Category: Security and Justice

The draft Directive on Terrorism: the Council is ready to adopt its “general approach”..

On March 10 the Justice and Home Affairs Council will probably adopt its “general approach” on the proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism submitted by the Commission to the co-legislators (Council and European Parliament) only beginning of  December 2015.

The new text will replace the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (as amended in 2008) by incorporating at the same time in the EU legal order the Council of Europe Convention on terrorism as well as its recent Protocol (14) on “Foreign Fighters” (which itself refers to the UNSC Resolution 2178/14).

You may find on a WIKI-LEX page on this blog here most of the background documentation dealing with the main institutional documents on this sensitive subject. The consolidated compromise text of the proposed Directive, as resulting from these discussions is set out below and, if, endorsed by the Council, will constitute the basis for future negotiations with the European Parliament in view of a possible “first reading agreement”.

Quite surprisingly until now the competent Parliamentary Committee (LIBE) had only some very general (and generic) debates on such a complex subject. From a civil society point of view this is extremely worrying also because such a sensitive issue has not debated since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (and of the Charter) so that none knows what has been achieved within the current legal framework nor what is expected from the new envisaged Directive. If this is the new way of “better law making” you can only regret the old good times when this kind of initiatives were duly debated in the European and national Parliaments.

EDC

2015/0281(COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 83(1) and Article 82(2) (c) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)  The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.

(2) Acts of terrorism constitute one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on which the European Union is founded. It also represents one of the most serious attacks on democracy and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States and on which the European Union is based.

(3) Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA[3] is the cornerstone of the criminal justice response to counter terrorism. A legal framework common to all Member States, and in particular, a harmonised definition of terrorist offences, serves as a benchmark for information exchange and cooperation between the competent national authorities under Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA,[4] Council Decision 2008/615/JHA[5] and Council Decision 2005/671/JHA,[6] Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council,[7] Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA[8] and Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA.[9]

(4)  The terrorist threat has grown and rapidly evolved in recent years. Individuals referred to as “foreign terrorist fighters” travel abroad for terrorism purposes. The United Nations Security Council has expressed its concern in UNSCR 2178 (2014) in relation to the foreign terrorist fighters. The Council of Europe has, in this respect, adopted in 2015 the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 217). Returning foreign terrorist fighters pose a heightened security threat to all EU Member States. (…) In addition, the European Union and its Member States face increased threats from individuals inspired or instructed by terrorist groups abroad but who remain within Europe.

(5)  Taking account of the evolution of terrorist threats and legal obligations to the Union and Member States under international law, the definition of terrorist offences, (…)offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, should be further approximated in all Member States, so that it covers more comprehensively conduct related to in particular foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing. These forms of behaviour should be punishable also if committed through the Internet, including social media.

(6) The offences related to terrorist activities are of a very serious nature as they have the potential to lead to the commission of terrorist offences and enable terrorists and terrorist groups to maintain and further develop their criminal activities, justifying the criminalisation of such conduct.

(7)  The offenses related to public provocation to commit a terrorist offence act comprise, inter alia, the glorification and justification of terrorism or the dissemination of messages or images including those related to the victims of terrorism as a way to gain publicity for the terrorists cause or seriously intimidating the population, provided that such behaviour causes a danger that terrorist acts may be committed. To strengthen actions against public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, and also taking into account the increased use of technology, in particular the Internet, it seems appropriate for Member States to take measures to remove or to block access to webpages publicly inciting to commit terrorist offences. Where such measures are taken, they must be set by transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure that restrictions are limited to what is necessary and proportionate.

(8) Considering the seriousness of the threat and the need to in particular stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, it is necessary to criminalise the travelling abroad to a country outside the Union for terrorist purposes, not only in order to commit terrorist offences and provide or receive training but also to participate in the activities of a terrorist group. The criminalisation under this Directive is limited to the travel to countries outside the Union as the destination where the person concerned intends to engage in terrorist activities and offences. The travel to the State of destination may be direct or by transiting other States en route. Any act of facilitation of such travel should also be criminalised. It is not indispensable to criminalise the act of travelling as such.

(9) Criminalisation of the receiving training for terrorism complements the existing offence of providing training and specifically addresses the threats resulting from those actively preparing for the commission of terrorist offences, including those ultimately acting alone.

(10) Terrorist financing should be punishable in the Member States. Criminalisation should cover the financing of terrorist acts, the financing of a terrorist group, as well as other offences related to terrorist activities, such as the recruitment and training, or travel for terrorist purposes, with a view to disrupting the support structures facilitating the commission of terrorist offences. (…)

(11)     Furthermore, the provision of material support for terrorism through persons engaging in or acting as intermediaries in the supply or movement of services, assets and goods, including trade transactions involving the entry into or exit from the Union, such as sale, acquisition or exchange of a cultural object of archaeological, artistic, historical or scientific interest illegally removed  from an area controlled by a terrorist group at the time of the removal, should be punishable in the Member States, as aiding and abetting terrorism or as terrorist financing if performed with the knowledge that these operations or the proceeds thereof are intended to be used, in full or in part, for terrorist purposes or will benefit terrorist groups. Further measures may be necessary with a view to effectively combat the illicit trade in cultural goods as a source of income for terrorist groups.

(12)     The attempt to travel abroad for terrorist purposes, should be punishable, as well as the attempt to provide training and recruitment for terrorism.

(13)     With regard to the criminal offences provided for in this Directive, the notion of intention must apply to all the elements constituting those offences. The intentional nature of an act or omission may be inferred from objective, factual circumstances.

(14)     Furthermore, penalties should be provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being liable for such offences, which reflect the seriousness of such offences.

(15)     Jurisdictional rules should be established to ensure that the offences laid down in this Directive may be effectively prosecuted. In particular, it appears appropriate to establish jurisdiction for the offences committed by the providers of training for terrorism, whatever their nationality, in view of the possible effects of such behaviours on the territory of the Union and of the close material connexion between the offences of providing and receiving training for terrorism.

(15a)   To ensure the success of investigations and the prosecution of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group or offences related to terrorist activities, those responsible for investigating and prosecuting such offences should have the possibility to make use of effective investigative tools such as those which are used in combating organised crime or other serious crimes. Such tools should, where appropriate, while taking into account the principle of proportionality and the nature and seriousness of the offences under investigation in accordance with national law, include, for example, the search of any personal property, the interception of communications, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, the taking and the fixing of audio recordings in private or public vehicles and places, and of visual images of persons in public vehicles and places, (…) and financial investigations(…). The right to the protection of personal data should be respected.

(16)      Member States should adopt (…) measures of protection, support and assistance responding to the specific needs of victims of terrorism, in accordance with  Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council[10] and as further qualified by this Directive. Victims of terrorism are those defined in Article 2 of Directive 2012/29/EU being a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by a terrorist offence, and family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a terrorist offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that person’s death. (…) Family members of surviving victims of terrorism, as defined in Article 2 of Directive 2012/29/EU, have access to victim support services and protection measures in accordance with Directive 2012/29/EU.

(16a)   Member States should ensure that relevant mechanisms or protocols are in place allowing for activation of support services which are able to address the specific needs of victims of terrorism immediately after a terrorist attack and for as long as necessary thereafter. Such support services should take into account that specific needs of victims of terrorism may evolve in time. In that regard, the Member States should ensure that support services will address in the first place at least the emotional and psychological needs of the most vulnerable victims of terrorism, and will inform all victims of terrorism about the availability of further emotional and psychological support including trauma support and counselling.

(17)     Member States‘ should (…) ensure that all victims of terrorism have access to information about the victims’ rights, about available support services and (…) compensation schemes in the Member State where the terrorist offence was committed. Member States concerned should take appropriate action to facilitate cooperation with each other in order to ensure that victims of terrorism, who are residents of a Member State other than that where the terrorist offence was committed have effective access to such information. Moreover the Member States should ensure that victims of terrorism have access to a long-term support services in the country of their residence, even if the terrorist offence took place in another EU country.

(18)     Given that the objectives of this Directive cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States unilaterally and can therefore, because of the need for European-wide harmonised rules, be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article 5, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(19)     This Directive respects the principles recognised by Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, respects fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including those set out in Titles II, III, V and VI thereof which encompass inter alia the right to liberty and security, freedom of expression and information, freedom of association and freedom of thought conscience and religion, the general prohibition of discrimination in particular on grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, the right to respect for private and family life and the right to protection of personal data, the principle of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, covering also the requirement of precision, clarity and foreseeability in criminal law, the presumption of innocence as well as freedom of movement as set forth in Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and  Directive 2004/38/EC. This Directive has to be implemented in accordance with these rights and principles. This Directive has to be implemented in accordance with these rights and principles taking also into account the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights obligations under international law.

(19a)   This Directive should not have the effect of altering the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Member States under international law, including under international humanitarian law. The activities of armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by international humanitarian law within the meaning of these terms under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, activities of the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties are not governed by this Directive.

(20)     The implementation of the criminalisation under this Directive should be proportional to the nature and circumstances of the offence, with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society, and should exclude any form of arbitrariness, racism  or discrimination.

(20a)   Nothing in this Directive should be interpreted as being intended to reduce or restrict the dissemination of information for scientific, academic or reporting purposes. The expression of radical, polemic or controversial views in the public debate on sensitive political questions, falls outside the scope of this Directive and, in particular, of the definition of public provocation to commit terrorist offences.

(21)     The Directive should replace Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA[11] for the Member States bound by this Directive.

(22)     In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the United Kingdom and Ireland have notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Directive.

AND/OR

(23)     In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and without prejudice to Article 4 of that Protocol, the United Kingdom and Ireland are not taking part in the adoption and application of this Directive and are not bound by it or subject to its application.

(24)    In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA shall continue to be binding upon and applicable to Denmark.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Title I: Subject matter and definitions

Article 1 Subject matter
This Directive establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, as well as (…) measures of protection of and assistance to victims of terrorism.

Article 2 Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

a)”funds” means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit,
b) “legal person” means any entity having legal personality under the applicable law, except for States or public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public international organisations,
c) “terrorist group” shall mean: a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences; “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
d) merged with letter “c”

Title II: Terrorist offences and offences related to a terrorist group

Article 3 Terrorist offences
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to in paragraph 2, as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation are defined as terrorist offences where committed with the aim of one or more of the following:
a)seriously intimidating a population;
b) unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act;
c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

2. Intentional acts referred to in paragraph 1 are
a) attacks upon a persons’ life which may cause death;
b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;

i) illegal system interference, as referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems in cases where Article 9, paragraph (3) or (4)(b) or (c) of the said Directive apply, and illegal data interference, as referred to in Article 5 of Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems in cases where Article 9, paragraph (4)(c) of the said Directive applies;
j) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in points (a) to (i).

Article 4 Offences relating to a terrorist group
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following acts, when committed intentionally, are punishable as a criminal offence:
a) directing a terrorist group;
b) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.

Title III: Offences related to terrorist activities

Article 5 Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), where such conduct directly, or indirectly such as by the glorification of terrorist acts, advocates the commission of terrorist offences thereby causing a danger that one or more such offences may be committed, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 6 Recruitment for terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that soliciting another person to commit one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), or in Article 4 is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 7 Providing training for terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that providing instruction in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of committing of or contributing to one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 8 Receiving training for terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that to receive instruction, from another person in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of committing of or contributing to the commission of one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2) is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 9 Travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that travelling to a country outside the Union, directly or by transiting through one or several Member States of the Union, for the purpose of the commission of or contribution to a terrorist offence referred to in Article 3, the participation in the activities of a terrorist group with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of such a group as referred to in Article 4, or the providing or receiving of training for terrorism referred to in Articles 7 and 8 is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 10 Organising or otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any act of organisation or facilitation that assists any person in travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, as referred to in Article 9, knowing that the assistance thus rendered is for that purpose, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 11 Terrorist financing
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that providing or collecting funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intent that they should be used, or knowing that they are to be used, in full or in part, to commit or to contribute to any of the offence(s) referred to in Articles 3 to 10 (…) is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.
2. Where terrorist financing as referred to in paragraph 1 concerns any of the offences laid down in Articles 3, 4 or 9, it shall not be necessary that the funds are in fact used, in full or in part, to commit or to contribute to any of these offences, nor shall it be required that the offender knows for which specific offence(s) the funds are to be used.

Article 12 Other offences related to terrorist activities
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences related to terrorist activities include the following intentional acts:
a) aggravated theft with a view to committing one of the offences listed in Article 3;
b) extortion with a view to the perpetration of one of the offences listed in Article 3;
c) drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), point (b) of Article 4 and Article 9.

Article 13 (merged with Article 12)

Article 14 (merged with Article 12)

Title IV: General provisions relating to terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities

Article 15 Relationship to terrorist offences
For an offence referred to in Article 4 and Title III to be punishable, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed, nor shall it be necessary, insofar as the offences referred to in Articles 5 to 10 and 12 are concerned, to establish a link to another specific offence laid down in this Directive.

Article 16 Aiding or abetting, inciting and attempting
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that aiding or abetting an offence referred to in Articles 3 to 8, 11 and 12 is made punishable.
2.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting an offence referred to in Articles 3 to 12 is made punishable.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to commit an offence referred to in Articles 3, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12, with the exception of possession as provided for in point (f) of Article 3(2) and the offence referred to in point (j) of Article 3(2), is made punishable.


