7.1 Regular immigration – Page 12 – European Area of Freedom Security & Justice

Future of EU migration, home and justice policies. Some questions to the new candidates commissioners..

by Steve PEERS, Henri LABAYLE and Emilio DE CAPITANI

The would-be Commissioners for immigration and home affairs and Justice will shortly be questioned by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in hearings, to determine whether the EP should vote to confirm them in office. MEPs have already asked some written questions and the would-be Commissioners have replied. Since most of the written questions were not very searching (except for a couple of questions on data protection issues), the Commissioners did not reply in much detail. However, the hearings are an opportunity for MEPs to ascertain the Commissioners’ plans, and to secure important political commitments, in these fields. To that end, we have therefore suggested a number of oral questions which MEPs should ask in the hearings.

Immigration and asylum

The Commission consider that migration policy should be framed by the (non binding) objectives of the global approach to migration (GAMM) and relations with third countries should be dealt with by “Mobility Partnership” which are more diplomatic declarations than binding acts. Would you propose a binding legal basis for treaties with the countries concerned, grounded on Articles 77, 78 and 79 of the TFEU?

What actions will the Commission take to ensure that EU legislation in this field is fully and correctly implemented by the Member States?

Will the Commission propose an immediate amendment to the EU visa code, to confirm that Member States are obliged to give humanitarian visas to those who need them and who apply at Member States’ consulates in third countries?

When will the Commission propose EU legislation to guarantee mutual recognition of Member States’ decisions regarding international protection, including the transfer of protection?

When will the Commission make proposals for a framework for sharing responsibility for asylum-seekers and persons who have been granted international protection, starting with those who have applied outside the territory of the Member States?

Will the Commission propose an immigration code, and what will its main contents be?

The Court of Justice has recognised that search and rescue obligations are interlinked with external borders surveillance (Case C-355/10). The EU adopted rules in this field which governing only border control coordinated by Frontex. Do you intend to propose that such rules should apply to all Member States’ border controls as a general rule, by formally amending the Schengen Borders Code ?

What immediate and longer-term steps will the Commission take to address the death toll of migrants crossing the Mediterranean?

Will the Commission propose to amend the EU legislation on facilitation of unauthorised entry to confirm that anyone who saves migrants from death or injury during a border crossing, or who otherwise acts from humanitarian motives, is exempt from prosecution?

Internal Security and Police cooperation Continue reading “Future of EU migration, home and justice policies. Some questions to the new candidates commissioners..”

Two Codes to rule them all: the Borders and Visa Codes

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS HERE

Written by Steve PEERS

In today’s judgment in Air Baltic, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken the next logical step following its judgment late last year in Koushkaki, where it ruled that the EU’s visa code set out an exhaustive list of grounds for refusing a visa application. Today the Court has confirmed that the same is true of theSchengen Borders Code. Moreover, the Court has clarified a number of general and specific points about the nature and interpretation of the two codes.

Facts and judgment

This case concerned an Indian citizen who flew from Moscow to Riga. He had a valid multiple-entry Schengen visa, which was attached to a cancelled Indian passport. He also had a second Indian passport, which was valid but which did not contain a visa. The Latvian border guards then refused him entry into Latvia, on the grounds that the valid visa had to be attached to the valid passport, not to the cancelled passport.

For good measure, the Latvian authorities also fined the airline, Air Baltic, for transporting him without the necessary travel documents. The airline appealed the fine, and lost at first instance. But an appeal court then sent questions to the Court of Justice to clarify the legal position.

The CJEU ruled first of all that the cancellation of a passport by a third country did not mean that the visa attached to the passport was invalid. This was because only a Member State authority could annul or revoke a visa, and because the visa code did not allow for the annulment of a visa in such cases anyway. The Court extended its ruling in Koushkaki to confirm that the grounds for annulling a visa were exhaustive; the same must be true of the grounds for revoking a visa.

Secondly, the Court ruled that the Schengen Borders Code did not require entry to be refused in cases like these. The different language versions of that code suggested different interpretations, but as always, the Court seeks a uniform interpretation of EU law regardless. In this case, the standard form to be given to persons who were refused entry at the border to explain why they were refused does not provide for refusal on the grounds that a valid visa was not attached to a valid passport.

Also, the Court pointed out that the idea of separate visas and passports was not unknown to EU law, since the visa code provides that in cases where a Member State refuses to recognise a passport as valid, a visa must be issued as a separate document. Checking two separate documents was not a huge burden for border guards, and refusing entry simply on the grounds that the valid passports and visas were in two separate documents would infringe the principle of proportionality.

Finally, the Court ruled that the national authorities of Member States do not have any residual powers to refuse entry to third-country nationals on grounds besides those listed in the Schengen Borders Code. The Court reached this conclusion, by analogy with Koushkaki, because: the standard form giving the grounds for refusing entry contains an exhaustive list of grounds for refusal; the nature of the Schengen system ‘implies a common definition of the entry conditions’; and this interpretation would support ‘the objective of facilitating legitimate travel’ referred to in the preamble to the visa code.

Comments

The Court’s ruling that the Schengen Borders Code provides for complete harmonisation of the rules on refusal of entry is not really surprising, particularly after the judgment in Koushkaki reaching the equivalent conclusion regarding the visa code. However, it should be noted that in today’s judgment, the Court does not repeat its qualification in Koushkaki that national authorities had wide discretion to interpret the common rules in question. Furthermore, the Schengen Borders Code is relevant not only to those third-country nationals who need visas for entry, but also those who do not, such as visitors from the USA, Canada and most of the Western Balkans.

In effect, the Court’s ruling confirms that the Schengen zone is in effect the equivalent of the EU’s customs union, as regards the movement of people. Of course, the customs union and the Schengen zone do not apply to the same countries, due to opt-outs from Schengen (UK and Ireland), the deferred admission to the Schengen system (Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia), and the rules on association with each system (Turkey is part of the EU’s customs union, while Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland apply the Schengen rules). But the basic concept is the same, with the obvious implications as regards exclusive external competence of the EU (although a Protocol to the Treaties conserves some external competence over borders for Member States), and uniform interpretation of the rules in the respective codes.

As to the more detailed aspects of this case, the Court is surely right to rule against the pedantry of insisting that where a person holds a valid visa and a valid passport, the visa must always be attached to the passport. The underlying objective to ensure that the person concerned meets the conditions of entry is satisfied regardless of whether the visa is attached to the passport or not. Also, the Court’s ruling that the Borders Code has to be interpreted in accordance with the principle of proportionality, and in light of the objective of facilitating legitimate travel, could have broader implications in other cases.

Finally, the necessary corollary of the judgments in Koushkaki and Air Baltic is that a third-country national who meets the conditions to obtain a visa and/or cross the external borders has the right to that visa and/or to cross those borders. So these issues are not governed by national administrative discretion, but by uniform EU rules. The strengthening of the rule of law in this field is very welcome.

The Missed Opportunity of the “Ypres Guidelines” of the European Council Regarding Immigration and Asylum

Written by Philippe De Bruycker on July 29, 2014.
ORIGINAL Posted in EU, EU Migration Policies

The European Council of 26 and 27 June 2014 had to define the strategic guidelines for the legislative and operational planning within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for the next period (2014-2020 in line with the EU financial perspectives). It did so by also adopting a “Strategic Agenda for the Union in times of change” consisting of five priorities among which was a “Union of Freedom, Security and Justice”.

As no other name had been used, we called them the “Ypres Guidelines” because this was the Belgian city chosen by the President of the European Council to hold the summit commemorating World War 1. The Ypres guidelines succeed the Tampere conclusions (1999), The Hague programme (2004) and the Stockholm programme (2009) with which the European Council laid down the foundations and indicated the main directions for the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The preparatory discussion of these guidelines took place in a climate in which most stakeholders and observers considered that times have changed and a new programme was no longer necessary because the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice had reached a stage of maturity with the adoption of many legal and policy instruments. Following that line, the emphasis had to be put on the correct transposition of EU directives and the effective implementation of the instruments in place. The new guidelines reflect that priority but their added value is extremely limited. They constitute mainly a collection of previous general statements without commitment, as is the case with the guidelines on integration, return, resettlement, Frontex and the link between the internal and external dimensions of the immigration and asylum policy.

Even guideline n°3 on the main priority relating to the transposition and implementation of existing instruments is rather weak as it is silent on the crucial issue of how they should be evaluated and could therefore remain dead letter, which has already been the case in the past (see in particular a Commission Communication of 28 June 2006 followed by Council conclusions of 19 June 2007 , which were never implemented).

Contrary to guidelines n°8 on irregular migration and n°9 on external borders, one will also notice that guidelines n°6 and 7, on legal migration and asylum respectively, are not accompanied by specific requests. This reflects the true priorities of the EU and puts into evidence the disequilibrium between the different components of its migratory policy.

Despite their weaknesses, the Ypres guidelines may generate a lively academic debate as shown by the complete opposition between our own analysis and that of the Ceps, overestimating from our point of view their content considered as “a subversion of (a so-called) Lisbonisation of Justice and Home affairs”.

