Category: 8. Judicial cooperation

EU-USA “UMBRELLA” AGREEMENT ON DATA PROTECTION: A …LEAKY UMBRELLA ?

Posted HERE on 18. September 2015

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On 8 September 2015, the European Commission announced the successful completion of the negotiations with the US on a framework agreement („Umbrella Agreement“), that shall apply to the co-operation between law enforcement authorities. „Once in force, this agreement will guarantee a high level of protection of all personal data when transferred between law enforcement authorities across the Atlantic. It will in particular guarantee that all EU citizens have the right to enforce their data protection rights in US courts“, said the competent EU Commissioner Věra Jourová. Prerequisite for the signing of the agreement will be, however, that the US Congress will have approved the necessary legislative changes („Judicial Redress Bill“).

Although the Commission initially did not want to publish the agreement, the text – however – has found it’s way into the Internet, enabling the assessment.

First the good news: The agreement contains, in fact, substantial concessions from the US side. It has to be highlighted, that the US shall even provide EU citizens with a right to seek judicial redress if they are of the opinion that their privacy rights have been violated in the context of processing information the respective US authorities have received from the EU. Over years, the US government insisted on granting EU citizens only administrative redress. For Europe such limited redress – ultimately depending on the goodwill of the US administration – would not have provided an adequate level of data protection.

Another positive aspect is that both sides have agreed to commit to the principles of proportionality, necessity and purpose limitation and that they have to determine the use and duration of storage of personal information in accordance with these principles. The concrete purposes of data processing and the retention periods have to be determined by the specific legal acts.

However, although the agreement improves the legal status of EU citizens whose data are transferred to the US, it would be a misperception that the agreement provides EU citizens with the same privacy rights as US persons. If this would have been intended, the rights provided by US Privacy Act of 1974 and other laws, currently limited to US citizens and residents, could have been extended to EU citizens. Instead, the agreement text contains complicated rules, which do not ensure equality in the result. EU citizens have first to seek administrative redress. They may call a US court only after administrative redress definitely was exhausted. In addition, administrative and judicial redress are limited to those privacy rights explicitly specified in the Agreement, as the right to access and correction of the personal information. The agreement will not grant EU citizens – unlike US citizens – further rights to challenge the lawfulness of the entire process of data processing before a US court.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the agreement shall apply only to judicial and police authorities, but not to authorities with the task to guarantee the „national security“. US intelligence agencies like the NSA and the CIA share personal data with law enforcement agencies, even if they have received these information from their European partners. The provisions of the umbrella agreement would not apply in these cases. Last but not least the agreement does not cover data US and European authorities collect on the basis of national laws, i.e. the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or similar European legislation.

Another limitation of the umbrella: While according to the European data protection law, all personal data will be protected regardless of the nationality of the persons concerned, the agreement should apply only to data on EU citizens which have been transferred to the US by European authorities or companies based on bilateral or multilateral agreements. So data relating to citizens of third countries remain unprotected.

Finally, the agreement (Art. 21) falls short, however, with regard to the data protection oversight. It lacks an explicit commitment of both parties to ensure an independent data protection supervision. While the European Union commits that the independent data protection authorities shall be competent to check the provisions, the agreement refers with respect to the United States on a variety of oversight institutions, some of them not independent, which are to exercise the supervision of data protection „cumulatively“.

Given these shortcomings, to me the exultation of the agreement seem premature. The European legal bodies which need to approve the ratification of the agreement, in particular the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States are called upon to thoroughly examine the agreement, in particular, its compatibility with the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Depending on the results of such assessment it might be necessary to renegotiating and caulking the umbrella.

 

The impact of the EU law on Italian criminal procedure law in investigations on EU fraud

ORIGINAL IN ITALIAN.

(Translated by Dalila Delorenzi, FREE-Group Trainee)

by Andrea Venegoni (*)

A reflection on the issue of the influence of European law on procedure criminal law may  instinctively lead to think of the most recent developments in case law at European level that have affected and are affecting also the typical categories of the Italian procedural system.