Article 17 Penalties for natural persons
1.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to Articles 3 to 12 and 16 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail surrender or extradition.
2.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist offences referred to in Article 3 and offences referred to in Article 16, inasmuch as they relate to terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those imposable under national law for such offences in the absence of the special intent required pursuant to Article 3, save where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under national law.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences listed in Article 4 are punishable by custodial sentences, with a maximum sentence of not less than fifteen years for the offence referred to in point (a) of Article 4, and for the offences listed in point (b) of Article 4 a maximum sentence of not less than eight years. Where the terrorist offence referred to in point (j) of Article 3(2) is committed by a person directing a terrorist group as referred to in point (a) of Article 4, the maximum sentence shall not be less than eight years.

Article 18 Mitigating circumstances
Each Member State may take the necessary measures to ensure that the penalties referred to in Article 17 may be reduced if the offender:
a) renounces terrorist activity, and
b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to:
1. prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
2. identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
3. find evidence; or
4. prevent further offences referred to in Articles 3 to
12 and 16.

Article 19 Liability of legal persons
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, and having a leading position within the legal person, based on one of the following:
a) a power of representation of the legal person;
b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person;
c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. Member States shall also take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 for the benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.
3. Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, inciters or accessories in any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16.

Article 20 Penalties for legal persons
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 19 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other penalties, such as:

    a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
    b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities;
    c) placing under judicial supervision;
    d) a judicial winding-up order;
    e) temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for committing the offence.

    Article 21 Jurisdiction and prosecution
    1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 where:
    a) the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory;
    b) the offence is committed on board of a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft registered there;
    c) the offender is one of its nationals or residents;
    d) (deleted)
    e) the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in its territory;
    f) the offence is committed against the institutions or people of the Member State in question or against an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union and based in that Member State.
    Each Member State may extend its jurisdiction if the offence is committed in the territory of a Member State.
    1a.Each Member State may extend its jurisdiction over training for terrorism, as referred to in Article 7, where the offender provides training to its nationals or residents, in cases where paragraph 1 is not applicable. The Member State shall inform the Commission thereof.
    2. When an offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State and when any of the States concerned can validly prosecute on the basis of the same facts, the Member States concerned shall cooperate in order to decide which of them will prosecute the offenders with the aim, if possible, of centralising proceedings in a single Member State. To this end, the Member States may have recourse to Eurojust in order to facilitate cooperation between their judicial authorities and the coordination of their action.
    (…) Account shall be taken of the following factors:
    a) the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the acts were committed,
    b) the Member State shall be that of which the perpetrator is a national or resident,
    c) the Member State shall be the Member State of origin of the victims,
    d) the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the perpetrator was found.
    3.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures also to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 in cases where it refuses to hand over or extradite a person suspected or convicted of such an offence to another Member State or to a third country.
    4.Each Member State shall ensure that its jurisdiction covers cases in which any of the offences referred to in Articles 4 and 16 has been committed in whole or in part within its territory, wherever the terrorist group is based or pursues its criminal activities.
    5.This Article shall not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters as laid down by a Member State in accordance with its national legislation.

    Article 21a Investigative tools
    Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools, such as those which are used in organised crime or other serious crime cases, are available to persons, units or services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12.

    Article 21bis  Fundamental principles relating to freedom of press and other media
    Member States may establish conditions required by and in line with fundamental principles relating to freedom of the press and other media, governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where these rules relate to the determination or limitation of liability.

    TITLE V: Provisions on protection, support and rights of victims of terrorism

    Article 22 (…) Assistance and support to victims of terrorism
    1. Member States shall ensure that investigations into, or prosecution of, offences covered by this Directive are not dependent on a report or accusation made by a victim of terrorism or other person subjected to the offence, at least if the acts were committed on the territory of the Member State.
    2.Member States shall ensure that (…) support services addressing the specific needs of victims of terrorism are in place in accordance with Directive 2012/29/EU and that they are available for victims of terrorism immediately after a terrorist attack and as long as necessary thereafter. Such services shall be provided in addition to, or as an integrated part of general victim support services, which may call on existing entities providing specialist support.
    3. The support services shall have the ability to provide assistance and support to victims of terrorism in accordance with their specific needs (…). The services shall be confidential, free of charge and easily accessible to all victims of terrorism. They shall include in particular:
    a) emotional and psychological support, such as trauma support and counselling;
    b) provision of advice and information on any relevant legal, practical or financial matter
    4.This Directive shall apply in addition to and without prejudice to measures laid down in Directive 2012/29/EU.


    Article 22a Protection of victims of terrorism
    Member States shall ensure that measures are available to protect victims of terrorism and their family members, in accordance with Directive 2012/29/EU. When determining whether and to what extent they should benefit from (…) protection measures in the course of criminal proceedings, particular attention shall be paid to the risk of intimidation and retaliation and to the need to protect the dignity and physical integrity of victims of terrorism, including during questioning and when testifying.

    Article 23 Rights of victims of terrorism resident in another Member State
    1. Member States shall ensure (…) that victims of terrorism who are residents of a Member State other than that (…) where the terrorist offence was committed have access to information regarding their (…) rights, the available support services and (…) compensation schemes in the Member State where the terrorist offence was committed. In this respect, Member States concerned shall take appropriate action to facilitate cooperation between their competent authorities or entities providing specialist support to ensure the effective access of victims to such information.
    2. Member States shall ensure that all victims of terrorism have access to the assistance and (…) support services as laid down in Article 22 on the territory of the Member State of their residence, even if the terrorist offence was committed in another Member State.

    Title VI: Final provisions

    Article 24 Replacement of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism
    Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA is replaced with regard to the Member States bound by this Directive, without prejudice to the obligations of those Member States with regard to the date for transposition of that Framework Decision into national law.
    With regards to the Member States bound by this Directive, references to Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA shall be construed as references to this Directive.

    Article 25 Transposition
    1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [24 months after adoption]. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
    When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
    2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.

    Article 26 Reporting
    1.The Commission shall, by [24 months after the deadline for implementation of this Directive], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures to comply with this Directive.
    2.The Commission shall, by [48 months after the deadline for implementation of this Directive], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the impact and added value of this Directive on combating terrorism. The Commission shall take into account the information provided by Member States under Decision 2005/671/JHA.

    Article 27 Entry into force
    This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Article 28 Addressees
    This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.

    Done at Brussels,
    For the European Parliament                                         
    For the Council

    NOTES

    [1]  Changes compared to the Commission proposal are marked in bold.
    [2]  CZ and SE have parliamentary scrutiny reservations
    [3]  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3).
    [4] Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89).
    [5] Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).
    [6] Council decision 2005/671/JHA on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences (OJ L 253, 29.9.2005, p. 22).
    [7] Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 1).
    [8] Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).
    [9] Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (OJ L 162, 20.6.2002, p. 1).
    [10] Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001(OJ L 315, 14.11.2012 p. 57).
    [11] As amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, p. 21).

Why the (US) Judicial Redress Act is worthless

PUBLISHED ON THE IDENTITY PROJECT

Yesterday President Obama signed the Judicial Redress Act into law. European Union Commissioner for Justice Věra Jourová described the new law as, “a historic achievement [that] will ensure that all EU citizens have the right to enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts…. The entry into force of the Judicial Redress Act will pave the way for the signature of the EU-U.S. Data Protection Umbrella Agreement.”

Is the Judicial Redress Act really so historic? And will it actually “ensure that all EU citizens have the right to enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts”?

Sadly, no.

Europeans should not be by statements such as those from Commissioner Jourová or his counterparts in other EU institutions. As we know from our own experience in court as US citizens, there are almost no real-world cases in which the Judicial Redress Act will provide any actual protection or enforceable legal rights to citizens or residents of the EU, or anywhere else.

The Judicial Redress Act gives some foreign citizens some of the rights that US citizens currently have, with respect to some of the uses and misuses by the US government of their personal information. But in no case will any foreigner have more rights under the Judicial Redress Act than US citizens have under the Privacy Act.

Serious scrutiny of the terms of the Privacy Act, and of the history of attempts by US citizens to use the Privacy Act to protect themselves against misuse of our personal information by the US government, has been largely absent from the debate about the Judicial Redress Act. But from our experience as parties to one of the key lawsuits attempting to assert Privacy Act claims by US citizens in relation to one of the most controversial categories of personal information being transferred from the EU to the US — passenger name records (PNRs) for international airline flights — we have learned an important lesson that Europeans need to know: the Privacy Act is so limited and riddled with exceptions that it is almost worthless. It is because the Privacy Act is useless, not because the US government follows fair personal information practices in its dragnet surveillance, that there are so few examples of successful litigation against the US government by US citizens under the Privacy Act.

All of the limitations and exceptions that always rendered the “protection” of the Privacy Act inadequate — even for US citizens — will continue to render the protection of the Judicial Redress Act inadequate for foreigners, in all of the same ways, and in additional ones.

What are these exceptions and limitations? In order to make sense out of the Judicial Redress Act, it’s essential to understand the exemptions in the Privacy Act, as courts have interpreted them.

Federal agencies can exempt themselves from almost all of the requirements of the Privacy Act with respect to “investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes,” a catch-all category that has been applied to records of dragnet surveillance and other information compiled and used for “pre-crime” profiling, even when the data subjects have never been accused or suspected of any crime. All an agency has to do to opt-out is to publish a notice in the Federal Register that a particular system of records has been declared exempt by the agency that maintains the records. An agency can wait to promulgate such a notice until after it receives a request for access to records, a request for an accounting of disclosures, or a request for correction of records.

What does this mean in practice, when the courts have been asked to apply the Privacy Act to sensitive PNR data pertaining to a US citizen? As we noted in 2012 at the conclusion of our Privacy Act litigation against the US government for the government’s copies of PNR data contained in the CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS):

Under the interpretation of the Privacy Act adopted by Judge Seeborg’s ruling in our case, additional Privacy Act exemptions could be promulgated at any time in the future, and applied even to requests that had already been made. Nobody can rely on any “rights” under the Privacy Act that could be retroactively revoked at any time. In addition, the new notices fail to give any additional detail about the data-mining or search-and-retrieval capabilities of the software (which Judge Seeborg ruled that CBP does not have to disclose, notwithstanding the specific requirement of the Privacy Act law that a SORN include the “practices of the agency regarding … retrievability” of records) or the algorithms used for processing data and making “targeting” decisions… (The use of secret algorithms makes it impossible for airlines or other travel companies subject to European Union jurisdiction, but which provide PNR or other data to CBP for ATS, to fulfill their duty under EU law to inform data subjects how their data is processed — a point we’ve made in complaints against airlines to European data protection authorities.)…

Individuals and governments abroad should also take due note of the US government’s claims in this case, and judge their collaboration with ATS accordingly. Individuals — even US citizens — have no right under US law to see what ATS records are being kept about them, and no right to know how or according to what algorithms data about themselves is mined, processed, or otherwise used. No records are kept of requests for access to records, and no logs are kept of who retrieves records.

The rules published by the DHS to exempt records in the Automated Targeting System (including copies of airline PNR data, “targeting rule sets”, and “risk assessment analyses”) from the requirements of the Privacy Act are typical of the exemptions that have been promulgated for numerous other systems of Federal records about individuals:

The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (e)(5), and (8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2)…. These exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled or is created from information contained in other systems of records.

To understand what this means, one has to read the clauses of the Privacy Act referred to in the exemption rules. The contents of ATS, including PNR data, have been exempted by the DHS from each of the following requirements of the Privacy Act:

The right of a data subject to access records about herself.
The right of a data subject to receive, on request, an accounting of disclosures of her personal data to other agencies or third parties.
The prohibition on maintaining records about individuals that are not relevant and necessary to accomplish a legal purpose of the agency.
The requirement to maintain records which are used in making determinations about individuals “with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual.”
The requirement to collect personal information “to the greatest extent practicable” directly from the data subject rather than from third parties.
The requirement to notify data subjects of what information about them is being collected, and from whom it is being collected.
The right of a data subject to to dispute, amend, or correct records about herself.
The right of a data subject to add a notice of disputed data in records about herself, and to have that notice included whenever the disputed potion of the record is disclosed to a third party.
It’s not just the DHS that has opted out of the Privacy Act, as Federal courts have upheld that the law allows it to do. The NSA has similarly exempted its dragnet surveillance records from the Privacy Act, as other experts have noted:

The problem is that Europeans are likely to notice that the Privacy Act provides no meaningful redress to targets of NSA surveillance. Agencies can exempt themselves from the Privacy Act’s access and redress provisions on grounds of national security. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k). The NSA has taken full advantage of this section. 32 C.F.R. § 322.7(a).

Once an agency has published a notice exempting a system of records from these requirements of the Privacy Act, it is completely legal (or at least, it is not a violation of the Privacy Act for which a US citizen or anyone else can sue the agency) for the agency to fill that database with secret information about individuals, collected from undisclosed third parties, that it knows is likely to be inaccurate, outdated, incomplete, and irrelevant to any lawful purpose. The agency can withhold all of this information from the data subject, and secretly disclose any or all of it to any other government agency or third party anywhere in the world. Any disclosure of exempt records that an agency chooses to make is “discretionary” and not subject to judicial review.

