8.2 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Page 11 – European Area of Freedom Security & Justice

THE FRENCH “WAR ON TERROR” IN THE POST-CHARLIE HEBDO ERA

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUCRIM EDITED BY THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE AND THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW ASSOCIATION’S FORUM (*)

by Vasiliki Chalkiadaki

I. Introduction

France’s history of terrorism is neither new nor exclusively Islamist-related. At the end of the 1970s, France experienced a wave of terrorist activity both from left-revolutionary groups, such as the Action Directe,1 and from nationalist-separatist groups, especially those active in Brittany, Corsica, and the Basque Country.2 By the early 1980s, however, France had become a target of Islamist terrorist groups and has remained so ever since, as the gunmen attack on the Paris headquarters of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 demonstrated.3

The history of contemporary French counterterrorism legislation dates back to 1986, with the law on counterterrorism of 9 September 1986. Before the latter, France dealt with terrorist attacks by means of special laws on state security that had been enacted during the Algerian wars (1954–1962), which provided for an intensive limitation of individual rights and even for a special court to deal with the relevant offences (Cour de Surete de l’Etat, “Court of State Security”)4 that was abolished only in 1982. Therefore, until 1986, no specific counterterrorism legislation existed.

Before 1986, terrorist acts were characterized as “serious violent acts threatening the integrity and the security of the state” and treated accordingly.5

This paper presents the impact that the latest terrorist attack (hereafter: the Charlie attack) has had so far on France’s counterterrorism legislation (part III). After a brief historical overview of current legislative measures (part II), the following aspects are examined as being the effects of the attack:

the enactment of a series of provisions, mainly in the Code of Internal Security (Code de securite interieure, hereafter: Cod. Sec. Int.);
the exponentially increasing number of prosecutions on the basis of already existing substantive criminal law provisions (especially the glorification of terrorism and the preparation of terrorist acts);
the planning of new measures and the drafting of the relevant provisions regarding the financing of terrorism to reinforce the already existing framework on terrorist financing.

II. Historical overview Continue reading “THE FRENCH “WAR ON TERROR” IN THE POST-CHARLIE HEBDO ERA”

Summer School on The European Area of Criminal Justice (Brussels, 29 June – 3 July 2015)

NB: This Summer School is particularly designed for practitioners in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, EU or national civil servants, as well as researchers and students interested in EU “Freedom, Security and Justice” policies.

Programme (See updated version here)

The 12th edition of the Summer School “The EU Area of Criminal Justice” will take place in Brussels from 29 June – 3 July 2015.

The objective of the Summer School is to provide participants with an extensive knowledge of EU criminal law. The classes are both theoretical and practical. They are conducted by academics, national experts or European officials who deal every day with the European criminal area.

The Summer School is specially designed for practitioners in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, EU or national civil servants as well as researchers and students interested in the EU area of freedom, security and justice.

Concerning the programme: the Summer School takes place over a week, lectures are in English, participants receive a certificate of attendance, the final examination entitles participants to receive 3 ECTS and lawyers to gain 37 points from the OBFG (Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone de Belgique).

The Summer School covers essentially 5 topics :

subject I (day 1): general introduction (historical evolution, institutional issues – Schengen included, judicial control – EU accession to ECHR included);
subject II (day 2): cooperation between national authorities in criminal cases, covering both police cooperation and judicial co-operation. The latter will address the evolution from classic judicial cooperation (Mutual Legal Assistance instruments) to mutual recognition instruments, with special attention to the European Arrest Warrant;
subject III (day 3): approximation of criminal law, in theory and practice. Thus, following a class on the approximation of substantive criminal law, the example of financial crimes will be addressed. Similarly, the theoretical course on approximation of procedural law will be complemented with the study of the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer;
subject IV (day 4): current and future actors of the European criminal area, particularly Eurojust, Europol and the EPPO.
subject V (day 5): data protection and external dimension of the EU area of criminal justice. The Summer School will end with a negotiation exercise.

