Meijers Committee : Accommodating British EU-demands and democratic change of the Treaties

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE ON 28 October 2015

  1. Introduction

In recent years, the British government has repeatedly expressed concerns about current EU law and suggested particular changes. Some of these changes require amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). According to public sources, the European Council asked David Cameron to present his particular proposals in writing four weeks in advance of the European Council of 17/18 December 2015.   It is not certain that those proposals will be made publicly available.

An agreement by the Heads of Government to change the Treaties, would give rise to serious concerns over legality, transparency, parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The Meijers Committee argues that the European Council should not be the exclusive forum to consider changes to the Treaties in an effort to accommodate British political demands. The Meijers Committee stresses that national parliaments, the European Parliament and, possibly, a Convention have a role to play and should not be left out of the current negotiations only to be confronted later on with a political agreement cast in stone.

This note describes the proper procedures by which the EU treaties  can be amended and explains why a European Council or Head of Government agreement would be void or unlawful. In addition, the reforms of one of the substantive policy areas, free movement law, are analysed on the basis of specific proposals formulated by British Ministers over the past year.1 At the European Councils of 25/26 June and 15 October 2015 Mr Cameron raised this issue and it was decided that it would be further discussed in December.2   After the June European Council, Mr Cameron announced that the UK is seeking changes under three other headings as well: sovereignty of Member States (no longer ‘an ever closer union’ and more influence of national parliaments), fairness (the interests of Member States not participating in the Euro should be “more fairly balanced”) and on competiveness of the EU.

  1. European Council agreement to amend the Treaties

Continue reading “Meijers Committee : Accommodating British EU-demands and democratic change of the Treaties”

STUDY: EU COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION

FULL TEXT OF THE STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE (LIBE) IS ACCESSIBLE HERE (148 PAGES)

AUTHORS: Dr. Paula GARCÍA ANDRADE, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, Prof. Iván MARTÍN, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence. SUPERVISION Prof. Philippe DE BRUYCKER, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) Prof. Cristina GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

EU immigration and asylum policies have to face two major challenges: on the one hand the impending demographic crisis in Europe and on the other hand the migration pressures coming from outside its borders, as the current migration and refugee crises in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East exemplify. This makes it indispensable to develop a strong EU external action able to combat smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, promote mobility and facilitate legal migration opportunities to third-country nationals, maximise synergies between migration and development of countries of origin, and enhance protection capacities towards persons in need of international protection, in line with the pillars of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

This study aimed at examining the overall strategy of EU cooperation with third countries in the field of immigration and asylum and evaluating its contours and outcomes, proceeds in three sections. Section 1 reviews the main forms of international cooperation adopted by the EU to tackle the multiple dimensions of the migration phenomenon, focusing on those covering enlargement and Eastern Partnership countries, Southern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan countries, as well as the Greater Middle East. The analysis includes a mapping of the diverse funding sources for EU cooperation with third countries of origin and transit of migratory flows and a brief survey of the main modalities of Member States’ own external cooperation in this field. Section 2 attempts to undertake an assessment of the outcomes and impact of the instruments of EU external cooperation on migration, from a triple perspective: the objectives pursued (substantive dimension), the consequences of the nature of the instruments used (functional dimension), and the challenges of coordination regarding their adoption and implementation (institutional dimension). Case studies on Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia seek to provide empirical insight into the topics examined. Finally, section 3 formulates conclusions contributing to the debate on the configuration and impact of EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration, and proposes a set of concrete recommendations for further action.

1. The toolbox of EU external cooperation with third countries in the field of immigration and asylum Continue reading “STUDY: EU COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION”

Les migrants en situation irrégulière, sujets d’une discrimination légale : l’exemple du droit à la liberté et à la sûreté

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE SITE ON 19 OCTOBER 2015

Par Chloé Peyronnet, EDP (Lyon)

Pendant que la « crise » des réfugiés occupe l’agenda politique et médiatique européen, la politique de retour de l’Union européenne continue à s’appliquer aux migrants non éligibles à une protection internationale. La directive 2008/115/CE a fait l’objet d’une nouvelle décision préjudicielle en interprétation (C-290/14). Cette dernière confirme une ligne jurisprudentielle faisant primer une conception sécuritaire de l’effet utile sur les droits fondamentaux des intéressés, en l’occurrence le droit à la liberté et à la sûreté.  Victimes d’un déni d’habeas corpus, parfois d’une double-peine et pouvant cumuler les statuts de non-éloignables et d’indésirables, les migrants en situation irrégulière se voient appliqué un droit à la liberté et à la sûreté amputé qui s’avère de facto discriminatoire. 

En janvier 2015, le nombre de morts en mer Méditerranée est devenu trop important pour être ignoré. Depuis lors, le sort des migrants sans-papiers cherchant à regagner le territoire des États-membres de l’Union européenne semble être au centre de l’attention médiatico-politique. En réalité, malgré l’emploi fréquent du terme générique  de « migrants », seuls les demandeurs d’asile ont l’heur d’être placés sous le feu des projecteurs. Les migrants familiaux, les migrants économiques et les migrants potentiellement éligibles à une protection internationale dont ils ne peuvent faire la demande sont de facto exclus du paysage journalistique et de l’agenda gouvernemental. Sans s’attarder sur l’extrême porosité des situations humaines recouvertes par ces catégories juridiques, l’on peut d’ores et déjà souligner que les problématiques de la gestion de l’immigration irrégulière n’ont pas disparu avec l’augmentation massive du nombre de demandeurs d’asile (qui, par définition, ne peuvent être qualifiés de migrants irréguliers tant que leur demande n’a pas été définitivement rejetée). En effet, dans le cadre de l’espace Schengen, tout migrant sans-papiers qui n’a pas obtenu de protection internationale est en situation irrégulière et a dès lors vocation à être « retourné » vers le territoire d’un Etat tiers, qu’il s’agisse de son Etat d’origine ou d’un Etat lié par un accord de réadmission avec l’Union européenne ou l’un de ses Etats membres.