But wait, there’s more! For the reasons discussed above, the Privacy Act gives US citizens inadequate legal protection. But even with the Judicial Redress Act, Europeans and other foreigners will continue to have even less protection and fewer rights than US citizens. The Judicial Redress Act gives foreign citizens (even citizens of the most preferred foreign nations) fewer rights than US citizens, in important ways that most Europeans probably are not aware of.

First, even with respect to records that have not been exempted from the Privacy Act, the Judicial Redress Act gives foreign citizens the right to sue to enforce only some, but not all, of the rights that US citizens can sue to enforce under the Privacy Act. Specifically, foreign citizens can bring lawsuits in US courts only for violations of “section 552a(g)(1)(D) of title 5, United States Code” or “subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 552a(g)(1) of title 5, United States Code” but not under any of the other provisions of the Privacy Act. These sections cover refusal by a Federal agency to comply with a subject access request or request for amendment of a record, but notably exclude lawsuits by foreigners for violations of subparagraph (C), which allows a US citizen to sue an agency that “fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relation to … the individual that may be made on the basis of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is adverse to the individual.”

The very deliberate exclusion of this subparagraph (C) of this section of the Privacy Act from the causes of action allowed by the Judicial Redress Act, while including subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D), appears to have been deliberately crafted to preclude challenges by foreigners to the use of unreliable and irrelevant third-party data in “garbage in, garbage out” pre-crime profiling , risk assessments, and similar algorithmic processing and scoring systems.

Second, records are “covered” by the Judicial Redress Act only if they have been transferred:

(A) by a public authority of, or private entity within, a … covered country; and

(B) to a designated Federal agency or component for purposes of preventing, investigating, detecting, or prosecuting criminal offenses.

It might not be obvious at first glance, but this excludes two key categories of records: records maintained for purposes other than enforcement of criminal laws, and records transferred from the EU to the US government by way of commercial intermediaries in the US (or in third countries that are not covered by the Judicial Redress Act).

Records maintained by the US government for the enforcement of civil laws — such as the civil penalties for violations of aviation “security” orders — are thus exempt from the Judicial Redress Act, as are all records maintained for other purposes, or for no defined or particularized purpose at all. Records maintained for criminal law enforcement purposes can be (and almost always have been) exempted from the Privacy Act, and records for all other purposes are exempt from the Judicial Redress Act. The result, undoubtedly intentional, is that hardly any records that will fall through the cracks between the exemptions in these two laws, and provide a basis for a lawsuit by a foreign citizen. The Judicial Redress Act is a carefully constructed paper tiger.

Even if either or both the Privacy Act and/or the Judicial Redress Act were amended to remove some or all of these exemptions (which is highly unlikely, to say the least), the limitation of the Judicial Redress Act to records transferred directly from an entity in the EU to the US government would leave a huge loophole, of exactly the sort the US has exploited in the past to intercept information about financial transfers between European banks from servers of SWIFT in the US, information about electronic communications between other countries from intermediaries in the US through which messages were routed, and information about PNR data collected and stored by European airlines, travel agents, and tour operators stored with computerized reservation systems in the US.

As we have pointed out in our previous testimony to the European Parliament, most transfers of PNR data from the EU to the US government are indirect, and occur by way of CRSs/GDSs and/or other commercial intermediaries in the US. These indirect but routine transfers already evade the EU-US “agreement” on direct PNR transfers, and now also evade the Judicial Redress Act, due to its limitation to direct transfers from the EU to the US government.

The Privacy Act provides inadequate data protection for US citizens, and the Judicial Redress Act would provide even more inadequate protection for non-US citizens. Neither of these laws provides any basis for a finding that anyone’s rights are adequately protected in the US, for approval of the proposed Safe Harbor 1.1 Privacy Shield, or for approval of the proposed EU-US “umbrella agreement” on data transfers.

This entry was posted on Thursday, February 25th, 2016 at 9:46 am and is filed under Secret Law, Surveillance State. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

STRASBOURG : The CIA’s abduction and extrajudicial transfer to Egypt of the imam Abu Omar infringed the applicants’ rights under the Convention

 

The judgment which has just been issued, resulting from the unanimous convergence of the Chamber’s seven judges, declares that the Italian state has violated art. 3 of the ECHR, not just by cooperating in Abu Omar’s kidnapping and his rendition to the Egyptian authorities, which exposed him to subsequent tortures; but also, and most importantly, insofar as it prevented the investigations undertaken by the Milan prosecutors’ office and the trial which were subsequently celebrated from ending naturally into the punishment of the defendants who were deemed responsible.

The reasons for the most important violation among those ascertained in Strasbourg (and it is a very long list) lie in the government’s, Constitutional Court’s and the former President of the Republic behaviour. These institutions have been respectively held responsible for the following reasons:

– insofar as the government is concerned, for its decision to apply state secrecy in the criminal trials to information that was already widely known to the public, evidently for the only purpose of preventing several defendants from being punished (see points 268 and 272 of the sentence), as well as for its later decision not to request -except for a single case- the extradition of the convicted US nationals;

– insofar as the Constitutional Court is concerned, for establishing through the judgments rendered in this case the prevalence of the state secrecy over the public interests pursued by the criminal justice system and, more generally, over the protection of the victims’ fundamental rights;

– insofar as the President of the Republic is concerned, for his decision to grant pardon to three convicts, including the one who had received the heaviest sentence because of his key role in the operation.

Worth to be mentioned here are the passages where the Court “pays homage to the national judges, who have done everything they could to try to establish the truth” (para. 265), and where it stresses the “great quality of the Italian investigators’ and judges’ work” (para. 269). All this has, unfortunately, not prevented the entire matter from ending in the impunity, in pratice, of all those found to be responsible, in contrast to the procedural obligations arising from the Convention.

This is a new unfortunate chapter for Italy in Strasbourg, in spite of the important recognition -as it had already happened in the Cestaro judgment, concerning the case of the Diaz school [at the Genoa G8 in 2001]- of the quality of the work done by our Judiciary for the defence of everybody’s fundamental rights, innocent parties and culprits alike.

Francesco VIGANO’

 

 

NOTA BENE : THIS IS A EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RELEASE (emphasis are added) EDC

In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case of Nasr and Ghali v. Italy (application no. 44883/09) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:

– with regard to Mr Nasr:

  • a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
  • a violation of Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention,
  • a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and
  • a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) read in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8

– with regard to Ms Ghali:

  • a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment),
  • a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and
  • a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8

The case concerned an instance of extrajudicial transfer (or “extraordinary rendition”), namely the abduction by CIA agents, with the cooperation of Italian officials, of the Egyptian imam Abu Omar, who had been granted political asylum in Italy, and his subsequent transfer to Egypt, where he was held in secret for several months.

Having regard to all the evidence in the case, the Court found it established that the Italian authorities were aware that the applicant had been a victim of an extraordinary rendition operation which had begun with his abduction in Italy and had continued with his transfer abroad.

The Court had already held in previous cases (El-Masri v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], ECHR 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014) that the treatment of “high-value detainees” for the purposes of the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” programme was to be classified as torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

In the present case the Court held that the legitimate principle of “State secrecy” had clearly been applied by the Italian executive in order to ensure that those responsible did not have to answer for their actions. The investigation and trial had not led to the punishment of those responsible, who had therefore ultimately been granted impunity.

Principal facts

The first applicant is Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, who was born in 1963. The second applicant is Nabila Ghali, who was born in 1968. Both are Egyptian nationals. Mr Nasr, member of the group Jama’a al-Islamiya – an Islamist movement regarded by the Egyptian government as a terrorist organisation – had lived in Italy since 1998. He became an imam and settled in Milan in July 2000. He was granted political asylum in February 2001 and married Ms Ghali in October of that year.

Mr Nasr was suspected, among other offences, of conspiracy to commit international terrorist acts, and his links to fundamentalist networks were investigated by the Milan public prosecutor’s office. The investigations concluded in June 2005 when the investigating judge made an order for Mr Nasr’s pre-trial detention. On 6 December 2013 the Milan District Court convicted Mr Nasr of membership of a terrorist organisation.

On 17 February 2003, while he was walking down a street in Milan, Mr Nasr was abducted and taken to the Aviano air base operated by USAFE (United States Air Forces in Europe), where he was put on a plane bound for the Ramstein US air base in Germany. From there he was flown in a military aircraft to Cairo. On his arrival he was interrogated by the Egyptian intelligence services about his activities in Italy, his family and his trips abroad. Mr Nasr was detained in secret until 19 April 2004 in cramped and unhygienic cells. He was taken out of his cell at regular intervals and subjected to interrogation sessions during which he was ill-treated and tortured.

On 19 April 2004 Mr Nasr was released. He maintained that he had been released because he had given statements in accordance with the instructions he had received and on condition that he did not leave Alexandria and remained silent about his experiences in prison. In spite of this condition, Mr Nasr telephoned his wife to let her know that he was safe. He also submitted a statement to the Milan public prosecutor’s office in which he described his abduction and torture. Approximately 20 days after his release, Mr Nasr was rearrested and detained. He was released on 12 February 2007 without charge but was prohibited from leaving Egypt.

On 20 February 2003 Ms Ghali had reported her husband’s disappearance to the police. The Milan public prosecutor’s office immediately started an investigation into abduction by a person or persons unknown. The Milan police department dealing with special operations and terrorism (the “Digos”) was put in charge of the investigation. In February 2005 it submitted a report on the investigation to the public prosecutor’s office. All the information obtained in the investigation confirmed Mr Nasr’s version of events with regard to his abduction and his transfer to the Aviano US air base and subsequently to Cairo. It also established that 19 US nationals had been involved in the events, including members of the United States diplomatic and consular corps in Italy. The investigators also found that the CIA chief in Milan at the time, Robert Seldon Lady, had played a key role in the events.

On 23 March 2005 the public prosecutor requested the pre-trial detention of 19 US nationals, including Mr Lady, who were suspected of involvement in planning and carrying out the abduction. The Milan investigating judge ordered the pre-trial detention of a further three US nationals. All 22 were declared “fugitives”. In November and December 2005 the prosecutor in charge of the investigation requested the principal public prosecutor to ask the Ministry of Justice to seek the extradition of the accused on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the United States and to request Interpol to initiate an international search for them. On 12 April 2006 the Minister of Justice informed the prosecuting authorities that he had decided not to seek the extradition of the 22 accused US nationals or to have an international wanted notice issued concerning them.

The second phase of the investigation related to the involvement of Italian nationals, including State agents. During the investigation it transpired that two senior officials of the SISMi (the Italian military intelligence agency) had been aware of the CIA’s plan to abduct Mr Nasr and of possible SISMi involvement. A journalist, Mr Farina, was also implicated, having allegedly attempted to lay false trails for the investigators at the request of SISMi agents.

In July 2006 the Prime Minister stated that the information and documents requested by the public prosecutor’s office were covered by State secrecy and that the conditions for lifting that secrecy were not met. In a judgment of 18 March 2009 the Constitutional Court held that the interests protected by State secrecy took precedence over any other interests guaranteed by the Constitution, and pointed out that the executive was invested with discretionary powers to assess the need for secrecy in order to protect those interests. The Constitutional Court specified that these powers were exempt from review, including by the Constitutional Court, and emphasised that it was not its task to examine the reasons for having recourse to State secrecy. Numerous items of evidence in the ongoing proceedings were therefore declared confidential and unusable.

On 4 November 2009 the Milan District Court delivered a judgment in which it found that Mr Nasr’s abduction had been planned and carried out by CIA operatives on the basis of a decision taken at political level; that the abduction had been carried out without the knowledge of the Italian authorities also engaged in investigating Mr Nasr at that time; and that the fact that authorisation had been given by very senior CIA officials suggested that the operation had been staged with the knowledge or even the tacit consent of the Italian authorities, although it had not been possible to further investigate the evidence existing in that regard for reasons of State secrecy.

Lastly, 22 CIA operatives and high-ranking officials, and one US army officer, were convicted in absentia of Mr Nasr’s abduction and were given prison sentences of between six and nine years. Two members of the SISMi were found guilty of obstructing the investigation and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The convictions of the former head of the SISMi and his deputy, and those of the three former SISMi members, were quashed by the Court of Cassation on grounds of State secrecy. The US nationals were also ordered to pay damages to the applicants in an amount to be determined in civil proceedings. The District Court provisionally awarded one million euros (EUR) to Mr Nasr and EUR 500,000 to Ms Ghali. The applicants have received no compensation to date, nor have the Italian authorities sought the extradition of the convicted US nationals.

Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court

Relying on Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention, Mr Nasr complained of his abduction, in which the Italian authorities had been involved, of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected during his transfer and detention, of the fact that those responsible had been granted impunity owing to the application of State secrecy, and of the fact that the sentences imposed on the convicted US nationals had not been enforced because of the refusal of the Italian authorities to request their extradition. Lastly, both applicants alleged, among other violations, a breach of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) in that Mr Nasr’s abduction and detention had resulted in their forced separation for over five years.

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 6 August 2009.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:

  • George Nicolaou (Cyprus), President,
  • Guido Raimondi (Italy),
  • Päivi Hirvelä (Finland),
  • Ledi Bianku (Albania),
  • Nona Tsotsoria (Georgia),
  • Paul Mahoney (the United Kingdom),
  • Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Poland),
  • and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar.