A quick review of the more specific guidelines leads us to formulate the following remarks:

Guideline n°7 focuses on highly skilled migration without requesting a revision of the so-called “Blue Card” directive on the admission of highly skilled workers like the new President of the Commission rightly did immediately. The implicit consideration that the EU does not need low or unskilled migration is also questionable when looking at the number of illegal migrants working in the European Union;

Guideline n°8 on asylum is characterised by a narrow understanding of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) reduced to the harmonisation process of Member States’ legislations and by the willingness to give asylum seekers the “same procedural guarantees and protection throughout the Union”, which, contrary to the general assumption on which the guidelines are built that no new legislation is necessary, would require legislative changes to the existing norms.

This guideline is however visionary by requiring a reinforcement of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) at the core of the emerging bottom-up approximation process of Member States’ practices, which is indispensable to complete the top-down legislative harmonisation undertaken in order to build a truly Common Asylum Policy. But this will once again require amending regulation 439/2010, which is the legal basis of the EASO… Reference to the mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions has unfortunately been deleted despite the requirements of the Treaties. This actually shows the level of distrust between the Member States;

Curiously, guideline n°8 on irregular migration mixes the root causes approach of migration with cooperation with third countries of origin and of transit of migrants in the field of migration and border management, while it is certainly necessary to prioritise the fight against smuggling and not just trafficking as has been the case. The worst point is the link established between those elements and the diminishing loss of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean. The European Council hopes that, in this way, it will save lives in the future, but for the moment and for many years, if not decades, to come it actually leaves the migrants to drown alone in the sea…

Guideline n°9 on external borders expresses the support of the European Council for the creation of the “Smart Borders” databases (the entry-exit system and the registered traveler programme) – which is not neutral as this is still a controversial issue (in particular with the European Parliament) – as well as support for the reinforcement of Frontex, which shows the contradictions between the European policies because the budget of this agency decreased between 2013 and 2014;
The second part of guideline n°9 on visas reflects the recent change in the perception of this policy in economic terms and requires its modernisation by facilitating legitimate travel. Unfortunately, the European Council only envisages a reinforcement of the local cooperation between the Schengen consulates, while it is the missing European institutional framework of that policy which needs to be invented;

It is difficult not to be disappointed by the Ypres Guidelines, on which it has been easy to build a consensus because they lack real content as noticed by another watchful observer of the EU policies on migration and asylum.

Their lack of ambition is confirmed in comparison with the proposals put forward by the Commission in a Communication entitled “An open and secure Europe: make it happen” of 11 March 2014, envisaging among other elements a platform for the exchange of information between Member States on labour market needs, a single area of migration based on mutual recognition rather than harmonisation and the creation of Schengen Visa Centres. Let us not even speak of future challenges that have been insufficiently taken into consideration, such as the concrete implementation of the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities between Member States, or even completely ignored, such as the mobility of third-country nationals.

The Ypres guidelines could be a paradoxical turning point with no guidance given by the European Council at the moment it proclaims the Union of Freedom, Security and Justice as one of the top five priorities of the EU. This draw-down of the European Council is not neutral from an institutional point of view.

The Commission could be seen as the winner of the process because, with such guidelines, its new members will be freer than they have previously been to set the future agenda of the EU. This could, however, be a pyrrhic victory as the Commission may have lost the political support of the European Council it precisely needs in its daily face to face with the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs, which has until now been the more reluctant institution in the building process of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

Let us hope that this episode does not announce the beginning of the decline of EU immigration and asylum policies , which could enter into a phase of stagnation focused on daily business despite the twists and turns they may create on the political agenda because of the media coverage of some events.

The fact that the question “What to do now?” came up immediately after their adoption shows not only the absence of real content in these guidelines, but also that the moment chosen for their adoption was not the right one.

Despite the protests of the European Parliament, the European Council decided to maintain its agenda as foreseen, with the consequence that the guidelines were prepared by a Commission and a President of the European Council who were finishing their mandate, and without a Parliament able to contribute to the process because of the elections.

The publication by the EU Italian Presidency on 1 July 2014 of several papers to reflect on the priorities of the Union of freedom, security and justice confirms that the Ypres guidelines will probably be quickly forgotten.

The new Commission, particularly as one of its members will be specifically in charge of migration, could be tempted to present a brand-new and complete programme. It is, however, unlikely that the Member States would appreciate the Commission devising its own programme for the EU just after having been told that such technique was outdated. Therefore, one way out could be to elaborate on the basis of the Ypres guidelines with a much more complete and detailed action plan to be adopted jointly with the Council of Ministers, such has been the case with the action plan implementing The Hague programme. This would also be an occasion to involve more closely the new European Parliament and the members of its Libe Committee in the definition of the agenda in order to build an inter-institutional consensus around sensitive policies that need as much political support as possible.

By Prof. Philippe De Bruycker, Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Centre at the RSCAS/EUI The views expressed by the authors are not necessarily the views of the Migration Policy Centre.

EU gives US six months to come clean on visa policy

Published on EurActiv (http://www.euractiv.com)

Source URL: http://www.euractiv.com/justice/eu-gives-usa-deadline-reciprocat-news-533275

Published: 05 February 2014

EXCLUSIVE / The European Commission has told the United States to lift visa requirements on Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia, whose citizens still need an entry permit to travel to the country.

Background

Back in 2008, when the nationals of twelve EU countries were subject to the visa requirement to travel to the US, the Commission warned that it may force American diplomats to apply for visas to travel to the European Union.

At that time, nationals of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia were excluded from the US Visa Waiver Programme, which allows visa-free travel. Washington has been refusing to grant visa-free access to US territory on a bloc-wide basis, saying it had to first ensure that each individual country fulfils its stringent security requirements.

At that time, EU officials have accused the US of attempting to undermine the Union’s common visa policy and force individual countries to agree to additional security measures that are in violation with Union rules on aviation security and data protection. [more]

The citizens of most EU countries travel without visas to a list of foreign countries, listed in annex II of Council Regulation No 539/2001. But the nationals of some new EU member states still need a visa to travel to countries such as the United States, Canada or Australia. A regulation which entered into force on 20 December requires EU countries to “react in common” on visa matters, especially in cases where foreign countries “subjects [EU] citizens to differing treatment”.

If within six months the problem is not solved, the EU could introduce visas for US diplomats, the Commission warned. But diplomats of the countries concerned told EurActiv they would continue to negotiate bilaterally to solve the problem.

New EU regulation on visa matters

According to the new regulation, the Commission can temporarily suspend the EU’s own visa exemptions on foreign countries if they have not lifted their visa requirements within six month. The Commission has warned in the past that such rules may force American diplomats to apply for visas to travel to the European Union, if Washington doesn’t lift the visa requirement for individual EU countries (see background).

The new legislation is an initiative of the European Parliament, which in a 2012 report drew a list of third countries maintaining visa requirements on some EU countries. Canada requires visas for nationals of Bulgaria and Romania, while Australia in theory applies a unified system of treatment of visa requests to all EU countries, but its visa grant to nationals of Bulgaria and Romania is by far the lowest. According to MEPs, the Lisbon Treaty gives new powers to the Union to request that its member countries are treated as a whole and that the USA reciprocates on visa policy.

US pressure on data exchange

The four EU countries were reportedly asked by Washington to sign certain bilateral agreements as a precondition for benefitting from the US Visa Waiver Program. One of them is a 2003 provision for the exchange of terrorism screening information (HSPD-6), which called for the establishment of a single consolidated watchlist to improve the identification, screening, and tracking of known or suspected terrorists and their supporters [more].

Another is the agreement on Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PSCS), requiring signatory countries to share biometric and other data of individuals, for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating serious criminal activity and terrorism, on a query basis. The US has signed such agreements with a number of EU countries already.

But the European Commission is reportedly not happy that individual countries sign data exchange agreements with the USA in the absence of a so-called EU-US Umbrella Agreement on data protection, which ensures EU citizens keep their rights when their data is processed in the US.

Diplomats from the countries lacking reciprocity in their visa affairs told EurActiv that their capitals would notify the Commission of their situation with third countries before the deadline of 9 February. According to the new regulation, if the US still applies visas for those countries 90 days following notification, the Commission may decide to suspend EU visa exemption for “certain categories of US nationals”, a jargon term referring to holders of diplomatic passports.

However, diplomats said they would pursue bilateral negotiations as well, suggesting they did not put too much hope in the EU common effort. Indeed, when the new regulation was adopted in December, it was accompanied by a statement by several member states who said that while raising the issue, the EU countries would also “take into account potential adverse political consequences that might arise from such proposals or decisions for the external relations, both of the Union and its Member States”. “This applies in particular to external relations with strategic partners,” says the statement, signed by Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, but also Poland, a country under US visa requirement.

Next Steps

9 Feb.: Deadline for the EU countries who are still under visa requirement to notify the Commission on their situation;
March: EU countries can ask the Commission that the EU suspends the visa exemption for certain categories of US nationals;
June: At the latest six months after publication of the regulation, the Commission may decide that the suspension of the visa obligation should take effect.