Au sein de l’espace Schengen, une harmonisation minimale a été réalisée par la directive 2008/115/CE du 16 décembre 2008 (directive « retour »), dont l’article 15 encadre la « rétention à des fins d’éloignement » (qualifiée en droit français de « rétention administrative »). Cette privation de liberté, qui se singularise par son appartenance à la matière administrative, est applicable aux migrants en situation irrégulière faisant l’objet d’une procédure de retour (initiée en droit français par une obligation de quitter le territoire français ou une mesure d’expulsion). Exclue de la matière pénale avec la bénédiction de la Cour EDH, cette mesure est une éloquente illustration des « discriminations légales » dont font l’objet les migrants en situation irrégulière quant à la protection de leurs droits fondamentaux, dont la vocation universelle s’avère parfois chimérique.

Entre déni d’habeas corpus et double peine Continue reading “Les migrants en situation irrégulière, sujets d’une discrimination légale : l’exemple du droit à la liberté et à la sûreté”

“Foreign Fighters” and EU implementation of the UNSC resolution 2178. Another case of “Legislate in haste, repent at leisure…” ? (2)

by Dalila DELORENZI (FREE Group Trainee – Original in Italian)

1. Foreword
As the hostilities in Syria and Iraq continue and terrorism activities worldwide seem to be on the rise, EU Member States are increasingly confronted with the problem of aspiring and returning ‘foreign fighters’ as described already in this blog HERE. More precisely, in the EU the term is used to indicate European citizens who, after leaving to join jihadist groups, may have become further radicalised and acquired combat experience, and therefore be capable of carrying out deadly terrorist attacks once they return to Europe.

Such phenomenon is anything but new; however, its scale certainly is: as illustrated by the rise of the terrorist group calling itself “Islamic state”, the phenomenon has acquired an entirely new dimension – according to the EU intelligence sources 19% of the total fighters originated from the EU.

It explains then the wide perception of these individuals as a serious threat to the security of both individual Member States and the EU as a whole – especially in the aftermath of the recent terrorist attacks occurred in Brussels[1], Paris[2], Copenhagen[3].

Broadly speaking , a different way to envision human mobility and checks at external borders of Schengen has come to light. Whereas initially, they were rather conceived to protect the Schengen area from threats coming from country outside the Schengen zone, now such threat to security is deemed to be already inside the EU, due to the fact that most of the time militants returning to Europe possess the nationality of a Member State.

2. EU response Continue reading ““Foreign Fighters” and EU implementation of the UNSC resolution 2178. Another case of “Legislate in haste, repent at leisure…” ? (2)”

Some notes on the relations between UNSC Resolution 2240 (2015) fighting smugglers in Mediterranean and the EUNAVFOR Med “Sophia” operation

by Isabella Mercone  (Free Group Trainee – Original Version in Italian)

  1. INTRODUCTION

On 9 October 2015, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 2240 (2015), authorizing Member States to intercept vessels off  Libyan coast, suspected of migrant smuggling.

The resolution was adopted in a short time, without much discussion and ahead of schedule, with 14 votes in favour and just one abstention (Venezuela). “Incredible!” – Someone could say – “For once, the Security Council succeeded in adopting a resolution on time.” However, the true is that the adopted resolution is not the one imagined in May by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, when operation EUNAVFOR Med was launched. But let’s go one step at a time: let’s see first where the idea of ​​EUNAVFOR Med came from and what is its goal, and let’s try to understand why the EU should have required a resolution by the Security Council, allowing it to intervene in the Mediterranean and dismantle the smuggling of migrants.

  1. THE OPERATION EUNAVFOR MED (now renamed “SOPHIA”)

Continue reading “Some notes on the relations between UNSC Resolution 2240 (2015) fighting smugglers in Mediterranean and the EUNAVFOR Med “Sophia” operation”

EU-US Umbrella Data Protection Agreement : Detailed analysis by Douwe Korff

14 October 2015 (NOTA BENE : This text is more than 60 pages)

by Douwe KORFF (FREE GROUP MEMBER)

About the Fundamental Rights Europe Expert Group (FREE): The Fundamental Rights European Experts Group (FREE Group : http://www.free-group.eu)  is a Belgian non governmental organisation (Association Sans But Lucratif (ASBL) Registered at Belgian Moniteur: Number 304811. According to art 3 and 4 of its Statute ( see below *) the association focus is on monitoring, teaching and advocating in the European Union freedom security and justice related policies. In the same framework we follow also the EU actions in protecting and promoting EU values and fundamental rights in the Member States as required by the article 2, 6 and 7 of the Treaty on the European Union (risk of violation by a Member State of EU founding values)

About the author: Douwe Korff is a Dutch comparative and international law expert on human rights and data protection. He is Emeritus Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University; Associate, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford (Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre); Fellow, Centre for Internet & Human Rights, University of Viadrina, Frankfurt/O and Berlin; and Visiting Fellow, Yale University (Information Society Project).