 

Decision of the Court

Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment)

Regarding the investigation and trial

The Court began by observing that the domestic courts had conducted a detailed investigation that had enabled them to reconstruct the events. The evidence that had ultimately been disregarded by the courts on the ground that the Constitutional Court had found it to be covered by State secrecy had been sufficient to convict the accused. The Court went on to note that the information implicating the SISMi agents had been widely circulated in the press and on the Internet; it therefore found it difficult to imagine how invoking State secrecy had been apt to preserve the confidentiality of the events once the information in question had been disclosed. In the Court’s view, the executive’s decision to apply State secrecy to information that was already widely known to the public had resulted in the SISMi agents avoiding conviction.

As to the convicted US agents, the Court noted that the Government had acknowledged never having sought their extradition. According to the Government, they had issued European arrest warrants and a single international arrest warrant against Mr Lady, which had yielded no results. Furthermore, the President of the Republic had pardoned three of the convicted persons, including Mr Lady, who had received a heavier sentence because of the extent of his responsibility in the extraordinary rendition operation.

The Court noted that in spite of the efforts of the Italian investigators and judges, which had identified the persons responsible and secured their convictions, the latter had remained ineffective owing to the attitude of the executive. The legitimate principle of “State secrecy” had clearly been applied in order to ensure that those responsible did not have to answer for their actions. Accordingly, the investigation and trial had not led to the punishment of those responsible, who had ultimately been granted impunity.

The Court therefore took the view that the domestic investigation had not satisfied the requirements of the Convention. Accordingly, there had been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.

Regarding the inhuman and degrading treatment

It was beyond doubt that Mr Nasr’s abduction had entailed the use of techniques that must have caused him emotional and psychological distress. His ensuing detention, including his transfer by plane to an unknown destination, had undoubtedly placed Mr Nasr in a situation of complete vulnerability, and he had undeniably lived in a permanent state of anxiety owing to his uncertainty about his fate. In fact, in his statement to the Milan public prosecutor Mr Nasr had given details of the circumstances surrounding his abduction and his detention in Egypt and the treatment to which he had been subjected, and in particular the violent interrogation sessions. The Court had previously held that similar treatment of “high-value detainees” for the purposes of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme was to be classified as torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention2.

In view of the fact that the Italian authorities had been aware of the extraordinary rendition operation carried out in the context of the CIA’s high-value detainee programme, and had actively cooperated with the CIA during the initial phase of the operation – Mr Nasr’s abduction and his transfer abroad – the Court considered that those authorities had known or should have known that this would place him at a real risk of ill-treatment. In those circumstances, the likelihood of a violation of Article 3 had been particularly high and should have been considered as inherent in the Mr Nasr’s transfer. Accordingly, by allowing the CIA to transfer Mr Nasr outside the country, the Italian authorities had exposed him to a serious and foreseeable risk of ill-treatment and of conditions of detention contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

Under Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention the Italian authorities had had a duty to take the appropriate measures to ensure that the persons within their jurisdiction were not subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This had not been the case, and the respondent State had to be considered directly responsible for the violation of the first applicant’s rights under this head, as its agents had failed to take the measures that would have been necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent this situation from occurring. The State’s responsibility in this regard was all the greater since Mr Nasr had been granted refugee status in Italy.

In the Court’s view, by allowing the US authorities to abduct the first applicant, the Italian authorities had knowingly exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. There had therefore been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.

Regarding the violation of Article 3 in the case of Ms Ghali

As acknowledged by the Italian courts, Ms Ghali had suffered significant non-pecuniary damage as a result of her husband’s disappearance, especially on account of the sudden interruption of their married life and the damage to her psychological well-being and that of her husband. The unjustified conduct of the Italian authorities and the suffering caused to Ms Ghali as a result had been regarded by the Italian courts as sufficiently serious to warrant an award of 500,000 euros in damages.

Furthermore, the uncertainty, doubt and apprehension felt by Ms Ghali over a lengthy and continuous period had caused her severe mental suffering and distress. Like Mr Nasr’s disappearance, the prolonged period during which Ms Ghali had been left without any news of her husband was attributable to the domestic authorities. In the Court’s view, Ms Ghali had been subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3. With regard to the investigation and trial, as the Court had already found that these had not led to the punishment of those responsible, there had also been a violation of Article 3 in Ms Ghali’s case.

Article 5 (right to liberty and security)

The unlawful nature of Mr Nasr’s detention had been established by the domestic courts, which found that he had been subjected from the outset to unacknowledged detention in complete disregard of the guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention; this constituted a particularly serious violation of his right to liberty and security. The detention of terrorist suspects under the programme of renditions set up by the US authorities had already been found in similar cases to be arbitrary3.

The Court had already found under Article 3 that Italy had been aware of Mr Nasr’s transfer outside the country in the context of an extraordinary rendition and that the Italian authorities, by allowing the CIA to abduct Mr Nasr in order to transfer him to Egypt, had knowingly exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The Court maintained those findings and considered them to be applicable in the context of Article 5. It concluded that Italy’s responsibility was engaged with regard both to Mr Nasr’s abduction and to the entire period of detention following his handover to the US authorities. There had therefore been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention in that regard.

Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)

In view of its findings concerning the responsibility of the respondent State under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, the Court took the view that the State’s actions and omissions also engaged its responsibility under Article 8 of the Convention. In the light of the facts as established, the Court considered that the interference with the first applicant’s exercise of his right to respect for his private and family life had not been “in accordance with the law”. There had therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

The Court was of the view that Mr Nasr’s disappearance, which was attributable to the Italian authorities, also amounted to interference with Ms Ghali’s private and family life. As that interference had not been in accordance with the law, there had also been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention with regard to Ms Ghali.

Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) read in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8

The Court had established that the investigation carried out by the national authorities – the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts – had been deprived of its effectiveness by the executive’s decision to invoke State secrecy. The Court had demonstrated that the State’s responsibility was engaged on account of the violations of the applicants’ rights under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention.

In the Court’s view, the applicants should have been able to avail themselves of practical and effective remedies capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, to the establishment of the truth and to an award of compensation. In view of the circumstances already examined, the Court could not consider that the criminal proceedings had been effective within the meaning of Article 13 with regard to the complaints under Articles 3, 5 and 8.

As the Government themselves acknowledged, it had not been possible to use the evidence covered by State secrecy; likewise, a request for the extradition of the convicted US agents had proved futile. As to the civil consequences, the Court considered that, in view of the circumstances, any possibility for the applicants to obtain damages had been virtually ruled out.

There had therefore been a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8 in Mr Nasr’s case and a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 in the case of Ms Ghali.

Article 6 (right to a fair trial)

The Court considered that this complaint covered the same ground as the applicants’ complaint under the procedural limb of Article 3, in so far as it related only to one specific aspect of proceedings which the Court had already found not to satisfy the criterion of effectiveness for Convention purposes. The Court therefore deemed it unnecessary to examine this complaint separately under Article 6.

Article 41 (just satisfaction)

The Court held that Italy was to pay 70,000 euros (EUR) to Mr Nasr and EUR 15,000 to Ms Ghali in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 to the applicants jointly in respect of costs and expenses.

NOTES

(1) Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day. Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.

(2) El-Masri v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], ECHR 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014.

(3)  El-Masri v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], ECHR 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014.

EU-US “Umbrella Agreement on Data Protection: Opinion of EDPS

EDPS (*) Preliminary Opinion Published HERE on 12 February 2016

(*) The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is an independent institution of the EU, responsible under Article 41(2) of Regulation 45/2001 ‘With respect to the processing of personal data… for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, are respected by the Community institutions and bodies’, and ‘…for advising Community institutions and bodies and data subjects on all matters concerning the processing of personal data’. He was appointed in December 2014 together with Assistant Supervisor with the specific remit of being constructive and proactive. The EDPS published in March 2015 a five-year strategy setting out how he intends to implement this remit, and to be accountable for doing so.

This Opinion builds on the general obligation that international agreements concluded by the EU must comply with the provisions of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the respect for fundamental rights that stands at the core of EU law. In particular, the assessment is made so as to analyse the compliance of the content of the Umbrella Agreement with Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 16 TFEU ensuring personal data protection.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Investigating and prosecuting crime is a legitimate policy objective, and international cooperation including information exchange has become more important than ever. Until now, the EU has lacked a robust common framework in this area and so there are no consistent safeguards for individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms. As the EDPS has long argued, the EU needs sustainable arrangements for sharing personal data with third countries for law enforcement purposes, fully compatible with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights

Therefore, we welcome and actively support the efforts of the European Commission to reach a first ‘Umbrella Agreement’, with the US. This international law enforcement agreement aims at establishing for the first time data protection as the basis for information sharing. While we recognise that it is not possible to replicate entirely the terminology and definitions of EU law in an agreement with a third country, the safeguards for individuals must be clear and effective in order to fully comply with EU primary law.

The European Court of Justice in recent years has affirmed data protection principles including fairness, accuracy and relevance of information, independent oversight and individual rights of individuals These principles are as relevant for public bodies as they are for private companies, regardless of any formal EU adequacy finding with respect to third countries data protection safeguards; indeed they become all the more important considering the sensitivity of the data required for criminal investigation.

This Opinion aims to provide constructive and objective advice to the EU institutions as the Commission finalises this delicate task, with broad ramifications, not only for EU-US law enforcement cooperation but also for future international accords. The ‘Umbrella Agreement’ is separate from but has to be considered in conjunction with the recently announced EU-US ‘Privacy Shield’ on the transfer of personal information in the commercial environment. Further considerations may be necessary to analyse the interaction between these two instruments and the reform of the EU’s data protection framework.

Before the Agreement is submitted for the consent of the Parliament, we encourage the Parties to consider carefully significant developments since last September, when they signalled their intention to conclude the Agreement once the Judicial Redress Act is passed. Many safeguards already envisaged are welcome, but they should be reinforced, also in the light of the Schrems judgment in October invalidating the Safe Harbor Decision and the EU political agreement on data protection reform in December, which covers transfers and judicial and police cooperation.

The EDPS has identified three essential improvements which he recommends for the text to ensure compliance with the Charter and Article 16 of the Treaty:

* clarification that all the safeguards apply to all individuals, not only to EU nationals;

* ensuring judicial redress provisions are effective within the meaning of the Charter;

* clarification that transfers of sensitive data in bulk are not authorised.

The Opinion offers additional recommendations for clarification of the envisaged safeguards by way of an accompanying explanatory document. We remain at the disposal of the institutions for further advice and dialogue on this issue. 

Continue reading “EU-US “Umbrella Agreement on Data Protection: Opinion of EDPS”

L’ELSJ à l’heure de l’état d’urgence : un effet collatéral du « syndrome shadok » de la lutte antiterroriste française ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE PAGE  (2 FÉVRIER 2016)

by Pierre Berthelet, CDRE

« Il vaut mieux pomper d’arrache-pied même s’il ne se passe rien que risquer qu’il se passe quelque chose de pire en ne pompant pas ». La devise des Shadoks n’aura nullement échappé à l’observateur du droit français de la lutte antiterroriste au moment où le gouvernement prolonge la loi sur l’état d’urgence, validée par le Conseil d’État dans une ordonnance du 27 janvier 2016. La France, en proie à une pulsion législative si bien évoquée dans l’ouvrage Un droit pénal postmoderne ?, empile les textes juridiques destinés à faire face à la menace terroriste. La France semble être atteinte du « syndrome Shadok » caractérisé par une inflation législative constante.

Ce « syndrome Shadok » évoqué par Yves Trintignon de l’Université du Québec met en évidence le fait que le gouvernement français, confronté aux attaques terroristes de janvier et de novembre 2015, s’est empressé de renforcer les capacités des services de renseignement sans réellement s’interroger sur les difficultés rencontrées en matière d’organisation, sur les défaillances de leurs méthodes, ou encore sur les lacunes de leurs pratiques opérationnelles. Pis, il aggrave la situation en répondant promptement à la demande de ces services, et à l’inquiétude de l’opinion publique, sans véritablement faire preuve de distanciation à l’égard des effets pervers à plus long terme.

 

Une telle vision à court-termiste consistant à « pomper » sans relâche, c’est-à-dire à renforcer constamment le dispositif antiterroriste, est constatée à l’échelon national, mais aussi à l’échelon européen. D’emblée, la construction européenne dans ce domaine connaît des progrès sensibles. Ces avancées, observables concernant particulièrement l’ELSJ, s’expliquent notamment par l’implication de la France dans le processus décisionnel, désireuse que l’Union soit pleinement associée à la lutte qu’elle mène (1).

 

Cependant, à y regarder de près, la construction européenne risque d’être davantage victime que bénéficiaire de l’engagement de la France dans l’intégration européenne. En effet, son implication est avant tout dictée par une logique en vertu de laquelle le gouvernement entend obtenir un crédit politique à travers une réaffirmation de son autorité. L’État cherche à se légitimer à travers les lois qu’il prend, peu importe d’ailleurs leur efficacité. Il est d’ailleurs à noter que la France réclame une plus grande implication de l’Union dans la lutte antiterroriste, mais elle se garde bien de demander une évaluation globale de l’efficacité des politiques menées par les différents États membres.