As an example, the issue of “res judicata” can be taken into account. It is common opinion that its binding effect is gradually eroding as a result of transposition in the internal system of jurisprudential principles established by the European Courts (e.g the cases Dorigo or Scoppola ). Another example may come from the “ne bis in idem” principle which is gradually coloring of meanings that were unthinkable a few years ago, also thanks to the role of supranational courts.

But, to be honest, if that had been the subject of my speech, the same would not be fully consistent with the title of the seminar that refers specifically to the influence of the EU law on the domestic criminal procedure law.  Indeed in the above mentioned evolutions the ECHR system – which as it is known, is something other than the European Union system – has played and still plays a fundamental role. In this case, therefore, the title of the seminar should have referred to the “European” law in general and not just that of the EU.

I therefore focused my attention on EU law and its impact on criminal investigations in fraud matters within the Community, not only for formal reasons, because it was the specific scope of the seminar, but also for another more substantial reason.

More precisely, all legislative and jurisprudential developments occurred in criminal law and its procedure by supranational European legal systems are substantially aimed at creating a common space of justice, with a view to recognise guarantees, common rights and for the purposes of a better circulation of evidence. If this is true, it does exist an area, a sector, where this process has been already realised or, at least, realised in a better way than elsewhere.

This is precisely the field of protection of the EU financial interests. In this sector, since the late ‘90s the European Union has put in place a series of legislative instruments to assist the investigations, and in particular the cross-border enquiries, and at the same time to protect the rights of the people involved, with no equal compared to any other field. As such, if the European Union is informed by the will to create, among other issues, also a common space of justice, both criminal and civil – as said in the founding treaty (i.e. Maastricht Treaty, 1992) – then we may affirm that, since more than 16 years, this purpose has been largely achieved, with specific modalities, in the field of the protection of EU’s financial interests (hereinafter “PIF Area”), even if just few legal practitioners have realised it.

This was because the PIF sector has always been essential to the existence of the Union and for the accomplishment of its purposes. Without effective protection of its own finances, the Union might not have the necessary funds not only to manage its administration, but also to grant them to the States or other beneficiaries. Indeed this is necessary for the realization of the great goals the Union intends achieving – sometimes with mixed success – Europe wide and worldwide, such as social cohesion and economic development, the progress of scientific research, environmental protection, the fight against poverty in third countries.

Therefore, the protection of its resources has always been essential for the Union, and since the conducts affecting such interest may constitute both irregularities at the administrative level, and criminal offenses, the relevant legislation at European level has always unfolded in between the so called First and Third Pillar in the European institutional framework after the Maastricht Treaty. In simple words, the First Pillar covered interventions in the Union’s own policies that did not concern the criminal law; the Third Pillar, on the contrary, was just about facilitating the judicial cooperation in criminal law.

Nevertheless, before going any further, it has to be clarified what the so called “PIF Area” is, to fill of content concepts that otherwise risk to be only theoretical. For the purpose of this presentation, also to avoid getting into technicalities of the Union’s Financial Regulation, with a view to simplifying it may be easier to refer to the Union budget sheet items. Indeed, since the early 70s, the Union has a budget with their own revenues and expenditures.

Revenues consist in customs duties and agricultural levies charged on import and export of goods (the so-called own resources),  a percentage of each EU country’s standardised value-added tax revenue and an additional sum provided by the Member States proportionally to each respective gross national income. Therefore every kind of conduct tending to avoid the payment and collection of duties and agricultural levies affects the EU financial interests. In our system, such conducts constitute the criminal offence of smuggling. Equally, the conducts aiming at evading the VAT payment are harmful for the EU budget. This category includes, for example, the so-called VAT  carousel fraud, which still today are matter of interest for several Italian prosecutor offices, like they have been in the recent years.

