Violence against women: what will be the impact of the EU signing the Istanbul Convention?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS

by Steve Peers

The scourge of violence against women is a serious human rights abuse and the worst form of sex discrimination. Several years ago, the Council of Europe (a body different from the EU) drew up the Istanbul Convention on this issue. It came into force in 2014, and currently applies to 20 countries, including 12 EU Member States (for ratification details, see here). Today, the EU Commission proposed that the EUsign and then conclude the Convention. What practical impact will that have on violence against women?

If the EU does sign and conclude (ie ratify) the Treaty, it will be the second human rights treaty binding the Union. The first is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. While most attention has been focussed on the EU’s attempt to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was essentially thwarted by the EU’s Court of Justice (CJEU) in 2014 (as discussedhere), the EU’s capacity to sign up to other human rights treaties is also relevant. While the EU cannot sign up to older international human rights treaties, like the UN Covenants, because they are only open to States, newer treaties (like the Istanbul Convention) expressly provide for the EU to sign up to them – if it wishes.

Impact of EU ratification

Like many international treaties, the Istanbul Convention is a ‘mixed agreement’, meaning that (if the EU ratifies it), the treaty will bind both the Union and its Member States. EU ratification should have six main effects (I’ve updated this list from the previous post on the reasons why the EU should ratify).

First of all, the EU’s ratification of the Convention could provide encouragement to its Member States, as well as non-Member States of the EU, to ratify the Convention. It would increase the prominence of the Convention worldwide, perhaps inspiring changes to national law and regional treaty-making outside Europe. It should be noted that the treaty is open for signature to non-EU countries: the 19 Council of Europe countries not in the EU (8 of them have ratified it already), as well as the 4 non-European countries (plus the Holy See) which took part in drawing it up.

Do you live in a country which hasn’t ratified the Convention? You can sign up to a campaign for the UK to ratify the Convention here. Please let me know of any other campaigns in the UK or any other country, and I’ll list them with a link in an Annex to this post.

Secondly, ratification could, as regards this Convention at least, address the argument that the EU has ‘double standards’ as regards human rights, insisting that Member States, would-be EU Member States and associated countries should uphold human rights standards that the EU does not apply itself. If the EU is perfectly able to ratify the Istanbul Convention, but chooses not to, what moral authority does it have to urge any countries to do so?

Thirdly, ratification of the Convention should enhance its role in EU law, because it could more easily be used as a parameter for the interpretation and validity of EU legislation. While there’s no general EU criminal law on violence against women (on the case for such a law, see here), there are other relevant EU rules. In particular, the Commission proposal refers to EU free movement law, substantive EU criminal law relevant to violence against women, EU immigration and asylum law, and the EU law on crime victims’ rights, applicable from last autumn (on the content of the crime victims’ law, see discussion here). It should also mean that the Convention will already bind those EU Member States which had not yet ratified it, as regards those provisions within EU competence.The proposal is based on EU competence over victims’ rights, and would apply (if agreed) to every Member State covered by the crime victims’ law – meaning every EU country except Denmark.

In practical terms, that should mean that (for instance), EU law must be interpreted to mean victims receive a residence permit based on their personal situation, if the authorities consider it necessary (Article 59(3) of the Convention). That would apply to citizens of other Member States and their (EU or non-EU) family members, in all 27 Member States covered by the proposal. It would also apply to non-EU citizens in general, in the Member States which apply EU law on non-EU migration (ie the 25 Member States other than the UK, Ireland and Denmark, which have mostly opted out of such laws).  

For asylum cases, Article 60 of the Convention makes clear that gender-based violence is a ground of persecution. This is more explicit than the EU’s qualification Directive, which says that ‘gender-related aspects shall be given due consideration’, with further reference in its preamble to specific practices like genital mutilation. (Note that the UK and Ireland are covered by the first-phase qualification Directive, which has less precise wording on this issue; so the EU’s ratification of the Convention might have more influence in these countries).

As regards victims of domestic violence crimes (of any nationality and residence status), Chapter IV of the Convention, concerning support and protection, could in particular have an impact on the interpretation of the crime victims’ Directive in each Member State.

Fourth, since the CJEU will have jurisdiction to interpret those provisions of the Convention which fall within the scope of EU competence, this could promote a uniform interpretation of those provisions within the EU.  

Next, the relevant provisions of the Convention will be more enforceable if the EU ratifies it. While the CJEU ruled in the Z case that the UN Disabilities Convention did not have direct effect, and might rule the same as regards the Istanbul Convention, at least that Convention would have ‘indirect effect’ (ie the obligation to interpret EU law consistently with it), and the Commission could bring infringement actions against Member States which had not applied the Convention correctly, as regards issues within the scope of EU competence. Ensuring the enforceability of the Convention is all the more important since it does not provide for an individual complaint system.

Finally, ratification would subject the EU to outside monitoring as regards this issue, and avoid the awkward scenario of its Member States being monitored as regards issues within EU competence – meaning that the Convention’s monitoring body would in effect to some extent be monitoring whether EU Member States were complying with EU law.


Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the EU’s planned ratification can only be welcomed. It may not, by itself, prevent any act of violence from being committed, but it may accelerate a broader process of ratification (and corresponding national law reform) on this issue. And it may have the important practical impact of helping victims receive support or protection, particularly in the context of the law on crime victims, immigration or asylum.

Draft Directive on terrorism : first comments from civil society..

Below the Joint submission by Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Open Society European Policy Institute (also accessible HERE) 
February 2016

INTRODUCTION

In this submission, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ], and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI] and the Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI] analyse and offer recommendations on the European Commissions December 2015 proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism (“the proposed Directive”] in light of Member States obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law. Rather than submitting observations on every challenge raised by this proposal, the present document focuses on some of the organisations  main issues of concern and makes specific recommendations to address them (both in general -Part I- and in regard to specific articles – Part II]. Therefore, the absence of comment on a specific recital or draft article should not be read as an endorsement of that text.

This submission seeks to specifically address:

  • The failure to provide sufficient guarantees of human rights protection in the implementation of the Directive by Member States;
  • The overbroad scope and vague delineation of many of the offences to be established under the Directive, with consequences for the principle of legality and the prohibitions on arbitrary, disproportionate and discriminatory interference with human rights;
  • The designation of ancillary and inchoate offences with a low degree of proximity to the principal offence of commission of a terrorism-related act;
  • The imprecise definition of the specific intent required to incur responsibility for a number of offences and lack of requirements for willful or voluntary conduct;
  • The potential of the Directive to undermine states obligations under international humanitarian law and international criminal law, where those regimes are applicable.
  1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Background to the Directive

This proposed Directive develops and extends the criminalisation of terrorism-related acts in EU law, building on Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism as amended by Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA. The impetus for the new offences included in the proposed Directive is said to be UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) which seeks to address what is often characterized as the “foreign terrorist fighters” phenomenon and provides that: “Member States shall… prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training and the financing of their travel and of their activities”.1 The proposed Directive further draws on the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism adopted in May 2015 (“the Additional Protocol”), which was aimed at implementing Security Council Resolution 2178 within the Council of Europe legal framework. Amnesty International, the ICJ and OSJI made a series of submissions on the draft Protocol, and retain significant concerns regarding its content and potential to result in violations of human rights.2

Although both Security Council Resolution 2178 and the Additional Protocol affirm that the measures they establish must be implemented in accordance with States international human rights obligations, both contain flaws that give rise to the potential to result in arbitrary, disproportionate, and discriminatory interference with human rights, and to conflict with international humanitarian law and international criminal law where applicable.3 These problems are also reflected, and in some cases exacerbated, in the text of the proposed Directive.

International human rights law: general principles

Amnesty International, the ICJ, and OSJI and OSEPI consider that the proposed Directive as currently drafted would not accord with the principle of legality of criminal offences enshrined in article 49 of the EU Charter, Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 15 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The human rights obligations engaged by the measures in the proposed Directive include, among others, the right to liberty; the right to freedom of movement, including the right to leave and enter ones own country; the right to privacy; the rights to freedom of expression and association; and the principle of non-discrimination. Under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Article 52.1), as well as the ECHR and the ICCPR, both of which are binding on all EU Member States, any restrictions of these rights must be prescribed by law which is clear and accessible, in pursuit of a legitimate purpose, and must be necessary and proportionate to achieve that purpose. The burden is on the state to demonstrate that these conditions are met, including the necessity and proportionality of the restriction. Restrictions must be consistent with all other human rights recognized in international law; may not impair the essence of the right affected; and may not be applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner.

The requirement that, where limitations on certain human rights are permissible, they must be “prescribed by law” reflects the well-established principle of legality, a principle that similarly applies to defining all criminal offences. Thus, laws must be clear and accessible and their application in practice must be sufficiently foreseeable. In particular, they must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly. They must not confer unfettered discretion on authorities, but rather provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their application to enable them to ascertain the sort of conduct that falls within their scope.4 This principle has been affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights as an essential element of the rule of law and an important protection against arbitrariness.   With regard to criminalization, the principle of legality requires that the law must classify and describe offences in precise and unambiguous language that narrowly defines the punishable behaviour. The offences in the proposed directive are insufficiently precise and conduct which would trigger criminal responsibility under them insufficiently foreseeable to satisfy the principle of legality, and should be amended accordingly. (See further below specific recommendations with regard to Articles 2,4, 5, 8, 9 and 10.)

Furthermore, the criminalization of earlier stages of certain preparatory acts that are several stages removed from any principal offence, including when related to terrorism and without a direct intent to commit the principal offence, leads to a very weak, if any, causal or proximate link with the principal offence. These ancillary offences are therefore difficult to justify as necessary and proportionate to legitimate aims such as combatting serious crime and protecting national security. Any preparatory offence to be criminalized must have a genuinely close connection to the commission of the principal criminal offence, with a real and foreseeable risk that such principal criminal conduct would in fact take place. The relevant provisions in the proposed Directive should be amended in light of these requirements, to clarify that there must be genuinely close proximity to the principal offence and specific intent to commit or to actually6 contribute to a terrorism-related act.

Crimes under international law and related states’ obligations

Where individuals are accused of crimes under international law, criminalization and co-operation in the prosecution of those crimes should include, where necessary, asserting universal jurisdiction, and bringing those responsible to justice, in fair proceedings. The obligation to take these steps is binding on all EU Member States under existing international law. 7 While there are clear evidential challenges in investigating and prosecuting crimes under international law such as war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in other countries, the responsibility of states to ensure that those who engage in such crimes are held accountable for them needs to remain at the forefront of all EU Member States agenda.

We therefore urge EU Member States and MEPs, in the negotiation of this Directive, and Member States in its implementation in national law, to give priority to the fulfillment of their existing obligations to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law, including through co-operative measures.

The role of non-punitive approaches

While the proposed Directive focuses on punitive measures to combat terrorism, it would be beneficial for the recitals to recognize the importance of using a non-punitive approach to address many of the factors surrounding the resort to criminal conduct, including terrorism related conduct. This is warranted, inter alia, in light of the role that duress and coercion can play, in particular with regard to children. At the same time, it should be made clear that such references to non-punitive measures are not regarded as including or encouraging administrative measures, such as restrictions on freedom of movement, which may be tantamount to detention without charge or trial or measures, which interfere with rights including freedom of expression beyond what is demonstrably necessary and proportionate for the stated lawful purpose, or which are applied in a discriminatory manner, and that all such measures must be subject to effective appeal in the courts.

The legislative process and the lack of an impact assessment

Amnesty International, the ICJ, and OSJI and OSEPI are concerned that the expedited process for the adoption of this Directive will further increase the risk of its provisions leading to violations of human rights, when implemented in national law.   In particular, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Directive states that “given the urgent need…in light of recent terrorist attacks… this proposal is exceptionally presented without an impact assessment.” Given the impact that this Directive may have on a wide array of human rights, in addition to the resources of Member States, it is crucial that this Directive undergoes proper scrutiny and debate, including through an impact assessment, and through proper consultation with civil society as to the potential impact of the Directive in practice. Amnesty International, the ICJ, and OSJI and OSEPI recommend that the timetable for consideration of the proposed Directive be modified, with a view to ensuring thorough scrutiny and a proper participatory debate.

We also note that the explanatory memorandum outlines “implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements” which include “consultations with Member States and stakeholders, notably Europol, Eurojust and the Fundamental Rights Agency.” Amnesty International, the ICJ, and OSJI and OSEPI recommend that provision be made for civil society to also participate in these activities.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES Continue reading “Draft Directive on terrorism : first comments from civil society..”

Save Schengen / Beyond Dublin: a Joint initiative of Italy and Germany

LETTER SENT BY ANGELINO ALFANO (IT) AND THOMAS DE MAIZIERE (DE) MINISTERS OF INTERIOR

March 2, 2016

To: Vice President Timmermans  / Commissioner Avramopoulos  EU Commission Bruxelles

Dear Mr. Vice President, dear Commissioner,

The refugee crisis has revealed the limitations of the European Policy on Migration and Asylum, and in particular of the Dublin Regulation as well as substantial shortcomings in the protection of the external borders of the Union, it has become evident that the existing refugee procedures and mechanisms in Europe are not viable. Our legislation has not been designed for managing so large a number of refugees.

What we need is an ambitious reform of the Dublin Regulation within a readjusted Common European Asylum System. We need to develop a protection system in which the burden of illegal migration and persons in need of protection are not just borne by the member states of first arrival and on the external borders and a few other receiving countries.

We need updated and effective procedures. This applies to the asylum procedure as such, to harmonized standards for accommodation and basic services, the procedures on the recognition of the status of refugees but also on legal redress and return issues. An acceler­ated appeal procedure should be introduced for all cases.