 

Le « syndrôme Shadok » de la lutte antiterroriste française, qui consiste à pomper toujours plus même si cela ne sert à rien, a un impact néfaste sur l’édification de l’ELSJ à long terme (2).

 

Toute tentative de vouloir ralentir cette course effrénée est susceptible de constituer un obstacle inadmissible à l’égard d’un État membre désireux de se défendre face à une menace d’une gravité extrême. Qui plus est, les valeurs sur lesquelles l’Union est fondée, la préservation de l’État de droit et le respect des droits de l’homme pourraient faire les frais d’une telle course aveugle. On voit dès lors l’importance du juge européen, comme rempart face au cercle vicieux sécuritaire traduit en langage shadok par « je pompe donc je suis ».

 

  1. Le rôle moteur dans la lutte antiterroriste d’une France aux allures pro-européenne

 

La France apparaît comme l’aiguillon, désireuse de progresser dans l’intégration européenne, et ce, pour ce qui est de l’ELSJ. Un document du Conseil indique ainsi que la délégation française souhaite élargir le champ de la proposition de directive présentée par la Commission européenne le 2 décembre 2012.

Pour mémoire, ce texte, remplaçant la décision-cadre 2002/475/JAI du Conseil relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme, entend harmoniser la législation nationale concernant l’incrimination des « combattants étrangers », de même que l’aide apportée à la sortie du territoire. La décision-cadre a fait l’objet d’une modification en 2008 pour rendre punissable la provocation publique à commettre une infraction terroriste, ainsi que la diffusion sur Internet de la propagande terroriste.

De son côté, la France estime qu’il convient d’aller au-delà de cette actualisation de la législation européenne au regard des textes internationaux ayant trait à ce phénomène des « combattants étrangers » (la résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (RCSNU) 2178 (2014)) et le protocole additionnel à la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe pour la prévention du terrorisme de mai 2015).

Elle considère notamment qu’il importe de rendre punissable dans tous les États membres le trafic d’œuvres d’art en provenance de zones sous contrôle terroriste et de supprimer les pages internet incitant au terrorisme ou d’en bloquer l’accès.

Les ajouts de la France dans la proposition de directive s’inscrivent dans un contexte où ces questions font l’objet d’une attention particulière en droit interne.

Ainsi, concernant le trafic d’œuvres d’art, la répression du commerce illicite de biens culturels figure dans le projet de loi contre le crime organisé et le terrorisme, qui doit être présenté courant février 2016.

Pour ce qui est de la suppression des pages internet faisant l’apologie du terrorisme, le Sénat avait adopté le 1er avril 2015 une résolution européenne réclamant l’extension des compétences du Centre européen de lutte contre la cybercriminalité (EC3) en lui donnant la possibilité de supprimer des contenus terroristes ou extrémistes.

Peu avant, le 5 février 2015, un décret a été adopté fixant les modalités permettant aux internautes d’avoir accès à des pages web faisant cette apologie.

La force de proposition de la France concernant ce projet de directive est le reflet d’une volonté politique affichée concernant l’ELSJ : dans une déclaration après le Conseil JAI à Amsterdam du 25 janvier 2016, le ministre de l’Intérieur, Bernard Cazeneuve, fixe les demandes françaises, entendues comme des priorités « essentielles » figurant dans un agenda qui « n’est pas négociable ». Il énumère également les mesures sur lesquelles la France a obtenu satisfaction, en prenant le soin d’ajouter que bon nombre de ces mesures ont été initiées sous son impulsion : la directive PNR, la modification de l’article 7-2 du code frontières Schengen visant à instaurer des contrôles approfondis sur les ressortissants européens quittant l’espace Schengen, ou encore la révision de la directive de 1991 relative au contrôle des armes à feu.

 

  1. La stratégie de fuite en avant sécuritaire d’une France tentée par le repli national

 

La déclaration du ministre de l’Intérieur à l’issue du Conseil JAI du 25 janvier 2016 démontre l’intention de la France de continuer « son travail de persuasion » avec « beaucoup de volontarisme », pour reprendre les termes du texte. Elle fait office également de satisfecit, à la fois au sujet de l’efficacité de l’implication de la France dans la sphère institutionnelle et concernant l’action de l’Union européenne menée sous sa houlette, en matière de lutte antiterroriste.

 

La France s’est engagée depuis de nombreuses années dans une logique de renforcement continuel de l’arsenal répressif au nom de ce que le président de la République a qualifié de « guerre contre le terrorisme ». La fuite en avant sécuritaire se traduit par l’adoption de nombreux textes en 2014 et en 2015 : plan d’avril 2014 contre la radicalisation violente et les filières terroristes, loi du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme et décrets d’application du 14 janvier 2015 destinés à mettre en place l’interdiction administrative de sortie du territoire des ressortissants français, décret précité du 5 février 2015, décret du 4 mars 2015 relatif au déréférencement des sites, plan d’action du 18 mars 2015 pour lutter contre le financement du terrorisme, loi du 24 juin 2015 sur le renseignement et ses multiples décrets d’application, et décret du 14 novembre 2015 instaurant le régime de l’état d’urgence, prorogé par la loi du 20 novembre 2015.

 

D’autres projets sont en cours : projet de loi précité contre le crime organisé et le terrorisme, proposition de loi relative à la sécurité dans les transports, projet de loi constitutionnelle « de protection de la nation » comprenant deux volets, à savoir la déchéance de la nationalité d’un binational devenu français et l’inscription dans la Constitution des conditions de déclenchement de l’état d’urgence.

 

Cette fuite en avant est inquiétante, car s’il est possible de comprendre la stratégie de la France dans une perspective purement nationale, notamment à l’aune des manœuvres déployées par le gouvernement à l’égard du Front national, il est aussi possible d’inscrire le renforcement de l’arsenal répressif dans un contexte de dérive autoritaire que connaissent bon nombre de gouvernements européens, la Pologne au premier chef, vis-à-vis de laquelle la Commission a engagé une procédure de dialogue sur la base de l’article 7.1 TUE.

 

Une telle fuite en avant se traduit, sur le plan européen, par davantage de fermeté de la part de la France : fermeté vis-à-vis d’un Parlement européen réticent à adopter la directive PNR, fermeté à l’égard des délégations nationales enclines à tergiverser au Conseil sur les propositions d’actes en instance d’adoption, fermeté à l’encontre de la Commission désireuse de vérifier la conformité de la décision française de rétablir les contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

 

L’ultimatum lancé à celle-ci par le gouvernement français concernant le rétablissement de ces contrôles en vertu de l’art. 25 du Code Frontières Schengen, aussi longtemps que perdurerait la menace terroriste, est significatif de sa volonté d’afficher, sur tous les fronts, une détermination sans faille. Or, lerétablissement temporaire prolongé en dehors des délais prévus par le Code pose problème du point de vue de la légalité européenne, en particulier au regard des art. 23, 23bis et 25 du code.

L’attitude de la France consistant à faire preuve de fermeté tous azimuts lui permet de faire illusion sur le plan politique. Celle-ci se pare des atours d’une nation leader de la construction européenne pour mieux dissimuler les tentations de repli national. En effet, les efforts menés pour se trouver à la pointe de la lutte antiterroriste masquent la prévalence des intérêts nationaux érigés, en matière sécuritaire, au rang de principes absolus, insusceptibles de limitation.

 

D’ailleurs, pour s’en convaincre, il suffit de constater que, quel que soit le gouvernement, de droite ou de gauche, la France n’hésite pas à remettre en cause publiquement l’acquis de Schengen si celui-ci lui porte préjudice. Une telle attitude se révèle problématique d’un point de vue politique, car elle menace de détricoter cet acquis, faisant, par la même occasion, le jeu de certains gouvernements situés à l’Est de l’Europe.

 

Une telle attitude, prompte par ailleurs à désigner Schengen comme bouc émissaire, et à pointer les défaillances de l’ELSJ, se révèle problématique d’un point de vue juridique, car le droit français adopté dans le contexte de la lutte antiterroriste pose la délicate question de sa conformité du point de vue du droit européen. Ainsi, une France sous état d’urgence prolongé aurait-elle pu adhérer à l’Union européenne conformément aux critères insérés aux art. 6 et 49 TUE ? De manière générale, la législation française est-elle conforme à l’art. 2 TUE ainsi qu’aux dispositions de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux ?

 

La question est d’autant plus pertinente que le forcing français à l’égard de la directive PNR pourrait conduire à une annulation de ladite directive et ce, au regard de la jurisprudence Digital Rights. À ce propos, les juges européens se montrent sévères à l’égard de la dérive sécuritaire observée dans les États membres.

 

Prenant appui sur cette jurisprudence Digital Rights, la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, dans un arrêt du 12 janvier 2016, Szabo et Vissy c. Hongrie (voir l’analyse de Sylvie Peyrou), s’est montrée très ferme à l’égard des mesures nationales prises dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, en l’occurrence les opérations secrètes de surveillance antiterroriste.

 

Le rôle du juge européen n’a jamais été aussi important, non seulement comme défenseur du droit, mais aussi comme gardien des valeurs européennes. Il s’érige comme l’ultime recours face à cette fuite en avant sécuritaire préoccupante pour l’Europe et pour la France. Les mots de la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH) dans sa déclaration du 16 janvier 2015 sur l’état d’urgence et ses suites sonnent particulièrement juste : « la France ne doit pas, sous l’emprise de la sidération, sacrifier ses valeurs, au contraire, elle doit renforcer la démocratie ».

 

Live. Die. Repeat. The ‘Privacy Shield’ deal as ‘Groundhog Day’: endlessly making the same mistakes?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS (Wednesday, 3 February 2016)

by Steve Peers

Love it, hate it, or spend an academic career analysing it, the USA is the best-known country in the world. Yet some of its traditions still puzzle outsiders. One of them, celebrated yesterday, is ‘Groundhog Day’: the myth that the appearance, or non-appearance, of the shadow of an otherwise obscure rodent on February 2nd each year will determine whether or not there will be another six weeks of winter. Outside the USA, Groundhog Day is probably better known as a movie: grumpy Bill Murray keeps repeating the same day, trying to perfect it and woo the lovely Andie MacDowell. Others have borrowed this basic plot. In Edge of Tomorrow, sleazy Tom Cruise keeps repeating the same day, trying to kill aliens and woo the lovely Emily Blunt. In the Doctor Who episode Hell Bent, angry Peter Capaldi keeps repeating the same day, trying to cut through a diamond wall and resurrect the lovely Jenna Coleman.

The basic idea is summed up in the advertising slogan for Edge of Tomorrow: Live. Die. Repeat. Groundhog Day in particular has attracted many interpretations. Of these, the most convincing is that the film’s story is a Buddhist parable: repeated reincarnation until we reach the state of enlightenment, or nirvana.

How does this relate to the new EU/US privacy deal, dubbed ‘Privacy Shield’? Obviously the deal involves the USA, and it was reached yesterday, on Groundhog Day. And it’s a new incarnation of a prior deal: ‘Safe Harbor’, killed last October by the CJEU in the Schrems judgment (discussed here). While the text of the new agreement is not yet available, the initial indication is that it is bound to be killed in turn – unless the CJEU, admittedly an increasingly fickle judicial deity, is willing to go back on its own case law. Goodness knows how many further reincarnations will be necessary before the US and EU can reach enlightenment.

Problems with the deal

The point of the new deal is the same as the old one: to provide a legally secure set of rules for EU/US data transfers, for companies that subscribe to a set of data protection principles. Failing that, it is possible to argue that transfers can be justified by binding corporate rules, by individual consent or (as regards US government access to the data) by a third State’s public interest. But as I as I noted in my blog post on Schrems, these alternatives are untested yet in the CJEU, and are possibly subject to legal challenges of their own. Understandably, businesses would like to make a smooth transition to a new set of legally secure rules. Does the new deal fit the bill?

In the absence of a text, I can’t analyse the new deal much. But here are my first impressions.

According to the CJEU, the main problems with the previous deal were twofold: the extent of mass surveillance in the USA, and the limited judicial redress available to EU citizens as regards such government surveillance. It appears that the new agreement will address the latter issue, but not the former. There will be an ‘ombudsman’ empowered to consider complaints against the US government. While the details are unknown, it’s hard to see how this new institution could address the CJEU’s concerns completely, unless it is given the judicial power to order the blocking and erasure of data, for instance.

Furthermore, there’s no sign that the underlying mass surveillance will be changed. Here, the argument is that the Court of Justice simply misunderstood the US system, or that in any event many EU countries are just as wicked as the USA when it comes to mass surveillance. These arguments are eloquently set out in a barrister’s opinion, summarised in this (paywalled) Financial Times story.

Facebook and the US government disdained to get involved in the Schrems case, and have no doubt repented this at leisure. The assumption here appears to be that they would participate fully in new litigation, and convince the CJEU to see the error of its ways.

How likely is this? It’s undoubtedly true to say that the CJEU gives an increasing impression that it willing to bend the rules, or double up on its own case law, in order to ensure the survival of an increasingly beleaguered EU project. In Pringleand Gauweiler, it agreed with harshly criticized plans to keep monetary union afloat. In Dano and Alimanovic, it qualified its prior case law on EU citizens’ access to benefits, in an attempt to quell growing public concern about this issue. In Celaj, it gave a first indication that it would row back on its case law limiting the detention of irregular migrants, perhaps in light of the migration and refugee crisis. The drafters of the proposed deal on UK renegotiation appear to assume that the Court would back away from even more free movement case law, if it appears necessary to keep the UK from leaving the European Union.