Actually, the issue of VAT is very sensitive and it is necessary, for sake of providing with a complete information, to mention that according to an opinion that is strengthening at the level of the Member States, and partly also of the European Parliament, in the negotiations on legislative proposals under way, such tax would be exclusively national, and only indirectly of Union relevance, and for this reason it should be considered outside the PIF area (1). However it must be said that this view is contradicted, for example, in the case law of the Court of Justice that has even recently stated that the application of VAT involves the Union’s financial interests (see Akberg Fransson case C-617/10). Continue reading “The impact of the EU law on Italian criminal procedure law in investigations on EU fraud”

Passenger Name Records, data mining & data protection: the need for strong safeguards

EXCERPTS FROM EXPERTS’ OPINION SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PUBLISHED ON THE STATEWATCH SITE)

by Douwe KORFF and Marie GEORGES (FREE-Group Members)

Introduction

Much has been said and written about Passenger Name Records (PNR) in the last decade and a half. When we were asked to write a short report for the Consultative Committee about PNR, “in the wider contexts”, we therefore thought we could confine ourselves to a relatively straightforward overview of the literature and arguments.

However, the task turned out to be more complex than anticipated. In particular, the context has changed as a result of the Snowden revelations. Much of what was said and written about PNR before his exposés had looked at the issues narrowly, as only related to the “identification” of “known or [clearly ‘identified’] suspected terrorists” (and perhaps other major international criminals). However, the most recent details of what US and European authorities are doing, or plan to do, with PNR data show that they are part of the global surveillance operations we now know about.

More specifically, it became clear to us that there is a (partly deliberate?) semantic confusion about this “identification”; that the whole surveillance schemes are not only to do with finding previously-identified individuals, but also (and perhaps even mainly) with “mining” the vast amounts of disparate data to create “profiles” that are used to single out from the vast data stores people “identified” as statistically more likely to be (or even to become?) a terrorist (or other serious criminal), or to be “involved” in some way in terrorism or major crime. That is a different kind of “identification” from the previous one, as we discuss in this report.

We show this relatively recent (although predicted) development with reference to the most recent developments in the USA, which we believe provide the model for what is being planned (or perhaps already begun to be implemented) also in Europe. In the USA, PNR data are now expressly permitted to be added to and combined with other data, to create the kinds of profiles just mentioned – and our analysis of Article 4 of the proposed EU PNR Directive shows that, on a close reading, exactly the same will be allowed in the EU if the proposal is adopted.

Snowden has revealed much. But it is clear that his knowledge about what the “intelligence” agencies of the USA and the UK (and their allies) are really up to was and is still limited. He clearly had an astonishing amount of access to the data collection side of their operations, especially in relation to Internet and e-communications data (much more than any sensible secret service should ever have allowed a relatively junior contractor, although we must all be grateful for that “error”). However, it would appear that he had and has very little knowledge of what was and is being done with the vast data collections he exposed.

Yet it is obvious (indeed, even from the information about PNR use that we describe) that these are used not only to “identify” known terrorists or people identified as suspects in the traditional sense, but that these data mountains are also being “mined” to label people as “suspected terrorist” on the basis of profiles and algorithms. We believe that that in fact is the more insidious aspect of the operations.

This is why this report has become much longer than we had planned, and why it focusses on this wider issue rather than on the narrower concerns about PNR data expressed in most previous reports and studies.

The report is structured as follows. After preliminary remarks about the main topic of the report, PNR data (and related data) (further specified in the Attachment), Part I discusses the wider contexts within which we have analyzed the use of PNR data. We look at both the widest context: the change, over the last fifteen years or so, from reactive to “proactive” and “preventive” law enforcement, and the blurring of the lines between law enforcement and “national security” activities (and between the agencies involved), in particular in relation to terrorism (section I.i); and at the historical (immediately post-“9/11”) and more recent developments relating to the use of PNR data in data mining/profiling operations the USA, in the “CAPPS” and (now) the “Secure Flight” programmes (section I.ii).

In section I.iii, we discuss the limitations and dangers inherent in such data mining and “profiling”.