Acknowledgments: The author would like to express his thanks to Mme. Marie Georges and Prof. Steve Peers, members of FREE Group, for their very helpful comments on and edits of the draft of this Note.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

We believe the following aspects of the Umbrella Agreement violate, or are likely to lead to violations of, the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights:

  1. The Umbrella Agreement appears to allow the “sharing” of data sent by EU law enforcement agencies to US law enforcement agencies with US national security agencies (including the FBI and the US NSA) for use in the latter’s mass surveillance and data mining operations; as well as the “onward transfer” of such data to “third parties”, including national security agencies of yet other (“third”) countries, which the Agreement says may not be subjected to “generic data protection conditions”;
  2. The Umbrella Agreement does not contain a general human rights clause prohibiting the “sharing” or “onward transfers” of data on EU persons, provided subject to the Agreement, with or to other agencies, in the USA or elsewhere, in circumstances in which this could lead to serious human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture or even extrajudicial killings or “disappearances” of the data subjects (or others);
  3. The Umbrella Agreement does not provide for equal rights and remedies for EU- and US nationals in the USA; but worse, non-EU citizens living in EU Member States who are not nationals of the Member State concerned – such as Syrian refugees or Afghan or Eritrean asylum-seekers, or students from Africa or South America or China – and non-EU citizens who have flown to, from or through the EU and whose data may have been sent to the USA (in particular, under the EU-US PNR Agreement), are completely denied judicial redress in the USA under the Umbrella Agreement.

In addition:

  1. The Umbrella Agreement in many respects fails to meet important substantive requirements of EU data protection law;
  2. The Umbrella Agreement also fails to meet important requirements of EU data protection law in terms of data subject rights and data subjects’ access to real and effective remedies; and
  3. In terms of transparency and oversight, too, the Umbrella Agreement falls significantly short of fundamental European data protection and human rights requirements.

The Agreement should therefore, in our view, not be approved by the European Parliament in its present form.

FULL TEXT OF THE ANALYSIS 

  1. Introduction / Background

Continue reading “EU-US Umbrella Data Protection Agreement : Detailed analysis by Douwe Korff”

UNSC RESOLUTION 2240(215) (NB:fighting smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean Sea)

NOTA BENE : After UNSC Resolution 2178(2014) on Foreign Fighters aiming to address a problem raised notably by the EU, UNSC Resolution 2240(2015) paves now the way for a strenghtened  EU intervention against smugglers and traffickers in the South Mediterranean currently conducted in the framework of the Operation EUNAVFOR -Sophia. Emphasis have been added to the original text and comment will follow in the coming days 

UNITED NATIONS 

Resolution 2240(2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7531st meeting, on 9 October 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling  its press statement of 21 April on the maritime tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Recalling that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean,

Reaffirming also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC Convention) and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, as the primary international legal instruments to combat the smuggling of migrants and related conduct, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,

Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC Convention, as the primary international legal instruments to combat trafficking in persons,

Underlining that, although the crime of smuggling of migrants may share, in some cases, some common features with the crime of trafficking in persons, Member States need to recognise that they are distinct crimes, as defined by the UNTOC Convention and its Protocols, requiring differing legal, operational, and policy responses,

Deploring the continuing maritime tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea that have resulted in hundreds of casualties, and noting with concern that such casualties were, in some cases, the result of exploitation and misinformation by transnational criminal organisations which facilitated the illegal smuggling of migrants via dangerous methods for personal gain and with callous disregard for human life,

Expressing grave concern at the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular off the coast of Libya and recognizing that among these migrants may be persons who meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

Emphasizing in this respect that migrants, including asylum-seekers and regardless of their migration status, should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urging all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable, stressing also the obligation of States, where applicable, to protect the human rights of migrants regardless of their migration status, including when implementing their specific migration and border security policies,

Reaffirming in this respect the need to promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, especially those of women and children, and to address international migration through international, regional or bilateral cooperation and dialogue and through a comprehensive and balanced approach, recognizing the roles and responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination in promoting and protecting the human rights of all migrants, and avoiding approaches that might aggravate their vulnerability,

Further recalling the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search  and Rescue,

Expressing further concern that the situation in Libya is exacerbated by the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory, which could provide support to other organised crime and terrorist networks in Libya,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Libyan Government to take appropriate action to prevent the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through the territory of Libya and its territorial sea,

Mindful of the need to support further efforts to strengthen Libyan border management, considering the difficulties of the Libyan Government to manage effectively the migratory flows in transit through Libyan territory, and noting its concern for the repercussions of this phenomenon on the stability of Libya and of the Mediterranean region,

Welcoming support already provided by the most concerned Member States, including Member States of the European Union (EU), taking into account inter alia the role of FRONTEX and the specific mandate of EUBAM Libya in support of the Libyan Government, and by neighbouring States,

Acknowledging the European Council statement of 23 April 2015 and the press statement of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 27 April, which underlined the need for effective international action to address both the immediate and long-term aspects of human trafficking towards Europe,

Taking note of the Decision of the Council of the European Union of 18 May 2015 setting up ‘EUNAVFOR Med’ which underlined the need for effective international action to address both the immediate and long-term aspects of migrant smuggling and human trafficking towards Europe,

Taking further note of the ongoing discussions between the EU and the Libyan Government on migration related issues,

Expressing also strong support to the States in the region affected by the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, and emphasizing the need to step up coordination of efforts in order to strengthen an effective multidimensional response to these common challenges in the spirit of international solidarity and shared responsibility, to tackle their root causes and to prevent people from being exploited by migrant smugglers and human traffickers,

Acknowledging the need to assist States in the region, upon request, in the development of comprehensive and integrated regional and national strategies, legal frameworks, and institutions to counter terrorism, transnational organised crime, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking, including mechanisms to implement them within the framework of States’ obligations under applicable international law,