An essential part of our overall obligation and efforts to improve the protection of the external borders of the European Union must be an enhanced European mechanism for identification and registration of all migrants entering the EU. This requires a substantial strengthening of EASO. Through comprehensive legal, organizational, personnel and financial measures, EASO must be transformed into an EU asylum agency.

Repatriation activities are crucial for the effectiveness of the whole migration management system. We urge the Commission to arrange, in cooperation with Frontex, repatriation initiatives which should be complemented by reinstallation programs (i.e. in the field of vocational training and in the start up of new micro-entrepreneurial businesses).

In order to manage the difficult situation in Europe all member states and the European Commission must work together in a constructive manner. For this reason, we suggest that the attached non-paper be taken into account in the context of the upcoming revision of the Common European Asylum System, which we are awaiting with great interest.

Yours sincerely. (Signatures)

ANNEX      

Save Schengen/Beyond Dublin)

Introduction

The Dublin Regulation on Asylum belongs to a past era when the pressure of immigration was lower than today. The context and challenges were also deeply different.

Today, the numbers have dramatically changed and the existing national systems fail to cope with the growing influx of arrivals in Europe. The burden is unevenly distributed since only a few member states receive the vast majority of applications.

We therefore highly welcome the intention of the European Commission to soon present a proposal for the reform of the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin Regulation, which is an integral part of the Common European Asylum System [CEAS), can only be reformed within a further development of the whole CEAS. We firmly believe that the current migration crisis demands a much higher convergence of the asylum and reception systems of the MS.

Time is short and we have to act soon if we want to save the free movement of persons and prevent a disintegration of Schengen, one of the founding pillars of the European Union.

A concerted action is needed along a three-pronged strategy: short-term coordinated ad-hoc measures to immediately lower the arrival flows; strengthening the joint EU control of external land and maritime borders; agreeing on a revision of the Common European Asylum System based on the core principles of solidarity and responsibility.

Indicative Guidelines

Border Protection

Strengthening the protection of the EU-External borders is a precondition to safeguard EU-internal free circulation and the stability of the European Union. The introduction of the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency is a top priority goal that must be pursued by taking into account national specificities. Speeding up this process is crucial. In order to achieve an immediate reduction of the influx, ad-hoc measures should be adopted in a coordinated manner and for limited time. In parallel, targeted and tailor-made assistance to non-member states on the migration routes should be provided. With the entry into force of the new EBCG-Regulation operational cooperation with third countries has to be initiated.

EU-Registration-Mechanism

A comprehensive EU registration mechanism including security checks (SIS, Eurodac) of all migrants and asylum seekers crossing EU-external borders is the cornerstone of all EU migratory and asylum policies. Member States have to ensure the compliance with this necessary obligation. Frontex has to play a major role in this development.

Burden sharing on Asylum

Our challenge is to design and implement a system of distribution of asylum seekers which goes beyond the principle of the state of the first arrival. It should be a system in which the burden of illegal Migration and persons in need of protection are not just borne by the member states of first arrival and on the external borders and a few other receiving countries. We need an EU fair burden sharing procedure based on objective criteria (e.g.: population, per capita income, rate of unemployment number of refugees received in the last five years etc.). Procedures should be speeded up and streamlined. The current system of national hotspots must be properly integrated within a wider EU arrival ad registration mechanism in order to curtail asylum-shopping.

Harmonized conditions

Harmonized conditions of reception, evaluation procedures and applicants’ rights will greatly help to establish a truly European Asylum System, reduce the pull-factor and curtail asylum shopping. EASO should be strengthened with adequate human and financial resources and wider legal competences so as to develop into a real an EU-Asylum agency. Additional effective Measures to counter secondary movement are required.

Accelerated procedures

Both the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33) contain key provisions which must be revised, along with the Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation. We need effective and harmonized procedures for admitting refugees, for granting them protection but also for returning those who are not in need of international protection. An accelerated legal procedure should be established in all cases, in particular for remedies against EU decisions for jurisdiction, distribution and transfer.

Returns

A well-functioning, robust and coordinated European Repatriation Mechanism is needed to return illegal economic migrants. Experience shows that single Member States find it hard to successfully implement repatriations in adequate numbers. Repatriation activities are crucial for the effectiveness of the whole migration management system. An effective EU-Repatriation Mechanism together with a stronger role of Frontex will disincentive perspective economic migrants. While EU-readmission agreements will certainly play a crucial role, joint cooperation among member states should be pursued to enhance the efficiency of the EU return policy also by taking advantage of existing well-functioning bilateral relations of MS. We urge the Commission to arrange, in cooperation with Frontex, repatriation initiatives which should be complemented by reinstallation programs (i.e. in the field of vocational training and in the start-up of new micro-entrepreneurial businesses).

Management of migration flows

Information sharing and analysis in order to obtain reliable prevision on migration flows should be improved and enhanced, taking into consideration the relevant role of the competent Agencies. EU and Member States should use policy instruments of the CSDP to strengthen capacities of third countries in managing and better controlling migration flows and coordinate a common communication-strategy towards potential migrants and Countries of origin and transit in order to inform and curtail illegal migrants.

Cooperation with third countries

To reduce migration flows, a much stronger EU External Action is needed. Cooperation with African countries must be intensified and properly focused. The fight against human trafficking and illegal migration should be at the core of all EU-contacts with third countries. Capacity Building and Training in Border and Migration Management should become an integral part of our Cooperation. During this process UNHCR and IOM will be import partners. We have to speed up the implementation of the Khartoum and the Rabat process and fully implement the EU Trust Fund for Africa as well as the North Africa Regional Protection programs. In the short term, Turkey will continue to play a major role in managing the refugees’ flows. A concrete follow-up of the Valletta Summit should also be ensured.

Resettlement: Pre-Screening in countries of origin and/or countries of transit and safe countries

Persons in need of protection could be already identified in countries of origin or transit countries, thus preventing refugees from taking risks of the journey as well as contributing to the common sound management of migration and asylum flows in the years to come. Establishment of an institutionalized EU resettlement scheme, based on annual quota to be distributed among all Member States, should be developed. Furthermore, an EU-list of safe countries must be agreed upon and communicated.

Hotspots and emergency relocation. State of play

PUBLISHED HERE BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERVICE. 

Author: Anita Orav

hOTSPOTS

SUMMARY

The year 2015 saw a record number of migrants arriving in the European Union: Frontex reports that 1.83 million irregular border crossings were detected at the EU’s external borders, 1.04 million of them in Greece and Italy. According to Eurostat, 1.29 million asylum applications were lodged in the EU in 2015. Based on the current Dublin system, applicants’ first country of entry is responsible for processing their asylum claims. This puts enormous pressure on frontline states.

The Commission’s communication on a European Agenda on Migration includes a proposal for a temporary emergency relocation mechanism to relieve the pressure on overburdened states. In parallel, the Commission has launched a ‘hotspot’ approach to provide assistance along specific sections of the border, characterised by ‘disproportionate mixed migratory flows’. The approach entails temporary intervention by EU agencies such as Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Europol to help national authorities guide asylum-seekers towards asylum procedures and irregular migrants towards return procedures.

Eleven such hotspots had been identified as of February 2016: six in Italy and five in Greece. Currently only three are fully operational. Although work on the hotspot approach is not yet complete and the relocation process only began in October 2015, stakeholders have already pointed to several shortcomings in how they currently operate. Parliament has insisted that the hotspot approach should not undermine the fundamental rights of any persons, refugees or otherwise, arriving at Europe’s shores.

Glossary

Hotspot: Section of the EU’s external border or a region under extraordinary migratory pressure, which calls for increased and concerted support by EU agencies.

Relocation: Redistribution among Member States of persons who are already present in the EU and in clear need of international protection.

Asylum: International protection offered by a state on its territory to a third-country national threatened by persecution in his or her own country. Following a successful application, an asylum-seeker is recognised as a refugee in the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

Context  Continue reading “Hotspots and emergency relocation. State of play”

The draft Directive on Terrorism: the Council is ready to adopt its “general approach”..

On March 10 the Justice and Home Affairs Council will probably adopt its “general approach” on the proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism submitted by the Commission to the co-legislators (Council and European Parliament) only beginning of  December 2015.

The new text will replace the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (as amended in 2008) by incorporating at the same time in the EU legal order the Council of Europe Convention on terrorism as well as its recent Protocol (14) on “Foreign Fighters” (which itself refers to the UNSC Resolution 2178/14).

You may find on a WIKI-LEX page on this blog here most of the background documentation dealing with the main institutional documents on this sensitive subject. The consolidated compromise text of the proposed Directive, as resulting from these discussions is set out below and, if, endorsed by the Council, will constitute the basis for future negotiations with the European Parliament in view of a possible “first reading agreement”.

Quite surprisingly until now the competent Parliamentary Committee (LIBE) had only some very general (and generic) debates on such a complex subject. From a civil society point of view this is extremely worrying also because such a sensitive issue has not debated since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (and of the Charter) so that none knows what has been achieved within the current legal framework nor what is expected from the new envisaged Directive. If this is the new way of “better law making” you can only regret the old good times when this kind of initiatives were duly debated in the European and national Parliaments.

EDC

2015/0281(COD) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 83(1) and Article 82(2) (c) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)  The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.

(2) Acts of terrorism constitute one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on which the European Union is founded. It also represents one of the most serious attacks on democracy and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States and on which the European Union is based.

(3) Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA[3] is the cornerstone of the criminal justice response to counter terrorism. A legal framework common to all Member States, and in particular, a harmonised definition of terrorist offences, serves as a benchmark for information exchange and cooperation between the competent national authorities under Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA,[4] Council Decision 2008/615/JHA[5] and Council Decision 2005/671/JHA,[6] Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council,[7] Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA[8] and Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA.[9]

(4)  The terrorist threat has grown and rapidly evolved in recent years. Individuals referred to as “foreign terrorist fighters” travel abroad for terrorism purposes. The United Nations Security Council has expressed its concern in UNSCR 2178 (2014) in relation to the foreign terrorist fighters. The Council of Europe has, in this respect, adopted in 2015 the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 217). Returning foreign terrorist fighters pose a heightened security threat to all EU Member States. (…) In addition, the European Union and its Member States face increased threats from individuals inspired or instructed by terrorist groups abroad but who remain within Europe.

(5)  Taking account of the evolution of terrorist threats and legal obligations to the Union and Member States under international law, the definition of terrorist offences, (…)offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, should be further approximated in all Member States, so that it covers more comprehensively conduct related to in particular foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing. These forms of behaviour should be punishable also if committed through the Internet, including social media.

(6) The offences related to terrorist activities are of a very serious nature as they have the potential to lead to the commission of terrorist offences and enable terrorists and terrorist groups to maintain and further develop their criminal activities, justifying the criminalisation of such conduct.

(7)  The offenses related to public provocation to commit a terrorist offence act comprise, inter alia, the glorification and justification of terrorism or the dissemination of messages or images including those related to the victims of terrorism as a way to gain publicity for the terrorists cause or seriously intimidating the population, provided that such behaviour causes a danger that terrorist acts may be committed. To strengthen actions against public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, and also taking into account the increased use of technology, in particular the Internet, it seems appropriate for Member States to take measures to remove or to block access to webpages publicly inciting to commit terrorist offences. Where such measures are taken, they must be set by transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure that restrictions are limited to what is necessary and proportionate.

(8) Considering the seriousness of the threat and the need to in particular stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, it is necessary to criminalise the travelling abroad to a country outside the Union for terrorist purposes, not only in order to commit terrorist offences and provide or receive training but also to participate in the activities of a terrorist group. The criminalisation under this Directive is limited to the travel to countries outside the Union as the destination where the person concerned intends to engage in terrorist activities and offences. The travel to the State of destination may be direct or by transiting other States en route. Any act of facilitation of such travel should also be criminalised. It is not indispensable to criminalise the act of travelling as such.

(9) Criminalisation of the receiving training for terrorism complements the existing offence of providing training and specifically addresses the threats resulting from those actively preparing for the commission of terrorist offences, including those ultimately acting alone.

(10) Terrorist financing should be punishable in the Member States. Criminalisation should cover the financing of terrorist acts, the financing of a terrorist group, as well as other offences related to terrorist activities, such as the recruitment and training, or travel for terrorist purposes, with a view to disrupting the support structures facilitating the commission of terrorist offences. (…)

(11)     Furthermore, the provision of material support for terrorism through persons engaging in or acting as intermediaries in the supply or movement of services, assets and goods, including trade transactions involving the entry into or exit from the Union, such as sale, acquisition or exchange of a cultural object of archaeological, artistic, historical or scientific interest illegally removed  from an area controlled by a terrorist group at the time of the removal, should be punishable in the Member States, as aiding and abetting terrorism or as terrorist financing if performed with the knowledge that these operations or the proceeds thereof are intended to be used, in full or in part, for terrorist purposes or will benefit terrorist groups. Further measures may be necessary with a view to effectively combat the illicit trade in cultural goods as a source of income for terrorist groups.

(12)     The attempt to travel abroad for terrorist purposes, should be punishable, as well as the attempt to provide training and recruitment for terrorism.

(13)     With regard to the criminal offences provided for in this Directive, the notion of intention must apply to all the elements constituting those offences. The intentional nature of an act or omission may be inferred from objective, factual circumstances.

(14)     Furthermore, penalties should be provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being liable for such offences, which reflect the seriousness of such offences.

(15)     Jurisdictional rules should be established to ensure that the offences laid down in this Directive may be effectively prosecuted. In particular, it appears appropriate to establish jurisdiction for the offences committed by the providers of training for terrorism, whatever their nationality, in view of the possible effects of such behaviours on the territory of the Union and of the close material connexion between the offences of providing and receiving training for terrorism.

