the US had not changed its law in the meantime, Facebook would have a dilemma: should it comply with its US legal obligations, or face the suspension of transfers of data from Europe? Possibly it could avoid this dilemma by ensuring that it only processed EU residents’ data within the EU, potentially avoiding the scope of US law. But this might be expensive, and in any event the US might seek to extend the scope of its law to cover such cases. These issues would inevitably arise for other major US companies as well.

Any real prospect that Facebook transfers from the EU might be blocked would cause a major earthquake in EU/US relations, making the concerns about the recent Google Spain judgment look like a minor tremor. It may be that the only solution is for the US to take more seriously its ongoing discussions with the EU on data protection issues, with a view to reaching a solution that reconciles its security concerns with the basic principles of privacy protection.

Europe v Facebook: the beginning of the end for NSA spying on EU citizens?

Original published on EU LAW ANALYSIS
Wednesday, 18 June 2014

by Steve Peers

Since the revelations about the extent of spying by the American National Security Agency (NSA) revealed by Edward Snowden, doubts have increased about the adequacy of the data protection regime in the United States, in particular as regards its impact on EU citizens, who are subject to the more favourable regime established by the Data Protection Directive. One aspect of these doubts concerns the ability of the NSA to examine the content of communications processed by social media companies based in the USA, such as Facebook.

Today’s decision by the Irish High Court to send questions in the ‘Europe v Facebook’ case to the CJEU raises the possibility that the NSA’s access to EU citizens’ personal data might soon come to an end. But it’s not clear if the CJEU will address the most essential issues directly, because the case raises a number of complex legal issues that need to be examined in more detail.

As a starting point, the basic legal regime governing transfers to Facebook is the ‘Safe Harbour’ system, which takes the form of a Commission Decision finding that all American companies certifying their participation in a system for complying with basic data protection principles maintain an ‘adequate’ level of data protection. This is one of the ‘adequacy decisions’ that the Commission can make pursuant to the rules on the data protection Directive on transfers of personal data outside the EU (see further my recent blog post on the planned reforms to this system). Despite the doubts arising from the Snowden revelations, the Commission’s most recent report on the Safe Harbour system did not suggest that the system should be abandonned

Not everyone accepts these assertions, however. An Austrian citizen, Mr. Schrems, complained about the transfer of his personal data as a Facebook user pursuant to the Safe Harbour rules to the Irish data protection authority, which was competent in this matter because Facebook has a subsidiary in Ireland. The national authority argued that it could not take a decision on this complaint, because it was bound by the Commission’s decision. Moreover, it argued that the complaint was ‘frivolous’.

Mr. Schrems then challenged the authority’s decision before the Irish High Court. In its ruling today, the national judge therefore decided to send a question to the CJEU. Essentially, the question is whether the national data protection authority is bound by the Commission’s Decision, and whether that authority can conduct its own examination.

The first obvious question in this case is whether the American system infringes EU data protection law. Basing itself on the recent Digital Rights judgment of the CJEU, in which that Court ruled that the EU’s data retention Directive was invalid, the national court clearly believes that it does. While acknowledging the important anti-terrorist objectives of the law, the judge, when examining national constitutional law states that it is ‘very difficult’ to see how such mass surveillance ‘could pass any proportionality test or survive any constitutional scrutiny’. Indeed, such surveillance has ‘gloomy echoes’ of the mass surveillance carried out in ‘totalitarian states such as the [East Germany] of Ulbricht and Honeker’.

The judge equally believes that the US system is a violation of EU law, with no adequate or accessible safeguards available to EU citizens, and no consideration of EU law issues built in to the review process that does exist.

Is this analysis correct? There are two fundamental issues here which the national court doesn’t consider: the scope of the data protection directive, and the derogations from that Directive. On the question of scope, the CJEU previously found in its Passenger Name Records (PNR) judgment that the EU/US agreement which provided for the transfer of data from airlines to the US authorities was outside the scope of the data protection Directive, because it regulated essentially only the activities of law enforcement authorities, and the Directive does not apply to the ‘processing of personal data…in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope’ of EU law, such as…public security, defence, State security…and…criminal law’. On the other hand, the CJEU ruled that the data retention directive was correctly based on the EU’s internal market powers, since it essentially regulated the activity of private industry, albeit for public security objectives. While in this case, it might be argued that the American law in question falls within the first type of law, the Safe Harbour agreement clearly falls within the second. So it is a sort of hybrid question, but on balance the issue falls within the scope of the Directive, since the measure at issue is essentially the Safe Harbour agreement.