Once the Court reminded legal observers of Rome: the imperial author of uniform codes that would bind a whole continent, upon which the sun would never set. Now it increasingly reminds me of Dunkirk: the centre of a brave and hastily improvised retreat from impending apocalypse, scouring for a beach to fight its last stand. The Court used to straighten every road; now it cuts every corner.

Since the ‘Privacy Shield’ deal faces many litigious critics, it seems virtually certain to end up before the Court before long. Time will tell where the judgment on the deal will fit within the broader sweep of EU jurisprudence.

Surveillance de masse : un coup d’arrêt aux dérives de la lutte antiterroriste (CEDH, Szabo et Vissy c. Hongrie, 12 janvier 2016

ORIIAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE (30 JANVIER 2016)

 by Sylvie Peyrou, CDRE

A l’heure où la lutte contre le terrorisme suscite nombre de réactions sécuritaires parmi les démocraties occidentales, et en particulier européennes (est-il besoin de citer l’exemple français, de la controversée loi sur le renseignement à l’état d’urgence ?), la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme semble garder le cap d’une stricte protection des droits fondamentaux.

L’arrêt de la Cour du 12 janvier 2016, Szabo et Vissy c. Hongrie (Req. n° 37138/14), en est une illustration récente et topique. Cet arrêt attire d’autant plus l’attention que les juges de Strasbourg ont estimé il y a peu dans l’arrêt Sher et autres c. Royaume-Uni (Req. n° 5201/11) que le crime terroriste entrait dans « une catégorie spéciale », justifiant une atténuation des droits au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme (voir Henri Labayle ici-même). Si l’arrière-fond des affaires est semblable (à savoir des législations restreignant les libertés au profit de la lutte contre le terrorisme), le contexte de chacune d’elles est cependant sensiblement différent, ce qui peut expliquer le souci de la Cour d’adresser un message lui aussi sensiblement différent.

Il s’agissait dans l’affaire Sher de trois pakistanais, suspectés de terrorisme et détenus par les autorités britanniques, qui se plaignaient de la violation du droit à contester la légalité de leur détention (violation alléguée de l’article 5 § 4 CEDH). Dans l’affaire Szabo et Vissy, les requérants sont des ressortissants hongrois, travaillant pour une ONG très critique à l’égard du gouvernement de leur pays, qui se sont plaints notamment de la violation de l’article 8 CEDH (droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale, du domicile et de la correspondance), causée selon eux par la loi hongroise de 2011 relative aux opérations secrètes de surveillance antiterroriste. En effet, une task force spéciale en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme créée en 2011 au sein des forces de police, s’est vu dotée par l’article 7/E de la loi évoquée, de compétences en matière d’opérations secrètes de perquisition et de surveillance de domiciles au moyen d’enregistrements, d’ouverture de lettres et de colis, ainsi que de vérification et d’enregistrement du contenu de communications électroniques et numériques, sans le consentement des personnes concernées (voir le communiqué de presse).

Un recours pour violation de leur droit au respect de la vie privée fut porté par les intéressés à la Cour constitutionnelle hongroise, qui a toutefois estimé que les opérations secrètes de surveillance se justifiaient, car menées à des fins de sécurité nationale. Les requérants se sont alors adressés à la Cour de Strasbourg, arguant de la violation de l’article 8 CEDH. Il est à noter qu’ils ne se plaignaient pas directement d’une mesure de surveillance dont ils auraient fait l’objet, mais, eu égard à l’ampleur et au caractère intrusif de telles mesures, allèguaient du risque potentiel de faire l’objet de mesures injustifiées, dans le cadre d’une législation incitant selon eux aux abus, notamment en l’absence de contrôle juridictionnel.

Si la réponse apportée par la Cour de Strasbourg aux requérants est, somme toute, sans surprise, et suit le schéma de raisonnement classique, son argumentation mérite néanmoins une lecture attentive, qui révèle une étonnante similitude avec celle de la CJUE, à laquelle il est d’ailleurs fait expressément référence.

1. Une solution sans surprise

S’agissant de mesures secrètes de surveillance, la Cour s’est référée à sa très classique jurisprudence Klass c. Allemagne (6 septembre 1978) puis à l’arrêt Roman Zakharov c. Russie (4 décembre 2015, req. n° 47143/06), pour juger qu’une législation permettant de telles mesures affecte directement tous les usagers des services de communication, en instituant un système où toute personne peut voir ses communications interceptées. La Cour note en outre que le droit national n’offre aux intéressés aucune possibilité de recours auprès d’un organe indépendant. Les requérants sont dès lors en droit de se prétendre victimes d’une violation de leurs droits garantis par la Convention, dont ils n’ont pu obtenir réparation en saisissant la Cour constitutionnelle.

Dans un premier temps, la Cour identifie sans difficulté une ingérence dans le droit au respect de la vie privée des requérants, dans la simple existence de la législation incriminée, qui fait peser sur tout un chacun une menace de surveillance. L’essentiel de l’analyse porte dès lors ensuite sur l’objectif visé par ces mesures, qui est de garantir la sécurité nationale, et/ou de prévenir tout désordre ou crime (§ 55). Ce sont donc les conditions que pose l’article 8 § 2 de la Convention qui sont classiquement vérifiées ici. Et tout aussi classiquement, la Cour, face à la mise en balance des intérêts de l’Etat (la protection de la sécurité nationale par la mise en place de mesures de surveillance) et ceux des individus (la protection de leur vie privée), recourt à la notion de « marge d’appréciation » dont disposerait l’Etat.

L’ingérence que constituent les mesures secrètes de surveillance dispose tout d’abord incontestablement d’une base légale, à savoir la loi évoquée de 2011 (loi de 1994 révisée en 2011). La question de la « prévisibilité » de la loi est ensuite examinée avec minutie par la Cour, qui constate que les dispositions législatives sont suffisamment claires pour donner aux citoyens une indication adéquate quant aux circonstances et aux conditions dans lesquelles les autorités publiques peuvent recourir à de telles mesures : prévention et poursuite des actes terroristes, opérations visant à secourir des ressortissants hongrois en détresse à l’étranger (§ 63 de l’arrêt).

La Cour va toutefois examiner plus avant le « risque d’arbitraire » évoqué par les requérants, s’agissant de mesures secrètes de surveillance. Là, son argumentation se fait tout d’abord plus compréhensive envers les exigences étatiques de lutte contre le terrorisme, à l’image notamment de l’arrêtSher évoqué, en soulignant « la nécessité d’éviter une excessive rigidité » des termes de la loi, afin de pouvoir s’adapter aux circonstances. Mais elle constate ensuite qu’il résulte de la loi que toute personne peut virtuellement en Hongrie être soumise à une surveillance secrète, puisque ne sont pas décrites les catégories de personnes qui peuvent voir leurs communications interceptées. Elle juge dès lors une telle disposition comme beaucoup trop large.

La nécessité d’une telle surveillance de masse fait dès lors question, d’autant que le juge constate l’absence de garanties entourant sa mise en œuvre, ou la réparation éventuellement, des mesures contestées. La Cour va donc considérer avec une très grande fermeté que, eu égard au potentiel d’intrusion dans la vie privée des citoyens que représentent les technologies de surveillance de pointe, l’exigence de « nécessité dans une société démocratique » (de l’ingérence considérée) doit être interprétée de façon très stricte (§ 73). Ainsi, une mesure de surveillance secrète doit, de manière générale, être strictement nécessaire à la sauvegarde des institutions démocratiques et, de manière particulière, être strictement nécessaire pour l’obtention d’un renseignement vital lors d’une opération individuelle. Il y aurait, dans le cas contraire, un « abus » par les autorités de ces « redoutables technologies » dont elles disposent (§ 73).

Une objection majeure formulée par la Cour à l’encontre de la législation hongroise est par ailleurs l’absence de contrôle juridictionnel au niveau de l’autorisation ou de la mise en œuvre des mesures critiquées. Le seul « contrôle » existant est de nature politique – il est exercé par le ministre de la justice – ce qui accroît le risque d’abus…La Cour rappelle en effet le principe qui est celui posé notamment par l’arrêt Klass, à savoir celui d’un contrôle juridictionnel, raison pour laquelle la supervision prévue par un membre du pouvoir exécutif n’offre pas les garanties nécessaires.

La Cour cependant se livre à une subtile et très pragmatique analyse, admettant le nécessaire caractère a posteriori d’un tel contrôle juridictionnel en estimant que la mise en œuvre d’une autorisation juridictionnelle n’est pas praticable car, compte tenu de « la nature de la menace terroriste contemporaine », elle serait « contreproductive » ou ferait tout simplement « gaspiller un temps précieux » (voir § 80 de l’arrêt). Quant à une éventuelle procédure de réparation enfin, la Cour note qu’existe simplement une disposition faisant obligation au Ministre de rendre compte deux fois par an à une commission parlementaire, mais ne distingue dans la loi contestée aucune procédure de recours en faveur des personnes soumises à une surveillance secrète, dont, par définition, elles ne sont pas informées…

La Cour de Strasbourg, par le biais de son contrôle de proportionnalité, conclut par conséquent que de telles mesures de surveillance secrète ne répondent pas aux critères de la stricte nécessité qu’exige la préservation des institutions démocratiques. Un tel raisonnement se suffirait à lui seul, et pourtant la Cour a pris soin de faire longuement référence à son homologue de l’UE, ce qui dessine une solution surprenante par sa motivation.

2. Un écho opportun à la jurisprudence de la CJUE

Si les emprunts jurisprudentiels auxquels l’analyste est habituellement confronté vont de Strasbourg vers Luxembourg, force est de constater qu’ici, c’est le juge de la CEDH qui emprunte son raisonnement au juge de l’UE, devenu depuis l’avènement de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE, le gardien « constitutionnel » de ces derniers.

Face aux problèmes de la surveillance de masse et de la collecte de données y afférente, la Cour EDH, s’interrogeant sur l’existence concomitante de garanties légales assurant le respect des droits des citoyens, fait ici des références réitérées, et singulières, à la jurisprudence de la CJUE. C’est à l’arrêtDigital Rights Ireland (C-293/12 et C-594/12) de cette dernière en effet qu’elle renvoie de façon pertinente. Sont cités notamment les §§ 52 et 62 de l’arrêt de la CJUE, qui exigent la « stricte nécessité » des mesures de rétention des données de communication électroniques organisée par la directive 2006/24/CE, examinée à « la lumière des objectifs poursuivis ». La Cour de Strasbourg fait donc un parallèle implicite entre la rétention de ces données organisée par la directive à des fins de lutte contre le terrorisme et les mesures de surveillance secrète – notamment des communications – mises en place par la législation hongroise aux mêmes fins.

La CJUE a en effet mené dans cet arrêt une réflexion très fine et argumentée sur les métadonnées de communications collectées qui, « prises dans leur ensemble, sont susceptibles de permettre de tirer des conclusions très précises concernant la vie privée des personnes dont les données ont été conservées, telles que les habitudes de la vie quotidienne, les lieux de séjour permanents ou temporaires, les déplacements journaliers ou autres, les activités exercées, les relations sociales de ces personnes et les milieux sociaux fréquentés par celles-ci ».

Ce passage (§ 27 de l’arrêt) cité in extenso par la Cour EDH, permet à cette dernière de souligner l’ampleur des conséquences que peut entraîner la mise en œuvre de telles techniques de surveillance de masse qui – cela va sans dire, et la Cour ne le rappelle d’ailleurs pas explicitement – portent atteinte au droit au respect de la vie privée des personnes. C’est la raison pour laquelle de telles mesures de surveillance doivent être nécessairement accompagnées de garanties légales assurant le respect des droits des citoyens, et doivent par surcroît justifier d’une « stricte nécessité » au regard de la défense des institutions démocratiques.

Il est significatif de noter par ailleurs que la Cour de Strasbourg, outre la jurisprudence Digital Rights Ireland de la CJUE, évoque également la résolution votée par le Parlement européen le 12 mars 2014 concernant « le programme de surveillance de la NSA, les organismes de surveillance dans divers États membres et les incidences sur les droits fondamentaux des citoyens européens et sur la coopération transatlantique en matière de justice et d’affaires intérieures » (P7_TA(2014)0230). Ce sont des passages substantiels qu’elle cite dans son arrêt (§ 25), en particulier et naturellement ceux relatifs à la surveillance de masse et ses conséquences sur les droits fondamentaux, à savoir liberté d’expression, liberté de la presse, respect de la vie privée, protection des données à caractère personnel…autant d’éléments présentés par le Parlement européen comme des piliers de la démocratie, auxquels une telle surveillance de masse porte atteinte. La Cour termine sur la citation relatant le danger de mésusage de telles techniques de collecte et de traitement de données en cas de changement de régime politique (§ 14 de la résolution du Parlement européen)…

Dans un contexte européen où les populismes progressent et les libertés régressent à proportion (en Hongrie précisément par exemple, ou aujourd’hui en Pologne, ce qui a conduit la Commission européenne à lancer pour la première fois la « procédure d’alerte » inventée suite aux problèmes hongrois), cet arrêt sonne comme un avertissement.