(15a)   To ensure the success of investigations and the prosecution of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group or offences related to terrorist activities, those responsible for investigating and prosecuting such offences should have the possibility to make use of effective investigative tools such as those which are used in combating organised crime or other serious crimes. Such tools should, where appropriate, while taking into account the principle of proportionality and the nature and seriousness of the offences under investigation in accordance with national law, include, for example, the search of any personal property, the interception of communications, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, the taking and the fixing of audio recordings in private or public vehicles and places, and of visual images of persons in public vehicles and places, (…) and financial investigations(…). The right to the protection of personal data should be respected.

(16)      Member States should adopt (…) measures of protection, support and assistance responding to the specific needs of victims of terrorism, in accordance with  Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council[10] and as further qualified by this Directive. Victims of terrorism are those defined in Article 2 of Directive 2012/29/EU being a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by a terrorist offence, and family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a terrorist offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that person’s death. (…) Family members of surviving victims of terrorism, as defined in Article 2 of Directive 2012/29/EU, have access to victim support services and protection measures in accordance with Directive 2012/29/EU.

(16a)   Member States should ensure that relevant mechanisms or protocols are in place allowing for activation of support services which are able to address the specific needs of victims of terrorism immediately after a terrorist attack and for as long as necessary thereafter. Such support services should take into account that specific needs of victims of terrorism may evolve in time. In that regard, the Member States should ensure that support services will address in the first place at least the emotional and psychological needs of the most vulnerable victims of terrorism, and will inform all victims of terrorism about the availability of further emotional and psychological support including trauma support and counselling.

(17)     Member States‘ should (…) ensure that all victims of terrorism have access to information about the victims’ rights, about available support services and (…) compensation schemes in the Member State where the terrorist offence was committed. Member States concerned should take appropriate action to facilitate cooperation with each other in order to ensure that victims of terrorism, who are residents of a Member State other than that where the terrorist offence was committed have effective access to such information. Moreover the Member States should ensure that victims of terrorism have access to a long-term support services in the country of their residence, even if the terrorist offence took place in another EU country.

(18)     Given that the objectives of this Directive cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States unilaterally and can therefore, because of the need for European-wide harmonised rules, be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article 5, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(19)     This Directive respects the principles recognised by Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, respects fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including those set out in Titles II, III, V and VI thereof which encompass inter alia the right to liberty and security, freedom of expression and information, freedom of association and freedom of thought conscience and religion, the general prohibition of discrimination in particular on grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, the right to respect for private and family life and the right to protection of personal data, the principle of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, covering also the requirement of precision, clarity and foreseeability in criminal law, the presumption of innocence as well as freedom of movement as set forth in Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and  Directive 2004/38/EC. This Directive has to be implemented in accordance with these rights and principles. This Directive has to be implemented in accordance with these rights and principles taking also into account the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights obligations under international law.

(19a)   This Directive should not have the effect of altering the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Member States under international law, including under international humanitarian law. The activities of armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by international humanitarian law within the meaning of these terms under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, activities of the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties are not governed by this Directive.

(20)     The implementation of the criminalisation under this Directive should be proportional to the nature and circumstances of the offence, with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society, and should exclude any form of arbitrariness, racism  or discrimination.

(20a)   Nothing in this Directive should be interpreted as being intended to reduce or restrict the dissemination of information for scientific, academic or reporting purposes. The expression of radical, polemic or controversial views in the public debate on sensitive political questions, falls outside the scope of this Directive and, in particular, of the definition of public provocation to commit terrorist offences.

(21)     The Directive should replace Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA[11] for the Member States bound by this Directive.

(22)     In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the United Kingdom and Ireland have notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Directive.

AND/OR

(23)     In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and without prejudice to Article 4 of that Protocol, the United Kingdom and Ireland are not taking part in the adoption and application of this Directive and are not bound by it or subject to its application.

(24)    In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA shall continue to be binding upon and applicable to Denmark.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Title I: Subject matter and definitions

Article 1 Subject matter
This Directive establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, as well as (…) measures of protection of and assistance to victims of terrorism.

Article 2 Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

a)”funds” means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit,
b) “legal person” means any entity having legal personality under the applicable law, except for States or public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public international organisations,
c) “terrorist group” shall mean: a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences; “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
d) merged with letter “c”

Title II: Terrorist offences and offences related to a terrorist group

Article 3 Terrorist offences
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to in paragraph 2, as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation are defined as terrorist offences where committed with the aim of one or more of the following:
a)seriously intimidating a population;
b) unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act;
c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

2. Intentional acts referred to in paragraph 1 are
a) attacks upon a persons’ life which may cause death;
b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;

i) illegal system interference, as referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems in cases where Article 9, paragraph (3) or (4)(b) or (c) of the said Directive apply, and illegal data interference, as referred to in Article 5 of Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems in cases where Article 9, paragraph (4)(c) of the said Directive applies;
j) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in points (a) to (i).

Article 4 Offences relating to a terrorist group
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following acts, when committed intentionally, are punishable as a criminal offence:
a) directing a terrorist group;
b) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.

Title III: Offences related to terrorist activities

Article 5 Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), where such conduct directly, or indirectly such as by the glorification of terrorist acts, advocates the commission of terrorist offences thereby causing a danger that one or more such offences may be committed, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 6 Recruitment for terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that soliciting another person to commit one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), or in Article 4 is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 7 Providing training for terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that providing instruction in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of committing of or contributing to one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 8 Receiving training for terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that to receive instruction, from another person in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of committing of or contributing to the commission of one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2) is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 9 Travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that travelling to a country outside the Union, directly or by transiting through one or several Member States of the Union, for the purpose of the commission of or contribution to a terrorist offence referred to in Article 3, the participation in the activities of a terrorist group with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of such a group as referred to in Article 4, or the providing or receiving of training for terrorism referred to in Articles 7 and 8 is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 10 Organising or otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any act of organisation or facilitation that assists any person in travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, as referred to in Article 9, knowing that the assistance thus rendered is for that purpose, is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.

Article 11 Terrorist financing
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that providing or collecting funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intent that they should be used, or knowing that they are to be used, in full or in part, to commit or to contribute to any of the offence(s) referred to in Articles 3 to 10 (…) is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.
2. Where terrorist financing as referred to in paragraph 1 concerns any of the offences laid down in Articles 3, 4 or 9, it shall not be necessary that the funds are in fact used, in full or in part, to commit or to contribute to any of these offences, nor shall it be required that the offender knows for which specific offence(s) the funds are to be used.

Article 12 Other offences related to terrorist activities
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences related to terrorist activities include the following intentional acts:
a) aggravated theft with a view to committing one of the offences listed in Article 3;
b) extortion with a view to the perpetration of one of the offences listed in Article 3;
c) drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(2), point (b) of Article 4 and Article 9.

Article 13 (merged with Article 12)

Article 14 (merged with Article 12)

Title IV: General provisions relating to terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities

Article 15 Relationship to terrorist offences
For an offence referred to in Article 4 and Title III to be punishable, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed, nor shall it be necessary, insofar as the offences referred to in Articles 5 to 10 and 12 are concerned, to establish a link to another specific offence laid down in this Directive.

Article 16 Aiding or abetting, inciting and attempting
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that aiding or abetting an offence referred to in Articles 3 to 8, 11 and 12 is made punishable.
2.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting an offence referred to in Articles 3 to 12 is made punishable.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to commit an offence referred to in Articles 3, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12, with the exception of possession as provided for in point (f) of Article 3(2) and the offence referred to in point (j) of Article 3(2), is made punishable.


Article 17 Penalties for natural persons
1.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to Articles 3 to 12 and 16 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail surrender or extradition.
2.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist offences referred to in Article 3 and offences referred to in Article 16, inasmuch as they relate to terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those imposable under national law for such offences in the absence of the special intent required pursuant to Article 3, save where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under national law.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences listed in Article 4 are punishable by custodial sentences, with a maximum sentence of not less than fifteen years for the offence referred to in point (a) of Article 4, and for the offences listed in point (b) of Article 4 a maximum sentence of not less than eight years. Where the terrorist offence referred to in point (j) of Article 3(2) is committed by a person directing a terrorist group as referred to in point (a) of Article 4, the maximum sentence shall not be less than eight years.

Article 18 Mitigating circumstances
Each Member State may take the necessary measures to ensure that the penalties referred to in Article 17 may be reduced if the offender:
a) renounces terrorist activity, and
b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information which they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to:
1. prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
2. identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
3. find evidence; or
4. prevent further offences referred to in Articles 3 to
12 and 16.

Article 19 Liability of legal persons
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, and having a leading position within the legal person, based on one of the following:
a) a power of representation of the legal person;
b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person;
c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. Member States shall also take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 for the benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.
3. Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, inciters or accessories in any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16.

Article 20 Penalties for legal persons
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 19 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other penalties, such as:

    a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
    b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities;
    c) placing under judicial supervision;
    d) a judicial winding-up order;
    e) temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for committing the offence.

    Article 21 Jurisdiction and prosecution
    1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 where:
    a) the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory;
    b) the offence is committed on board of a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft registered there;
    c) the offender is one of its nationals or residents;
    d) (deleted)
    e) the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in its territory;
    f) the offence is committed against the institutions or people of the Member State in question or against an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union and based in that Member State.
    Each Member State may extend its jurisdiction if the offence is committed in the territory of a Member State.
    1a.Each Member State may extend its jurisdiction over training for terrorism, as referred to in Article 7, where the offender provides training to its nationals or residents, in cases where paragraph 1 is not applicable. The Member State shall inform the Commission thereof.
    2. When an offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State and when any of the States concerned can validly prosecute on the basis of the same facts, the Member States concerned shall cooperate in order to decide which of them will prosecute the offenders with the aim, if possible, of centralising proceedings in a single Member State. To this end, the Member States may have recourse to Eurojust in order to facilitate cooperation between their judicial authorities and the coordination of their action.
    (…) Account shall be taken of the following factors:
    a) the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the acts were committed,
    b) the Member State shall be that of which the perpetrator is a national or resident,
    c) the Member State shall be the Member State of origin of the victims,
    d) the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the perpetrator was found.
    3.Each Member State shall take the necessary measures also to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 16 in cases where it refuses to hand over or extradite a person suspected or convicted of such an offence to another Member State or to a third country.
    4.Each Member State shall ensure that its jurisdiction covers cases in which any of the offences referred to in Articles 4 and 16 has been committed in whole or in part within its territory, wherever the terrorist group is based or pursues its criminal activities.
    5.This Article shall not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters as laid down by a Member State in accordance with its national legislation.

    Article 21a Investigative tools
    Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools, such as those which are used in organised crime or other serious crime cases, are available to persons, units or services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12.

    Article 21bis  Fundamental principles relating to freedom of press and other media
    Member States may establish conditions required by and in line with fundamental principles relating to freedom of the press and other media, governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where these rules relate to the determination or limitation of liability.

    TITLE V: Provisions on protection, support and rights of victims of terrorism

    Article 22 (…) Assistance and support to victims of terrorism
    1. Member States shall ensure that investigations into, or prosecution of, offences covered by this Directive are not dependent on a report or accusation made by a victim of terrorism or other person subjected to the offence, at least if the acts were committed on the territory of the Member State.
    2.Member States shall ensure that (…) support services addressing the specific needs of victims of terrorism are in place in accordance with Directive 2012/29/EU and that they are available for victims of terrorism immediately after a terrorist attack and as long as necessary thereafter. Such services shall be provided in addition to, or as an integrated part of general victim support services, which may call on existing entities providing specialist support.
    3. The support services shall have the ability to provide assistance and support to victims of terrorism in accordance with their specific needs (…). The services shall be confidential, free of charge and easily accessible to all victims of terrorism. They shall include in particular:
    a) emotional and psychological support, such as trauma support and counselling;
    b) provision of advice and information on any relevant legal, practical or financial matter
    4.This Directive shall apply in addition to and without prejudice to measures laid down in Directive 2012/29/EU.


    Article 22a Protection of victims of terrorism
    Member States shall ensure that measures are available to protect victims of terrorism and their family members, in accordance with Directive 2012/29/EU. When determining whether and to what extent they should benefit from (…) protection measures in the course of criminal proceedings, particular attention shall be paid to the risk of intimidation and retaliation and to the need to protect the dignity and physical integrity of victims of terrorism, including during questioning and when testifying.

    Article 23 Rights of victims of terrorism resident in another Member State
    1. Member States shall ensure (…) that victims of terrorism who are residents of a Member State other than that (…) where the terrorist offence was committed have access to information regarding their (…) rights, the available support services and (…) compensation schemes in the Member State where the terrorist offence was committed. In this respect, Member States concerned shall take appropriate action to facilitate cooperation between their competent authorities or entities providing specialist support to ensure the effective access of victims to such information.
    2. Member States shall ensure that all victims of terrorism have access to the assistance and (…) support services as laid down in Article 22 on the territory of the Member State of their residence, even if the terrorist offence was committed in another Member State.

    Title VI: Final provisions

    Article 24 Replacement of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism
    Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA is replaced with regard to the Member States bound by this Directive, without prejudice to the obligations of those Member States with regard to the date for transposition of that Framework Decision into national law.
    With regards to the Member States bound by this Directive, references to Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA shall be construed as references to this Directive.

    Article 25 Transposition
    1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [24 months after adoption]. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
    When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
    2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.