Special events during the Summer School:

Mid-week conference : “Foreign fighters – a criminal law revolution?”

The conference will be chaired by Hans G. Nilsson (General Secretariat of the EU Council) and will count on speeches from illustrious practitioner and professors. For details, please download the programme on the right.

The Summer School is organised by the Institute for European Studies of the Free University of Brussels (IEE-ULB) in collaboration with the European Criminal Law Academic Network (ECLAN).

Europe and “Whistleblowers” : still a bumpy road…

by Claire Perinaud (FREE Group trainee) The 9th and the 10th of April was organized in Paris by the University Paris X Nanterre la Défense in collaboration with the University Paris I Sorbonne a Conference on « whistleblowers and fundamental rights »[1] which echoed a rising debate on the figure of wistleblowers after the numerous revelations of scandals and corruption which occurred last years, with some of them directly linked to EU institutions. In the following lines I will try to sketch a) the general framework then b) the main issues raised during the Conference

A) The general framework

The term « whistle-blower » was created by Ralph Nader in 1970 in the context of the need to ensure the defense of citizens from lobbies. He defined « whistle blowing » as « an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, blows the whistle that the organization is in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity »[2]. The interest of scholars and lawyers to the figure of whistle-blowers in the United States dates back to the adoption by the Congress in 1863 of the False claims act which is deemed to be the first legislation related to the right of alert[3].
The system which developed afterwards is notably based on the idea that whistle-blowing is a strong mechanism to fight corruption and has to be encouraged by means of financial incentives[4]. If this mechanism is of utmost importance in the United States, protection of whistle blowers is only slowly introduced in Europe[5].
With numerous scandals related to systemic violations of human rights, the subject is progressively dealt with in the European Union (EU) and in the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, in both organizations, the protection of whistleblowers remain at the stage of project or only recommendations to the states.

The Council of Europe… Continue reading “Europe and “Whistleblowers” : still a bumpy road…”

The EU’s Planned War on Smugglers

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON STATEWATCH

by Steve Peers (Twitter: @StevePeers)

The EU’s Foreign Affairs Council is meeting today (May 18) to discuss the possibility of a military operation in the Mediterranean to take actions against smuggling of migrants. Officially, at least, the purpose of the operation (as defined by EU leaders last month) is to destroy smugglers’ boats. The EU’s High Representative has stated that there will be ‘no boots on the ground’; and as she arrived at the Council meeting today, she referred to authorising an ‘EU operation at sea’.

However, it is clear from the documents discussed in the EU’s Political and Security Committee last week that (unless plans have changed radically in the meantime) the High Representative is being “economical with the truth”. The EU action clearly contemplates action by ground forces. Moreover, it anticipates the possible loss of life not only of smugglers but also of Member States’ forces and refugees. In effect, the EU is planning to declare war on migrant smugglers – without thinking through the consequences.

Details

The document defines the purpose of the EU operation: ‘to disrupt the business model of the smugglers, achieved by undertaking systematic efforts to identify, seize/capture and destroy vessels and assets before they are used by smugglers.’

There would be four phases: ‘(1) a deployment and assessment phase, (2) an operational/seizure (of smuggled vessels) phase; (3) an operational/disruption phase, (4) a mission withdrawal and completion phase. The EU states that authorisation by the UN is not required by the first phase. While ‘ideally’ there should be consent of ‘the government(s) concerned’, the EU document clearly contemplates going ahead without it.

Phase 1 – Deployment Continue reading “The EU’s Planned War on Smugglers”

A.T. V LUXEMBOURG: THE START OF THE EU-ECHR STORY ON CRIMINAL DEFENCE RIGHTS

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Alex Tinsley, (*)

(*) Legal & Policy Officer (Head of EU Office) at Fair Trials, based in Brussels. Twitter: @AlexLouisT

On 9 April 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) gave judgment in A.T. v Luxembourg. The judgment, which will become final unless referred to the Grand Chamber, in finding a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), develops the principles established in the Salduz v Turkey. At the invitation of Fair Trials International, third party intervener, it also takes into account, for the first time, Directive 2013/48/EU on access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings (the ‘Access to a Lawyer Directive’), a possible indicator of future convergence in this area.