Stressing that addressing both migrant smuggling and human trafficking, including dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks in the region and prosecuting migrant smugglers, and human traffickers requires a coordinated, multidimensional approach with States of origin, of transit, and of destination, and further acknowledging the need to develop effective strategies to deter migrant smuggling and human trafficking in States of origin and transit,

Emphasizing that migrants should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urging all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable,

Bearing in mind the obligations of States under applicable international law to exercise due diligence to prevent and combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to investigate and punish perpetrators, to identify and provide effective assistance to victims of trafficking and migrants and to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress migrant smuggling and human trafficking,

Affirming the necessity to put an end to the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya, and, for these specific purposes, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

  1. Condemns all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the process of stabilisation of Libya and endanger the lives of thousands of people;
  1. Calls on Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations, including the EU, to assist Libya, upon request, in building needed capacity including to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through its territory and in its territorial sea; in order to prevent the further proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking into, through and from the territory of Libya and off its coast;
  1. Urges Member States and regional organisations, in the spirit of international solidarity and shared responsibility, to cooperate with the Libyan Government, and with each other, including by   sharing   information about acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya’s territorial sea and on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and rendering assistance to migrants and victims of human trafficking recovered at sea, in accordance with international law;
  1. Urges States and regional organisations whose naval vessels and aircraft operate on the high seas and airspace off the coast of Libya, to be vigilant for acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and in this context, encourages States and regional organisations to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, in cooperation with Libya;
  2. Calls upon Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations that are engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking to inspect, as permitted under international law, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, any unflagged vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organised criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, including inflatable boats, rafts and dinghies;
  1. Further calls upon such Member States to inspect, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organised criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya;
  1. Decides, with a view to saving the threatened lives of migrants or of victims of human trafficking on board such vessels as mentioned above, to authorise, in these exceptional and specific circumstances, for a period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations that are engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, provided that such Member States and regional organisations make good faith efforts to obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag State prior to using the authority outlined in this paragraph;
  1. Decides to authorise for a period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations to seize vessels inspected under the authority of paragraph 7 that are confirmed as being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, and underscores that further action with regard to such vessels inspected under the authority of paragraph 7, including disposal, will be taken in accordance with applicable international law with due consideration of the interests of any third parties who have acted in good faith;
  1. Calls upon all flag States involved to cooperate with respect to efforts under paragraphs 7 and 8, and decides that Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations under the authority of those paragraphs shall keep flag States informed of actions taken with respect to their vessels, and calls upon flag States that receive such requests to review and respond to them in a rapid and timely manner;
  1. Decides to authorise Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers in carrying out activities under paragraphs 7 and 8 and in full compliance with international   human   rights   law,   as applicable, underscores that the authorizations in paragraph 7 and 8 do not apply with respect to vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law, and calls upon Member States and regional organisations carrying out activities under paragraphs 7, 8 and this paragraph, to provide for the safety of persons on board as an utmost priority and to avoid causing harm to the marine environment or to the safety of navigation;
  1. Affirms that the authorisations provided in paragraphs 7 and 8 apply only with respect to the situation of migrant smuggling and human trafficking on the high seas off the coast of Libya and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, including the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a flag State over its vessels on the high seas, with respect to any other situation, and further affirms that the authorisation provided in paragraph 10 applies only in confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers on the high seas off the coast of Libya;
  1. Underscores that this resolution is intended to disrupt the organised criminal enterprises engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking and prevent loss of life and is not intended to undermine the human rights of individuals or prevent them from seeking protection under international human rights law and international refugee law;
  1. Emphasises that all migrants, including asylum-seekers, should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urges all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable;
  1. Urges Member States and regional organisations acting under the authority of this resolution to have due regard for the livelihoods of those engaged in fishing or other legitimate activities;
  1. Calls upon all States, with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking at sea, consistent with States’ obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable;
  1. Calls for Member States to consider ratifying or acceding to, and for States Parties to effectively implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
  1. Requests States utilising the authority of this resolution to inform the Security Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every three months thereafter on the progress of actions undertaken in exercise of the authority provided in paragraphs 7 to 10 above;
  1. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council eleven months after the adoption of this resolution on its implementation, in particular with regards to the implementation of paragraphs 7 to 10 above;
  1. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authority provided in this resolution for additional periods;
  1. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

SCHREMS CASE : The Essence of Privacy, and Varying Degrees of Intrusion

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED IN VERFASSUNGBLOG ON Wed 7 Oct 2015

by Martin Scheinin

This brief comment will address the 6 October 2015 CJEU Grand Chamber ruling inMax Schrems, asking what it tells us about the status of two fundamental rights in the EU legal order, namely the right to the respect for private life (privacy) and the right to the protection of personal data (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 7 and 8, respectively). The ruling must be read together with the 8 April 2014 ruling inDigital Rights Ireland where Articles 7 and 8 were discussed side by side.

Although the Max Schrems ruling contains many references to personal data, it does not really discuss the right to the protection of personal data as a distinct fundamental right. Article 8 of the Charter is mentioned in the dispositive part of the ruling but not for instance in what I would call the main finding by the Court which refers only to Article 7:

In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter…

The outcome of the case – declaring Commission’s Safe Harbor Decision 2000/52 invalid – flows from this finding of a breach of the essence of the right to privacy when we are dealing with indiscriminate blanket access to data. In Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU had already indicated (paras. 39-40) that blanket access to ‘content’ would trigger the application of the essence clause in Article 52 (1.1) of the Charter, while surveillance, even indiscriminate mass surveillance, based on even complex use of various categories of metadata amounted to a “particularly serious interference” (Digital Rights Ireland, para. 65) with fundamental rights but did not trigger the application of the essence clause. The Court’s distinction between ‘content’ and ‘metadata’ can be criticized, and it was indeed relativised by the Court itself in Digital Rights Ireland (para. 27).