    Article 26 Reporting
    1.The Commission shall, by [24 months after the deadline for implementation of this Directive], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures to comply with this Directive.
    2.The Commission shall, by [48 months after the deadline for implementation of this Directive], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the impact and added value of this Directive on combating terrorism. The Commission shall take into account the information provided by Member States under Decision 2005/671/JHA.

    Article 27 Entry into force
    This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Article 28 Addressees
    This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.

    Done at Brussels,
    For the European Parliament                                         
    For the Council

    NOTES

    [1]  Changes compared to the Commission proposal are marked in bold.
    [2]  CZ and SE have parliamentary scrutiny reservations
    [3]  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3).
    [4] Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89).
    [5] Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).
    [6] Council decision 2005/671/JHA on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences (OJ L 253, 29.9.2005, p. 22).
    [7] Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 1).
    [8] Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).
    [9] Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (OJ L 162, 20.6.2002, p. 1).
    [10] Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001(OJ L 315, 14.11.2012 p. 57).
    [11] As amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, p. 21).

THE ODYSSEUS NETWORK : SEARCHING FOR SOLIDARITY ​IN EU ASYLUM AND BORDER POLICIES

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE 
A Collection of Short Papers: Searching for Solidarity in EU Asylum and Border Policies

We are pleased to publish a collection of short papers written by conference speakers, based on a number of presentations given at the conference.

READ THE PUBLICATION
Table of contents :
  • Failure by Design? On the Constitution of EU Solidarity, ​​Gregor Noll​​
  • Intra-EU solidarity and the implementation of the EU asylum policy: a refugee or governance ‘crisis’? Lilian Tsourdi
  • Practical Cooperation and the First Years of the EASO, Madeline Garlick
  • Solidarity as a sovereignty-reducing penalty for failing to meet responsibility in the European Border and Coast Guard, Philippe De Bruycker
  • Control and Closure of Internal Borders in the Schengen Area, Nuno Piçarra
  • Hotspots: the case of Greece, Aikaterini Drakopoulou
Visit the Odysseus website in the coming days for material from the conference, including Powerpoint presentations, photos, podcasts and more…


​

Why the (US) Judicial Redress Act is worthless

PUBLISHED ON THE IDENTITY PROJECT

Yesterday President Obama signed the Judicial Redress Act into law. European Union Commissioner for Justice Věra Jourová described the new law as, “a historic achievement [that] will ensure that all EU citizens have the right to enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts…. The entry into force of the Judicial Redress Act will pave the way for the signature of the EU-U.S. Data Protection Umbrella Agreement.”

Is the Judicial Redress Act really so historic? And will it actually “ensure that all EU citizens have the right to enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts”?

Sadly, no.

Europeans should not be by statements such as those from Commissioner Jourová or his counterparts in other EU institutions. As we know from our own experience in court as US citizens, there are almost no real-world cases in which the Judicial Redress Act will provide any actual protection or enforceable legal rights to citizens or residents of the EU, or anywhere else.

The Judicial Redress Act gives some foreign citizens some of the rights that US citizens currently have, with respect to some of the uses and misuses by the US government of their personal information. But in no case will any foreigner have more rights under the Judicial Redress Act than US citizens have under the Privacy Act.

Serious scrutiny of the terms of the Privacy Act, and of the history of attempts by US citizens to use the Privacy Act to protect themselves against misuse of our personal information by the US government, has been largely absent from the debate about the Judicial Redress Act. But from our experience as parties to one of the key lawsuits attempting to assert Privacy Act claims by US citizens in relation to one of the most controversial categories of personal information being transferred from the EU to the US — passenger name records (PNRs) for international airline flights — we have learned an important lesson that Europeans need to know: the Privacy Act is so limited and riddled with exceptions that it is almost worthless. It is because the Privacy Act is useless, not because the US government follows fair personal information practices in its dragnet surveillance, that there are so few examples of successful litigation against the US government by US citizens under the Privacy Act.

All of the limitations and exceptions that always rendered the “protection” of the Privacy Act inadequate — even for US citizens — will continue to render the protection of the Judicial Redress Act inadequate for foreigners, in all of the same ways, and in additional ones.

What are these exceptions and limitations? In order to make sense out of the Judicial Redress Act, it’s essential to understand the exemptions in the Privacy Act, as courts have interpreted them.

Federal agencies can exempt themselves from almost all of the requirements of the Privacy Act with respect to “investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes,” a catch-all category that has been applied to records of dragnet surveillance and other information compiled and used for “pre-crime” profiling, even when the data subjects have never been accused or suspected of any crime. All an agency has to do to opt-out is to publish a notice in the Federal Register that a particular system of records has been declared exempt by the agency that maintains the records. An agency can wait to promulgate such a notice until after it receives a request for access to records, a request for an accounting of disclosures, or a request for correction of records.

What does this mean in practice, when the courts have been asked to apply the Privacy Act to sensitive PNR data pertaining to a US citizen? As we noted in 2012 at the conclusion of our Privacy Act litigation against the US government for the government’s copies of PNR data contained in the CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS):

Under the interpretation of the Privacy Act adopted by Judge Seeborg’s ruling in our case, additional Privacy Act exemptions could be promulgated at any time in the future, and applied even to requests that had already been made. Nobody can rely on any “rights” under the Privacy Act that could be retroactively revoked at any time. In addition, the new notices fail to give any additional detail about the data-mining or search-and-retrieval capabilities of the software (which Judge Seeborg ruled that CBP does not have to disclose, notwithstanding the specific requirement of the Privacy Act law that a SORN include the “practices of the agency regarding … retrievability” of records) or the algorithms used for processing data and making “targeting” decisions… (The use of secret algorithms makes it impossible for airlines or other travel companies subject to European Union jurisdiction, but which provide PNR or other data to CBP for ATS, to fulfill their duty under EU law to inform data subjects how their data is processed — a point we’ve made in complaints against airlines to European data protection authorities.)…

Individuals and governments abroad should also take due note of the US government’s claims in this case, and judge their collaboration with ATS accordingly. Individuals — even US citizens — have no right under US law to see what ATS records are being kept about them, and no right to know how or according to what algorithms data about themselves is mined, processed, or otherwise used. No records are kept of requests for access to records, and no logs are kept of who retrieves records.

The rules published by the DHS to exempt records in the Automated Targeting System (including copies of airline PNR data, “targeting rule sets”, and “risk assessment analyses”) from the requirements of the Privacy Act are typical of the exemptions that have been promulgated for numerous other systems of Federal records about individuals:

The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to the limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (e)(5), and (8); (f); and (g) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2)…. These exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled or is created from information contained in other systems of records.

To understand what this means, one has to read the clauses of the Privacy Act referred to in the exemption rules. The contents of ATS, including PNR data, have been exempted by the DHS from each of the following requirements of the Privacy Act:

The right of a data subject to access records about herself.
The right of a data subject to receive, on request, an accounting of disclosures of her personal data to other agencies or third parties.
The prohibition on maintaining records about individuals that are not relevant and necessary to accomplish a legal purpose of the agency.
The requirement to maintain records which are used in making determinations about individuals “with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual.”
The requirement to collect personal information “to the greatest extent practicable” directly from the data subject rather than from third parties.
The requirement to notify data subjects of what information about them is being collected, and from whom it is being collected.
The right of a data subject to to dispute, amend, or correct records about herself.
The right of a data subject to add a notice of disputed data in records about herself, and to have that notice included whenever the disputed potion of the record is disclosed to a third party.
It’s not just the DHS that has opted out of the Privacy Act, as Federal courts have upheld that the law allows it to do. The NSA has similarly exempted its dragnet surveillance records from the Privacy Act, as other experts have noted:

The problem is that Europeans are likely to notice that the Privacy Act provides no meaningful redress to targets of NSA surveillance. Agencies can exempt themselves from the Privacy Act’s access and redress provisions on grounds of national security. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k). The NSA has taken full advantage of this section. 32 C.F.R. § 322.7(a).

Once an agency has published a notice exempting a system of records from these requirements of the Privacy Act, it is completely legal (or at least, it is not a violation of the Privacy Act for which a US citizen or anyone else can sue the agency) for the agency to fill that database with secret information about individuals, collected from undisclosed third parties, that it knows is likely to be inaccurate, outdated, incomplete, and irrelevant to any lawful purpose. The agency can withhold all of this information from the data subject, and secretly disclose any or all of it to any other government agency or third party anywhere in the world. Any disclosure of exempt records that an agency chooses to make is “discretionary” and not subject to judicial review.

But wait, there’s more! For the reasons discussed above, the Privacy Act gives US citizens inadequate legal protection. But even with the Judicial Redress Act, Europeans and other foreigners will continue to have even less protection and fewer rights than US citizens. The Judicial Redress Act gives foreign citizens (even citizens of the most preferred foreign nations) fewer rights than US citizens, in important ways that most Europeans probably are not aware of.

First, even with respect to records that have not been exempted from the Privacy Act, the Judicial Redress Act gives foreign citizens the right to sue to enforce only some, but not all, of the rights that US citizens can sue to enforce under the Privacy Act. Specifically, foreign citizens can bring lawsuits in US courts only for violations of “section 552a(g)(1)(D) of title 5, United States Code” or “subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 552a(g)(1) of title 5, United States Code” but not under any of the other provisions of the Privacy Act. These sections cover refusal by a Federal agency to comply with a subject access request or request for amendment of a record, but notably exclude lawsuits by foreigners for violations of subparagraph (C), which allows a US citizen to sue an agency that “fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relation to … the individual that may be made on the basis of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is adverse to the individual.”

The very deliberate exclusion of this subparagraph (C) of this section of the Privacy Act from the causes of action allowed by the Judicial Redress Act, while including subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D), appears to have been deliberately crafted to preclude challenges by foreigners to the use of unreliable and irrelevant third-party data in “garbage in, garbage out” pre-crime profiling , risk assessments, and similar algorithmic processing and scoring systems.

Second, records are “covered” by the Judicial Redress Act only if they have been transferred:

(A) by a public authority of, or private entity within, a … covered country; and

(B) to a designated Federal agency or component for purposes of preventing, investigating, detecting, or prosecuting criminal offenses.

It might not be obvious at first glance, but this excludes two key categories of records: records maintained for purposes other than enforcement of criminal laws, and records transferred from the EU to the US government by way of commercial intermediaries in the US (or in third countries that are not covered by the Judicial Redress Act).

Records maintained by the US government for the enforcement of civil laws — such as the civil penalties for violations of aviation “security” orders — are thus exempt from the Judicial Redress Act, as are all records maintained for other purposes, or for no defined or particularized purpose at all. Records maintained for criminal law enforcement purposes can be (and almost always have been) exempted from the Privacy Act, and records for all other purposes are exempt from the Judicial Redress Act. The result, undoubtedly intentional, is that hardly any records that will fall through the cracks between the exemptions in these two laws, and provide a basis for a lawsuit by a foreign citizen. The Judicial Redress Act is a carefully constructed paper tiger.

Even if either or both the Privacy Act and/or the Judicial Redress Act were amended to remove some or all of these exemptions (which is highly unlikely, to say the least), the limitation of the Judicial Redress Act to records transferred directly from an entity in the EU to the US government would leave a huge loophole, of exactly the sort the US has exploited in the past to intercept information about financial transfers between European banks from servers of SWIFT in the US, information about electronic communications between other countries from intermediaries in the US through which messages were routed, and information about PNR data collected and stored by European airlines, travel agents, and tour operators stored with computerized reservation systems in the US.

As we have pointed out in our previous testimony to the European Parliament, most transfers of PNR data from the EU to the US government are indirect, and occur by way of CRSs/GDSs and/or other commercial intermediaries in the US. These indirect but routine transfers already evade the EU-US “agreement” on direct PNR transfers, and now also evade the Judicial Redress Act, due to its limitation to direct transfers from the EU to the US government.

The Privacy Act provides inadequate data protection for US citizens, and the Judicial Redress Act would provide even more inadequate protection for non-US citizens. Neither of these laws provides any basis for a finding that anyone’s rights are adequately protected in the US, for approval of the proposed Safe Harbor 1.1 Privacy Shield, or for approval of the proposed EU-US “umbrella agreement” on data transfers.

This entry was posted on Thursday, February 25th, 2016 at 9:46 am and is filed under Secret Law, Surveillance State. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

STRASBOURG : The CIA’s abduction and extrajudicial transfer to Egypt of the imam Abu Omar infringed the applicants’ rights under the Convention

 

The judgment which has just been issued, resulting from the unanimous convergence of the Chamber’s seven judges, declares that the Italian state has violated art. 3 of the ECHR, not just by cooperating in Abu Omar’s kidnapping and his rendition to the Egyptian authorities, which exposed him to subsequent tortures; but also, and most importantly, insofar as it prevented the investigations undertaken by the Milan prosecutors’ office and the trial which were subsequently celebrated from ending naturally into the punishment of the defendants who were deemed responsible.

The reasons for the most important violation among those ascertained in Strasbourg (and it is a very long list) lie in the government’s, Constitutional Court’s and the former President of the Republic behaviour. These institutions have been respectively held responsible for the following reasons:

– insofar as the government is concerned, for its decision to apply state secrecy in the criminal trials to information that was already widely known to the public, evidently for the only purpose of preventing several defendants from being punished (see points 268 and 272 of the sentence), as well as for its later decision not to request -except for a single case- the extradition of the convicted US nationals;

– insofar as the Constitutional Court is concerned, for establishing through the judgments rendered in this case the prevalence of the state secrecy over the public interests pursued by the criminal justice system and, more generally, over the protection of the victims’ fundamental rights;

– insofar as the President of the Republic is concerned, for his decision to grant pardon to three convicts, including the one who had received the heaviest sentence because of his key role in the operation.