Background

The applicant, A.T. was questioned by police following surrender under a European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’) (as to the cross-border aspect, see the post-script). On arrival, he demanded a lawyer. Police gave information (it is unclear what) which led him to accept to be questioned without one. He denied the offences. He was then questioned again before the investigating judge, with a lawyer present but (a) without having had the chance to talk with that lawyer beforehand and (b) without the lawyer having had sight of the case file prior to that questioning; again, he denied the offences.

A.T. argued that his defence rights had been breached as he had been denied access to a lawyer. The appeal court, and then the Court of Cassation, rejected this, essentially finding that he had agreed to be questioned without a lawyer and that no obligation arose to remedy any prejudice caused. With local remedies exhausted, A.T. applied to the ECtHR arguing a violation of Article 6 ECHR.

The legal territory: the Salduz principle Continue reading “A.T. V LUXEMBOURG: THE START OF THE EU-ECHR STORY ON CRIMINAL DEFENCE RIGHTS”

The EU’s new (internal) security agenda

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON STATEWATCH

by Chris Jones, May 2015

For anyone interested in an overview of the substantial law and order bureaucracy that the European Union and its Member States have constructed over the last four decades, and the direction in which it is heading, the European Commission’s recently-published ‘European Agenda for Security’ is worth a read. This article provides an overview of the key points.

The Agenda [1] opens by stating:
“The European Union aims to ensure that people live in an area of freedom, security and justice, without internal frontiers. Europeans need to feel confident that, wherever they move within Europe, their freedom and their security are well protected, in full compliance with the Union’s values, including the rule of law and fundamental rights.”
It follows on from the EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy and the ‘action plan’ that sought to implement it.
The Agenda was formally requested by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in December 2014, [2] through a set of conclusions that call for many of the same proposals put forward by the Commission.
It sets out a five-year “shared agenda between the Union and the Member States” that is supposed to lead to “an EU area of internal security where individuals are protected in full compliance with fundamental rights.”

On the basis of the Commission’s communication and ongoing political and legal developments, it is doubtful – to say the least – whether the proposed “full compliance with fundamental rights” will be achieved.
Instead, the Agenda looks likely to legitimise more repressive laws and policies at EU and national level.
What’s the Agenda? The Agenda will improve:

“information exchange”, including of personal data;
“increased operational cooperation” between policing, security, border guard and customs agencies, prosecutors, companies, etc.; and
“mutual trust [between different national authorities], drawing on the full range of EU policies and tools.”

The three main priorities are “terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime”, although the Commission is “remaining vigilant to other emerging threats [to security] that might also require a coordinated EU response.” The Commission’s broad concerns are that:
“In recent years new and complex threats [to security] have emerged highlighting the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels [of state and industry]. Many of today’s security concerns originate from instability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature.”
There are undoubtedly a number of serious ongoing crises within the EU’s “immediate neighbourhood”. Nevertheless, this rather vague statement also to some extent encourages fear of the unknown. In any case, it provides significant leeway for developing new laws, policies and activities.

The key principles The Agenda has five: Continue reading “The EU’s new (internal) security agenda”

The surveillance society (4): a further study for the European Parliament

Following the so called “Snowden revelations” at the end of the last legislature the European Parliament adopted a wide ranging resolution addressing the main problems arising from an emerging surveillance society. The resolution adopted inter alia “A European Digital Habeas Corpus” deemed to protect fundamental rights in a digital age.