What is now remarkable in Max Schrems is that

a) the Court actually identified the intrusion in question as falling under the notion of the essence of privacy – something the European Court of Human Rights has never done under the privacy provision of ECHR Article 8, and

b) the identification of an intrusion as compromising the essence of privacy meant that there was no need for a proportionality assessment under Article 52 (1.2) of the Charter.

This can be contrasted with theDigital Rights Ireland judgment (para. 69) where the final outcome was based on the application of a proportionality test. For these reasons, the Max Schrems judgment is a pathbreaking development, a major contribution to the understanding of the structure and legal effect of fundamental rights under the Charter. Digital Rights Ireland indicated where the path would go, and now the Court actually went that way.

An equally important contribution is documented in the same paragraph, namely that mere “access” to communications by public authorities) constitutes an interference. Notably, Article 8 (2) of the Charter uses the notion of “processing” when defining the fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Surveillance advocates might have until the Max Schrems ruling enjoyed some credibility with their claims that mere access does not amount to processing, and therefore mere access to the flow of communications does not amount to an intrusion until the automated selectors and algorithms have made their job and the human eye starts to “process” a much more narrow set of data. Now we know, that mere access is an intrusion into privacy, and even into the essence of privacy when it provides for indiscriminate access to ‘content’.

This gives rise to the next question, whether the Max Schrems rationale will only apply to the “transfer” of data from Europe to “servers” in the United States. This was the factual basis of the case, as reflected in paragraphs 2 and 31. The CJEU was asked a question about data transfers from Europe to Facebook servers in the US under the Safe Harbor arrangement, and it responded to that question. It did not address the scenario of “upstream” access to data flows through the splitting of fiber-optic cables to obtain generic access to all data that passes through transatlantic cables just because the Internet is built in the way that a lot of traffic ends up going through those cables. It would indeed be difficult to bring a case to the CJEU that would address this scenario.

Nevertheless, paragraph 94 quoted above is formulated in a way that gives a generic answer concerning the contours of the right to privacy under Article 7 of the EU Charter: yes, also access through the upstream method of capturing the data flow in a fibre-optic cable is to be regarded as compromising the essence of privacy and therefore as prohibited under the Charter, without a need even to engage in a proportionality analysis. It may be hard to get a case to the CJEU but the content of the substantive norm under Article 7 of the Charter is now clear. One can on good grounds expect that the European Court of Human Rights will now be prepared to follow the lead of the CJEU and draw the same conclusion under ECHR Article 8.

In closing, I dare to present the view that the Digital Rights Ireland and Max Schremsrulings taken together provide verification and demonstration of the utility of the methodology we developed in the SURVEILLE project where we produced a general framework for the holistic assessment of surveillance technologies for their security benefit, cost efficiency, moral hazards and fundamental rights intrusion. In short, in our model an intrusion into the essence of privacy would by definition produce the highest possible fundamental rights intrusion score which is, again by definition, higher than the maximum usability score and would therefore make redundant any proportionality assessment. Other types of intrusion – even particularly serious ones – would be assessed through giving separate scores to the importance of a fundamental right in a given situation and the depth of the intrusion into the same right as created by surveillance, and by then comparing the resulting fundamental right intrusion score against the usability score based on technology assessment. Here, a proportionality assessment is needed, even if the highest possible intrusion scores will be so high that the benefits obtained through surveillance cannot in practice outweigh them. Similarly to the CJEU in the Digital Rights Ireland case, the outcome will be that crude methods of mass surveillance, even when not triggering the essence clause, will be assessed as unlawful.

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Angela Merkel au Parlement européen, des paroles aux actes ?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE (12 OCTOBER 2015)

 par Henri Labayle,

Le discours prononcé par Angela Merkel devant le Parlement européen, 7 octobre 2015 aux cotés de François Hollande, est remarquable en tous points. Au delà du symbole d’une intervention du couple franco-allemand, qui n’était d’ailleurs peut être pas le meilleur signal à envoyer à ceux que l’on tentait de convaincre, cette prise de parole publique devant les représentants des peuples européens ne manque pas de sens.

Il était donc naturel  d’en souligner l’impact, partageant le sentiment d’un Jürgen Habermas « aussi surpris que réjoui » par le positionnement allemand face à la crise des réfugiés dans l’Union.

L’intervention de la chancelière allemande traduit en effet une constance politique qui mérite le respect et elle annonce des évolutions techniques qui suscitent l’interrogation.

1. La constance

Angela Merkel persiste et signe, est-on obligé de souligner. Malgré une vague grandissante de critiques, confrontée à une fronde plus ou moins larvée au sein de sa propre majorité et à une crispation évidente de l’opinion publique allemande que traduisent des sondages récents, la chancelière n’a pas dévié d’un pouce quant au terrain sur lequel elle entendait se placer et entraîner à sa suite l’Union européenne.

Ce dernier est le seul concevable, il est celui des valeurs de l’Union européenne qui, aux termes des traités, la « fondent » et « sont communes aux Etats membres » et dont l’Union doit assurer la« promotion ». C’est à ces valeurs et à la dignité de l’être humain que s’est référée explicitement la chancelière allemande le 31 aout lorsque la crise matérielle de l’asile s’est transportée sur le terrain institutionnel.