Steve PEERS : Amending the EU’s visa list legislation (Analysis – February 2014 )

ORIGINAL PUBSLISHED ON STATEWATCH

Steve Peers: Professor of Law, University of Essex

Background

The EU’s legislation defining the countries and territories whose nationals are (and are not) subject to a visa requirement to enter the EU is a crucial part of the EU’s immigration policy, and has a further significant impact on the EU’s external relations. In its current form, this legislation was originally adopted in 2001 (Regulation 539/2001), and was amended seven times up until 2010 (in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009 and twice in 2010), as well as by the last three accession agreements, without ever being codified.

A new amendment to the visa list rules was adopted in December 2013, and the European Parliament and the Council have also agreed on two further amendments to the rules, which will be officially adopted early in 2014. This analysis examines all of these recent changes, and presents an informally codified version of the text of what the Regulation will look like after they all take effect. Furthermore, the visa list Regulation was also amended back in summer 2013, as part of a set of amendments to the Schengen borders code and other EU visa legislation.

The amendment (which is also highlighted in the codified Regulation below) changed Articles 1(2) and 2 of the visa list Regulation in order to provide for a revised definition of ‘visa’. This was intended to overturn a ruling of the EU’s Court of Justice on the calculation of the time period during which a third-country national non-resident in the EU can visit (Case C241/05 Bot [2006] ECR I-9627).

The EU’s visa list rules are applicable to all the Member States (including Denmark) except the UK and Ireland, plus the four Schengen associates: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. This includes those newer Member States which do not yet apply all of the Schengen rules (Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia)

The three new amendments

(a) the December 2013 amendments

This first amendment, which came into force on 9 January 2014, did not make any amendment to the lists of countries and territories whose nationals do (or do not) need a visa to enter the EU. Instead, it set out three other changes to the rules: a new ‘safeguard clause’, a revised ‘reciprocity clause’ and revised rules on exemptions for categories of persons. These three issues will be considered in turn.

First of all, the ‘safeguard clause’ (new Article 1a; see also new Article 4a) provides for a possible fast-track reintroduction of visa requirements for the nationals of any country on the visa ‘white-list’ (ie whose nationals are not subject to a visa requirement) in cases where Member States believed that visa liberalisation has resulted in a sharp increase in irregular (‘illegal’) immigration. This change is mainly a response to concerns about the impact of the waiver of visa requirements for nationals of Western Balkan countries in 2009 and 2010, although the new safeguard clause could in theory apply to any country on the visa white-list. The Council (ie, Member States’ interior ministers) amended the Commission’s proposal so that the relevant rules leave more discretion. Both this new clause and the amended reciprocity clause must be reviewed in 2018 (new Article 1b).

Secondly, the Commission had proposed only a minor amendment to the rules governing ‘visa reciprocity’, ie the procedure for encouraging third States on the EU white-list to exempt citizens of all Member States from a visa requirement. These rules had been amended in 2005 to make them more diplomatic (the original version of 2001 had been too threatening to be credible). However, Member States had become disappointed with their application in recent years since Canada reintroduced visa requirements for Czech nationals and the Commission neither persuaded Canada to change its policy nor took any move towards retaliation. So during negotiations, the Council amended the reciprocity rules to make them tougher again, and the European Parliament insisted that they be tougher still. The revised Article 1(4) of the visa list Regulation (Article 1(5) was deleted; see also the new Article 4b); has therefore strengthened the rules to provide for a fast-track process of reimposing visa requirements upon countries like Canada. In fact, immediately after the new rules entered into force, Canada waived its visa requirement for Czech nationals again.

The negotiation of these provisions took some time because the European Parliament, the Council and Commission argued over the precise legal process that would govern the Commission’s use of the revised reciprocity clause. Ultimately, the Commission was dissatisfied with the final results and so threatened to bring a legal challenge to the final Regulation before the EU courts. It has until the beginning of March to do so.

Finally, the amendments to the rules on exemptions (Article 4) drop a cross-reference to repealed legislation, add an exemption from the rules for the crew of ships who visit the shore, and provide for an optional waiver of the visa requirement for refugees and stateless persons residing in the UK and Ireland. The Commission had proposed bigger changes to these rules, including a specific clause relating to the visa waiver which some Member States must extend to Turkish service providers due to the EU’s association agreement with Turkey, but these proposals were not accepted by the Council.

(b) the 2012 proposal

The 2012 proposal to amend the visa list, now agreed by the European Parliament and the Council, will amend the lists of States whose nationals require visas to enter most of the EU (see the Annexes to the Regulation). It will also insert into the Regulation a revised list of criteria to take into account when deciding which States will enjoy a visa waiver from the EU.

First of all, the new Regulation will waive the visa requirement for four categories of quasi-British citizens. This is in line with the Commission’s proposal, and was not contested by either the European Parliament or the Council.

Next, it will waive the visa requirement for nineteen countries, subject to the negotiation of a visa waiver agreement between the EU and each of those countries. The Commission had proposed sixteen of the countries concerned – all of them small tropical islands. But the Council had insisted that the United Arab Emirates be added, and then the European Parliament had insisted that Peru and Colombia be added too. The UAE will be the first Muslim (or Arab) country to be on the EU’s whitelist (countries whose nationals do not require visas). As for Peru and Colombia, this will be the first time that countries which the EU had previously moved to its ‘blacklist’ (countries whose nationals require visas) have returned to the whitelist (those States were moved to the blacklist back in 1995 and 2001 respectively). It seems that the European Parliament was particularly keen to reward these countries for signing a free trade agreement with the EU recently.

This brings us to the third change – the new clause in the main text of the Regulation spelling out the criteria for deciding which States’ nationals must be subject to a visa requirement. This clause was already in the preamble to the Regulation (see recital 5), and has been added to the main text because the European Parliament insisted upon it. Also, the Parliament insisted upon changing the criteria, to add references to ‘economic benefits’ such as ‘tourism and foreign trade’, as well as ‘respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms

(c) the 2013 proposal

The 2013 proposal has one purpose only – to exempt Moldova from the visa requirement. Along with most other States to the east of the EU (as well as Kosovo, and now also Turkey), Moldova has been participating in a ‘visa dialogue’ with the EU, in which the EU set a number of benchmarks and judged whether Moldova had met them before considering waiving the visa requirement. The Commission judged that Moldova had met all the requirements set out in this dialogue, although its proposal (just before the high-profile Eastern Partnership summit last November) was presumably timed for maximum political effect. Moldova is the first Eastern Partnership state to qualify for visa exemption – although the Western Balkans States had also qualified in 2009-10, following their own visa dialogue. Of course, the visa waiver for Moldova must be seen in light of the new rules, discussed above, which allow for a fast-track reimposition of visa requirements.

Assessment

Following the upcoming amendments, the visa Regulation will have been amended fourteen times: eleven times by legislation and three times by accession agreements. In the interest of public transparency, an official codification of these rules is therefore obviously urgent.

As for the substance of the amendments, the decision to apply or waive a visa obligation is an important part of the external relations policy of both the EU and its Member States. So this explains Member States’ desire to retain their remaining discretion as regards visa policy for various categories of persons. It also explains their collective desire, bolstered by the European Parliament, to assert the EU’s authority more forcefully as regards visa policy by the creation of two new fast-track powers to impose visa obligations (as regards reciprocity and safeguards), while retaining a lot of political discretion when using such powers.

In particular, the possible use of the safeguard power will likely entail many contacts between the Commission and the affected third States, perhaps entailing setting benchmarks for staying on the white list which might be compared to those benchmarks which are already set for getting on to that list.

Since the Member States wanted to ensure some control over the Commission in this area, it is not surprising that the European Parliament wanted to do so as well, via means of the use of ‘delegated acts’ which the EP could possibly block the Commission from adopting. The new amendments also demonstrate, for the first time in practice, the EP’s important role as regards the substance of the EU’s visa policy, given its successful demand to extend a visa waiver to Peru and Colombia and to change the grounds determining whether a visa requirement is waived or not.

Member States also asserted their control over the Court of Justice, overturning a judgment that irritated interior ministries, and refusing to make express reference to other case law that irritated them even more, by preventing them from imposing visa requirements on at least some Turkish visitors (Case C-228/06 Soysal; but see the later judgment in Case C-221/11 Demirkan, in which the Court of Justice deferred to Member States’ desire to retain a visa requirement for Turkish tourists). However, as noted already, Turkey has now started a visa dialogue with the EU, in return for signing a readmission agreement.

In general, Member States are clearly unwilling to consider the possibility of a system of decision-making on visa requirements which relies more on objective evidence about trends in irregular migration (as the Commission had proposed, to a limited degree, as regards the new safeguard clause) and less upon discretion, power politics and gestures synchronised with certain Member States’ election cycles.