Work on this sensitive issue is continuing also in this legislature as the European Parliament has to play a pivotal role in the establishment of the European Digital Agenda, the reform of data protection and to approve an “umbrella” agreement with the United States which is deemed to cover also the access to personal data for security purposes.

To support this Parliamentary strategy several studies have been done the last of them being a study done by the EP “Scientific and Technology Options Assessment “(STOA) which was presented in the responsible Parliamentary Committee (LIBE) Meeting on 23 April 2015.

The aim of the study is to propose measures to reduce the risks identified with the current generation of networks and services and to identify long-term technology oriented policy options for a better, more secure and more privacy friendly internet, whilst at the same time allowing governmental law enforcement and security agencies to perform their duties, and obtain quickly and legally all the information needed to fight crime and to protect national security interests.

The first part of the study concludes with a list of security solutions to help citizens protect themselves from illicit mass surveillance activities. In its Conclusions it recognise that “Mass surveillance is a reality today and has been applied for years by national intelligence agencies of a number of countries, namely those allied in the Five Eyes coalition, but also including EU members and other countries. The agencies involved in mass surveillance practices justify these methods with the doctrine of pre-emptive prevention of crime and terrorism and adopt the principle of omniscience as its core purpose. This objective of intercepting all communication taking place over Internet or telephone networks is in many cases pursued by applying questionable, if not outright illegal intrusions in IT and Telecommunication systems.This strategy accumulates an amount of information that can only be processed and analysed by systems of artificial intelligence, able to discern patterns which indicate illegal, criminal, or terrorist activities. While warranted and lawful interception of data on targeted suspects is a required and undisputed tool for law enforcement to access evidence, the generalised approach of information gathering through mass surveillance is violating the right to privacy and freedom of speech. The delegation of decisions on suspicious data patterns or behaviour of citizens to intelligent computer systems is furthermore preventing accountability and creating the menace of an Orwellian surveillance society. Many citizens are not aware of the threats they may be subject to when using the Internet or telecommunication devices. As of today, the only way for citizens to counteract surveillance and prevent breach of privacy consists in guaranteeing uncorrupted end-to-end encryption of content and transport channel in all their communications. Due to the amount/complexity/heterogeneity of tools this is however a task too complex to achieve for most of technically unexperienced user. This situation calls for both, awareness creation and the provision of integrated, user friendly and easy to use solutions that guarantee privacy and security of their communications. But policy makers must understand that the problem of mass surveillance can not be solved on a technical terrain, but needs to be addressed on a political level. An adequate balance between civil liberties and legitimate national security interests has to be found, based on a public discussion that empowers citizens to decide upon their civil rights affected and the societal values at stake”.

The second part of the study concludes with the proposal of several policy options with different levels of public intervention and technological disruption.

A STOA options brief below provides an overview of all the policy options and Two short Video-Clips have been published on YouTube to raise the awareness of the public.

Further information

Will the EU Migration Agenda (at last) propose to update the EU legislation on smuggling ?

By Isabella MERCONE (FREE Group trainee)

It appears that after the recent tragedies in the Mediterranean, the European Union could finally take action against deaths in the sea, and focus its efforts on the fight against trafficking of human beings. Indeed, in its special meeting on the 23th April, the European Council promised to ‘undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and destroy vessels before they are used by traffickers’, while the High Representative was invited ‘to immediately begin preparations for a possible CSDP operation to this effect’.[1]

This statement has been perceived by some scholars as ‘a disproportionate measure’ as it mixes up different legal situation by covering smugglers, traffickers and even pirates in the same legal basket where the legal definition of these crimes is not the same so that this EU strategy looks too hasty and quite ‘an outrage to human rights and even to the rule of law.’[2] It has still to be seen if such a repressive approach will be endorsed at UN level (as it recently happened with the EU pressure for criminalizing the so-called “Foreign Fighters” phenomenon). The EU High Representative Federica Mogherini will brief the UN Security Council on the issue on Monday (11 May), and for the time being both the Russian and Chinese representatives and the UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon have already expressed their contrary opinion, by saying that “Apprehending human traffickers and arresting these vessels is one thing, but destroying them would be going too far.”[3]

Smuggling an trafficking look similar but are legally different..