Only then do we turn to PNR and Europe by describing, in Part II. both the links between the EU and the US systems (section II.1), and then the question of “strategic surveillance” in Europe (II.ii).

In Part III, we discuss the law, i.e., the general ECHR standards (I); the ECHR standards applied to surveillance in practice (II, with a chart with an overview of the ECtHR considerations); other summaries of the law by the Venice Commission and the FRA (III); and further relevant case-law (IV).

In Part IV, we first apply the standards to EU-third country PNR agreements (IV.i), with reference to the by-passing of the existing agreements by the USA (IV.ii) and to the spreading of demands for PNR to other countries (IV.iii). We then look at the human rights and data protection-legal issues raised by the proposal for an EU PNR scheme. We conclude that part with a summary of the four core issues identified: purpose-specification and –limitation; the problem with remedies; “respect for human identity”; and the question of whether the processing we identify as our main concern – “dynamic”-algorithm-based data mining and profiling – actually works.

Part V contains a Summary of our findings; our Conclusions (with our overall conclusions set out in a box on p. 109); and tentative, draft Recommendations. (…)

Conclusions Continue reading “Passenger Name Records, data mining & data protection: the need for strong safeguards”

Les lourdes chaînes de Prométhée, réflexions critiques sur la Stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure 2015 – 2020

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE ON  23 JUIN 2015

par Pierre Berthelet, CDRE

Le Professeur Panayotis Soldatos comparait il y a peu l’Union européenne à Prométhée enchaîné par les Etats membres. Ces réflexions mettant en évidence une construction européenne dépendante des États, « dont les élites politiques, écrit-il, se refusent à admettre la réalité de l’obsolescence de la souveraineté nationale », s’illustrent parfaitement avec l’adoption par le Conseil de la stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure pour la période 2015-2020.

À première vue, la sécurité intérieure vient de franchir un pas supplémentaire dans l’intégration avec l’approbation par le Conseil le 16 juin 2015, de conclusions renouvelant et modernisant pour cinq années à venir la stratégie 2010-2014. Pour autant, il semble bien que les chaînes soient pesantes, car les États conservent la main, et de main ferme pourrait-on dire, le processus d’intégration dans ce domaine.

Ces conclusions entraînent une série de réflexions critiques quant aux conséquences institutionnelles et quant à la manière dont les États décident d’œuvrer dans la construction européenne en matière de sécurité intérieure.

Elles suscitent d’emblée des interrogations concernant l’inclusion du Parlement européen dans le processus décisionnel lié au déroulement du cycle, ainsi que sur la préservation accrue des droits fondamentaux (1).
Continue reading “Les lourdes chaînes de Prométhée, réflexions critiques sur la Stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure 2015 – 2020”

Les lourdes chaînes de Prométhée, réflexions critiques sur la Stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure 2015 – 2020

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE ON 23 JUIN 2015

par Pierre Berthelet, CDRE

Le Professeur Panayotis Soldatos comparait il y a peu l’Union européenne à Prométhée enchaîné par les Etats membres. Ces réflexions mettant en évidence une construction européenne dépendante des États, « dont les élites politiques, écrit-il, se refusent à admettre la réalité de l’obsolescence de la souveraineté nationale », s’illustrent parfaitement avec l’adoption par le Conseil de la stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure pour la période 2015-2020.

À première vue, la sécurité intérieure vient de franchir un pas supplémentaire dans l’intégration avec l’approbation par le Conseil le 16 juin 2015, de conclusions renouvelant et modernisant pour cinq années à venir la stratégie 2010-2014. Pour autant, il semble bien que les chaînes soient pesantes, car les États conservent la main, et de main ferme pourrait-on dire, le processus d’intégration dans ce domaine.

Ces conclusions entraînent une série de réflexions critiques quant aux conséquences institutionnelles et quant à la manière dont les États décident d’œuvrer dans la construction européenne en matière de sécurité intérieure.