Les juges européens semblent en effet unir leurs forces (et comment ne pas lire dans l’arrêt de la Cour EDH un hommage à la jurisprudence de la CJUE, qui illustre selon une modalité inattendue le très commenté « dialogue des juges » ?) afin de construire un vaste espace dédié à la protection des droits fondamentaux. Ceci semble d’autant plus nécessaire que les considérables progrès techniques offrent aux Etats avides d’instaurer des mesures sécuritaires, parées notamment du mérite de la lutte contre le terrorisme, de « redoutables » outils de surveillance des citoyens et de leurs comportements, qui vont bien au-delà du panoptique de Bentham…

 

Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LIBE COMMITTEE (Full study – 128 pages-accessible HERE) 

Authors: Dr Sergio CARRERA , Prof. Elspeth GUILD, Dr Ana ALIVERTI, Ms Jennifer ALLSOPP ,Ms Maria Giovanna MANIERI, Ms Michele LEVOY

The ongoing ‘asylum crisis’, with the tragic experiences and loss of lives among people trying to reach and cross the EU’s external borders, has been the catalyst for renewed EU policy efforts to address the issue of irregular migration and people smuggling  in the scope of the  European Agenda on Migration.

The issue of facilitating the entry, transit and stay of irregular migrants has been politicised at the EU’s internal borders and within Member States during the course of 2015. While migrants remain in transit in areas such as Calais, Ventimiglia and the Serbian-Croatian border, often seeking out the services of smugglers to cross into neighbouring states to reunite with family members or fulfil a personal migration goal, humanitarian actors seek to respond to their human rights and needs in an increasingly ambiguous, punitive and militarised environment. Within many EU Member States, the backdrop of austerity and cuts to public services has placed local authorities and civil society actors in a difficult position as they seek to respond to the basic needs of new and  established  migrants.

In the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020) (COM(2015) 285), the Commission noted that it would ensure that appropriate criminal sanctions are in place while avoiding the risks of criminalising those who provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in distress. Accordingly, the Commission has at least implicitly acknowledged the inherent tension between assisting irregular migrants to enter, transit and remain in EU Member States and the real risks this poses to those who provide humanitarian assistance of being subject  to criminal  sanctions.

This tension between the criminalisation of people smuggling and those providing humanitarian assistance is a by-product of Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (the Facilitation Directive) and the Council Framework Decision implementing it – collectively known as the ‘Facilitators’ Package’. The tension arises because the Facilitators’ Package seeks to compel Member States to provide criminal sanctions for a broad range of behaviours that cover a continuum from people smuggling at one extreme to assistance at the other, but it does so with a high degree of legislative ambiguity and legal uncertainty.

The implementation of the Facilitators’ Package has been said to face a number of key challenges. There is, however, a lack of on-the-ground information about the multilayered effects of the practical implementation of the Facilitation Directive on irregular migrants and those providing assistance to them. This study aims to address this gap by providing new knowledge on this issue, while also identifying areas for further research. It provides a comprehensive understanding of the implementation of the humanitarian exception provisions of the Facilitators’ Package and their impact on irregular migrants, as well as the organisations and individuals assisting them in selected Member States.

The study finds a substantial ‘implementation gap’ between the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (referred to as the UN Smuggling Protocol) and the international and EU legal frameworks on people smuggling. Chiefly, the latter differs from the UN Protocol in three main ways: i) the extent of the inclusion and definition of an element of “financial gain” in the description of facilitation of irregular entry, transit and stay; ii) the inclusion of an exemption of punishment for those providing humanitarian assistance; and iii) the inclusion of specific safeguards for victims of   smuggling.   As   a   result   of   the   discretionary   powers   granted   to   Member   States    in   the implementation of the Facilitators’ Package, the study further finds variation in the way in which laws are implemented in the national legislation of selected Member States. This results in legal uncertainty and inconsistency, and impacts on the effectiveness of the legislation.

An analysis of available statistics coupled with an in-depth analysis of court cases in selected countries involving the criminalisation of facilitation and humanitarian assistance reveals that qualitative and quantitative data on the prosecution and conviction rates of those who have provided humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants is lacking at the national and EU level. We can therefore identify a significant knowledge gap regarding the practical use and effects of the criminalisation of entry, transit and residence. Domestic court cases in selected EU Member States offer anecdotal evidence that family members and those assisting refugees to enter have been criminalised. Meanwhile, domestic developments in Greece and Hungary suggest that these laws are being applied with renewed rigour but with minimal monitoring of the direct or indirect impact on humanitarian assistance. Irrespective of the actual number of convictions and prosecutions, the effects of the Facilitators’ Package extend beyond formal   prosecutions and the number  of criminal  convictions.

Drawing on primary evidence from an online survey, the study demonstrates that, in addition to direct and perceived effects, the Facilitation Directive has profound unintended consequences (or indirect effects) that have an impact not just on irregular migrants and those who assist them, but also on social trust and social cohesion for society as a whole. Some civil society organisations fear sanctions and experience intimidation in their work with irregular migrants, with a deterrent effect on their work. They similarly highlight the lack of EU funding to support the work of cities and civil society organisations providing humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants. Moreover, we find widespread confusion among civil society practitioners about how the Facilitation Directive is implemented in their Member State, which can lead to misinformation and ‘erring on the side of caution’, thereby compromising migrants’ access to vital services. This is especially true in the context of the current migration crisis, where everyday citizens are obliged to volunteer vital services in the absence of sufficient state provision. This confusion stems in part from a lack of coordination between local and national authorities regarding implementation  of the Facilitation  Directive.

In certain Member States, the implementation of the Facilitation Directive is perceived to contribute to the social exclusion of both irregular and regular migrants and to undermine social trust. Shipowners report that they feel poorly supported by Member States and  are ill  placed  to  help  irregular migrants  at  sea.

In light of the above considerations, the study formulates the following policy recommendations  to  the  European Parliament:

Recommendation 1: The current EU legal framework should be reformed to i) bring it into full compliance with international, regional and EU human rights standards, in particular those related to the protection of smuggled migrants; ii) provide for a mandatory exemption from criminalisation for ‘humanitarian assistance’ in cases of entry, transit and residence; and iii) use the financial gain element and include standards on aggravating circumstances in light of the UN Smuggling Protocol. Clarity and  legal   certainty should  be  the  key guiding  principles  of  this  legislative reform.

Recommendation 2: Member States should be obliged to put in place adequate systems to monitor and independently evaluate the enforcement of the Facilitators’ Package, and allow for quantitative and qualitative assessment of its implementation when  it  comes to the number  of  prosecutions  and convictions, as  well   as  their effects.

 

Recommendation 3: EU funding should be made available for cities and civil society organisations to address the human rights, destitution and humanitarian needs of irregular migrants.

Recommendation 4: Firewall protections should be enshrined for irregular migrants to allow them to report human rights abuses and access public services without fear that they  will  immediately  be  reported  to  immigration  authorities.

Continue ...

 

EU-US “Umbrella agreement”on data protection: an interesting analysis of the US Congressional research service.

NOTA BENE : this blog has already published a detailed analysis of Professor DOUWE KORFF of the envisaged EU-US Umbrella agreement on data protection as well as a comment by Professor Peter SCHAAR a summary of important contributions for the European Parliament Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE) written by Professor Francesca Bignami and other researchers on the same subject. Following these contributions the EP committee has required a formal opinion to the EP legal service and that opinion will probably presented in the coming weeks. In the meantime it could be worth reading the Congressional Research Service document below which is notably focused on the limited scope of protection for the EU citizens even in case of adoption by the US Congress of the Judicial Redress act.

EDC

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INTERNAL NOTE CRS Reports & Analysis – Legal Sidebar

Judicial Redress Act 101 – What to Know as Senate Contemplates Passing New Privacy Law 01/21/2016  Update: The Senate Judiciary Committee delayed the markup on S. 1600, the Judicial Redress Act, previously scheduled for January 21, 2016.

Reports indicate that the Senate may soon vote on the Judicial Redress Act (JRA), a bill that could have major implications on transatlantic data flows and the global economy. The House of Representatives passed the JRA (H.R. 1428) in October (for the House Report on the JRA, see here), and the Senate is currently considering an identical version of the JRA (S. 1600). To understand why the JRA is important, it’s first worth discussing the underlying legislation that the JRA would amend: the Privacy Act of 1974.

The Privacy Act generally regulates how the federal government collects, uses, and discloses “records” – a term of art defined by the Act to refer to information possessed by a federal agency that contains individual identifying information. The Privacy Act provides for civil remedies by private parties to help enforce its provisions in four situations:

  1. when an agency refuses to amend an individual’s record;
  2. when an agency refuses to provide access to an individual’s record;
  3. when an agency has failed to maintain certain records in an accurate, relevant, timely, and complete manner,

resulting in an “adverse effect” on an individual; and

  1. when an agency fails to comply with “any other provision” of the Act or rule promulgated pursuant thereunder resulting in an “adverse effect” on the individual.

The Privacy Act as currently written is limited to the records of an “individual,” a term the Act defines as a “citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” As a result, a foreign national who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence and believes a federal agency is failing to comply with the Privacy Act with respect to his record currently has no judicial recourse under the 1974 law.

The JRA generally would amend the Privacy Act to expand the number of eligible Privacy Act plaintiffs under certain, narrow circumstances to a limited group of foreign nationals. The JRA would not allow every foreign national to obtain civil relief under the Privacy Act; instead the JRA would expand the Act to cover foreign nationals from countries specifically designated by the Attorney General because of formal or informal information sharing arrangements respecting transnational crime. Moreover, even if a foreign national is from a designated country, not all four categories of Privacy Act civil actions are made available by the JRA; instead the proposed legislation would allow foreign nationals to proceed under categories (1) or (2) only if the information at issue was possessed by a designated federal agency that receives information from the foreign national’s home country because of a formal or informal information sharing agreement between the United States and the home country. In addition, the JRA would allow a covered foreign national to pursue one specific cause of action under category (4)—the JRA would allow a plaintiff to recover actual damages if a plaintiff can prove that a federal agency has intentionally or willfully disclosed a covered record without written consent. Finally, the JRA does not allow a covered foreign national to pursue claims with respect to any record; instead the bill would only cover records that have been transferred by an entity within the foreign national’s home country for the purpose of “preventing, investigating, detecting, or prosecuting criminal offenses.”

Attention has centered on the JRA following a major ruling by the European Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidating the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement, which generally permitted companies to transfer personal data from the E.U. to the U.S.

The decision centered on an interpretation of the E.U.’s 1995 Data Protection Directive (Directive) which requires member states to establish privacy laws that would bar the transfer of personal data to non-E.U. countries that fail to provide an “adequate” level of privacy protections. The Directive permits the European Commission (EC), an executive body within the E.U., to make general determinations regarding whether other countries offer the needed level of protection in their domestic laws or international commitments. To ensure compliance with the Directive, in the late 1990s, the Department of Commerce and the EC negotiated the Safe Harbor agreement which permits an American company to receive E.U. citizens’ data if it meets certain privacy principles. In order to join the Safe Harbor, a U.S. company typically must self-certify to the Department of Commerce that it will abide by the Safe Harbor principles. Companies that do so were formerly assumed to meet the Directive’s adequacy standard for privacy protection. The EC approved the Safe Harbor agreement in 2000.

On October 6, 2015 the CJEU invalidated the 2000 EC decision approving the Safe Harbor agreement. The Court first determined that even when the EC has concluded that a non-E.U. country has adopted procedures satisfying the adequacy requirements of the Directive, the EC’s determination does not prohibit individual E.U. countries’ data authorities from examining claims that that country nonetheless is failing to provide an adequate level of protection of personal data. Second, the CJEU, interpreting the adequacy standard to necessitate that a non-EU country receiving E.U. data have privacy laws that are the functional equivalent to those in the E.U., raised several concerns about the Safe Harbor agreement, including recent disclosures about the U.S. government’s surveillance activities and the lack of judicial redress in U.S. courts for European citizens’ whose data has been collected by the government. Ultimately, the CJEU found that the EC’s decision approving Safe Harbor did not comply with the Directive because the Commission did not determine whether the United States ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data. While supporters of the JRA hope that providing legal redress in U.S. courts for European citizens whose data is collected by U.S. companies may be a step toward providing the adequate privacy standards required by E.U. law, the question remains whether the JRA, which is focused on providing a limited number of foreign nationals a cause of action under the Privacy Act for information transferred with respect to transatlantic criminal investigations, would satisfy the CJEU’s broader concerns about United States privacy law. (EMPHASIS ADDED)

In addition to the Safe Harbor agreement, the JRA is seen as integral to ongoing negotiations between the United States and Europe concerning data transfers in the context of law enforcement investigations. To that end, the parties have been negotiating the so-called “Umbrella Agreement,” which will regulate all personal data exchanged between the United States and the European Union for the purposes of “prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offenses, including terrorism.”

A critical issue for the E.U. in these negotiations has been access to judicial redress in U.S. courts for European citizens, a provision that was included in the recently released draft agreement. However, it appears that the agreement will not be signed and formalized unless the United States enacts the JRA or a functional equivalent.

Currently, requests and transfers of data between the United States and the member-states of the European Union for purposes of law enforcement investigations are primarily governed by Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) or letters rogatory.