One can then guess if by proposing a bold action such as the destruction of smugglers boats, the European Union is not taking the wrong direction by using military means without a clear legal basis, outside its territory, when the issue should be more framed by criminal law measures be they linked to smugglers or to traffickers. Under this perspective it is worth recalling that, according to international law [4],
– ‘human smuggling’ is recognized as ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’, while
– ‘human trafficking’ is ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.’[5]

This is to say that the difference between the two phenomena could be often very subtle, because both of them usually concern the transport of persons from one country to another. However, the different purpose is clear: while the smuggler simply aims at receiving the benefit for the assistance provided for the illegal entry in another country, human trafficking requires evidence of the intent to exploit the trafficked person.
This is why human trafficking and human smuggling differ, although in the real life they can often overlap [6]: because, even if many desperate people are looking for the services provided by smugglers, not all of them are (fortunately) victims of trafficking, and they deserve different kind of support. Regrettably,these days the public debate and the press present these two different legal situations as if they were the same.
On his side, the European Union, even if it has established a broad legal framework concerning trafficking in human beings[7], has regrettably “forgot” to update its legislation on human smuggling, to effectively tackle this growing phenomenon.

An outdated EU legal framework for smuggling

It is worth recalling that the EU legal framework on smuggling (so-called “facilitators package”) dates back to 2002 and is composed by two [8]measures:

– Council Directive 2002/90/EC, that provides a common definition of the offence and requires Member States to adopt effective sanctions upon any person who intentionally assists a third-country national ‘to enter or transit across’ a Member State ‘in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the entry or transit’ of foreigners, and any person ‘who, for financial gain, intentionally assists’ a third-country national to ‘reside within’ a Member State in breach of its national laws on residence. Identical sanctions must also be applied to instigators or accomplices and those who attempt to commit the activities in question.There is a ‘humanitarian’ exemption, applying ‘where the aim of the behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned’. But this exception is optional, and only applies to the first category of offence.[9]

– Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, requires Member States to punish ail the conduct defined in the Directive by ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition’, accompanied if appropriate by confiscation of transport, prohibition of practice of an occupation, or deportation. In cases of unauthorized entry or transit, there must be a maximum sentence of at least eight years if the activity was committed by a criminal organization or if committed while endangering a would-be migrant’s life.

These two measures were adopted as a partial implementation of the UN “Palermo” Convention and clearly only focus on the criminalization of smugglers. As such, they lack in addressing any other aspect of the problem, like prevention or protection of smuggled persons even if in particular there is still no EU requirement to criminalize (or to decriminalize) migrants who have breached immigration law as such.[10]
Instead of providing support and assistance to smuggled persons, who are often in difficult conditions before their departure, suffer great harm during the journey, and eventually find themselves “lost” in a foreign country, trying to build a new life, after having paid a great amount of money for a journey where they risk their life, the European Union decided to insist on the ‘need to combat illegal immigration’, reaffirming the importance of protecting State (EU) sovereignty, rather than providing legal forms of migration to people looking for a better life.

An issue for the EU Commission Migration agenda…

The humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean is now apparently wakening up the EU and raising the awareness on the growing scale of the migration phenomenon. Moreover, after the Lisbon Treaty it could be possible for the same political majority [11] to adopt a comprehensive migration policy and frame in the same legal framework humanitarian and security aspects by creating a binding burden sharing between the EU MS.
Now it could be the right time for the EU to change its approach by taking the individual at the core of the EU policies, as required by the Charter of fundamental rights and by dealing with smuggling in a more comprehensive and consistent framework. To do do, in its “holistic” Migration agenda, the Commission should also take into account the European Parliament recommendations :