Secondly, the external transfer rules in the EU Directive do not refer expressly to the issue of derogations from data protection rights on public security grounds. Yet presumably some such derogations can exist, given that the Directive itself provides for public security derogations as regards the standard EU rules. Surely the security exceptions applied by third countries don’t have to be exactly the same as those applied by the Directive. But some form of minimum standard must apply. For the reasons set out by the national judge, however, there is a strong argument that the US rules fall below the standard of anything which the EU can accept as ‘adequate’.

Because the national judge takes these two issues for granted, there is no question sent to the CJEU on whether the American regime is either within the scope of the Directive, or violates the minimum standards of adequacy which the EU can accept as regards third states. But both these issues are absolutely essential in the debate over the post-Snowden relationship between the US and EU. It would therefore be desirable if the CJEU addressed them nonetheless.

Next, another problematic issue here is which set of EU data protection rules should apply: the external transfer rules, or the more stringent standard rules? The national court, along with the data protection authority, applies the external transfer rules, given Facebook’s certification under the Safe Harbour system. However, it is doubtful whether this is correct.

As is well known, in the recent Google Spain judgment, the CJEU ruled that the standard rules applied to Google’s search engine function, given that it had an ‘establishment’ in Spain, according to the Court’s interpretation of the rules. As I then argued on this blog, it probably follows from that judgment that the standard rules apply at least to some social networks like Facebook. In any event, the issue will arise again when the revised jurisdiction and external transfer rules, mentioned above, apply. However, the complainant and the national court assume that the external transfer rules apply. Perhaps the CJEU should also examine this issue of its own motion.

Another problematic issue is the question of how to challenge the inadequacy of data protection in practice in the US, which is the subject of the only question sent to the CJEU. The Safe Harbour agreement addresses this point directly, since it allows national data protection authorities to suspend data transfers as regards an individual company, in accordance with existing national law, if either the US government or the US enforcement system has found a violation of that agreement, or if:

there is a substantial likelihood that the Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not take adequate and timely steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to data subjects; and the competent authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to provide the organisation with notice and an opportunity to respond.

However, Irish national law does not provide for such a system, but simply sets out an irrebutable presumption that the Commission’s adequacy decision is sufficient. This rule may well have played a part in convincing Facebook and the subsidiaries of other US companies to set up in Ireland in the first place.
The challenge argued that the national data protection authority nevertheless had to exercise such powers, and so the national judge asked only whether this was possible. Logically, there can be only one answer, by extension from the NS judgment: Member States cannot create an irrebutable presumption that prevents the exercise of Charter rights, so the national data protection authority must have the powers in question.

In the alternative, or arguably additionally, it must be possible to challenge the validity of the Commission’s adequacy decision in the national courts, which would then have an obligation, if they thought that challenge was well-founded, to send questions on that point to the CJEU. (See the Foto-Frost judgment).

The next problematic issue is the role of the national constitutional protection for human rights. Clearly the national judge believes that the American system breaches the protection for the right to privacy guaranteed in the Irish constitution. Nevertheless, the national court proceeds to examine the issue primarily from the perspective of EU law. So if the CJEU rules against the challenge to the American law on the merits, or does not address those merits for procedural reasons, should the national court proceed to apply Irish law?

In principle, national constitutional law cannot apply here, since EU law, as the national court recognises, has extensively harmonised this issue. This means that, according to the Melloni judgment of the CJEU, only the EU’s human rights standards, in the form of the Charter, can apply. National constitutional standards cannot. But national courts in Ireland (and elsewhere) might be unwilling to accept that outcome.

National law would only apply if the CJEU rules that this issue falls entirely outside the scope of the Directive, as discussed above. If, on the other hand, the processing falls within a public security derogation from the Directive, the EU Charter would apply, by analogy with the CJEU’s recent judgment in Pfleger (discussed here), in which it ruled that the Charter applies to national derogations from EU free movement law. This parallels the argument (discussed here) that national data retention law falls within the scope of EU law, following the Digital Rights judgment, because it is a derogation from the EU’s e-privacy Directive.