Worth to be mentioned here are the passages where the Court “pays homage to the national judges, who have done everything they could to try to establish the truth” (para. 265), and where it stresses the “great quality of the Italian investigators’ and judges’ work” (para. 269). All this has, unfortunately, not prevented the entire matter from ending in the impunity, in pratice, of all those found to be responsible, in contrast to the procedural obligations arising from the Convention.

This is a new unfortunate chapter for Italy in Strasbourg, in spite of the important recognition -as it had already happened in the Cestaro judgment, concerning the case of the Diaz school [at the Genoa G8 in 2001]- of the quality of the work done by our Judiciary for the defence of everybody’s fundamental rights, innocent parties and culprits alike.

Francesco VIGANO’

 

 

NOTA BENE : THIS IS A EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RELEASE (emphasis are added) EDC

In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case of Nasr and Ghali v. Italy (application no. 44883/09) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:

– with regard to Mr Nasr:

  • a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
  • a violation of Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention,
  • a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and
  • a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) read in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8

– with regard to Ms Ghali:

  • a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment),
  • a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and
  • a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8

The case concerned an instance of extrajudicial transfer (or “extraordinary rendition”), namely the abduction by CIA agents, with the cooperation of Italian officials, of the Egyptian imam Abu Omar, who had been granted political asylum in Italy, and his subsequent transfer to Egypt, where he was held in secret for several months.

Having regard to all the evidence in the case, the Court found it established that the Italian authorities were aware that the applicant had been a victim of an extraordinary rendition operation which had begun with his abduction in Italy and had continued with his transfer abroad.

The Court had already held in previous cases (El-Masri v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], ECHR 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014) that the treatment of “high-value detainees” for the purposes of the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” programme was to be classified as torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

In the present case the Court held that the legitimate principle of “State secrecy” had clearly been applied by the Italian executive in order to ensure that those responsible did not have to answer for their actions. The investigation and trial had not led to the punishment of those responsible, who had therefore ultimately been granted impunity.

Principal facts

The first applicant is Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, who was born in 1963. The second applicant is Nabila Ghali, who was born in 1968. Both are Egyptian nationals. Mr Nasr, member of the group Jama’a al-Islamiya – an Islamist movement regarded by the Egyptian government as a terrorist organisation – had lived in Italy since 1998. He became an imam and settled in Milan in July 2000. He was granted political asylum in February 2001 and married Ms Ghali in October of that year.

Mr Nasr was suspected, among other offences, of conspiracy to commit international terrorist acts, and his links to fundamentalist networks were investigated by the Milan public prosecutor’s office. The investigations concluded in June 2005 when the investigating judge made an order for Mr Nasr’s pre-trial detention. On 6 December 2013 the Milan District Court convicted Mr Nasr of membership of a terrorist organisation.

On 17 February 2003, while he was walking down a street in Milan, Mr Nasr was abducted and taken to the Aviano air base operated by USAFE (United States Air Forces in Europe), where he was put on a plane bound for the Ramstein US air base in Germany. From there he was flown in a military aircraft to Cairo. On his arrival he was interrogated by the Egyptian intelligence services about his activities in Italy, his family and his trips abroad. Mr Nasr was detained in secret until 19 April 2004 in cramped and unhygienic cells. He was taken out of his cell at regular intervals and subjected to interrogation sessions during which he was ill-treated and tortured.

On 19 April 2004 Mr Nasr was released. He maintained that he had been released because he had given statements in accordance with the instructions he had received and on condition that he did not leave Alexandria and remained silent about his experiences in prison. In spite of this condition, Mr Nasr telephoned his wife to let her know that he was safe. He also submitted a statement to the Milan public prosecutor’s office in which he described his abduction and torture. Approximately 20 days after his release, Mr Nasr was rearrested and detained. He was released on 12 February 2007 without charge but was prohibited from leaving Egypt.

On 20 February 2003 Ms Ghali had reported her husband’s disappearance to the police. The Milan public prosecutor’s office immediately started an investigation into abduction by a person or persons unknown. The Milan police department dealing with special operations and terrorism (the “Digos”) was put in charge of the investigation. In February 2005 it submitted a report on the investigation to the public prosecutor’s office. All the information obtained in the investigation confirmed Mr Nasr’s version of events with regard to his abduction and his transfer to the Aviano US air base and subsequently to Cairo. It also established that 19 US nationals had been involved in the events, including members of the United States diplomatic and consular corps in Italy. The investigators also found that the CIA chief in Milan at the time, Robert Seldon Lady, had played a key role in the events.

On 23 March 2005 the public prosecutor requested the pre-trial detention of 19 US nationals, including Mr Lady, who were suspected of involvement in planning and carrying out the abduction. The Milan investigating judge ordered the pre-trial detention of a further three US nationals. All 22 were declared “fugitives”. In November and December 2005 the prosecutor in charge of the investigation requested the principal public prosecutor to ask the Ministry of Justice to seek the extradition of the accused on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the United States and to request Interpol to initiate an international search for them. On 12 April 2006 the Minister of Justice informed the prosecuting authorities that he had decided not to seek the extradition of the 22 accused US nationals or to have an international wanted notice issued concerning them.

The second phase of the investigation related to the involvement of Italian nationals, including State agents. During the investigation it transpired that two senior officials of the SISMi (the Italian military intelligence agency) had been aware of the CIA’s plan to abduct Mr Nasr and of possible SISMi involvement. A journalist, Mr Farina, was also implicated, having allegedly attempted to lay false trails for the investigators at the request of SISMi agents.

In July 2006 the Prime Minister stated that the information and documents requested by the public prosecutor’s office were covered by State secrecy and that the conditions for lifting that secrecy were not met. In a judgment of 18 March 2009 the Constitutional Court held that the interests protected by State secrecy took precedence over any other interests guaranteed by the Constitution, and pointed out that the executive was invested with discretionary powers to assess the need for secrecy in order to protect those interests. The Constitutional Court specified that these powers were exempt from review, including by the Constitutional Court, and emphasised that it was not its task to examine the reasons for having recourse to State secrecy. Numerous items of evidence in the ongoing proceedings were therefore declared confidential and unusable.

On 4 November 2009 the Milan District Court delivered a judgment in which it found that Mr Nasr’s abduction had been planned and carried out by CIA operatives on the basis of a decision taken at political level; that the abduction had been carried out without the knowledge of the Italian authorities also engaged in investigating Mr Nasr at that time; and that the fact that authorisation had been given by very senior CIA officials suggested that the operation had been staged with the knowledge or even the tacit consent of the Italian authorities, although it had not been possible to further investigate the evidence existing in that regard for reasons of State secrecy.

Lastly, 22 CIA operatives and high-ranking officials, and one US army officer, were convicted in absentia of Mr Nasr’s abduction and were given prison sentences of between six and nine years. Two members of the SISMi were found guilty of obstructing the investigation and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The convictions of the former head of the SISMi and his deputy, and those of the three former SISMi members, were quashed by the Court of Cassation on grounds of State secrecy. The US nationals were also ordered to pay damages to the applicants in an amount to be determined in civil proceedings. The District Court provisionally awarded one million euros (EUR) to Mr Nasr and EUR 500,000 to Ms Ghali. The applicants have received no compensation to date, nor have the Italian authorities sought the extradition of the convicted US nationals.

Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court

Relying on Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention, Mr Nasr complained of his abduction, in which the Italian authorities had been involved, of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected during his transfer and detention, of the fact that those responsible had been granted impunity owing to the application of State secrecy, and of the fact that the sentences imposed on the convicted US nationals had not been enforced because of the refusal of the Italian authorities to request their extradition. Lastly, both applicants alleged, among other violations, a breach of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) in that Mr Nasr’s abduction and detention had resulted in their forced separation for over five years.

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 6 August 2009.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:

  • George Nicolaou (Cyprus), President,
  • Guido Raimondi (Italy),
  • Päivi Hirvelä (Finland),
  • Ledi Bianku (Albania),
  • Nona Tsotsoria (Georgia),
  • Paul Mahoney (the United Kingdom),
  • Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Poland),
  • and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar.

 

Decision of the Court

Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment)

Regarding the investigation and trial

The Court began by observing that the domestic courts had conducted a detailed investigation that had enabled them to reconstruct the events. The evidence that had ultimately been disregarded by the courts on the ground that the Constitutional Court had found it to be covered by State secrecy had been sufficient to convict the accused. The Court went on to note that the information implicating the SISMi agents had been widely circulated in the press and on the Internet; it therefore found it difficult to imagine how invoking State secrecy had been apt to preserve the confidentiality of the events once the information in question had been disclosed. In the Court’s view, the executive’s decision to apply State secrecy to information that was already widely known to the public had resulted in the SISMi agents avoiding conviction.

As to the convicted US agents, the Court noted that the Government had acknowledged never having sought their extradition. According to the Government, they had issued European arrest warrants and a single international arrest warrant against Mr Lady, which had yielded no results. Furthermore, the President of the Republic had pardoned three of the convicted persons, including Mr Lady, who had received a heavier sentence because of the extent of his responsibility in the extraordinary rendition operation.

The Court noted that in spite of the efforts of the Italian investigators and judges, which had identified the persons responsible and secured their convictions, the latter had remained ineffective owing to the attitude of the executive. The legitimate principle of “State secrecy” had clearly been applied in order to ensure that those responsible did not have to answer for their actions. Accordingly, the investigation and trial had not led to the punishment of those responsible, who had ultimately been granted impunity.

The Court therefore took the view that the domestic investigation had not satisfied the requirements of the Convention. Accordingly, there had been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.

Regarding the inhuman and degrading treatment

It was beyond doubt that Mr Nasr’s abduction had entailed the use of techniques that must have caused him emotional and psychological distress. His ensuing detention, including his transfer by plane to an unknown destination, had undoubtedly placed Mr Nasr in a situation of complete vulnerability, and he had undeniably lived in a permanent state of anxiety owing to his uncertainty about his fate. In fact, in his statement to the Milan public prosecutor Mr Nasr had given details of the circumstances surrounding his abduction and his detention in Egypt and the treatment to which he had been subjected, and in particular the violent interrogation sessions. The Court had previously held that similar treatment of “high-value detainees” for the purposes of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme was to be classified as torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention2.

In view of the fact that the Italian authorities had been aware of the extraordinary rendition operation carried out in the context of the CIA’s high-value detainee programme, and had actively cooperated with the CIA during the initial phase of the operation – Mr Nasr’s abduction and his transfer abroad – the Court considered that those authorities had known or should have known that this would place him at a real risk of ill-treatment. In those circumstances, the likelihood of a violation of Article 3 had been particularly high and should have been considered as inherent in the Mr Nasr’s transfer. Accordingly, by allowing the CIA to transfer Mr Nasr outside the country, the Italian authorities had exposed him to a serious and foreseeable risk of ill-treatment and of conditions of detention contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

Under Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention the Italian authorities had had a duty to take the appropriate measures to ensure that the persons within their jurisdiction were not subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This had not been the case, and the respondent State had to be considered directly responsible for the violation of the first applicant’s rights under this head, as its agents had failed to take the measures that would have been necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent this situation from occurring. The State’s responsibility in this regard was all the greater since Mr Nasr had been granted refugee status in Italy.

In the Court’s view, by allowing the US authorities to abduct the first applicant, the Italian authorities had knowingly exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. There had therefore been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.

Regarding the violation of Article 3 in the case of Ms Ghali

As acknowledged by the Italian courts, Ms Ghali had suffered significant non-pecuniary damage as a result of her husband’s disappearance, especially on account of the sudden interruption of their married life and the damage to her psychological well-being and that of her husband. The unjustified conduct of the Italian authorities and the suffering caused to Ms Ghali as a result had been regarded by the Italian courts as sufficiently serious to warrant an award of 500,000 euros in damages.

Furthermore, the uncertainty, doubt and apprehension felt by Ms Ghali over a lengthy and continuous period had caused her severe mental suffering and distress. Like Mr Nasr’s disappearance, the prolonged period during which Ms Ghali had been left without any news of her husband was attributable to the domestic authorities. In the Court’s view, Ms Ghali had been subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3. With regard to the investigation and trial, as the Court had already found that these had not led to the punishment of those responsible, there had also been a violation of Article 3 in Ms Ghali’s case.

Article 5 (right to liberty and security)

The unlawful nature of Mr Nasr’s detention had been established by the domestic courts, which found that he had been subjected from the outset to unacknowledged detention in complete disregard of the guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention; this constituted a particularly serious violation of his right to liberty and security. The detention of terrorist suspects under the programme of renditions set up by the US authorities had already been found in similar cases to be arbitrary3.

The Court had already found under Article 3 that Italy had been aware of Mr Nasr’s transfer outside the country in the context of an extraordinary rendition and that the Italian authorities, by allowing the CIA to abduct Mr Nasr in order to transfer him to Egypt, had knowingly exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The Court maintained those findings and considered them to be applicable in the context of Article 5. It concluded that Italy’s responsibility was engaged with regard both to Mr Nasr’s abduction and to the entire period of detention following his handover to the US authorities. There had therefore been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention in that regard.

Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)

In view of its findings concerning the responsibility of the respondent State under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, the Court took the view that the State’s actions and omissions also engaged its responsibility under Article 8 of the Convention. In the light of the facts as established, the Court considered that the interference with the first applicant’s exercise of his right to respect for his private and family life had not been “in accordance with the law”. There had therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

The Court was of the view that Mr Nasr’s disappearance, which was attributable to the Italian authorities, also amounted to interference with Ms Ghali’s private and family life. As that interference had not been in accordance with the law, there had also been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention with regard to Ms Ghali.

Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) read in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8

The Court had established that the investigation carried out by the national authorities – the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts – had been deprived of its effectiveness by the executive’s decision to invoke State secrecy. The Court had demonstrated that the State’s responsibility was engaged on account of the violations of the applicants’ rights under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention.

In the Court’s view, the applicants should have been able to avail themselves of practical and effective remedies capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, to the establishment of the truth and to an award of compensation. In view of the circumstances already examined, the Court could not consider that the criminal proceedings had been effective within the meaning of Article 13 with regard to the complaints under Articles 3, 5 and 8.

As the Government themselves acknowledged, it had not been possible to use the evidence covered by State secrecy; likewise, a request for the extradition of the convicted US agents had proved futile. As to the civil consequences, the Court considered that, in view of the circumstances, any possibility for the applicants to obtain damages had been virtually ruled out.

There had therefore been a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8 in Mr Nasr’s case and a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 in the case of Ms Ghali.

Article 6 (right to a fair trial)

The Court considered that this complaint covered the same ground as the applicants’ complaint under the procedural limb of Article 3, in so far as it related only to one specific aspect of proceedings which the Court had already found not to satisfy the criterion of effectiveness for Convention purposes. The Court therefore deemed it unnecessary to examine this complaint separately under Article 6.

Article 41 (just satisfaction)

The Court held that Italy was to pay 70,000 euros (EUR) to Mr Nasr and EUR 15,000 to Ms Ghali in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 to the applicants jointly in respect of costs and expenses.

NOTES

(1) Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day. Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.

(2) El-Masri v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], ECHR 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014.

(3)  El-Masri v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], ECHR 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014.

The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the dilemma of stricter or broader application of the Charter to national measures

STUDY FOR THE PETITION COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(TO BE DEBATED AT  THE PUBLIC HEARING  “Taking Citizens’ concerns seriously: broadening the scope of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (Article 51)?“( 23 February 2016 – Room ASP A3G-2 – 9H00-12h30.

by  Eleanor  SPAVENTA 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This analysis looks into the applicability of fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) in the European Union legal order. It focuses on the limits imposed to the rights and freedoms declared by the CFR by its Article 51, which states that the Charter only applies to European Union Institutions and bodies and to the  Member States  only when  they  are  implementing  Union  law.

The scope of application of fundamental rights before the adoption of the Charter was progressively established and developed by the European Court of Justice through its evolving jurisprudence. Fundamental rights were declared as general principles of Community law protected by the Court (Stauder), as common constitutional traditions among the Member States (Internationale Handelsgesellshaft) and     enshrined in international treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Nold) and the ECtHR jurisprudence. The scope of application covered the acts of EC/EU institutions, the implementation of EU law by Member States (Wachauf), including when they act within the field of EU law by limiting free movement rights (ERT, Carpenter). This jurisprudence has been particularly courageous in expanding the protection provided to  EU citizens in  relation to  fundamental rights.

The Charter was elaborated and adopted with the aim of codifying the Court jurisprudence and making the EU fundamental rights obligations more visible. At the same time, some Member States did not want the Charter to have effects that could potentially limit their competences by expanding in substance the field of application of EU law beyond EU powers. For this reason, a series of limits to the applicability of the Charter were inserted in the Charter itself, among which Article 51 CFR.

The CJEU jurisprudence shows that the Court has been receptive to this approach, adopting a narrow interpretation of the applicability of the CFR to national measures, on the basis of its  Article 51.

The analysis of the CJ EU case law shows that there is a varied application of EU fundamental rights to measures adopted by Member States: when a stronger interest of the EU is at stake (internal market; EU integration), the CFR is more likely to be applied also to national measures; when the Member State acts on the basis of EU co-ordination measures, the CFR applies (if at all) only in extreme cases; in all other cases, the CFR will most  likely not  apply.

The examination of the petitions tabled by citizens to the EP shows that citizens have high expectations in relation to the CFR and its application to measures adopted by the States allegedly infringing their fundamental rights. Having said that, the application of the CJ EU jurisprudence, as reflected in the Commission opinions on the selection of petitions analysed in this study, does not leave much margin of manoeuvre.

The Committee on Petitions seems to have mostly followed the Commission approach with a number of exceptions, notably on children rights, Greece austerity measures and some more recent petitions. The overall approach taken by the Commission on the petitions at stake seems justifiable to the author of this paper, with the exception of the petitions on the right  to  collective bargaining in  Greece. When looking into the interpretation of the CFR, the author believes that the approach taken   by the CJEU is dangerously restrictive and not warranted by Article 51,   for instance in relation to Union citizenship, the European Arrest Warrant or asylum cases.

The underlying notion that Member States guarantee an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights is fallacious, especially given that there is very little that can be done at EU level to ensure that fundamental rights are guaranteed across the Member States.

A more courageous use of the CFR should be made for national measures falling within the scope of EU law, so to ensure that those instruments cannot be used to undermine fundamental rights guarantees.

Furthermore, EU fundamental rights should never be seen as instrumental to the achieving of the effectiveness and supremacy of EU law; rather they should be seen as a tool without which integration in certain areas might become impossible and/or undesirable. Hence, the Court should not refrain from its duties and clarify that EU rules that are premised on a certain degree of mutual trust amongst Member States as to compliance with fundamental rights at national level might become inapplicable (or invalid) if this alleged common standard of fundamental rights protection does not exist in practice.

This approach would be a powerful incentive for Member States to achieve a satisfactory level of fundamental rights protection and to take fundamental rights obligations more seriously.

It might also encourage the EU institutions to be more vociferous in their critique of fundamental rights failures at national level. And it would also serve the primary objective of protecting individuals from fundamental   rights violations committed by authorities  at  EU   or  national  level.

INTRODUCTION

The PETI committee requested the EP Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs to acquire an expert opinion on Article 51 of the EU CFR, with a particular view to assess the applicability of the CFR to acts of national authorities in relation to petitions received by the Committee. To achieve this aim, this research analyses the way the Court of Justice of the EU has interpreted Article 51 CFR in relation to national rules to then turn to an analysis of the petitions; it concludes by recalling arguments in favour and against a broad application of the Charter; it advocates a more courageous use of the Charter in those situations that are firmly within the scope of Union law, and in particular cases of co-ordination of national rules; and Union citizenship cases. The  report  is structured  as follows.

Section 1, The scope of application of EU fundamental rights before the Charter, provides a brief historical introduction on the situation before the adoption of the Charter. This is important since Article 51 CFR, and the Charter more generally, sought to codify the existing state of the law. This section also briefly recalls the debate surrounding EU fundamental rights and in particular the fear that the application of the latter might have a significant impact on national   sovereignty and regulatory autonomy.

Section 2, Article 51 Charter: its significance and its interpretation by the Court of Justice, examines the way Article 51 CFR has been interpreted in relation to acts of national authorities. It should be recalled that Article 51 CFR applies to Member States only when they implement Union Law. In particular it focuses on three lines of case law: Åkerberg Fransson, where a remote link with EU law was sufficient to trigger the Charter; McB, and N.S., where national acts giving effect to EU co-ordinating rules are subject to a lighter touch review (or no review); and cases in which the Charter did not apply, either for lack of a connection with EU law, or because of a restrictive interpretation of the Union citizenship  provisions.

The report concludes that there is a varied application of the Charter which depends on the area considered (stronger in internal market, weaker in other cases).

Furthermore, the interest in integration is taken into account; and so is the need to ensure the effectiveness and supremacy of Union law. In cases of co-ordination of national rules the presumption of uniform compliance with a minimum standard of fundamental rights protection by all Member States is paramount; and in Treaty cases the Court has retreated from a generous interpretation of fundamental rights, leaving the Union citizen (especially, but not only, if non  economically active)  particularly  vulnerable.

Section 3, The petitions to the EP and the Commission’s position, analyses a selection of petitions received by the PETI Committee where petitioners raised concerns in relation to alleged violations of the CFR, to assess the extent to which the Charter would have been applicable in the cases at issue. It divides the petitions in three categories: those where there is no discernible link with Union law; those where there might have been a potential link;  and  those  which  raise issues  in  relation  to the foundational   principles  of  the   EU.

Section 4, The dilemma of a broad or strict application of the Charter, highlights the policy and legal reasons in favour and against a broad interpretation of the Charter. It concludes advocating  a  more   consistent,  and   courageous,  use  of  the  Charter   in  cases  of  coordination  of  national   rules (Asylum,  EAW)   and  in  citizenship  cases  also   as  a  means   to   raise the  level   of protection  of fundamental  rights in  the territory  of  the  EU.

Continue reading “The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the dilemma of stricter or broader application of the Charter to national measures”

Brexit : un arrangement, vraiment ? un départ, enfin ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE (21 FÉVRIER 2016)

 par Henri Labayle, CDRE

 

Le Conseil européen des 18 et 19 février s’est achevé à 23 heures 59, par la publication des conclusions auxquelles les dirigeants de l’Union étaient parvenus, accompagnées des commentaires du Président du Conseil européen.

Cousue de fil blanc, la négociation présentée comme celle de la « dernière chance », pour la 18eme fois selon un comptage journalistique, ne pouvait qu’aboutir à un accord. Sous peine de signifier l’échec du Premier ministre britannique et donc son obligation de sonner le retrait de son pays de l’Union européenne avant un référendum fixé au 23 juin.

Quitte à manger un cornet de frites devant le Conseil en attendant que l’heure tourne, comme la presse le rapporte à propos de la Chancelière allemande, ou à occuper son temps libre avec une émission radio pour le président français, il fallut donc simuler la tension, la sueur, le sang et les larmes. L’objectif de la mise en scène était connu : permettre au demandeur britannique de persuader son opinion publique qu’il avait arraché un « statut spécial » pour le Royaume Uni, garantissant à son pays le « meilleur des deux mondes » et justifiant son maintien. De même qu’il fallut multiplier les félicitations de ses pairs à David Cameron pour sa « combativité » et un « bon accord », à pur usage externe évidemment.

L’achèvement de ce simulacre peu glorieux permet de réfléchir au fond des choses, à l’instant où près d’un million de réfugiés soumettent l’Union à une pression sans pareille, sans bénéficier d’une attention aussi soutenue.

L’ampleur des compromis passés par le Conseil européen fournit-elle vraiment une réponse à la menace d’un Brexit ou bien n’y a-t-il là qu’apparence et jeux de rôle ? Au vu de leur forme et de la somme des démissions collectives que ces petits arrangements entre amis révèlent, ne faut-il pas aujourd’hui souhaiter que l’abcès soit percé, enfin ?

I – Les limites d’un compromis

David Cameron avait délimité lui-même le champ des concessions à arracher pour appeler à voter « oui » à un référendum qu’il avait, lui-même encore, décidé d’organiser quant au maintien du Royaume Uni dans l‘Union. Enfonçant des portes déjà largement ouvertes par les traités existants, la demande britannique se structurait autour de quatre idées simples et d’inégal intérêt : gouvernance économique de la zone euro, compétitivité, souveraineté, libre circulation et prestations sociales.

La réponse du Conseil s’ordonne en 4 sections correspondant à chacun de ces points, sans dissiper les doutes quant à sa portée juridique exacte et à sa signification politique.

A – Un accord juridiquement contraignant ?

Telle était, évidemment, la condition première pour parvenir à convaincre une opinion publique britannique dubitative. La complexité de la construction imaginée par les services du Conseil et les diplomates contient juste ce qu’il faut d’obscurité et de flou artistique pour rendre délicate une réponse franche.

a) – Le compromis de Bruxelles prend la forme d’un « arrangement», affiché comme étant « compatible avec le traité», qui sera applicable le jour où le Royaume Uni en avisera le secrétaire général du Conseil, après avoir réglé ses débats internes. il disparaîtra en cas contraire. L’arrangement est constitué par un ensemble disparate composé de 7 textes de portée inégale :

a) une décision des chefs d’État ou de gouvernement, réunis au sein du Conseil européen, concernant un nouvel arrangement pour le Royaume-Uni dans l’Union européenne (annexe 1);

b) une déclaration contenant un projet de décision du Conseil sur les dispositions particulières relatives à la bonne gestion de l’union bancaire et des conséquences d’une intégration plus poussée de la zone euro, dont l’adoption interviendra le jour où
la décision visée au point a) prendra effet (annexe 2);

c) une déclaration du Conseil européen sur la compétitivité (annexe 3);

d) une déclaration de la Commission sur un mécanisme de mise en œuvre de la subsidiarité et un mécanisme de mise en œuvre de la réduction des charges (annexe 4);

e) une déclaration de la Commission européenne sur l’indexation des allocations familiales exportées vers un État membre autre que celui où le travailleur réside (annexe 5);

f) une déclaration de la Commission sur le mécanisme de sauvegarde visé au point 2 b) de la section D de la décision des chefs d’État ou de gouvernement (annexe 6);

g) une déclaration de la Commission sur des questions liées à l’utilisation abusive du droit de libre circulation des personnes (annexe 7).

Ce montage complexe appelle évidemment des précisions quant à la valeur juridique de chaque strate, deux déclarations de la Commission ayant été ajoutées au projet initial. La nature des textes en cause commande la réponse sur la portée des engagements pris.

b) – Pour ce qui est de la « décision » figurant en annexe I, on est ici en présence d’un acte « des chefs d’État ou de gouvernement, réunis au sein du Conseil européen», « convenu» de façon intergouvernementale entre Etats membres et qui relève du droit international, en « forme simplifiée ». Les Etats eux mêmes en conviennent expressément, cette décision est « juridiquement contraignante et ne peut être modifiée ou abrogée que d’un commun accord entre les chefs d’État ou de gouvernement des États membres de l’Union européenne ». Elle n’en pose pas moins des questions sérieuses, indépendamment du fait qu’elle ne relève pas du droit de l’Union parce qu’exprimant la seule volonté des Etats membres et non celle du Conseil, qu’elle échappe à la compétence de la Cour de justice pour l’annuler (C-181/91) et que sa forme simplifiée lui permet d’éviter tout débat parlementaire, interne ou européen.