On the humanitarian side : to provide alternative and safer channels of legal migration by associating in the definition of the new EU strategy and legal acts.Notably, the ministers for social affairs as the Ministers of Interiors, who are currently in charge of these issues, still have a partial distorted view of the human mobility dynamics. In the same perspective, the EU and its MS should engage in information and awareness-raising campaigns to make would-be-migrants aware about the risks they might face in their irregular journeys towards Europe, and inform them about the existence of alternative, safer but affordable forms of migration. It would also be helpful to improve the support to ‘victims’ of smuggling (not only as it is currently the case when the victims cooperate in the criminal investigation, prosecution and trial of a smugglers), both at the moment of arrival and for an appropriate period after.

On the security side : to improve the cooperation among MS in the investigation and conduction of joint operations (supported by EU agencies such as Frontex, Europol and Eurojust) by strengthening in a consistent operational framework the exchange of information dealing with people which can be considered a “threat” for the EU such as smugglers[12], Traffickers and foreign fighters[13].

…or for the UN Security Council ?

EU institutions before launching military operations should take into account what in recent forum between Prosecutors of EU member states has emerged eg that most of the current prosecutions relate to the criminal activity committed by those who provide the transport of migrants in boats, whereas only a few of them address the leaders of the organised crime groups behind this phenomenon. The limited exchange of information through Europol and the lack of coordination between EU Member States should be considered the main obstacles in identifying these organised crime groups. Moreover, effective legislation is considered essential to address this phenomenon and to clearly distinguish between smuggling and trafficking activities, by extending law enforcement’s powers to enter adjacent territorial waters when in hot pursuit of vessels suspected of trafficking.

Last but not least, in the medium and long term perspective, given the trans-border nature of smuggling and human trafficking, consideration should be given to the need to ensure prosecution at EU level of THB and smuggling of migrants crimes, as well as the opportunity to extend the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) also to this kind of crimes. However, it is less than likely that this straight but more legally ambitious solution would be chosen, instead of the slippery shortcut of military intervention.

Further Reading :

Steve PEERS “EU Justice and Home Affairs Law” (Third Edition) published on Oxford European Union Law Library (Chapter 7 Irregular Migration)
Shelley L., “Human Smuggling and Trafficking into Europe: a comparative prospective”, Washington DC, Migration Policy Institute, 2014.
Gallagher A.T., “Trafficking, Smuggling and human rights: tricks and treaties”, Forced Migration Review, 12 (2003), 25-28. NOTES
[1] European Council, ‘Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement’, 23/04/2015, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23-special-euco-statement/
[2]See, for instance, Gabriella Carella, ‘Tratta degli esseri umani, uso della forza internazionale e prevenzione dei naufragi ( … dello stato di diritto)’, available at: http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1417
[3] EUObserver, ‘Russia to oppose EU sinking of migrant smuggler boats’, https://euobserver.com/foreign/128597
[4] Article 3(a) of the UNDOC Smuggling Protocol (‘Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’, GA Res. 55/25, Annex III, UN GAR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 53, UN Doc. A/45/49 (Vol.1) (2001), done Nov.15, 2000, entered into force Dec. 25, 2003)., available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf
[5] Article 3(a) of the UNDOC Trafficking Protocol (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, GA Res. 55/25, Annex II, UN GAR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 53, UN Doc. A/45/49 (Vol.1) (2001), done Nov.15, 2000, entered into force Dec. 25, 2003), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf
[6] It is not unusual that a victim of smuggling later on also falls into the hand of a trafficker, in order to pay off his debt for the journey (traffickers ad smugglers often know each other and cooperate).
[7] See primarily the Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA and the EU Strategy toward the eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012-2016.
[8] In the pre-Lisbon the legal basis for criminal sanctions was in the intergovernamental regime framing the judicial cooperation in criminal matters (so called “ third pillar”).
[9] See Steve PEERS “EU Justice and Home Affairs Law” (Third Edition) published on Oxford European Union Law Library (Chapter 7 Irregular Migration)
[10] It should not be forgotten, however, that Article 31 of the Geneva Convention on refugee status exempts refugees who have entered or stayed irregularly from penalties under certain circumstances.
[11] Before the Lisbon Treaty legislation on Legal migration required the unanimity in Council.
[12] Actually, a provision concerning Communication of information between the Member States is already established by article 7 of Directive 2002/90/EC, but so far it is not clear if the MS have adequately implemented this provision.
[13] It is worth recalling that Europol has recently established a “Focal Point (FP) Travellers” which is mainly focused on so called “foreign fighters” and which is opened to all the EU Member States as well as to third countries such as Australia, Norway, Switzerland and the US Custom and Border Protection Service (CBP). Eurojust has also asked to be associated.