Elles suscitent d’emblée des interrogations concernant l’inclusion du Parlement européen dans le processus décisionnel lié au déroulement du cycle, ainsi que sur la préservation accrue des droits fondamentaux (1). La stratégie ne fait pas véritablement l’impasse sur ces deux questions, car elle les mentionne en soulignant l’importance de ces problématiques. Cependant, l’observateur ne peut que demeurer sur sa faim quant aux modes d’inclusion du Parlement européen, et à la manière dont les droits fondamentaux ont vocation à être davantage pris en compte, alors que le Conseil semble précisément se focaliser davantage sur la sécurité que sur la liberté. Cette stratégie pour la période 2015-2020, justifiée par la permanence des menaces, voire leur accroissement, en premier lieu, le terrorisme et la grande criminalité organisée (p. 2 des conclusions du Conseil du 16 juin), est qualifiée par le Conseil de « globale et réaliste » (p. 5). Son adoption mérite d’être saluée à ce titre, car elle confère une certaine cohérence à une action qui dépasse les frontières de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice, pour comprendre des thématiques telles que la gestion de crise, la protection des infrastructures critiques et la cybersécurité. Pour autant, en l’examinant de plus près, cette stratégie pour la période 2015-2020 n’apparaît pas exempte de toutes critiques. Il est vrai qu’elle est bien plus précise concernant les priorités fixées par la stratégie précédente qui avait, par exemple, érigé la « lutte contre la violence en elle-même » en un objectif de sécurité de l’Union.

En revanche, elle l’est moins que le plan d’action venant compléter cette stratégie de 2010 et ce, en raison de l’ambiguïté des objectifs fixés par la stratégie européenne pour la période 2015-2020 (2). Il est même possible de considérer que la stratégie de 2015 est de moins bonne facture que la précédente, car il s’agit à la fois d’un document opérationnel, mais qui n’en est pas réellement un, et d’un document stratégique, mais qui n’en est pas réellement un non plus. De prime abord, elle se positionne à mi-chemin entre d’une part, des conclusions des 4 et 5 décembre 2014 qui énoncent les grands principes, et d’autre part, un plan d’action destiné à lister des mesures concrètes. Néanmoins, sa portée se révèle être bien plus opérationnelle que stratégique, car le plan d’action à venir, visant à mettre en œuvre cette stratégie censée, comme son nom le laisse supposer, être un document de nature stratégique, est réduit à la portion congrue (3).

Si le positionnement de la stratégie est complexe sur le plan normatif, il l’est beaucoup moins sur le plan conceptuel dans la mesure où la stratégie de 2015 demeure, comme celle de 2010, très empreinte d’une idéologie de la sécurité globale (4). Elle révèle certes, le peu d’audace de la part du Conseil concernant les avancées en matière de sécurité, reflétant le double discours habituel des États, très volontaires dans les déclarations d’intention, mais beaucoup moins dans la concrétisation de celles-ci. En revanche, elle suscite des interrogations quant aux relations qu’entretiennent la sécurité intérieure et l’espace pénal européen et ce, en raison de la place faite à la doctrine relative à la sécurité globale (5). L’un et l’autre se construisent de manière séparée et même dans l’ignorance mutuelle. La stratégie révèleà ce propos un monde de la sécurité (police, douane, garde-frontières) dont l’horizon d’action est davantage marqué par une collaboration avec celui de la sécurité et de la défense, qu’avec celui de la justice.

1. Une impasse sur le Parlement européen et sur les droits fondamentaux ?

Continue reading “Les lourdes chaînes de Prométhée, réflexions critiques sur la Stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure 2015 – 2020”

VERFASSUNGSBLOG : Europe’s Justice Deficit

SEE ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS HERE

The EU affects the lives of many people in ways they perceive as profoundly unjust. Lives are dramatically affected by the policies of austerity, widely understood to be EU-imposed. With the Court of Justice appearing to stand for its own authority and EU autonomy at any cost; with migrants attempting to reach fortress Europe and drowning en masse as the EU cuts back its rescue services; and with economic inequalities in the Member States reaching new heights, could it be that there is a justice deficit in Europe, exacerbated by the European Union? There is an urgent need to address the question of justice as an EU objective openly and without reservation, and not to permit nationalists and Eurosceptics to monopolize this debate. On the occasion of the newly launched book “Europe’s Justice Deficit?”, co-edited by EU constitutional law scholars Dimitry Kochenov, Gráinne de Búrca and Andrew Williams, we put this question up for debate.