Finally, the consequences of any future finding by the national data protection authority that transfers under the Safe Harbour decision must be suspended as regards Facebook must be considered. Assuming that the US had not changed its law in the meantime, Facebook would have a dilemma: should it comply with its US legal obligations, or face the suspension of transfers of data from Europe? Possibly it could avoid this dilemma by ensuring that it only processed EU residents’ data within the EU, potentially avoiding the scope of US law. But this might be expensive, and in any event the US might seek to extend the scope of its law to cover such cases. These issues would inevitably arise for other major US companies as well.

Any real prospect that Facebook transfers from the EU might be blocked would cause a major earthquake in EU/US relations, making the concerns about the recent Google Spain judgment look like a minor tremor. It may be that the only solution is for the US to take more seriously its ongoing discussions with the EU on data protection issues, with a view to reaching a solution that reconciles its security concerns with the basic principles of privacy protection.

The reform of Europol: modern EU agency, or intergovernmental dinosaur?

(ORIGINAL PUBLISHED on EU LAW ANALYSIS)

by Steve PEERS

Introduction

The EU’s police cooperation agency, Europol, has played a major role in the development of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation in the EU from an early stage. Europol was originally set up informally, then on the basis of a 1995 Convention, subsequently replaced by a Council Decision in 2009. While its powers have gradually been expanded, so has the controversy about its accountability and the adequacy of its data protection rules. Since it is a creature of the former ‘third pillar’ (the previous special rules on policing and criminal law) it is something of a ‘dinosaur’ in institutional terms, being an essentially intergovernmental body.

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament (EP) now has joint powers with the Council as regards the adoption of a Regulation governing Europol, and the Treaty now refers expressly to the importance of ensuring accountability to both national parliaments and the EP. Furthermore, the EU institutions agreed in 2012 a ‘Common Understanding’ on standard rules which would apply to the governance of EU agencies. To expand Europol’s powers further, while addressing the issues of governance, accountability and data protection, the Commission proposed a new Regulation reconstituting Europol in 2013.

At the most recent Justice and Home Affairs Council, ministers agreed the Council’s position on the Commission’s proposal. Since the European Parliament also recently agreed its own position, this clears the way for negotiations to take place between the two institutions for a final deal, once the EP is fully operational again following the recent elections. This is therefore a good time to examine the progress of discussions on the proposed Regulation so far.

It should be noted that Ireland has opted in to this proposed Regulation, while the UK and Denmark have opted out. The UK’s objections are due to the proposals to place national law enforcement bodies to comply with Europol’s requests to start investigations, and to supply information to Europol without a national security exception. However, as discussed further below, the Council’s and EP’s positions on the proposal address these issues, raising the possibility that the UK will opt in after adoption of the Regulation.

Europol’s powers
Continue reading “The reform of Europol: modern EU agency, or intergovernmental dinosaur?”

The European Investigation Order: shaping a new approach to mutual recognition in criminal matters.

By Steve PEERS (*) and Emilio DE CAPITANI (**)

The adoption of Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order (EIO) is a milestone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the European Union notably after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and of the EU Charter. This post focusses in turn on the broader legal context of the new Directive, its territorial scope in light of various opt-outs, and its important provisions on the relationship between human rights and mutual recognition.

A comprehensive single instrument

As from 22 May 2017, this Directive replaces most of the existing laws in a key area of judicial cooperation – the transfer of evidence between Member States in criminal cases – by a single new instrument which will make trans-border investigations faster and more efficient.
That current patchwork of rules comprises:
– the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 (and its two additional protocols);
– parts of the Schengen Convention;
– the 2000 EU Convention on Mutual assistance in criminal matters (and its Protocol);
– the 2008 Framework Decision on the European evidence warrant;[i] and
– the 2003 Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence (as regards freezing of evidence).

Unlike the European Evidence Warrant, which most Member States thought was useless and have not bothered to implement, the new Directive will cover almost all investigative measures such as interviewing witnesses, obtaining of information or evidence already in the possession of the executing authority, and (with additional safeguards) interception of telecommunications, and information on and monitoring of bank accounts.
The Directive will not apply to Schengen cross-border surveillance by police officers under the Schengen Convention, or to the setting up of a joint investigation team and the gathering of evidence within such a team which. According to the legislator, these issues “require specific rules which are better dealt with separately”.

A small part of the previous Conventions will remain in force because they regulate issues outside the scope of investigations, such as compensation for wrongful conviction. A handbook for practitioners will clarify this issue in future.

Territorial scope

Continue reading “The European Investigation Order: shaping a new approach to mutual recognition in criminal matters.”