The surveillance society (3) by David COLE

Original published on TIME

NSA Ruling Is a Victory for Privacy

By David COLE (*)

Renew the NSA’s authority — but only if it is significantly reined in

In a major victory for privacy and democracy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled today that the National Security Agency has been illegally collecting information about Americans’ phone calls—all Americans’ phone calls—for at least nine years. In the name of fighting terror, the agency has been collecting records on all of us—who we call, when we call, and how long we talk, although not the contents of the calls—without regard to whether we are connected to terrorism. The court unanimously ruled that the NSA’s massive “phone metadata” program, first revealed by Edward Snowden in June 2013, is not authorized by the statute the NSA has long relied on to conduct the program. Congress is currently considering whether to renew, reform, or let the provision expire. Today’s ruling should inform Congress’s debate, and supports renewing the NSA’s authority only if it is significantly reined in.

The court’s decision turned on the meaning of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, passed shortly after 9/11. It authorizes the government to obtain records from businesses if they are “relevant” to an “authorized investigation … of international terrorism.” This language would plainly enable the NSA to obtain the phone calling records, for example, of a suspected terrorist, or of persons closely connected to him. But in a secret interpretation allowed by a secret intelligence court in 2006, the NSA asserted that this provision empowered it to obtain the phone records of every American, regardless of whether they were in any way connected to terrorism. It’s that interpretation that the U.S. Court of Appeals wisely rejected today.

The NSA argued that every American’s records were “relevant” and therefore subject to collection because at some point in the future they might come in handy to a terrorism investigation. But as the court of appeals reasoned, that theory is limitless. It would authorize the NSA to collect all business records about everyone—including financial records, medical records, and email and internet search records—without any showing of an actual tie to terrorism.

The court of appeals is not the first to find the NSA’s interpretation a stretch. When Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, a Wisconsin Republican who drafted the Patriot Act provision in question, learned of the NSA’s interpretation, he said that he never intended it to authorize such “dragnet collection” of information on innocent Americans. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, a government oversight body created by Congress and appointed by the president, concluded in January 2014 that Section 215 did not authorize the NSA’s program.

But the unanimous decision of the federal court of appeals has the force of law. More important, its opinion makes eminent sense, underscoring that when Congress gives the executive authority to obtain information only where it is relevant to a specific investigation, the NSA should not secretly expand that to collect records on us all.

The court’s timely decision comes as Congress is considering what to do about Section 215. A bipartisan group of members, including Senators Pat Leahy and Mike Lee, and Representatives Sensenbrenner and John Conyers, has introduced the USA Freedom Act, which would end the NSA’s bulk collection authority, and allow it to seek phone records only when reasonably connected to specific identifiers or “selectors” tied to terrorism. Senator Mitch McConnell, by contrast, has proposed a bill that would reauthorize Section 215 with no reforms whatsoever.

Congress should be guided by the federal appeals court’s careful reasoning. As the court found, the authority asserted and exercised by the NSA was entirely unprecedented. It goes far beyond any preexisting authority to obtain records in any other investigative context. Digital technology makes this possible; the government can now track us in ways that until very recently were simply impossible. But just because it can do so doesn’t make it right to do so. If we are to preserve our privacy in the digital age, we must confront that reality and insist that the government’s new spying technologies be appropriately constrained.