Additionally, various other international agreements, such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) and the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement, regulate the request and transfer of data between the United States and Europe in the context of law enforcement investigations. The Umbrella Agreement, which is intended to “supplement” but “not replace” these existing international agreements, would create rules governing, among other things, the purpose and use of collected data; transfers to third-party countries; security measures to protect destruction, loss, or disclosure of data; notification of security breaches; and administrative and judicial redress.

(For a more detailed discussion and analysis of the CJEU Safe Harbor decision and the JRA, CRS has published a general congressional distribution memorandum that is available upon request).

Le terrorisme, une « catégorie spéciale » du droit, vraiment ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE (on January 18, 2016)

par Henri Labayle

A en croire la traduction juridique des discours ambiants, une page semble se tourner. Celle où les démocraties prétendaient encore répondre au terrorisme par l’usage du droit commun et l’intervention du juge ordinaire.

Législation d’exception et régime d’urgence sont désormais présentés comme une réponse normale à la violence aveugle qui cible la société. Il n’y a là rien de nouveau. Du Royaume Uni aux Etats Unis d’après le 11 septembre, les grandes démocraties ont souvent cédé à cette propension, sans pour autant que le balancier reprenne exactement depuis la place qu’il avait quittée.

La surprise vient donc d’ailleurs. Du juge suprême vers lequel le juriste se tourne d’ordinaire pour garantir l’essentiel. Sans (encore …) de procès d’intention à l’encontre du juge constitutionnel interne, la lecture d’un arrêt de chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, le 20 octobre dernier, dans l’affaire Sher et autres c. Royaume Uni, interpelle. La chambre y énonce benoîtement que « terrorist crime falls into a special category » (§149). Son affirmation invite à la réflexion, sur le jeu des mots comme celui des acteurs en cause.

I – Jeux de mots

Le choix de l’arme juridique en réponse à la criminalité terroriste contemporaine, interroge. Il plonge l’observateur dans le doute quant son usage et à la puissance des mots employés.

a. Jamais autant que depuis une vingtaine d’années l’empilement des strates législatives anti-terroristes n’a été aussi massif, chaque attentat recevant en retour une stigmatisation supplémentaire, en droit interne comme européen. La loi 2014-1353 relative au terrorisme tout comme la loi 2015-912 relative au renseignement sont les derniers avatars de cette option politique consistant à brandir la règle comme un bouclier destiné à rassurer une opinion publique déstabilisée.

Le droit de l’Union n’échappe pas à cette pente, qui vient d’annoncer une proposition (COM 2015 625) de directive se substituant à la décision cadre 2002/475/JAI du Conseil relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Principale nouveauté, outre une mise à niveau internationale, l’incrimination de toute une série d’infractions liées au terrorisme dont  « certains actes préparatoires, tels que l’entraînement et le fait de se rendre à l’étranger à des fins terroristes ainsi que le fait de se rendre complice d’actes terroristes, d’inciter à les commettre et de tenter de les commettre ».

Pour quel effet concret ? Quel est en définitive l’impact réel d’une telle inflation textuelle sur la lutte anti-terroriste, si tant est qu’elle a bien pénétré le droit de tous les Etats membres ? Passer au tamis de ces propositions ce que l’on sait aujourd’hui des modes de réalisation des attentats de Paris, en janvier comme en novembre, permettrait-il de se rassurer a posteriori ? Les auraient-elles empêchés ? Rien n’est moins certain.

En revanche, cette agitation normative possède un effet d’entrainement incontestable, celui de l’accoutumance à un droit d’exception et de la banalisation des transgressions qu’il implique. Peut-être, d’ailleurs, est-ce là simplement ce que veut signifier le paragraphe 149 de l’arrêt de la CEDH en semblant considérer comme normale cette rupture entraînée par la « spécialisation » des catégories.

D’abord, ce mouvement est en rupture avec le mouvement profond du droit européen relatif à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Depuis le milieu des années soixante dix, 1976 précisément avec la Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme, un accord profond lie les Etats européens quant à la conduite à tenir. Nier la singularité politique de cette violence, lui refuser un statut et une qualité politique autorisant un privilège quelconque dans sa répression ou dans la coopération entre Etats, en bref lui opposer la loi pénale, telle était la ligne commune. Elle présentait deux utilités immédiates : user de l’arsenal pénal, y compris en aggravant la force de sa rigueur, et disqualifier la cause comme l’auteur du crime aux yeux du corps social, pour éviter toute dissémination.

La boursouflure des propos tenus en France sur la « guerre » que nous mènerions au terrorisme, peu appréciée par nos partenaires européens, n’est pas qu’effet d’estrade ou confusion entre le Mali et le Stade de France. Elle infléchit cette option de fond des trente dernières années. Tout comme l’usage désormais répandu du terme « combattants » attribué sans nuance à ceux qui sont et devraient demeurer avant tout des criminels au sens pénal du terme. Les « foreign fighters » sur lesquels, enfin, l’Union européenne se penche aujourd’hui mèneraient-ils donc un combat, une « guerre » ? Si oui, celle-ci est-elle identique en Syrie et au Bataclan ? Si oui, pourquoi et comment cette même Union peut-elle prétendre mobiliser la loi pénale pour y répondre ?

Donner ainsi raison, au moins sur le plan sémantique, à la revendication du criminel en acceptant de se placer sur le terrain qu’il a lui même choisi lorsqu’il met en avant son « combat », n’est pas sans conséquence. L’impuissance du droit pénal à s’opposer à ce « combat » risque de conduire alors à ce que, précisément, l’on entendait éviter : donner un sens, une légitimité à des formes de criminalité aveugles au point de voir leur auteur en devenir lui même une victime sacrificielle…

Le prurit juridique pallierait alors l’absence de réflexion politique. Celle-ci devrait pourtant être une priorité, menée en profondeur. Que ce soit à propos du traitement technique autant que démocratique d’une criminalité sans précédent qui porte massivement la nationalité de nos Etats membres, la déstabilisation de nos constructions nationale et européennes est considérable. Indifférent au châtiment pénal, puisque disparaissant avec ses victimes, ce terrorisme d’une forme nouvelle peut-il faire l’objet d’une politique criminelle adaptée, de formes de réinsertion sociale indispensables, vue l’extrême jeunesse des individus ?

b. L’effet de brouillage dans lequel la criminalité terroriste plonge les sociétés européennes est l’une de ses conséquences les plus perverses, tant elle attente à leurs certitudes.

Une chose est, en effet, de considérer, comme le droit de la CEDH le fait depuis toujours, que le terrorisme est porteur d’une menace pour la société d’une gravité telle qu’elle légitime sa riposte, une autre est d’avancer dans l’arrêt Sher qu’il constituerait désormais en droit une « catégorie spéciale ».

Tout comme les lois d’exception initialement réservées au terrorisme se voient ensuite emprunter les facilités qu’elles procurent par des textes relatifs à d’autres formes de criminalité, ici la formule jurisprudentielle inquiète. Serait-elle annonciatrice demain, d’une jurisprudence plus permissive relative à cette « catégorie » ?

En l’espèce, trois pakistanais détenus par les autorités britanniques dans le cadre d’une opération antiterroriste se plaignaient d’une atteinte à l’article 5 §4 CEDH, c’est à dire du droit à contester la légalité de leur détention, lors de certaines audiences et devant le silence gardé quant à des éléments de preuve les incriminant.

A cette occasion, les termes employés par la Cour sont lourds de sens, indépendamment des faits de la cause.

Prétendant rappeler ce qui est en fait, à notre connaissance, une première (however, as the Court has explained, terrorist crime falls into a special category ), la Chambre estime que l’article 5 CEDH « should not be applied in such a manner as to put disproportionate difficulties in the way of the police authorities in taking effective measures to counter organised terrorism in discharge of their duty under the Convention to protect the right to life and the right to bodily security of members of the public ».

Chacun le sait, les droits intangibles garantis par la Convention, ne souffrent d’aucune atteinte dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Avec un courage certain dans des épisodes récents, la Cour l’a assumé tant à propos des risques individuels encourus en cas d’éloignement qu’à propos du comportement de certains Etats parties eux même. Il est bon de rappeler qu’elle fut parfois bien seule à cet égard.

Il reste que certains droits tirés de la CEDH, ceux notamment relatif au droit au juge et à la liberté, peuvent subir des restrictions graves en matière d’anti-terrorisme, ce que la Cour admet.

Ainsi par exemple, deux semaines après les attentats de 2005 à Londres, le refus d’assistance par un avocat fut-il validé par la Cour européenne en décembre 2014, dans l’affaire Ibrahim et autres c. Royaume Uni. Elle le fit en toute conscience, sur la base d’un faisceau d’indices et notamment parce qu’il existait des « raisons impérieuses » de procéder ainsi, en retardant provisoirement l’accès à un avocat au vu des circonstances du moment, devant la crainte d’autres attentats. Que l’affaire ait été depuis portée en grande chambre ne change rien au raisonnement : la Cour ne conclut pas pour autant à l’existence d’une « catégorie spéciale » justifiant l’ingérence mais raisonne essentiellement au vu des raisons impérieuses.

Tel n’est pas le cas dans l’affaire Sher où la Cour estime que l’article 5 § 4 ne peut être invoqué pour exclure la tenue d’une audience à huis clos – en l’absence du détenu ou de son avocat – consacrée à la présentation de sources d’information confidentielles étayant les pistes d’investigation des autorités, et qu’il ne peut être appliqué d’une manière qui causerait aux autorités de police des difficultés excessives pour combattre par des mesures adéquates le terrorisme organisé. Ces justificatifs, admissibles selon les circonstances, ne nécessitaient en rien de les fonder sur le caractère « spécial » de la criminalité terroriste.

La tentation est donc là de passer insensiblement à un contrôle adapté à la réalité du moment à un contrôle admettant, presque par hypothèse, de devoir baisser la garde. Cette tentation est désormais clairement franchie quant au rôle respectif des acteurs.

II – Jeux de rôle

C’est un fait, illustré particulièrement par la réalité française, la menace terroriste a conduit les responsables politiques à envisager une redistribution des rôles préoccupante.

Après la loi sur le renseignement, adoptée en procédure accélérée en réaction aux attentats parisiens de janvier, qui donne priorité à la police administrative sur la police judiciaire et la préférence au juge administratif sur le juge judiciaire, ce que l’on sait de la future loi sur la réforme pénale transmise pour avis au Conseil d’Etat en décembre inquiète.

En clair, elle marginalise l’institution judiciaire au profit de l’administration, au point de provoquer des réactions inhabituelles au sein de celle-ci.

Ainsi, le discours de rentrée du procureur général près la Cour de cassation, le 14 janvier dernier, formule-t-il exactement la nature des préoccupations : « l’inquiétude naîtrait si, à la lumière de l’activisme des services dans le cadre de l’état d’urgence, on en venait à imaginer d’en faire, certes en l’amodiant, un régime de droit commun, l’estimant bien plus efficace que la lourde machine judiciaire.

Il y aurait là, bien évidemment, un risque considérable pour l’Etat de droit car les nombreuses normes imposées, par le législateur, aux magistrats, notamment dans leur activité pénale, ont, pour leur immense majorité, l’objectif d’assurer une procédure équitable et contradictoire, une égalité des armes et une protection efficace des libertés individuelles ». Cette opinion n’est pas isolée.

En des termes aussi fermes, le premier président de cette Cour s’est également interrogé publiquement quant au sens de cette évolution : « les pouvoirs publics sont-ils parfois portés à prendre leurs distances avec l’Autorité judiciaire ? Si oui, pourquoi ? Quelles défaillances ou quels risques l’Autorité judiciaire présente-t-elle qui justifieraient que l’Etat préfère l’éviter lorsqu’il s’agit de la défense de ses intérêts supérieurs ?

Le Premier président de la Cour de cassation se doit de poser loyalement cette question dans les circonstances dramatiques que notre pays traverse avec un accompagnement législatif qui ne s’est pas tourné spontanément vers l’Autorité judiciaire lorsque l’on a mis en place le contrôle de l’application aussi bien de la loi sur le renseignement que de celle sur l’état d’urgence, textes qui intéressent pourtant au premier chef la garantie des droits fondamentaux ».

Inquiétude, enfin, que, en Assemblée plénière et à la quasi-unanimité, la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme a relayé dans une Déclaration en date du 15 janvier : « dans le contexte actuel de préparation d’un projet de réforme de la procédure pénale prévoyant d’accroître les pouvoirs des forces de l’ordre et ceux de l’autorité administrative, au détriment des garanties judiciaires, la CNCDH se doit de réaffirmer avec force que le consensus sur les enjeux sécuritaires de la lutte contre le terrorisme ne doit pas nuire à un débat de qualité. La simple invocation d’une plus grande efficacité ne peut justifier l’adoption, immédiate et sans discussion, de dispositifs inutilement répressifs. La plus grande victoire des « ennemis des droits de l’homme » (terroristes ou autres) serait en effet de mettre en péril l’Etat de droit par l’émergence et la consolidation d’un illusoire état de sécurité, qui se légitimerait par l’adoption de mesures de plus en plus attentatoires aux droits et libertés fondamentaux » (point 7).

Force est alors de rejoindre l’interrogation de notre collègue Pascal Beauvais, dans un article de presse récent publié dans le quotidien Libération : l’Etat de droit serait-il un «état d’insécurité » ?