Le procédé, pour être connu, n’en est pas moins détestable lorsqu’il vise à traiter de questions aussi importantes que le prétendu « statut » d’un Etat membre au sein de l’Union. Certes, les précédents danois, en 1992, et irlandais, en 2009, avaient conduit à faire usage de cette technique mais dans un contexte très différent : régler une impasse dans la ratification des traités institutifs à la suite de votes négatifs. Ici, elle intervient à titre purement préventif et pour de strictes raisons de politique intérieure. Il s’agit d’engager l’Union dans une voie pour le moins discutable du point de vue de la conformité aux traités et à la jurisprudence actuelle de la Cour de justice, par commodité nationale.

Preuve est donnée de cette incompatibilité potentielle lorsque l’engagement est pris d’intégrer au moins deux des questions abordées par l’arrangement dans le champ de futures révisions des traités. La gestion de la zone euro verra ainsi la « substance » (???) de la section A être l’objet d’une telle promesse (point 7) ainsi que les limites à la clause de l’intégration politique plus poussée (section C point 1). La décision du 19 février 2016 préempte donc le jeu des procédures classiques de révision de l’article 48 TUE. Avec une chance réelle de succès, qu’il s’agisse de la procédure simplifiée ou de la procédure solennelle de révision ? Rien n’est moins certain lorsque chaque Etat aura soulevé le couvercle de la boite de Pandore, malgré la force de la décision du 19 février …

Les autres composantes de « l’arrangement » sont d’une portée beaucoup plus aléatoire. D’une part car le projet de décision du Conseil relative à la bonne gestion de l’union bancaire et des conséquences d’une intégration plus poussée de la zone euro, s’il est acté, dépend pour son entrée en vigueur d’une décision positive du Royaume Uni quant à sa présence dans l’Union. D’autre part car les autres éléments du compromis sont constitués de simples « déclarations » de la Commission dont la portée sera celle que les acteurs de l’Union voudront qu’elle soit …

L’accord garde en effet le silence sur une modification éventuelle des traités sur ces questions dont certaines sont éminemment sensibles à l’Est de l’Union. Il renvoie au droit dérivé l’accomplissement de ces « déclarations ». Si l’une des déclarations fait dans la nouveauté avec l’instauration d’un mécanisme de mise en œuvre de la subsidiarité, les autres impliquent une intervention normative classique modifiant le droit en vigueur.

Le contenu précis de ces textes ne sera connu qu’à la fin du débat britannique et leur issue dépendra d’un législateur invité à modifier selon la procédure législative ordinaire des dispositions du droit de l’Union aussi fondamentales que symboliques. Nul n’est capable d’en prévoir l’aboutissement. Y compris contentieux si un citoyen de l’Union s’adresse à la Cour en invoquant ses droits fondamentaux, en matière de discrimination par exemple.

Pour ce qui est de l’attitude du législateur, si l’on peut (avec beaucoup de prudence) imaginer que la cohérence des Etats membres guidera le Conseil, rien n’est moins sûr pour un Parlement soigneusement tenu à l’écart et que le verrou de sa majorité allemande ne retiendra peut-être pas de tout faire voler en éclat … après le référendum et c’est après tout cela qui compte…

L’importance des textes visés n’échappe pas puisqu’il s’agit :

  • de modifier la directive 2004/38 sur la libre circulation des citoyens pour en réduire « l’utilisation abusive » ;
  • de modifier le règlement 492/2011 relatif à la libre circulation des travailleurs à l’intérieur de l’Union afin de prévoir un mécanisme de sauvegarde ;
  • modifier le règlement 883/2004 portant sur la coordination des systèmes de sécurité sociale, afin d’instaurer un mécanisme d’indexation lors de l’exportation des allocations familiales.

On comprend dans ces conditions le soin avec lequel David Cameron a soigneusement évité de prendre langue avec le Parlement européen, laissant à la « pax germanica » gérée par le chancelier allemand et le Président du Parlement le soin de s’occuper de l’intendance !!!

B – Un accord politiquement significatif ?

Construit en trompe l’oeil, l’arrangement du 19 février est volontairement incompréhensible pour qui ne maîtrise pas les arcanes du droit institutionnel et des politiques de l’Union. Chacun peut ainsi revendiquer la victoire de ses idées ou le succès de la défense des traités, le peu d’enthousiasme du Président de la Commission indiquant son manque de goût pour l’opération.

La fonction de l’arrangement en question, au delà de son utilité politique immédiate pour le premier ministre britannique, doit être éclaircie pour en comprendre la portée.

a) – L’arrangement veut d’abord être un instrument permettant de dissiper toute ambiguïté, de préciser le sens et le rôle des dispositions des traités, faute d’être en capacité d’en modifier le contenu. Il se présente donc comme un moyen de « clarifier dans la présente décision certaines questions qui sont particulièrement importantes pour les États membres, de sorte que les clarifications apportées devront être prises en considération à titre d’instrument d’interprétation des traités» (préambule).

D’où le long rappel des souplesses multiples offertes déjà aux Etats par des traités comportant des «processus permettant aux différents États membres d’emprunter différentes voies d’intégration, en laissant aller de l’avant ceux qui souhaitent approfondir l’intégration, tout en respectant les droits de ceux qui ne veulent pas suivre cette voie ».

Respect mutuel, ambition, obligation de coopération loyale et respect du cadre institutionnel sont ainsi convoqués successivement pour clarifier le fonctionnement de la zone euro et le jeu de la compétitivité dans le sens des demandes britanniques.

C’est dans ce cadre que le sujet sensible du droit de regard d’un Etat non membre de la zone euro a été traité à la fois dans la section relative à la gouvernance économique de la décision arrêtée le 19 février et dans un projet de « décision du Conseil sur les dispositions particulières relatives à la bonne gestion de l’union bancaire et des conséquences d’une intégration plus poussée de la zone euro ». Rappelant le dialogue de sourds des deux paragraphes du compromis de Luxembourg, le projet de texte permet à un Etat non membre d’indiquer « son opposition motivée » à l’adoption d’un acte législatif concernant cette zone, le Conseil faisant « tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour aboutir, dans un délai raisonnable et sans porter préjudice aux délais impératifs fixés par le droit de l’Union, à une solution satisfaisante pour répondre aux préoccupations soulevées par le ou les membres ». De veto, il n’y a donc pas.

b) – En second lieu, l’arrangement tente, et cet exercice est particulièrement difficile, de concilier les points de vue en ne faisant rien d’autre qu’interpréter les traités dans un sens susceptible de favoriser les compromis.

Tel est le cas de la section C consacrée à la « souveraineté » où l’on juge utile de rappeler, un peu cruellement lorsque l’on pense aux attentats de Paris ou à la situation en Grèce, que la sécurité nationale reste de la seule responsabilité de chaque État membre, que cette disposition « ne constitue pas une dérogation au droit de l’Union et ne devrait donc pas être interprétée de façon restrictive ».

Multipliant les références au principe de subsidiarité et à l’existence d’une organisation variable selon les Etats des compétences attribuées à l’Union, l’arrangement en conclut que « les références à une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples sont donc compatibles avec la possibilité, pour les différents États membres, d’emprunter différentes voies d’intégration ». Aussi, affirme-t-il sans cultiver le doute et espérant rassurer le demandeur, « les traités permettent aux États membres partageant une telle vision d’un avenir commun d’évoluer vers une intégration plus poussée, sans qu’elle s’applique aux autres États membres ».

Cependant, la limite de l’exercice est rapidement atteinte et c’est bien de modifications à venir qu’il se préoccupe. Ainsi, même si l’on découvre que, malgré leur ratification, « il est admis que, eu égard à sa situation particulière en vertu des traités, le Royaume-Uni n’est pas tenu de prendre part à une intégration politique plus poussée dans l’Union européenne », le besoin d’une révision des traités est admis. Par précaution sans doute, et parce que sa lecture du droit positif et des coopérations renforcées auxquelles il ne daigne pas faire grandes allusions, peut-être parce que ces coopérations visent selon l’article 20 TUE à « renforcer son processus d’intégration », l’arrangement promet de graver dans le marbre des futurs traités cette constitutionnalisation d’une Europe à la carte.

La volonté de modifier l’ordre des choses est, en revanche, encore plus clairement établie lorsque l’on se penche sur la subsidiarité et la libre circulation des personnes.

La confusion entourant les débats relatifs à la subsidiarité indique sans doute que l’on est peut-être arrivé ici à la fin de l’exploitation du filon politique qu’il représente pour des Etats en mal de justifications devant leurs opinions publiques. Un mécanisme supplémentaire est donc évoqué dans la Section C relative à la « souveraineté », dans son paragraphe 3. Evoquant la nécessité de prendre des dispositions « appropriées » pour garantir l’application du protocole n°2 relatif au principe de subsidiarité, la décision rajoute une hypothèse supplémentaire au jeu du contrôle politique de la subsidiarité.

Dans le cas où les avis motivés sur le non-respect du principe de subsidiarité par un projet d’acte législatif de l’Union, adressés dans un délai de douze semaines à compter de la transmission du projet, représentent plus de 55 % des voix attribuées aux parlements nationaux, la présidence du Conseil inscrira la question à l’ordre du jour du Conseil afin que ces avis et les conséquences à en tirer fassent l’objet d’une délibération approfondie. Là, et c’est une curiosité de l’arrangement intergouvernemental, les représentants des États membres, « agissant en leur qualité de membres du Conseil », mettront fin à l’examen du projet d’acte législatif, sauf prise en compte des préoccupations exprimées dans les avis motivés.

Pour ce qui est de la libre circulation, le texte de la section D est divisé en deux rubriques : « interprétation actuelle du droit de l’Union » et « modification à apporter au droit dérivé de l’Union ». Il s’agit donc soit de délivrer une interprétation neutralisante du droit positif et de la jurisprudence existante soit de modifier directement la législation, notamment et y compris en matière de droits familiaux des citoyens de l’Union ayant exercé leur droit à la libre circulation. Quitte, en laissant agir le conditionnel employé dans ce passage de l’arrangement, à laisser planer le doute en cas de gêne.

L’impact juridique de l’arrangement ne doit donc pas être sous estimé même si la presse britanniques et les opposants de David Cameron avaient largement relativisé son impact matériel et son application dans le temps. Les « travailleurs nouvellement arrivés » en seraient les principales victimes, « durant une période de sept ans » en ce qui concerne l’accès aux prestations liées à l’emploi.

Par ailleurs, nombre d’Etats membres et notamment la Belgique, ont immédiatement cerné le risque représenté pour l’avenir par l’aval ainsi donné au Royaume Uni, même en vue de faciliter son maintien dans l’Union.

On les comprend. L’affirmation du point 4 des conclusions selon laquelle « il est entendu que, si l’issue du référendum au Royaume-Uni devait être la sortie du pays de l’Union européenne, l’ensemble des dispositions visées au point 2 cesseront d’exister » n’engage en effet que ceux qui veulent croire que ce sera la fin de cette technique de renégociation permanente, en forme de chantage, et que d’autres pourraient être tentés d’utiliser à l’avenir.

II – Les dangers d’un « arrangement »

Le comportement britannique vis-à-vis de son engagement dans l’Union entraîne une lassitude conduisant à penser que l’on est parvenu, là, à un point de rupture entre le projet européen conduit depuis un demi-siècle et le Royaume Uni. La compréhension de ses pairs dissimule difficilement que le Royaume Uni dénature ici les conditions de son engagement autant que le contenu d’une politique centrale de l’Union, celle de la libre circulation.

A – La dénaturation de l’engagement européen

Le Conseil européen en effectue lui-même le recensement : la position du Royaume Uni est aujourd’hui une incongruité au regard des principes fondateurs de l’Union européenne.

a) – A ce jour en effet, le Royaume Uni est autorisé par les traités :

  • à ne pas adopter l’euro et dès lors à conserver la livre britannique comme monnaie, en vertu du protocole n° 15;
  • à ne pas participer à l’acquis de Schengen en vertu du protocole n° 19 ;
  • à exercer des contrôles aux frontières sur les personnes et dès lors à ne pas participer à l’espace Schengen en ce qui concerne les frontières intérieures et extérieures en vertu du protocole n° 20 ;
  • à choisir de participer ou non à des mesures dans l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice en vertu du protocole n° 21;
  • à bénéficier d’une situation particulière au regard de l’intervention de la Cour de justice en matière d’application de la Charte des droits fondamentaux en vertu du protocole n° 30.

Par ailleurs, sur la base du protocole n° 36 relatif aux dispositions transitoires, il vient de cesser d’appliquer (opt-out), le 1er décembre 2014, une grande majorité d’actes et de dispositions de l’Union dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale adoptés avant l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, le tout en choisissant de réintégrer trente-cinq d’entre eux, lui paraissant les plus utiles à ses intérêts (opt-in). Poursuivre cette œuvre de détricotage d’engagements souscrits de façon répétée et librement par le Royaume Uni est donc devenu problématique pour le projet européen, quoi que l’on en dise et même en prétendant minimiser les termes de « l’arrangement ».