Sources Continue reading “Steve PEERS : Amending the EU’s visa list legislation (Analysis – February 2014 )”

The EP and the Council agree on the new EU legal framework for seasonal workers

by Emilio De Capitani

After more than three years of negotiations the European Parliament has finally approuved (with 498 votes in favour 56 aginst and 68 abstentions) on February 5th the agreement with the Council on the new legal framework for seasonal workers in the European Union. The text will be finalised and linguistically revised in the coming weeks published in the Official Journal and should be transposed in national law after 30 months since its entry into force (end of 2016 or beginning of 2017)

It will replace a non binding EU Council Resolution which dates back to 1994 and which included some elements defining the notion of “seasonal” worker. According to the new Directive ’seasonal worker’ “means a third-country national who retains his or her principal place of residence in a third country and stays legally and temporarily in the territory of a Member State to carry out an activity dependent on the passing of the seasons”. In more plain terms seasonal workers are people generally engaged in non- or low-skilled economy sectors of the receiving country’s in particular in agriculture during the planting or harvesting period, or in tourism in hotels and catering in particular during the holiday period.(1) Regrettably for this kind of activities the risk of exploitation and sub-standard working conditions threatening the workers’ health and safety is very high also due to the fact that they are very often linguistically or geographically isolated. Around 100.000 people in the EU could fall currently in this category of workers (2).

The main objective of the new legislation is to overcome the existing patchwork of national legislation and of bilateral agreements by establishing the first EU scheme on circular migration where workers while keeping their residence outside the EU could have the chance to come in the EU every year for the same season (re-entry would be facilitated for third-country nationals who were admitted to the Member State as seasonal workers at least once within the previous five years).

Due to the very different economies in the MS (think to the situation which could exist in Finland or in Greece) it will be up to the MS when transposing the Directive to define in consultation with social partners, those sectors of employment which include activities which can be considered of “seasonal” nature.

The maximum period of stay will be between five and nine months in any 12‐month period and non EU seasonal workers may work for more than one employer during that period. For stays not exceeding three months, the provisions of the Directive shall apply without prejudice to the Schengen acquis. The Seasonal worker candidate should have a valid work contract or, a binding job offer which specifies the place and type of the work, duration of employment, the remuneration and the working hours per week. He should give evidence of having applied for sickness insurance and will have adequate accommodation. For admission for stays exceeding three months Member States shall issue a long-stay visa, indicating that it is issued for the purpose of seasonal work or a seasonal worker permit or a seasonal worker permit and a long-stay visa, (if the long-stay visa is required under national law for entering the territory). Most importantly the applicants must also also have sufficient resources without having recourse to Member States social assistance systems.

The main improvement arising from the new Directive will be that seasonal workers will be granted equal treatment with EU nationals at least with regard to (inter alia) terms of employment, including the minimum working age, and working conditions, including pay and dismissal, working hours, leave and holidays, the right to strike, education and vocational training, recognition of diplomas, etc. Member States may restrict equal treatment, particular with regard to access to certain social assistance.

Member States may determine whether the application is to be made by a third country national or by the employer (or both). Member States shall also designate the authorities competent to receive and decide on the application for and to issue a seasonal worker permit following a single application procedure.

Effective mechanisms through which seasonal workers may lodge complaints against their employers directly or through third parties, and measures protecting against dismissal or other adverse treatment by the employer as a reaction to a complaint must also be foressen. The employer shall be liable to pay compensation to the seasonal worker as it will be the case when the employer is a subcontractor, the main contractor and any intermediate subcontractor who have not undertaken due diligence obligations as defined by national law.

Sanctions against employers who have not fulfilled their obligations shall be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (following the classical “Greek Maize” formula).

The draft Directive list also the cases when an application may be rejected. This will be notably the case when the vacancy in question could be filled by nationals of the Member State concerned or by other Union citizens, or by third-country nationals lawfully residing in the Member State (principle of “Union preference”). It can also be rejected when the applicant might pose a threat to public policy, public security or public health.
Other grounds of rejection could arise from employer’s misgivings (when he has been sanctioned for undeclared work and/or illegal employment or where the employer’s business is being or has been wound up under national insolvency laws or where the employer has failed to meet its legal obligations regarding social security, taxation, labour rights, working conditions or terms of employment). The authorisation for the purpose of seasonal work granted may also be withdrawn if the third-country national applies for international protection.
Continue reading “The EP and the Council agree on the new EU legal framework for seasonal workers”

Analysis: EU rules on maritime rescue: Member States quibble while migrants drown…

by Steve Peers Professor of Law, University of Essex

PUBLISHED ON STATEWATCH

22 October 2013

Introduction

For many years now, the death toll of migrants who drown while attempting to reach the European Union in search of a better life has tragically been rising. Most recently, public opinion was particularly shocked when hundreds of migrants drowned when a single vessel sank off the coast of Italy. The Italian government has called for the EU to adopt an action plan to deal with the issue, and the Prime Minister of Malta, calling the Mediterranean a ‘graveyard’, has called on the EU to act.

Yet shockingly, these Member States, along with four others, are blocking an EU proposal on the table that contains concrete rules on the search and rescue of migrants – precisely and solely because it contains rules on search and rescue (along with disembarkation) of migrants. In fact, they describe their opposition to such rules as a ‘red line’, ie they refuse to negotiate on their opposition to any detailed EU rules which concern saving migrants’ lives.

The following analysis examines the background to this issue and assesses these Member States’ objections. It concludes that their legal objections to this proposal are clearly groundless. Furthermore, of course, from a political point of view, the hypocrisy and inhumanity of these Member States’ position speaks for itself.

Background

Due to widespread concerns about the accountability and legality of the actions of the EU’s border agency, known as ‘Frontex’, when it coordinates Member States’ maritime surveillance operations, EU rules on this issue were first adopted in 2010.

These rules initially took the form of a Council Decision implementing the EU legislation on the control of external borders, which is known as the ‘Schengen Borders Code’. The 2010 Council Decision included binding rules on interception at sea, and apparently non-binding rules on search and rescue and disembarkation of migrants.

A majority of those members of the European Parliament (EP) who voted on this Council Decision opposed it, and so the EP decided to sue the Council before the Court of Justice to annul the decision. The EP won its case, when the Court ruled in September 2012 that the Council Decision had to be annulled.

According to the Court, this Decision should have been adopted as a legislative act, because it addressed issues that affected the human rights of the persons concerned, and regulated the coercive powers of border guards; the Court also clarified that the rules in the Decision on search and rescue and disembarkation were in fact binding. However, the Court maintained the 2010 Decision in force until its replacement by a legislative act.

In spring 2013, the Commission proposed such a replacement act, which has to be adopted by means of the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, ie a qualified majority vote in the Council (Member States’ ministers) and joint decision-making powers of the European Parliament. This proposal took over much of the text of the Council decision, but also added some further details as regards search and rescue and disembarkation, confirming also that these rules were binding. Like the 2010 Council decision, the proposal is limited to cases where Frontex coordinates Member States’ maritime surveillance.

While the European Parliament is broadly supportive of this proposal, suggesting only modest amendments, a group of Mediterranean Member States opposes the idea of any EU measure containing any detailed binding rules on search and rescue and disembarkation – even though such provisions are the most important rules in the 2013 proposal as regards saving migrants’ lives and their subsequent welfare.

The proposed search and rescue and disembarkation rules

The relevant parts of the 2013 proposal are Article 9 (search and rescue) and Article 10 (disembarkation).
Article 9 contains first of all a general obligation to ‘render assistance to any ship or person under distress at sea’. It defines further what is meant by a condition of ‘uncertainty’, ‘alert’ or ‘distress’, and provides for general rules on coordination of operations in such cases.

As for disembarkation, Article 10 contains rules to determine where migrants should be disembarked if they are intercepted or rescued. If they are intercepted in the territorial water or nearby maritime zone of a Member State participating in Frontex operations, they must be disembarked in the territory of that State.

If they are intercepted in the high seas (ie waters which no State has a legal claim to, under the international law of the sea), then they should be disembarked in the State which they departed from – subject to the rules in Article 4 of the proposal, on the protection of fundamental rights. In the case of search and rescue operations, there are no specific rules on which State to disembark migrants in, but Article 4 implicitly applies here as well.

The rules in Article 4 prohibit sending a person to a State ‘where there is a serious risk that such person would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or from which there is a serious risk of expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of nonrefoulement’.

This clause reflects the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, in a case called Hirsi v. Italy, where Italy was condemned for ‘pushing back’ boats full of migrants to Colonel Khadafy’s Libya.

Member States’ objections

The group of Member States objecting to Articles 9 and 10 state that the EU has no competence over issues relating to search and rescue or disembarkation.

First of all, as regards disembarkation, this objection is clearly ridiculous.
The admission of a migrant onto a Member State’s territory, or removal to a third State’s territory, is obviously an inherent part and parcel of immigration policy, and the Treaties empower the EU to develop a ‘common immigration policy’. Equally, the Treaties give the power for the EU to adopt rules on border controls, and it would be absurd to adopt rules governing the interception of migrants without addressing the obvious corollary question of what to do with the migrants once the border guards catch them.

Secondly, at first sight, the objections to EU competence as regards search and rescue rules have more force. Certainly, there is nothing in the EU Treaties which gives the EU power to regulate searches and rescues generally. But the 2013 proposal would not do that: it would only regulate searches and rescues in the context of the EU’s border controls policy, and only where maritime surveillance was coordinated by Frontex.

Can the EU regulate searches and rescues in such cases?
The case law of the Court of Justice on public health issues should logically apply by analogy.
The Court has ruled that while the EU cannot regulate public health generally, it can take account of public health concerns when it adopts legislation (for instance, on tobacco advertising, cigarette content or the packaging of cigarettes) which is principally concerned with regulating the EU’s internal market. Similarly, the EU’s General Court has ruled that EU legislation can take account of the life and welfare of seals, if it adopts legislation on the sale of seal products that mainly concerns the internal market.