Read MORE

THE FRENCH “WAR ON TERROR” IN THE POST-CHARLIE HEBDO ERA

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EUCRIM EDITED BY THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE AND THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW ASSOCIATION’S FORUM (*)

by Vasiliki Chalkiadaki

I. Introduction

France’s history of terrorism is neither new nor exclusively Islamist-related. At the end of the 1970s, France experienced a wave of terrorist activity both from left-revolutionary groups, such as the Action Directe,1 and from nationalist-separatist groups, especially those active in Brittany, Corsica, and the Basque Country.2 By the early 1980s, however, France had become a target of Islamist terrorist groups and has remained so ever since, as the gunmen attack on the Paris headquarters of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 demonstrated.3

The history of contemporary French counterterrorism legislation dates back to 1986, with the law on counterterrorism of 9 September 1986. Before the latter, France dealt with terrorist attacks by means of special laws on state security that had been enacted during the Algerian wars (1954–1962), which provided for an intensive limitation of individual rights and even for a special court to deal with the relevant offences (Cour de Surete de l’Etat, “Court of State Security”)4 that was abolished only in 1982. Therefore, until 1986, no specific counterterrorism legislation existed.

Before 1986, terrorist acts were characterized as “serious violent acts threatening the integrity and the security of the state” and treated accordingly.5

This paper presents the impact that the latest terrorist attack (hereafter: the Charlie attack) has had so far on France’s counterterrorism legislation (part III). After a brief historical overview of current legislative measures (part II), the following aspects are examined as being the effects of the attack:

  • the enactment of a series of provisions, mainly in the Code of Internal Security (Code de securite interieure, hereafter: Cod. Sec. Int.);
  • the exponentially increasing number of prosecutions on the basis of already existing substantive criminal law provisions (especially the glorification of terrorism and the preparation of terrorist acts);
  • the planning of new measures and the drafting of the relevant provisions regarding the financing of terrorism to reinforce the already existing framework on terrorist financing.

  • II. Historical overview Continue reading “THE FRENCH “WAR ON TERROR” IN THE POST-CHARLIE HEBDO ERA”

Summer School on The European Area of Criminal Justice (Brussels, 29 June – 3 July 2015)

NB: This Summer School is particularly designed for practitioners in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, EU or national civil servants, as well as researchers and students interested in EU “Freedom, Security and Justice” policies.

Programme (See updated version here)

The 12th edition of the Summer School “The EU Area of Criminal Justice” will take place in Brussels from 29 June – 3  July  2015.

The objective of the Summer School is to provide participants with an extensive knowledge of EU criminal law. The classes are both theoretical and practical. They are conducted by academics, national experts or European officials who deal every day with the European criminal area.

The Summer School is specially designed for practitioners in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, EU or national civil servants as well as researchers and students interested in the EU area of freedom, security and justice.

Concerning the programme: the Summer School takes place over a week, lectures are in English, participants receive a certificate of attendance, the final examination entitles participants to receive 3 ECTS and lawyers to gain 37 points from the OBFG (Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone de Belgique).

The Summer School covers essentially 5 topics :

  • subject I (day 1): general introduction (historical evolution, institutional issues – Schengen included, judicial control – EU accession to ECHR included);
  • subject II (day 2): cooperation between national authorities in criminal cases, covering both police cooperation and judicial co-operation. The latter will address the evolution from classic judicial cooperation (Mutual Legal Assistance instruments) to mutual recognition instruments, with special attention to the  European Arrest Warrant;
  • subject III (day 3): approximation of criminal law, in theory and practice. Thus, following a class on the approximation of substantive criminal law, the example of financial crimes will be addressed. Similarly, the theoretical course on approximation of procedural law will be complemented with the study of the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer;
  • subject IV (day 4): current and future actors of the European criminal area, particularly Eurojust, Europol and the EPPO.
  • subject V (day 5): data protection and external dimension of the EU area of criminal justice. The Summer School will end with a negotiation exercise.