Congress should pass the USA Freedom Act. But doing so will by no means be sufficient. Snowden revealed a wide range of NSA spy programs that intrude on the privacy rights of innocent Americans and non-Americans alike. The USA Freedom Act deals only with one such program. But the court of appeals, and the USA Freedom Act, point the way forward in a more general way. If we are to rein in the NSA, we must insist first that there be public debate before the government institutes sweeping new surveillance programs, and we must demand, second, that surveillance be targeted at individuals as to whom there is suspicion of wrongdoing, and not applied indiscriminately to us all.

(*) George J. Mitchell Professor in Law and Public Policy at Georgetown University Law Center.

The Surveillance Society (1) by Emilio Mordini

Original published HERE

By Emilio MORDINI

Today (May 7) a US federal appeals court has ruled the phone metadata program of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) is illegal. Metadata is ancillary details generated by a piece of information. Telephone metadata includes details such as the length of a call, the phone number from which the call was made, the phone number called, the telephone devices used, the location of the call, and so. Telephone metadata do not include voice recording and call contents. In 2014 Stanford computer scientist and lawyer, Jonathan Mayer, demonstrated that from phone metadata it is possible to draw very sensitive inferences, such as details about an individual’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual life. Mayer demonstrated that metadata are highly meaningful even in a small population and over a short time period.

The NSA’s telephone metadata program, which started seven months before the September 11, 2001, collected metadata of hundreds of billions of telephone calls made along several years through the largest telephone carriers in the United States. In 2006, the existence of the NSA program was brought to the light by USA TODAY. However, it was only on June 5, 2013 that The Guardian published a top-secret document, which provided the conclusive evidence that the NSA collected phone metadata from hundreds of millions of phone subscribers. Such a document was included in NSA classified files leaked by Edward Snowden.

On June 11, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit against the NSA, challenging the legality and constitutionality of the phone metadata program. On Dec 16, 2013 the District Court for Southern District of New York ruled the phone metadata program was legal and does not violate the Fourth Amendment (on August 29, 2013, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had already stated that phone metadata: “is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, since the content of the calls is not accessed”). The ACLU appealed against this decision. Now the court of appeals has definitely ruled that phone metadata program is illegal, because it “exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized and therefore violates § 215” of the Patriot Act. Ruling the illegality of the program, the court avoided taking a stance about its constitutionality. However, what is interesting is the court’s main argument, say, the Patriot Act § 215 provides the legal framework for investigation, but not for a generic threat assessment. Investigation – argues the court – is an activity that entails “both a reason to conduct the inquiry and an articulable connection between the particular inquiry being made and the information being sought. The telephone metadata program, by contrast, seeks to compile data in advance of the need to conduct any inquiry (or even to examine the data), and is based on no evidence of any current connection between the data being sought and any existing inquiry”. Why is this argument intriguing? Because it implies a counter-intuitive explanation of surveillance policies.

Why so many governments and rulers are passionate of surveillance technologies? Because they want to know everything about us, the standard account goes. No, the court tells us; they spy because they do not have any inquiry to do, any explanation to test, any investigation to carry out. Briefly, because they do not know, are not able to know, and do not want to know. They do not understand the world and its conflicts, they do not have interpretation grids, they cannot figure out the future. They are just “walking shadows, poor players that strut and fret their hour upon the stage”. They spy just for spying, because of their political emptiness, because of their intellectual laziness. Surveillance is for them the obscene surrogate for knowledge. Understanding is precluded by their shortsighted view; modern, sophisticated, technologies become a surrogate for intelligence.

Today, privacy advocates are celebrating, yet this sentence makes justice also of some of their paranoid fantasies. The surveillance society is not ruled by the big brother, rather by an idiot Peeping Tom.