Aussi, tenir le cap politique en faisant valoir qu’à l’inverse de ce que l’on entend ici et là, le débat ne se pose pas en termes d’opportunité mais d’obligation morale autant que juridique est un discours responsable. Tout autant que l’est le propos répétant qu’isolément les Etats sont impuissants et que la réponse collective est la seule envisageable. Effectivement, « céder à la tentation de rétrograder, d’agir à une échelle nationale » serait une erreur historique et il convient politiquement « d’assumer l’attrait de l’Europe ».

Tel est le bon angle d’attaque du débat public. Faut-il en effet rappeler que, depuis le traité de Maastricht qui la considérait comme une « question d’intérêt commun » jusqu’à l’affirmation d’une « politique commune d’asile » à Amsterdam, l’accueil des demandeurs de protection internationale s’est européanisé au point de nécessiter une seconde génération des textes composant le régime d’asile commun ? Les articles 18 et 19 de la Charte se bornent à en tirer les conséquences.

Du reste, et à supposer que le niveau européen de cette protection du droit d’asile soit discutable, comment oublier les contraintes pesant sur la totalité des Etats membres de l’Union en raison de leur adhésion à la Convention de Genève comme à celle des droits de l’Homme ? Enfin et au delà de la France et de la République fédérale et pour n’en rester qu’aux Etats membres récalcitrants, comment nier l’autorité de la proclamation de ce même droit d’asile par les textes constitutionnels en Hongrie (article 14), en Pologne (article 56) ou en Slovaquie (article 53) ?

Aussi, prétendre mener la contestation des mesures arrêtées dans l’Union en matière de relocalisation des réfugiés au nom du respect de la légalité, comme semble vouloir le faire la Slovaquie, témoigne d’une curieuse vision de la Communauté de droit à laquelle on appartient, par delà les arguments techniques ou procéduraux fondés ou non.

Cette constance avait également animé auparavant le propos remarquable du Président de la Commission, le 9 septembre dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union prononcé lui aussi devant le Parlement européen.

Rappelant le poids de l’Histoire du continent européen, avant, pendant comme après le second conflit mondial, le chef de l’exécutif communautaire a choisi de mettre l’accent sur « le respect de nos valeurs communes et de notre histoire » après avoir resitué l’ampleur de l’effort à accomplir. Soulignant l’impact du contexte international autant que les enjeux d’une sous-estimation des besoins de protection, Jean Claude Juncker a ainsi redonné sa signification politique à la fonction qu’il exerce, enfin.

Ce faisant, l’alliance des deux acteurs principaux de l’Union n’aurait pu produire d’effet sans le relais efficace d’une présidence luxembourgeoise renouant avec la tradition qui veut qu’une présidence assurée par un petit Etat membre soit souvent des plus productives. Là encore, la brusque accélération du dossier législatif « relocalisation » en a tiré le bénéfice, les deux décisions de relocalisation ayant été publiées et commençant à prendre effet.

Pour autant, la constance du discours est-elle annonciatrice de véritables changements dans la politique d’asile de l’Union européenne ou bien faut-il en douter, à l’image de certains commentaires médiatiques au lendemain de ce discours regrettant l’absence de mesures concrètes ?

2. Le changement

D’ores et déjà, il est en marche. La conduite du dossier législatif de la relocalisation en est précisément une manifestation douloureuse pour les partisans de la méthode intergouvernementale.

On sait en effet la grande relativité de la communautarisation des procédures législatives. Malgré l’appellation des traités, la « procédure législative ordinaire » qui voudrait que la majorité qualifiée et l’accord du Parlement soient la règle en matière d’asile et d’immigration est passablement différente dans la pratique décisionnelle. La culture du consensus qui anime les diplomates qui se prétendent législateurs les amène ainsi à préférer les pratiques anciennes, celles qui consistent à ne pas forcer les Etats membres, conduits au pire à se réfugier dans l’abstention.

Ainsi, le 20 juillet 2015, une « décision des représentants des gouvernements des Etats membres réunis au sein du Conseil» c’est-à-dire un acte non pas de l’Union mais un acte engageant simplement les Etats collectivement (CJUE, 30 juin 1993, Parlement c. Conseil et Commission, C-181/91 et C-248/91, point 25) a permis de surmonter, par consensus, les désaccords entre Etats et d’adopter la décision2015/1523 procédant à la relocalisation de 40 000 personnes à partir de la Grèce et de l’Italie.

En revanche, le retour à l’orthodoxie communautaire s’est avéré bien plus pratique lorsqu’il a fallu surmonter l’opposition résolue de quatre Etats membres : la décision 2015/1601 du 22 septembre 2015 a donc été adoptée selon les voies classiques du traité et même en utilisant la procédure de vote à la majorité qualifiée … Signe de l’ampleur des désaccords, les conclusions de cette réunion ont été présentées par le ministre luxembourgeois comme « celles de la Présidence » et non du Conseil …

La seconde marque de changement a frappé l’espace Schengen. Improprement présenté comme relevant des « accords de Schengen », présentation ambiguë qui pourrait laisser penser que ces accords peuvent être dénoncés, le droit de l’espace Schengen repose d’une part sur les articles 67 et 77 TFUE qui garantissent l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures et, d’autre part, sur le règlement 562/2006 dit « Code Frontières Schengen » tel que modifié en 2013.

Ce dispositif de près de trente ans n’avait pas été conçu pour résister à une pression de l’ampleur de celle traversée par l’Union en cet été 2015. Il a donc volé en éclats tant à propos de la capacité des Etats membres à assumer leurs responsabilités de contrôles des frontières extérieures qu’en ce qui concerne l’interdiction d’exercer des contrôles nationaux aux frontières intérieures. Le rétablissement temporaire des contrôles aux frontières intérieures décidé par plusieurs Etats membres, de la Slovénie et l’Autriche avec l’aval de la Commission, conformément à l’article 25 du Code, a fait clairement ressortir la réalité.