Special events during the Summer School:

  • Mid-week conference : “Foreign fighters – a criminal law revolution?” 

The conference will be chaired by Hans G. Nilsson (General Secretariat of the EU Council) and will count on speeches from illustrious practitioner and professors. For details, please download the programme on the right.

The Summer School is organised by the Institute for European Studies of the Free University of Brussels (IEE-ULB) in collaboration with the European Criminal Law Academic Network (ECLAN).

Europe and “Whistleblowers” : still a bumpy road…

by Claire Perinaud (FREE Group trainee) The 9th and the 10th of April was organized in Paris by the University Paris X Nanterre la Défense in collaboration with the University Paris I Sorbonne a Conference on «  whistleblowers and fundamental rights »[1] which echoed a rising debate on the figure of  wistleblowers  after the numerous revelations of scandals and corruption which occurred last years, with some of them directly linked to EU institutions. In the following lines I will try to sketch a) the general framework then b) the main issues raised during the Conference

A) The general framework 

The term « whistle-blower » was created by Ralph Nader in 1970 in the context of the need to ensure the defense of citizens from lobbies. He defined « whistle blowing » as « an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, blows the whistle that the organization is in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity »[2]. The interest of scholars and lawyers to the figure of whistle-blowers in the United States dates back to the adoption by the Congress in 1863 of the False claims act which is deemed to be the first legislation related to the right of alert[3].
The system which developed afterwards is notably based on the idea that whistle-blowing is a strong mechanism to fight corruption and has to be encouraged by means of financial incentives[4]. If this mechanism is of utmost importance in the United States, protection of whistle blowers is only slowly introduced in Europe[5]. 
With numerous scandals related to systemic violations of human rights, the subject is progressively dealt with in the European Union (EU) and in the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, in both organizations, the protection of whistleblowers remain at the stage of project or only recommendations to the states.

The Council of Europe… Continue reading “Europe and “Whistleblowers” : still a bumpy road…”

The EU’s Planned War on Smugglers

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON STATEWATCH 

by Steve Peers (Twitter: @StevePeers)

The EU’s Foreign Affairs Council is meeting today (May 18) to discuss the possibility of a military operation in the Mediterranean to take actions against smuggling of migrants. Officially, at least, the purpose of the operation (as defined by EU leaders last month) is to destroy smugglers’ boats. The EU’s High Representative has stated that there will be ‘no boots on the ground’; and as she arrived at the Council meeting today, she referred to authorising an ‘EU operation at sea’.

However, it is clear from the documents discussed in the EU’s Political and Security Committee last week that (unless plans have changed radically in the meantime) the  High Representative is being “economical with the truth”. The EU action clearly contemplates action by ground forces. Moreover, it anticipates the possible loss of life  not only of smugglers but also  of Member States’ forces and refugees. In effect, the EU is planning to declare war on migrant smugglers – without thinking through the consequences.

Details

The document defines the purpose of the EU operation: ‘to disrupt the business model of the smugglers, achieved by undertaking systematic efforts to identify, seize/capture and destroy vessels and assets before they are used by smugglers.’

There would be four phases: ‘(1) a deployment and assessment phase, (2) an operational/seizure (of smuggled vessels) phase; (3) an operational/disruption phase, (4) a mission withdrawal and completion phase. The EU states that authorisation by the UN is not required by the first phase. While ‘ideally’ there should be consent of ‘the government(s) concerned’, the EU document clearly contemplates going ahead without it.

Phase 1 – Deployment Continue reading “The EU’s Planned War on Smugglers”