If EU internal market law can concern itself with the long-term effects of cigarette smoking for smokers, or the immediate effect of clubbing on seals, then surely EU law on border controls can concern itself with the effect of imminent drowning upon migrants, where there is a direct connection with maritime surveillance.
And there is bound to be such a connection: EU rules stepping up maritime surveillance, while they have (and legally must have) the principal purpose of controlling entry onto the territory of the Member States, will in some cases fall to be applied when the persons planning such entry are about to drown. It should be recalled, as explained above, that the proposal only sets out a general obligation to assist vessels in distress and to coordinate action in emergency situations.

Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that the proposed rules will apply only to operations coordinated by Frontex – an EU agency, funded entirely by money from the EU budget.

Why should the EU not have the power to set conditions before its agency (spending its money) assists Member States with maritime surveillance, in the same way that it has the power to set conditions on its financial assistance to its Member States, or third countries?

Another objection of the six Member States is the compatibility of the proposed Regulation with international law. The obvious way to address this problem (if it exists) is to amend the Regulation to ensure that it is consistent with international law. Anyway, the preamble to the legislation (recital 4) states that it must be applied consistently with international law: Member States did not object to such vague references to international law in readmission treaties, or in much of the EU’s legislation on irregular migration orborder controls.

The six objecting Member States seem to be concerned also about the proposal’s mere overlap (as distinct from conflict) with international law – but the EU adopts an enormous amount of legislation (on the environment, for instance) which overlaps with international law, and aims to provide for the detailed and effective implementation of the relevant international law obligations.

More fundamentally, eviscerating the proposed rules on disembarkation would empty the protection of Article 4 of the proposal (on ensuring the safety of persons sent to third countries) of much of its practical content – but, as explained above, this part of the proposal reflects important case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, removing or weakening the provisions on search and rescue would subtract from the proposal any added value as regards protection of the right to life – another key obligation of human rights law. One can only conclude that the six Member States in question come not to praise international law, but to bury it.

Conclusion

Member States rightly rejected specious and cynical legal arguments made throughout the last decade to justify torture, abduction and indefinite detention without trial in the name of the ‘war on terror’.
Of course, control of immigration is a different issue, but the legal arguments raised by these six Member States are equally specious and cynical – and should equally be rejected. The EU bears its share of responsibility (alongside its Member States) for the deaths of hundreds of migrants – but that must also mean that the Union should be able to make some concrete contribution towards reducing this death toll in future.

Sources

2010 Council Decision
Judgment of Court of Justice – Case C-355/10:
2013 Commission proposal –
European Parliament draft report–
Objections of six Member States –
Presidency proposal –
Positions of Member States on entire proposal

Statewatch does not have a corporate view, nor does it seek to create one, the views expressed are those of the author. Statewatch is not responsible for the content of external websites and inclusion of a link does not constitute an endorsement.© Statewatch ISSN 1756-851X. Personal usage as private individuals/”fair dealing” is allowed. We also welcome links to material on our site. Usage by those working for organisations is allowed only if the organisation holds an appropriate licence from the relevant reprographic rights organisation (eg: Copyright Licensing Agency in the UK) with such usage being subject to the terms and conditions of that licence and to local copyright law.

NEW!! : subscribe to the first summer school on the EAFSJ…

Roma, 8-11 July
Sala conferenze Fondazione Basso – via della Dogana Vecchia, 5 – Roma

The European Area of Freedom Security and Justice (EAFSJ): scope, objectives, actors and dynamics.

Aim: to take stock of the current state of EAFSJ and of its foreseeable evolution within the next multiannual program 2015-2019 (to be adopted under Italian Presidency at the beginning of the next legislature).
Lenght: 4 one day modules
Subscriptions: on line on the Fondazione Basso internet site : http://www.fondazionebasso.it
Participation fees:
Euro 480,00 (ORDINARY FEE).
Euro 200,00 (FOR STUDENTS / RESEARCHERS) .
(Bank Account of Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso – Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Ag. Senato Palazzo Madama: IBAN IT18I0100503373000000002777 ).
Subscriptions should be submitted before June 15th.The Summer School will take place only if a minimum number of subscribers is reached !For further information : tel. 0039.06.6879953 – basso@fondazionebasso.it
Languages: lessons will be mainly in Italian (some lessons will be in English and French), teaching material will be in Italian and/or English, French.
English/Italian translation will be available.
The programme is on the web-site of Fondazione Basso (www.fondazionebasso.it -Tel. 06.6879953 – email: basso@fondazionebasso.it)

July 8th
A Constitutional and Institutional perspective
09h00 am – 06h30 pm

Opening speeches:
Valerio Onida: Freedom, Security and Justice related policies from a constitutional perspective and in relation with international and supranational dimensions
Stefano Manservisi: After the Stockholm Programme : how to preserve the specificity of the European Area of freedom security and Justice related policies by integrating them in the general EU governance and legal framework?

Debate

Freedom Security and Justice as the core of the common constitutional european heritage
Protecting fundamental rights: the impact of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. A common European Constitutional Heritage arising from the Council of Europe and European Union European Courts. What can be expected from the Strasbourg Human Rights Court in areas related to the FSJ?.
Speaker: Giuseppe Cataldi

Freedom Security and Justice as the core of the common constitutional european heritage
Promoting fundamental rights: the European Charter and its impact on EU policies. Even if the Charter does not extend the EU competencies it is now a constitutional parameter to be taken in account not only by the European judges but also by the EU legislature, even for policies designed with a more limited scope.
Speaker:Ezio Perillo

Debate

Evolution and transformation of the principle of Primacy of EU law. Dialogue and mutual influence of European and national Constitutional Courts.
Fifty years after the landmark case of Van Gend en Loos and four years after the Lissabon-Urteil (Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment of 30.6.2009), the tensions between EU “limits” and national “counter-limits” could arise again notably in the EAFSJ area.
Speaker: Oreste Pollicino

The EAFSJ a cross road of European and national founding values (art. 2), as well as for fundamental and European citizenship rights. How manage the indivisibility of rights and a Member States differentiated integration ?
(Opt-in Opt-out Countries). How far can the EU impact on Member States internal legislation (Towards a “reverse Solange” mechanism)? How the EU and Council of Europe can influence national fundamental rights related policies
Speaker: Nicoletta Parisi

The EAFSJ as supranational constitutional area of democracy. From National State to the European Union: what kind of relation between national and european legal orders ?
Sixty years of EU integration have changed the concept of democracy and sovereignty. There is a metamorphosis in National State’ s traditional role and its constitutional elements such as territory, citizenship and sovereign power. The Kantian vision of a peaceful cosmopolitan project mirrors the category of EU citizenship arising in the EAFSJ. Today Habermas developed the concept of “Constitutional patriottism”, underlying a “constitutionalisation” of the European supranational area. What are the pro and cons of this EU perspective ? The post-Lisbon Treaty stressed that the EAFSJ is becoming the embryo of a European public sphere as well as of a first example of supranational democracy.
Speaker: Francesca Ferraro

Debate

July 9th
Institutional dynamics and EU practices
09h30 am – 06h30 pm

The EAFSJ before Lisbon. The intergovernmental cooperation. From “TREVI” via “Schengen” to Amsterdam. The first phase.
How formerly excluded EAFSJ related policies have been integrated into the EU framework. TREVI cooperation, the Schengen agreement (1985) and its 1990 Implementing Convention as well as the Dublin Convention on Asylum.
The emerging notion of supranational space in the Single European Act (1986). The mutual recognition principle in the Internal Market and in EAFSJ-related policies. The Schengen Acquis in the EU legal framework from Amsterdam to Lisbon. Opt-in and Opt-out Countries: the impact of differentiated integration. Schengen relevance and ECJ jurisprudence on the preservation of the Schengen system consistency. From cooperation to integration.
Speaker: Dino Rinoldi

Debate

The EAFSJ after Lisbon (1). How the EAFSJ specificity has been preserved by progressively integrating it in the ordinary EU (communitarized) legal institutional framework. The impact on the EU institutions and on the MS.
Dynamics and the role of the Institutions in promoting, negotiating and implementing the EAFSJ-related policies. European Council, European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Commission and Court of Justice interplaying in the EAFSJ. The preparatory work conducted behind the scene by the Commission Directorates General, the Council working bodies – COREPER, CATS, COSI – and the EP parliamentary committees
Speaker: Antonio Caiola

The EAFSJ after Lisbon (2) How democratic principles are fulfilled in the EAFSJ. The impact of the EP on legislative procedures.
The interparliamentary dialogue and the way how the EP and national parliaments play their role when verifying the subsidiarity and proportionality principles in the EAFSJ policies. The emerging role at EU level of “political families” represented at national European and international level (European political parties, EP political groups, national parties).
Speaker: Emilio De Capitani