La référence ici au précédent français menant au compromis de Luxembourg n’a pas de sens. Convaincre un Etat membre fondateur venant d’adopter un nouveau régime constitutionnel de s’adapter à un traité antérieurement conclu ne relevait pas d’une manoeuvre de boutiquier mais davantage d’une opération de survie pour un traité en passe de s’appliquer.

Rien n’interdit cependant, bien au contraire, pour garantir la présence britannique dans l’Union, de répéter tout haut ce que les traités disent déjà à propos des compétences ou de la subsidiarité ou ce que la Cour exprime dans jurisprudence la plus récente. Il suffit alors de feindre la conviction qu’il s’agit là de quelque chose de nouveau, arraché au forceps par le défenseur des intérêts britanniques. Tout, au contraire, conduit à refuser l’écriture d’une Europe à la carte que les conclusions du Conseil théorisent, malheureusement, le 19 février. Le reste des points actés prête davantage à être passé sous silence, au vu de menaces bien plus pressantes pesant sur l’avenir de l’Union.

b) – Ici, c’est la nature du projet européen qui est en question comme en témoigne la volonté britannique inlassable de remettre sur la table le principe d’une « union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples» qu’ils combattaient déjà en vain dans la négociation d’Amsterdam.

Evidemment, la référence à « une union sans cesse plus étroite » dans le préambule ne constitue pas une base légale pour étendre la portée des dispositions des traités ou du droit dérivé de l’Union, comme le souligne très sérieusement le Conseil européen. Pas plus qu’elle ne saurait être utilisée en vue d’élargir les compétences de l’Union. En des temps où des principes, inscrits eux dans les traités, tels que celui de solidarité de l’article 80 TFUE sont ouvertement foulés aux pieds par les Etats membres, la précaution oratoire fait sourire.

L’affirmation du Conseil européen selon laquelle ces références « n’obligent pas l’ensemble des États membres à aspirer à un destin commun » rompt avec le passé, posant un problème politique de première ampleur. Elle assigne clairement une finalité différente au projet européen, même si ce dernier n’est pas à la merci d’une décision intergouvernementale adoptée en catimini. Maîtres des traités, les Etats n’en sont pas les interprètes authentiques, à l’inverse de leur juge.

L’appel répété des traités à une « union sans cesse plus étroite » depuis 1957 n’est pas une clause de style. Il possède une fonction particulière et connaître la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice aurait permis de s’en pénétrer, à l’instant de vouloir satisfaire les tabloïds britanniques.

Traitant de l’adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH dans son avis 2/13 et rappelant de façon solennelle le « cadre constitutionnel » dans lequel elle raisonnait, la Cour de justice le relie aux « caractéristiques essentielles du droit de l’Union » lesquelles « ont donné lieu à un réseau structuré de principes, de règles et de relations juridiques mutuellement interdépendantes liant, réciproquement, l’Union elle-même et ses États membres, ainsi que ceux-ci entre eux, lesquels sont désormais engagés, comme il est rappelé à l’article 1er, deuxième alinéa, TUE, dans un «processus créant une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples de l’Europe » (point 167).

Et, au cas où l’on aurait pas exactement saisi le sens de ce processus, elle enfonce le clou : « la poursuite des objectifs de l’Union … est, pour sa part, confiée à une série de dispositions fondamentales … Ces dispositions, s’insérant dans le cadre d’un système propre à l’Union, sont structurées de manière à contribuer, chacune dans son domaine spécifique et avec ses caractéristiques particulières, à la réalisation du processus d’intégration qui est la raison d’être de l’Union elle-même » (point 172). Partager un destin commun au sein de ce processus d’intégration est donc « la raison d’être » de l’Union, indépendamment du degré d’intégration choisi par ses membres. Est-ce cette « raison d’être » qui est niée par les Etats membres ?

D’autant qu’il ne s’agit pas là d’une simple affirmation politique. Ce processus remplit une fonction dans l’Union, précisée dès 2003 par la Cour de justice mettant en avant le principe de confiance mutuelle dans l’affaire Pupino (C-105/03) : « l’article 1er, 2eme et 3eme alinéas du TUE dispose que ce traité marque une nouvelle étape dans le processus créant une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples de l’Europe et que la mission de l’Union … consiste à organiser de façon cohérente et solidaire les relations entre les États membres et entre leurs peuples » (point 41).

En tout état de cause, la position singulière du Conseil européen n’est pas non plus caractérisée par la cohérence. Ignorait-il que, dans un communiqué de presse des ministres des Affaires étrangères des 6 pays fondateurs, le 9 février 2016, Quelques jours auparavant, ces derniers affirmaient rester « déterminés à poursuivre la construction d’une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples européens » … Là est donc l’inquiétude majeure, dans ce renoncement et cette dénaturation du pacte constitutionnel européen.

B – La dénaturation de la politique de libre circulation

Sans aller jusqu’à un examen détaillé et scientifique de la portée des concessions faites en matière de libre circulation des personnes par le Conseil européen, deux traits peuvent néanmoins être stigmatisés : la volonté d’en nier la spécificité en l’assimilant à une forme d’immigration y accompagne le souhait de contrecarrer la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice sur ce point.

a) – Les revendications britanniques sur le terrain de la libre circulation des travailleurs de l’Union sont anciennes, connues et passablement irresponsables au vu d’une seule interrogation : qui, au lendemain de l’adhésion, a fait en sorte qu’aujourd’hui la population étrangère la plus nombreuse au Royaume Uni soit celle des 748 207 polonais recensés en 2015 par Eurostat ?

Ces critiques ont été partiellement entendues sans que le soit la demande de contrôles préalables à l’entrée dans l’Etat membre. D’où deux rubriques, celles d’une attaque frontale quant aux avantages sociaux dont bénéficient les travailleurs de l’Union au nom du principe de non discrimination et celle d’une assimilation de la libre circulation à l’immigration ordinaire.

La présentation abusive du système social britannique comme justifiant un appel d’air de travailleurs européen par le jeu de ses avantages a conduit à mettre en question un certain nombre de prestations, le Conseil européen semblant découvrir en 2016 que « les différences de niveau de rémunération entre les États membres rendent certaines offres d’emploi plus attrayantes que d’autres et induisent des mouvements découlant directement du libre marché ». D’où sa volonté de « limiter les flux de travailleurs d’une importance telle qu’ils ont des incidences négatives à la fois pour les États membres d’origine et pour les États membres de destination », mais ceci en respectant les principes du traité et notamment celles relatives à la libre circulation des citoyens.

– L’exportabilité des allocations familiales vers un autre Etat membre devrait donc faire l’objet d’une modification du règlement 883/2004 afin d’en établir l’indexation. Marchant sur des œufs, le Conseil avait ici à l’esprit la jurisprudence Pinna (aff. 41/84) protégeant cette exportation. Néanmoins, cette indexation ne concernerait que les nouveaux arrivants jusqu’au 1er janvier 2020 et la Commission se refuse à étendre cette indexation à d’autres prestations exportables, telles que les retraites par exemple.

– Les prestations sociales liées à l’emploi constituaient le coeur du débat, au nom du prétendu « appel d’air » évoqué par le Royaume Uni. Modifié, le règlement 492/2011 instituera « un mécanisme d’alerte et de sauvegarde » en cas de « situations caractérisées par l’afflux d’une ampleur exceptionnelle et pendant une période prolongée de travailleurs en provenance d’autres d’États membres ». Sa justification ? Un afflux d’une ampleur telle qu’elle « affecte des aspects essentiels de son système de sécurité sociale, y compris la finalité première de son régime de prestations liées à l’emploi, ou engendre de graves difficultés qui sont susceptibles de perdurer sur son marché de l’emploi ou qui soumettent à une pression excessive le bon fonctionnement de ses services publics ».

L’accès aux prestations liées à l’emploi à caractère non contributif pourrait être restreint « dans la mesure nécessaire ». Le travailleur serait totalement exclu du bénéfice de ces prestations dans un premier temps, mais il y aurait progressivement accès au fur et à mesure de son rattachement au marché du travail de l’État membre d’accueil. L’autorisation de restriction aurait une durée limitée et s’appliquerait aux travailleurs de l’Union nouvellement arrivés durant une période de 7 ans.

Le flou gardé sur le déroulement de la procédure réserve cependant la question du pouvoir dévolu au Parlement européen durant ce déroulement, lequel Parlement qui devra adopter le texte instituant la dite procédure et ne pas en être fanatique …

Toute la subtilité du mécanisme, ici, tient dans la Déclaration de la Commission jointe en annexe VI. Elle y indique « qu’il ressort de la nature des informations qui lui sont transmises par le Royaume-Uni, et notamment du fait qu’il n’a pas fait pleinement usage des périodes transitoires prévues dans les actes d’adhésion récents en ce qui concerne la libre circulation des travailleurs, que le pays connaît aujourd’hui le type de situation exceptionnelle auquel le mécanisme de sauvegarde proposé devrait s’appliquer. En conséquence, il serait justifié que le Royaume-Uni active le mécanisme dans l’attente légitime d’obtenir l’autorisation requise ». D’où la victoire proclamée par le Premier ministre britannique, prêt à faire usage de cette restriction puisque la condition mise à son emploi est satisfaite.

– Les prestations dues aux personnes sans emploi ont également fait l’objet de précisions de la part du Conseil européen, sous couvert « d’interprétations » d’autant plus fermes et gratuites que la Cour de justice a déjà dit le droit à leur propos dans ses arrêts Dano C-133/13 et Alimanovic (C-67/14) : « sur la base de considérations objectives indépendantes de la nationalité des personnes concernées et proportionnées à l’objectif légitimement poursuivi, des conditions peuvent être imposées en ce qui concerne certaines prestations afin de veiller à ce qu’il y ait un degré réel et effectif de rattachement entre la personne concernée et le marché du travail de l’État membre d’accueil ».

Aussi, « les États membres ont la possibilité de refuser l’octroi de prestations sociales à des personnes qui exercent leur droit à la libre circulation dans le seul but d’obtenir de l’aide sociale des États membres alors même qu’elles ne disposent pas de ressources suffisantes pour prétendre au bénéfice d’un droit de séjour ».

b) – Beaucoup plus pernicieuse, la volonté de réduire la spécificité jurisprudentielle de la libre circulation des citoyens de l’Union s’attache à deux cibles.

Le regroupement familial dont bénéficient les citoyens de l’Union est ici en jeu, en particulier à propos des membres de la famille non citoyens d’un Etat membre qui a fait l’objet de décisions complexes de la CJUE depuis l’arrêt Singh (C-370/90). En l’espèce, la rigueur du droit britannique était plus grande que celle du droit de l’Union à propos de ses citoyens désirant être rejoints par des membres de leur famille non citoyens européens. David Cameron en avait fait un cheval de bataille.

Ici, malgré le rappel martial du Conseil européen de la nécessité de lutter contre l’abus de droit, les mariages de complaisance et autres fraudes à la libre circulation destinées à obtenir un titre de séjour, le risque d’incompatibilité avec les traités et l’article 9 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux est réel. La jurisprudence Metock (C-127/08), en 2008, forme en l’espèce un obstacle de taille.

Aussi, en annexe VII, une « déclaration » de la Commission « prend acte » de la volonté des Etats et promet une proposition de modification de la directive 2004/38 destinée à la « compléter afin d’exclure du champ d’application des droits de libre circulation tout ressortissant d’un pays tiers qui n’a pas préalablement séjourné de manière légale dans un État membre avant de se marier avec un citoyen de l’Union ou qui ne se marie avec un citoyen de l’Union qu’après que celui-ci a établi sa résidence dans l’État membre d’accueil ».

L’important ici n’est pas dans la promesse mais dans la manière de la réaliser dans le champ de la future proposition. La Commission semble sous-entendre dans sa déclaration que, pour ce qui est des situations d’abus en matière d’admission au séjour, c’est sous forme de simples « lignes directrices » établies dans une Communication sur la libre circulation à venir qu’elle interviendra.

La clause d’ordre public, enfin, dont la Cour de justice a mis un demi-siècle à réguler les excès dans l’invocation qu’en faisaient les Etats membres, était en ligne de mire du Conseil européen, tenté à la fois par un alignement sur le moins disant, c’est-à-dire sur la situation faite aux immigré ordinaires, et par la limitation de circulation de catégories de population jugées indésirables.

Accréditant l’idée d’un lien entre libre circulation et criminalité, la décision du 19 février rappelle, en faisant mine de l’établir, que les États membres d’accueil « peuvent également prendre les mesures de restriction nécessaires pour se protéger contre des individus dont le comportement personnel est susceptible de représenter une menace réelle et grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité publique ». Parce que cette détermination est parfois problématique à défendre devant le juge, les États membres pourraient « tenir compte du comportement que la personne concernée a eu par le passé et la menace ne doit pas toujours être imminente. Même en l’absence de condamnation pénale antérieure, les États membres peuvent agir pour des raisons de prévention, aussi longtemps qu’elles sont liées spécifiquement à la personne concernée ».

Là encore, la prudence est de mise pour la Commission qui se borne à promettre les précisions nécessaires dans sa future communication sans faire écho aux soucis de prévention et de menace non « imminente » visant exprimés par les Etats membres.

Au total, le Conseil européen ne sort pas grandi de cette épreuve factice, n’hésitant pas à sacrifier son idéal pour un plat de lentilles. Loin des promesses anciennes d’une Europe proche des citoyens, il accentue la crise d’une Union en panne d’inspiration et de leadership au moyen de pauvres biais et stratagèmes juridiques avalisés par tous. Ce faisant, il rend la parole au seul acteur décisionnaire dans une démocratie, le peuple britannique dont on doute que la conviction soit emportée par un si triste ouvrage.