Elle est double : d’une part, l’absence de modification substantielle d’un mécanisme conçu à 5 pour s’appliquer à 30 Etats est devenue clairement problématique, d’autre part, le maintien d’un espace de libre circulation intérieure dépend évidemment d’un renforcement effectif des contrôles aux frontières extérieures. Ce second constat ne connaît qu’une issue, à espace européen constant en tous cas : une gestion plus intégrée de ces frontières. Là encore, dès le début septembre comme au Parlement européen, la chancelière allemande n’a pas masqué la gravité de cet enjeu.

Troisième signe de changement, le plus lourd de signification sans doute, la remise en question du système dit de Dublin. Mal dénommé car né en réalité dans le chapitre VII de la convention d’application des accords de Schengen de 1990, ce système pose le principe du traitement unique de la demande d’asile. Critiqué à juste titre, d’une efficacité pour le moins douteuse comme en témoigne le dernier rapport d’AIDA, mis en cause jusqu’au Conseil de l’Europe, le système Dublin a connu diverses réformes mais n’a jamais été remis en question par principe.

La raison en est simple : il fait peser l’essentiel de la charge sur les Etats que le hasard de la géographie a mis au contact de la pression migratoire extérieure. Ceci sans aucune mesure avec leurs capacités de réponse, la Grèce étant un exemple caricatural de cette situation. Les Etats de seconde ligne, malgré ces dysfonctionnements, y trouvaient bon gré mal gré un certain confort et même si, dans les faits, le système n’a pas fonctionné comme on l’a vu en Italie ou en Grèce.

D’où une difficulté à accepter l’idée d’un changement, malgré le coup de tonnerre provoqué par l’ouverture des frontières allemandes, clairement en contradiction avec cet état du droit.

Cet attachement au dispositif Dublin s’est manifesté jusqu’au dernier moment. Ainsi, la réunion informelle des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement du 23 septembre rappelait-elle que « nous devons tous respecter, appliquer et mettre en œuvre nos règles existantes, y compris le règlement de Dublin et l’acquis de Schengen ». De même, le dispositif de relocalisation adopté comme en préparation est-il présenté comme une « dérogation » au mécanisme de Dublin. Enfin, et sans que l’on voie exactement où elle entend se diriger, la Commission promet d’ouvrir le chantier de la réforme de Dublin en « mars 2016 ».

Sans tir de sommation, la salve de la chancelière allemande fait mouche et semble ouvrir un nouveau chapitre de la politique d’asile : « soyons francs, le processus de Dublin, dans sa forme actuelle, est obsolète » a-t-elle asséné aux parlementaires européens.

Dès lors, faut-il croire que la conclusion de la chancelière fera office de feuille de route ? Consciente de l’impasse dans laquelle sa politique l’a engagée, l’Union sera-t-elle capable d’une part d’ouvrir des voies légales d’accès à la protection et, d’autre part, de s’accorder sur une répartition équitable des charges telle que ses traités l’y invitent ?

(Amnesty International Briefing ) FENCED OUT : HUNGARY’S VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE 

INTRODUCTION

“[W]e would like Europe to be preserved for the Europeans. But there is something we would not just like but we want because it only depends on us: we want to preserve a Hungarian Hungary” Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, 25 July 20151

“We are also humans. Before we lived in peace and we have had our lives and dreams torn apart by wars and greed of the governments.” Hiba Almashhadani, an Iraqi refugee, 21 September 20152

In the first eight months of 2015, 161,000 people claimed asylum in Hungary. The Office for Immigration and Nationality has estimated that two thirds of those arriving3 were asylum-seekers from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq who entered the country irregularly.4 These are, unquestionably, large numbers and they have presented Hungary with considerable, if not entirely unforeseeable, challenges. Hungary’s response to these challenges has, however, been hugely problematic. While Hungary is bearing much of the brunt of the EU’s structurally unbalanced asylum regime, it has also shown a singular unwillingness to engage in collective EU efforts to address these shortcomings and participate in initiatives designed to redistribute the responsibility for receiving and processing asylum seekers, notably the relocation and “hotspot” processing schemes that the European Commission and Council have been proposing.

Instead, Hungary has moved in recent months to construct fences along its southern borders, criminalise irregular entry to its territory and expedite the return of asylum seekers and refugees to Serbia, through its inclusion on a list of safe countries of transit. The cumulative effect, and desired consequence, of these measures will be to render Hungary a refugee protection free zone. Ultimately, Hungary’s attempts to insulate itself against a regional, and wider global, refugee crisis can only be achieved at the expense of the respect its international human rights and refugee law obligations. In fact, this is already happening; only the completion of a fence along the Croatian border is preventing Hungary’s isolationist migration policies from reaching fruition.

Hungary’s determination to avoid its responsibilities towards refugees is not just a Hungarian problem. It is also an EU problem. Hungary’s policies are not preventing entry to the EU, they are merely displacing the routes refugees and migrants are taking to reach it. Hungary’s policies also represent a structural threat to the rule of law and the respect for human rights that other member states and EU institutions cannot afford to ignore. The EU should therefore engage Hungary in a formal discussion, as foreseen by Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union, with a view to bringing its migration and asylum policies in line with EU and other international law obligations and ensuring that Hungary participates fully in collective EU initiatives and reforms designed to address the current refugee crisis, while receiving the considerable support it needs to do so.