Debate

The EAFSJ after Lisbon (3). How EU policies are framed and implemented at national level. How cooperation, mutual recognition and harmonisation are implemented
How EAFSJ policies are implemented at national level. Problems and opportunities arising notably when implementing the mutual recognition of other EU countries’ measures. How intertwined are the EU and national administration in the EAFSJ related policies. Is there complementarity between EU and National strategies? The EU financial levy as a facilitator of mutual EU-national coordination. The emerging role of EU Authorities and Agencies as a support and meeting space also for national administrations (Ombudsman, FRA, EDPS, FRONTEX, EASO, EMCDDA, EUROPOL, OLAF, CEPOL, EUROJUST, …).
Speaker: Lorenzo Salazar

Debate

July 10th
An European space of freedom and rights
09h30 am- 06h30 pm

The EAFSJ after Lisbon (4) Placing the individuale at the heart of EU activities
How EU legislation implements the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The ECJ jurisprudence and the phenomenon of reverse discrimination. EU citizenship-related jurisprudence. Judicial action at national and European level founded on the EU Charter. Infringement of EU founding values and fundamental rights as possible exceptions to the mutual recognition obligations? Fundamental Rights Agency.
Speaker: Valentina Bazzocchi

The EU evolving framework of Transparency, access to documents, principle of good administration, and of classified information
After Lisbon a more transparent independent and efficient EU administration can be founded on Arts 15 and 298 of the TFEU as well as Arts 41 and 42 of the European Charter. However the close intertwining of the EU and the Member States has created a hybrid system of European Classified Information (EUCI), which is particularly relevant in the EAFSJ policies. How do European and national institutions implement the EU principles? How is the principle of good administration secured? What role should the EU Ombudsman play?
Speaker: Deirdre Curtin

Protection of Personal Data. The EU reform.
After the Lisbon Treaty and the merger of the so-called first and third pillars, protection of personal data can be framed in a globally consistent manner. Informational self determination, protection against possible abuses by the private sector as well as by public sector (law enforcement authorities) can now be framed at European level by taking stock of the lessons learned at national and international level (Council of Europe, OECD). How to preserve the role of national authorities and of the new coordinating body.
Speaker: Vanna Palumbo

Freedom of movement border integrated management
Freedom of movement of European citizens as well as of third country nationals in the EU remains a central and controversial issue. The integrated external border management is progressively framed at legislative level (borders, visas..) and implemented at operational level also thanks to the emerging role of Frontex and of the new European networks (SIS II – VIS). New opportunities as well as risks emerge in the definition of the EU-Member State management of internal and external borders
Speaker: Luisa Marin

Debate

European Migratory policies
Objectives, legal framework and operational setting of the EU-Member State policies. Five years after the European Pact on Asylum and Migration (2008), what lessons can be drawn for the next (2015-2019) multiannual programme? What improvements can be foreseen for the EU migration governance at central and national level? How are the Member States implementing the EU legislation? What are the main external aspects of the EU migration policy?
Speaker: Henry Labayle

The European common asylum system (and of EASO and EURODAC)
After the first generation of EU “minimum” rules the EU has now established the Common European Asylum System foreseen by Art. 18 of the Charter and Art 78 of the TFEU by taking account of the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts. At national level high standards should be granted to avoid the problems found for instance with Greece when implementing the Dublin system. The principle of solidarity still seems to be underexploited. Attention should be paid to the new role of EASO (Reg. (EU) No 439/2010) as well as to the implementation of the EURODAC system.
Speaker: Patricia Van de Peer

Debate

July 11
An European space of security and justice
09h30 am -06h30 pm

Judicial cooperation in civil matters; complement of the freedom of movement?
Judicial cooperation in civil matters has been one of the most dynamic domains after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Enhanced cooperation took place in matrimonial matters and intellectual property. Special attention will be reserved for the recently revised Brussels I Regulation (which abolished the “exequatur” procedure) as well as for the new Regulations on succession and wills and on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters.
Speaker: Filomena Albano

Internal security strategy: crisis prevention and management.
Special attention will be paid to the implementation of the 2010 European Internal Security Strategy and its impact on the cooperation between the EU institutions and agencies as framed by the “Policy Cycle” for the 2013-2017 period. There will also be a presentation of the implementation of PRUM cooperation and of the “availability principle” as well as the way how security- and intelligence-related information is exchanged notably within the framework of the so-called “Swedish Initiative”. The role played by COSI, Europol and of the internal security fund will be presented and debated together with the impact of the up-coming “Lisbonisation” of EU measures adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
Speaker: Sandro Menichelli

Debate

Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters
How judicial cooperation in criminal matters has been developed between countries of different legal traditions (civil and common law). Problems and opportunities arising at each level of cross-border cooperation (open coordination, mutual recognition, legislative harmonisation). The European jurisprudence (Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts) as well as the impact of the EU Charter. The implementation of the first post-Lisbon measures and impact of the Lisbonisation of former third pillar measures in this domain. Preserving the independence of the judiciary: towards European-wide judiciary quality evaluation systems.
Speaker: Luca De Matteis

The European Public Prosecutor: a pattern also for Member States?
The OLAF Reform and the Eurojust “Lisbonisation” are intermediate phases towards the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s office (EPPO) (Art. 86 TFEU). The latter will be empowered to bring action also before national courts. The European legislation will determine the general rules applicable to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the conditions governing the performance of its functions, the rules of procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the admissibility of evidence, and the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in the performance of its functions. What will be the impact, the risks and opportunities arising from the creation of this new European Institution?
Speaker: Claudia Gualtieri

How to empower the EU citizens when EAFSJ are shaped and implemented ?
Round Table with the Intervention of Paul Nemitz, Antonie Cahen, Robert Bray Tony Bunyan

Final Debate

PRESENTATION OF THE COURSE

The Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, constituted an important step both at the legal level and at the political level in the evolution of the European Union. The aim of the EU now is not only “… to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”, having presided over, since the end of the Second World War, the longest ever period of peace between European States, but also to achieve “… an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States.”

After the Treaty of Lisbon, the policies already provided for in the Maastricht Treaty within the framework of the so-called “third pillar” and originally focused mainly on intergovernmental cooperation and cooperation between administrations, are now to evolve into European “common policies” directly towards the interests of the individual, who is placed “at the heart of European integration.”

It is a Copernican revolution in so far as the Union is called not only to offer “… its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime” (Art. 3 TEU and Title V TFEU) but also to promote (and not only protect) fundamental rights and prevent all forms of discrimination (Art. 10 TFEU) and strengthen EU citizenship (Arts 18-25 TFEU) and with it the democratic principles on which it is based (Title II TEU).

The fact that the competences related to the ASFJ are now “shared” with the Member States (Art. 4 TEU) and are to be focused on the rights of the person brings about a daily interaction between the national and the European level, bringing into play national and European values, rights and objectives.

The process of reciprocal hybridization between the nascent European model and traditional national models is anything but politically painless, as the experience of almost thirty years of Schengen cooperation shows.

The aim of this Summer School is to assess the progress and difficulties encountered by the European institutions and the Member States in implementing the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the objectives set by the European Council in the “Stockholm Programme” of 10 December 2009.

Based on this evaluation, we intend to shed light on the possible priority bearing in mind that:
– it will be necessary to adjust the secondary legislation of the European Union in the light of the values and principles which are now enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (“Lisbonisation”);
– we shall be in the final phase of the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights;
– at the beginning of the next legislature, we will be entering into a new phase in the European judicial area with the negotiations on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor and the transition to the ordinary legislative procedure with regard to measures of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty (the transitional arrangements end on 1 December 2014);
– Member States which have hitherto enjoyed special treatment (Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom in particular) should have clarified their position with respect to the new phase of the ASFJ and the Schengen cooperation.

In the course of the next legislature it will also be necessary to promote greater consistency between European and national strategies related to the European area of freedom, security and justice. Just as in the economic sphere, the divergence of national public policies has put at risk the credibility of the common currency, the diversity of standards for the protection of the rights in Member States is straining mutual trust, the application of the principle of mutual recognition and the very credibility of the nascent “European model”. The strengthening of the operational solidarity between Member States’ administrations – which is being developed for example within the framework of Schengen cooperation – must be accompanied by legislative, operational and financial measures that implement solidarity between European citizens and third-country nationals on the territory of the Union.

In this perspective, Italy may play an important role as the new multi-annual programme for 2015-2019 is to be adopted by the second half of 2014 under the Italian Presidency.

Speakers:

Academics:
Valerio Onida, Former President of the Italian Constitutional Court
Giuseppe Cataldi, Pro-rettore Università L’Orientale (Napoli)
Oreste Pollicino, Public comparative law Professor (Università Bocconi – Milano)
Nicoletta Parisi, EU Law Professor (Università Catania)
Francesca Ferraro, Visiting Professor (Università L’Orientale – Napoli)
Dino Rinoldi, International Law Professor (Università Cattolica – Piacenza)
Valentina Bazzocchi, PHD EU Law (Alma Mater Università Bologna)
Deirdre Curtin, Professor of European Law (University of Amsterdam – NL),
Luisa Marin, Assistant Professor of European Law (University of Twente – NL)
Henri Labayle, Professeur de Droit international et européen (Université de Pau et des
pays de l’Adour – France)

Representatives and officials of European and national administrations:
Ezio Perillo (European Civil Service Tribunal)
Stefano Manservisi DG of the Commission DG Home
Paul Nemitz Director at the Commission DG Justice
Antoine Cahen, Patricia Van Den Peer, Claudia Gualtieri (European Parliament)
Filomena Albano, Luca De Matteis, Lorenzo Salazar (Italian Justice Ministery)
Sandro Menichelli (UE Italian Permanent Representation )
Vanna Palumbo (Garante Privacy IT)

Representatives of Civil Society:
Tony Bunyan, Director of Statewatch,Emilio De Capitani, FREE Group Secretary and Visiting Professor (Università L’Orientale – Napoli)

European “Smart Borders” project : negative opinion of the Meijers Committee

The Meijers Committee (*) has recently advised the members of the European Parliament to vote against the “Smart Borders” proposals (COM(2013) 95, 96 and 97).

In its letter it has expressed its deep concerns with respect to the:
– proportionality and practical feasibility of the proposals;
– coherence of the proposals with existing databases;
– applicable standards of data protection for the data subjects;
– conditions for transmission of personal data to third countries;
– broad discretion as regards the issuing of the registered traveller status;
– proposed amendments in the Schengen Borders Code;
– possible access to the Entry/Exit system for law enforcement purposes.

Note on the Smart Borders proposals (COM(2013) 95 final, COM(2013) 96 final and COM(2013) 97 final)

1. Introduction

The proposed Entry/Exit System (EES) processes alphanumeric data and fingerprints upon entry and exit of the third-country national, aiming to improve the management of the external border and the fight against irregular migration and more specifically to contribute to the identification of any person who may not, or may no longer fulfil the conditions of duration of stay within the territory of the Member States (so-called “overstayers”). This would effectively mean that the EES would collect the personal data of all third-country nationals entering the Schengen area. The Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) enables pre-vetted individuals to cross borders faster than other third-country nationals and aims to offset the additional constraints by the EES on cross-border travel. According to the European Commission, yearly 109 million third-country nationals without a visa and 73 million third- country nationals with a visa cross the EU borders.

The costs of the Smart Borders proposals envisaged by the European Commission are 1.1. billion euro.1

The sheer amount of data collected, in combination with the high costs of establishing Smart Borders, require compelling justifications. The EU legislator is obliged to observe proportionality as a general principle of EU law. This means that the measure must be suitable and necessary to achieve the aim it pursues, and should not impose “a burden on the individual (…) excessive in relation to the object sought to be achieved”.2

The Meijers Committee is of the opinion that the Smart Borders proposals are neither proportionate, nor suitable to its stated aims and raise severe data protection concerns. Therefore, the Committee advises the European Parliament to vote against the proposals.

2. Proportionality and practical feasibility

The proposals intend to facilitate the entry of “bona fide” travellers at the external borders and shorten waiting times.3 The EES is however likely to result in longer queues for third- country nationals, since all third-country nationals – also those that are not under a visa obligation – will be required to provide their fingerprints at the border. The RTP will only off-set waiting time to a limited extent, as only a limited number of third-country nationals will enrol in that programme.4 There is also a lack of clarity on the size of the problem of overstay which the EES intends to tackle. There are few reliable data on the numbers and profile of overstayers and there is very little research on the financial and social costs of the presence of third country nationals staying on an irregular basis in the EU.

Most importantly however, there is no direct link between the identification of overstayers and the stated objective of tackling irregular migration. The extent to which the information from the EES can help to implement and execute return proceedings is limited. The identification of overstayers does not provide authorities with any information as regards their location within the whole Schengen territory, nor does it facilitate return procedures. When a third county national is apprehended on suspicion of irregular stay, already now national authorities are able to establish the (ir)regularity of stay by examining the entry and exit-stamps on a person’s passport as well as by consulting the visa-stickers and VIS. Moreover, the mere identification of overstayers does not provide a solution in the situation where a third state does not cooperate in return proceedings. The side-effect of being able to collect statistics on overstay does not by itself justify the collection of large amounts of personal data.

Lessons need to be learnt from the experience with the setting up and practical operation of already existing databases. The European Commission itself has stated that a fully operational and developed Visa Information System (VIS) is “a prerequisite for the implementation of a Smart Borders System”.5 The Meijers Committee notes that the new generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) has only become operational as of 9 April 2013, the VIS is still in the process of being rolled out and access to EURODAC for law enforcement purposes has only been decided upon recently.6 There is therefore insufficient information to assess the functioning of existing databases and the added value of the current proposals. As required by the Hague Programme new centralised databases should only be created on the basis of studies that have shown their added value.7

Finally, the Meijers Committee wishes to point out the difficulties with the implementation of other information systems, most notably the SIS II, which was plagued with delays and cost over-runs due to technological problems. The United States has been unable to successfully implement a fully-functioning entry/exit system despite costly efforts to do so over the past decade.8 These experiences raise serious doubts as to the practical feasibility and cost-effectiveness of the current proposals.

3. Coherence with existing EU legislation

The Smart Borders Package will not function in isolation. Close attention has to be paid to the interaction with other databases in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The proposals do not stipulate the consequences of an entry as overstayer in the EES for the inclusion in other data bases or the possible issuing of a return decision and/or entry ban under the Return Directive 2008/115. The registration of entry bans into the SIS should always be subject to the principle of proportionality and requires an individual assessment, in accordance with Articles 21 and 24 of the SIS II Regulation. However, national practices with regard to the SIS and the application of entry bans show a diverging approach in the EU Member States.

In an earlier opinion, the Meijers Committee has already pointed out the legal uncertainty in relation to the issuing of an entry ban and its inclusion in the SIS.9 The Meijers Committee expects a similar problem with respect to the reporting of overstayers in the EES. When overstay in the past is an element to be taken into account when issuing a (new) Schengen visa to a third-country national, the risk exists that the fact that he or she is reported in the EES, will lead to an automatic refusal of a visa, not taking into account his or her personal circumstances or reasons to visit the EU.

The Meijers Committee further points to the relationship of the EES and the reintroduction of internal border controls, regulated in Article 28 of the Schengen Borders Code. According to this provision, the obligation to enter the entry and exit data of the third country- national in the EES would apply mutatis mutandis

Close attention also needs to be paid to the possible consequences of EES for EU citizens and especially third country family members of EU citizens. The proposals should guarantee that the application of the EES does not interfere with the rights laid down in Directive 2004/38 EC. Moreover, the Meijers Committee questions whether the EES can be applied to Turkish nationals falling under the Association Agreement and their family members in light of the standstill clause in Decision 1/80 and the nondiscrimination clause in Article 9 of the Association Agreement.

Finally, the Smart Borders proposals refer to Directive 95/46 as the applicable legal framework for data protection. These rules are however under review and set to be replaced by a new general legislative framework on data protection (COM(2012 9,10 and 11). The Meijers Committee recommends that the adoption of proposals involving the storage of large amounts of data is postponed until the final adoption of clear and uniform rules on data protection. Following the adoption of a new legal framework, the Smart Borders proposals should be re-assessed in the light of the new data protection framework.

4.Data protection rights

It is established case law of the ECtHR that the mere collection, storage and processing of personal data amounts to an interference with the right to privacy (art. 8 ECHR and art. 8 EU Charter). Such interference can only be justified when it serves a legitimate aim and is proportionate to this aim. The data must be relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored and preserved in a form no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored.10 As mentioned above, under point 2, the necessity and the proportionality of the Smart Borders proposals has not been established.

The Meijers Committee is of the opinion that the proposal for an Entry/Exit system does not offer sufficient guarantees to the data subject and leaves too much discretion to the Member States. In the following, the Committee makes a few comments on specific provisions relating to data protection in the proposal for an Entry/Exit system.

§ 4.1. Article 20- the storage of data

Article 20 of the proposal for an EES regulates that data will be stored in the EES for six months when the third-country national exits the territory of the Member States within the authorised period of stay. Data shall be stored for a maximum period of five years when there is no exit-record following the date of expiry of the authorised period of stay. The unconditional application of a five years data retention period may result in a disproportional limitation of the individual freedom of movement. It could mean that an individual may not be able to re-enter the EU during five years, also when a person has overstayed his or her authorised stay for a negligible amount of time or for causes not attributable to him or her.

§ 4.2. Article 21- the possibility to amend data in EES

The proposal is flawed as regards the rights granted to the data-subjects in case of justifiable overstay or of an erroneous entry in the EES. It is crucial that a third-country national has the possibility to request the,competent authorities to delete or amend such data and is given an effective judicial remedy, including interim measures, if the authorities refuse to amend the data, especially if in the future data stored in EES can be accessed for law enforcement purposes. Article 21 of the proposal includes these rights, but its text provides the Member State a wide discretionary power; notions such as “without delay”, “unforeseeable and serious event” and “in case of errors” can be interpreted in many different ways.

Also, the decision on which evidence shall be admitted to support the claim for amendment of the data should not be left to the discretion of the Member States. Considering that exceeding authorised stay might lead to the expulsion of the third country national, a clearly defined provision, including the possibility to grant suspensive effects to the appeal lodged on EU level is necessary. Finally, the Meijers Committee points at the important problem of the practical accessibility and implementation of the rights in Article 21, especially when the individual concerned has left the EU territory.

§ 4.3. Article 27- transfer of data to third countries

The Meijers Committee is concerned about the wide discretionary power left to the national authorities of the Member States with regard to the transfer of personal data from the EES to third countries, as provided in Article 27 of the proposal. This discretionary power undermines the general principle that data shall not be transferred to third countries, third parties or organisations. The transfer of data to third countries is allowed for the purpose of proving the identity of third-country nationals, including for the purpose of return. The conditions to allow for such communication do not offer sufficient guarantees. It has not been substantiated why the transfer of EES data to third countries is necessary for the return of third- country nationals.

Furthermore, Article 27(3) regulates that the transfer of third countries shall not prejudice the rights of, refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement. The Meijers Committee notes that it should be clarified how and by whom the decision on the transmission of data to third countries and the risk of non-refoulement will be examined and if the Member State involved will be held responsible when something happens to the person upon return to his or her country of origin.

§ 4.4. Articles 29 and Article 32- Liability and penalties

Article 29 on the liability for suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or any act incompatible with the EES does not offer a strong position to the third- country national; Member States will be exempted from liability if it proves that it is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage. This again leaves too much room for interpretation, especially because no clarity is given on the burden of proof, and the possibility to claim compensation is left to national law.

Article 32 provides for the possibility for the Member States to lay down rules on (administrative or criminal) penalties applicable on infringements of data protection provisions in this Regulation. These penalties should be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. While this formulation is consistent with EU law, the Meijers Committee finds that future evaluation mechanisms of the EES should assess carefully whether national provisions implementing this provision do guarantee in an effective manner European data protection rules.

§ 4.5. Role of the supervisory authorities

Considering the current use and development of large-scale databases in the EU and other instruments involving data processing, such as the API Directive, the VIS and Eurodac, the Meijers Committee underlines the excessive increase of workload of the national supervisory authorities and the EDPS. This development carries the risk that supervisory authorities will not be able to exercise their tasks effectively. Therefore, the financial and personal means which are necessary for data protection authorities in order to be able to perform their tasks effectively with respect to the whole data protection framework, should be taken into account and guaranteed.

5. Access to Entry/Exit System for law enforcement purposes and the possibilities offered by Privacy by Design

The current proposal for an EES clearly indicates that in the near future access to the Entry/ Exit System for law enforcement purposes will be considered. This can be derived from the Impact Assessment, where access for law enforcement is already explored and recital (11) where it is set out that the technical development of the system should be as such that in the future access for law enforcement purposes will be possible. The Meijers Committee regrets the premature reference to this possibility because it obscures the discussion on the desired form and the necessity and proportionality of the system as it stands.

As already expressed in earlier comments, the Meijers Committee underlines its strong objections to provide access for law enforcement purposes.11 Access for law enforcement purposes to the EES containing data of a large group of innocent persons is to be considered as a disproportional limitation of their privacy and data protection rights, including the principle of purpose limitation. In this context, the Meijers Committee recalls that preliminary questions have been submitted by national courts in Germany and the Netherlands to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the implementation of the Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by the Member States.12 In these questions, the national courts voice their concerns about the proportionality of the central storage of biometric data in passports and travel documents and their use for other purposes and about the relationship of the Regulation with the rights to privacy and protection of personal data safeguarded under Article 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 8 ECHR.

Although access for law enforcement purposes is not regulated in the current proposal, it is required that a technical system be set up in order to allow such access (Recital 11). In view of this, the Commission should device solutions which accommodate privacy by design,13 by recurring to Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET).14 For example, in this case, it should be considered to use fingerprint identification technologies coupled with the storage of templates (e.g. using hash functions) of fingerprints, instead of the storage of full fingerprints in the database. Besides enhancing security, by reducing the chance to compromise biometric data, this will offer some level of data minimisation and, consequently, will benefit proportionality for a database storing data of persons which are not suspected of any crime.

6. The Registered Traveller Programme (COM (2013) 97 final)

The Meijers Committee has also taken note of the proposal for a Regulation establishing a Registered Traveller Programme. Recognizing the usefulness of facilitating the swift entrance of frequent third- country travellers to the EU, the Meijers Committee questions whether Article 12 of the proposal does not give too much discretion to the competent authorities in deciding on an application for such a programme. Article 12 (d) for example provides that the applicant has to prove “his/her integrity and reliability, in particular a genuine intention to leave the territory in due time”, which can be interpreted in many different ways. The Meijers Committee is of the opinion that the provisions must be more concrete, in order to avoid discretionary decisions on the admission to the Registered Travellers Programme.

7. Proposed amendments to the Schengen Borders Code (COM (2013) 96 final)

The amendments to the Schengen Borders Code aims to bring the Code in line with the proposals for an EES and an RTP. The Meijers Committee notes that not only technical amendments are proposed, but also amendments on the substance, considerably extending the possibilities for border guards to check whether the third country national is an overstayer. For instance, border guards now always need to verify that the third country national did not exceed the maximum duration of authorised stay in the territory of the Member States upon exit of the territory (addition para. IV to Article 7(3)(b)), whereas in the current provision this is not compulsory (Article 7(3)(c)(ii). This extended obligation is not in line with the aim to shorten waiting lines at the borders.

The Meijers Committee is concerned about the amendments to Article 11 of the Schengen Borders Code. In the current Article 11 a presumption of irregular stay is provided for in the situation where a thirdcountry national does not bear an entry stamp, whereas in the proposed amendment not only the lack of an entry record in the EES presumes irregular stay, but also where there is an entry record but there is no exit date following the date of expiry of the authorised length of stay. The Meijers Committee notes that this considerably extends the possibilities for authorities to accept a presumption of irregular stay. This underlines the importance of entering data in the EES correctly and accurate, but also implies that clearly defined safeguards should be provided for to be able to rebut the presumption and to have an effective judicial remedy if the rebuttal of the presumption is not accepted.

The Meijers Committee questions whether the criterion of providing “credible evidence, by any means, such as transport tickets or proof of his or her presence outside the territory of the Member State” does not leave too much discretion to authorities to decide on this issue, especially because of the serious consequences: the third- country national may be expelled by the competent authorities from the territory of the Member State concerned. The Meijers Committee considers that it should be investigated first how the Member States have applied this provision so far and whether it has lead to diverging practices.

o-0-o

1 Impact Assessment Proposal for a Regulation establishing an entry/exit system to register entry and exit data of third- country nationals crossing the external border of the Member States of the European Union (SWD (2013) 47 final), p. 11 and p.45.

2 P. Craig, G. de Búrca, EU LAW, Oxford, OUP, 2008, p. 545.

3 ‘Smart Borders’ enhancing mobility and security’, press release European Commission, 28 February 2013.

4 Dr. B. Hayes, M. Vermeulen, “Borderline EU Border Surveillance Initiatives », Heinrich Böll Stiftung, May 2012.

5 COM (2011) 680 final, p.7.

6 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second- generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas and amended proposal for a Eurodac Regulation for the effective application of the Dublin Regulation and to request comparisons with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (COM(2012) 254).

7 The Hague Programme, Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union (2005/C 53/01).

8 GAO report number GAO-09-1002T: ‘Homeland Security: Despite Progress, DHS Continues to Be Challenged in Managing Its Multi-Billion Dollar Annual Investment in Large-Scale Information Technology Systems’(15 September 2009).

9 CM1202 Note on the coordination of the relationship between the Entry Ban and the SIS- Alert- An Urgent need for Legislative Measures, 8 February 2012.

10 ECtHR S and Marper v. the UK, 4 December 2008, application nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04. See also ECJ Huber v. Germany, C-524/06, 16 December 2008.

11 See also a.o. CM1216, CM0910 and CM0714.

12 Dutch Council of State, case 201205423/1/A3, 28 September 2012, C-447/12 and Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen, C-291/12 Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, 15 May 2012.

13 See the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Promoting Trust in the Information Society by Fostering Data Protection and Privacy, at: http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2010/10-03-19_Trust_Information_Society_EN.pdf.

14 See MEMO of the Commission Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), Reference: MEMO/07/159, at; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-159_en.htm#fn3; see also the Study on the economic benefits of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), Final Report to the European Commission, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, Prepared by London Economics,2010 at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/final_report_pets_16_07_10_en.pdf; see also Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 228 final, on Promoting Data Protection by Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0228en01.pdf.

(*) The Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal law, was established in 1990 by five NGO’s: the Dutch Bar Association, the Refugee Council, the Dutch section of the International Commission of Jurists, the Netherlands Centre for Immigrants/FORUM and the National Bureau against Racism (LBR).The Committee is independent. Most of its members are lawyers, working at Law Faculties in the Netherlands or in Belgium. The Standing Committee monitors developments in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and presents its opinion to the Dutch Parliament, the European Parliament, or parliaments in other Member States (e.g. the House of Lords), to the Dutch government, the European Commission and to other public authorities and NGO’s.

Conference: Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interactions between the EU and its Member States”

Please find in the link below information regarding the Conference entitled “Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interactions between the EU and its Member States” to be held in Brussels the 28 and 29 October 2010
link: http://www.ulb.ac.be/assoc/odysseus/IntegrationE.html