THE UNFOLDING OF THE “CRISIS”

On 15 September 2015 the Hungarian government declared a “crisis situation caused by mass immigration”.5 On the same day, the construction of a fence on the border with Serbia was finished and amendments to the Criminal Code and Asylum Law, making it an offence to enter the country through the border fence and establishing “transit zones” at the border, entered into effect.

On 21 September, the Hungarian Parliament adopted further amendments to the Police Act and the Act on National Defence. These extend the powers of the police in situations of “crisis caused by mass immigration” to block roads, ban or restrain the operation of public institutions, shut down areas and buildings and restrain or ban the entering and leaving of such places. The new measures authorise the army to support the police securing the border in the crisis situation and to use rubber bullets, tear gas grenades and pyrotechnical devices.6

On 22 September, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a resolution which stated, among other things, that Hungary should defend its borders by “every necessary means” against “waves of illegal immigration”. The resolution stated: “[W]e cannot allow illegal migrants to endanger the jobs and social security of the Hungarian people. We have the right to defend our culture, language, and values.”7

The number of asylum seekers in Hungary in 2015, represents a significant increase on the 42,777 applications registered in 2014. 8 The Hungarian government had, however, long been received signals of an expected increase in asylum applications. As early as 2012 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency) as well as NGOs were calling for an improvement of the reception facilities for asylum-seekers in Hungary and the need to bring them in line with the EU reception standards.9

Instead of introducing measures in line with these calls, the government started to work on measures to keep refugees and migrants out of the country. In 2015 it spent 3.2 million Euros10 on a “national consultation on immigration and terrorism”11 in the course of which it distributed a questionnaire to over eight million citizens seeking answers to questions such as whether or not those who cross the borders illegally should be detained for a period longer than 24 hours.12 Another 1.3 million Euros was spent on an anti-refugee billboard campaign that included messages such as “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the jobs of Hungarians” or “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!”.13 98 million Euros was spent on the construction of the border fence with Serbia.14 The 2015 budget of the Office of Immigration and Nationality responsible for reception of asylum seekers and processing applications was 27.5 million Euros.15

The government did however move swiftly with the adoption of measures aiming at keeping refugees and migrants out and facilitating their return. On 1 August 2015, an amendment of the Asylum Law16 entered into force which authorized the government to issue a lists of safe countries of origin and safe third countries of transit. Serbia, Macedonia and EU member states, including Greece, are considered safe by the Hungarian authorities as a result of these changes, meaning that asylum applications by people transiting through from these countries can be sent back to them following expedited proceedings.17 On 15 September another set of amendments came into effect. They criminalized “illegal entry” through the border fence and introduced “transit zones” for asylum-seekers at the border and other changes.18

On 17 September, the Minister of Interior ordered a “partial border closure” of the border crossings at the Röszke/Horgoš motorway and at the express road for a period of 30 days. It justified it as a measure “in the interest of the protection of public security”.19 During the period of the partial border closure, it was not possible for passengers, vehicles and cargo to cross the state border between Hungary and Serbia. The border was re-opened on 20 September after the Hungarian and Serbian Ministries of Interior “succeeded in finding a solution to opening the border crossing station and ensuring the continued flow of passenger and cargo traffic.”20

Following the effective sealing off of the border with Serbia in mid-September, refugees and migrants started entering Hungary through the border with Croatia through the crossings at Beremend21 and Zakány.22 By the beginning of October an average of about 4,000 people were entering on a daily basis according to the Hungarian police.23 The measures taken by the Hungarian government have therefore served primarily to redirect the flow of refugees and migrants, not stop it. However, Hungary has already begun constructing a similar fence along the Croatian border, and has already almost completed the laying of barbed wire along its entirety.24 Once a full-scale fence has been constructed, asylum-seekers will effectively no longer be able to access Hungarian territory and protection proceedings. Those that do succeed in crossing the fence will be liable to prosecution – and return to Serbia or Croatia.25

INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF HUNGARY’S MIGRATION POLICIES

Hungary’s draconian response to the increase of the number of refugees and migrants entering the country has been roundly criticised by international human rights bodies.

On 15 September, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland wrote to the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, expressing concerns over the legislation adopted “in the context of the migration crisis“. He asked for assurances that Hungary is still committed to its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Secretary General also warned that Hungary cannot derogate from its obligation to protect the right to life, prohibition of torture and other rights.26

On 17 September, the UN Human Rights Commissioner Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said that amendments of the Criminal Code and the Asylum Law which entered into force on 15 September are incompatible with the human rights commitments binding on Hungary. “This is an entirely unacceptable infringement of the human rights of refugees and migrants. Seeking asylum is not a crime, and neither is entering a country irregularly.” The UN Human Rights Commissioner further observed that some of the actions carried out by the Hungarian authorities, such as denying entry, arresting, summarily rejecting and returning refugees, using disproportionate force on migrants and refugees, as well as reportedly assaulting journalists and seizing video documentation, amounted to clear violations of international law.27 He also noted “the xenophobic and anti-Muslim views that appear to lie at the heart of current Hungarian Government policy”.

The response of the EU institutions has been less unequivocal. The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopolous, declared during his visit to Hungary on 17 September that “[The EU] will work collectively to protect the Union’s external borders.” Hungary, he noted, “is doing part in this work… [although the EC does] not always agree with the means used.” Commissioner Avramopolous expressed a commitment “to work with [EU’s] neighbours – establishing a common list of safe countries of origin and intensifying cooperation with the Western Balkan countries and Turkey.” At the same time, however, he acknowledged a “moral duty… inscribed in international and European laws” to offer protection to those who need it.28

METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING Continue reading “(Amnesty International Briefing ) FENCED OUT : HUNGARY’S VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS”