Speaking of EU legislation and.. of sausages making. Still today there is no way of knowing how EU “Safe Countries” legislation was made ..

By Emilio De Capitani

Setting the ..table

“Laws are like sausages. It is best not to see them being made” is the most famous Otto Bismark’s quote, (even though, there’s no evidence, that Bismarck ever said it, much less coined it…). This statement may well come to mind when looking at the procedure followed by the EU legislators when preparing, negotiating and adopting the legislation on “Safe Countries”. The legislative act is Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union. It consolidates the first list of EU “Safe countries” established by Regulation (EU) 2026/464 as well as the new rules defining the concept of ‘safe country’ eg Regulation (EU) 2026/463

It is worth noting that these texts creates some “legal presumptions” whose main justification is to make easier to repatriate or expel both irregular migrants and people who have not been granted the right to asylum[1] These legal presumption which amounts to consider as unfounded most of the request for protection of the people trying to enter the EU from these third countries and because of this it significantly restricts the rights of people who are extradited, removed or turned back. It will be up to them to prove in very short deadlines that, in exceptional circumstances, the concept of a safe country of origin should not apply in their specific case (see paragraph 5 of Regulation 2026/464)[2] . Furthermore, the right to judicial protection, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, would be severely restricted, as judicial appeals must be lodged within very short time limits, would not automatically have suspensive effect and, in the event of a negative decision, the individual would not be permitted to remain legally within the territory of the EU.

On these aspects it is worth recalling the art.52.1 of the EU  Charter which states “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law (emphasis added) and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.  Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.limitations to fundamental rights may be adopted “

Has the principle of legislative transparency been respected in the Safe Countries case ?

In the following lines I will focus notably on some principles of the EU Legislation which in my opinion have been violated in this case.

It is self evident that these three Regulations have been adopted under the joint responsibility of the European Parliament and of the Council [3]following the so called “ordinary procedure” (art.294 TFEU) and are therefore EU “legislative acts” (art.289 TFEU). However it is worth recalling that since Lisbon art.15.2 TFEU has established the obligation of  legislative transparency which covers not only the votes (as it was the case before Lisbon) but also debates and negotiating preparatory documents. Unsurprisingly the CJEU has declared in 2018 that “transparency is inherent to legislative procedure” as legislative transparency is the main expression of EU democratic nature. As such, the co-legislator obligation of proactively publishing legislative preparatory documents shall not depend from the aleatory condition that citizens may submit a request for access to these documents. Proactive publication of legislative preparatory documents paves also the way for citizens’ timely participation to the EU decision making process as granted by art.10.3  11 of the TEU.

Building on the CJEU jurisprudence on Safe Countries ..

Furthermore in the case of the EU legislation defining the “safe countries” the general obligation of legislative transparency foreseen by art.15.2 TFEU has already been strengthened by the CJEU jurisprudence. According to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Alace and Canpelli (in joined cases C-758/24, paragraphs 86–87, and C-759/24), “ the information justifying the designation of a third country as ‘safe’ – and on which a legal presumption may be based – must be precise and accessible not only to the public but, in particular, to the person seeking asylum or being refused entry; and, above all, it must be verifiable by any court called upon to rule on the matter[4](emphasis added). This jurisprudence was referring to national legislation dealing with “safe countries” and in my opinion is transferrable also to EU legislation. Moreover Article 61 of the same ‘Procedures’ Regulation, provides for the use of ‘relevant and available’ sources in order to verify whether a country can be defined as safe.  In other words, the designation of a country as ‘safe’ cannot be the result of mere political discretion, as it affects the exercise of a fundamental right (the right to political asylum) and because it may limit the prohibition on expulsion laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Unfortunately, it is by no means clear from the text and the preparatory work on the European legislation concerning safe countries what information the legislator relied on in designating several third Countries as ‘safe’. This is notably the case of Regulation (EU) 2024/0464, which, despite affecting the exercise of fundamental rights, did not undergo an impact assessment, as required by the 2016 ‘Better Law-Making’ Interinstitutional Agreement. Instead it merely refers to information gathered by the European Asylum Agency (EUAA) which may be considered the real impact assesment in this case. As such, following the 2018 “ClientHeart” jurisprudence on the accessibility of legislative impact assessment  it should had been, at least partially disclosed.  No way: when in 2024 I submitted to the EUAA a request of access to that information I received a negative answer for procedural reasons. Then I challenged the refusal of disclosure before the General Court (case T-661/25).[5] On my side the history could had be ended here awaiting for the General Court Ruling but something, unexpected, happened and may now re-open the issue of legislative transparency of that EU legislation on Safe Countries even before the CJEU.

India is a “safe Country” ? No according to the association “Sikhs for Justice”

It is worth noting that the EU has declared, that INDIA is a “safe” Country  for all its territory and for all the categories of people living there notwithstanding Article 63 of the ‘Procedures’ Regulation would had permitted to exclude parts of the territory or specific categories of persons. The latter approach has been adopted, for example, by the legislation of the Netherlands, which states: “The designation of this country as a safe country of origin does not apply to: • people originating from the ‘union territory’ of Jammu and Kashmir; • religious minorities who have experienced problems because of belonging to that religious minority; • Dalit women and girls; • journalists; • persons who have been critical of the Indian government and government policy, and have experienced problems as a result (for example, human rights activists, academics and demonstrators).” ([6] )

However these reservations, which, if mirrored at EU level would allowed for greater protection of certain categories of people and citizens of certain Indian states, can no longer be invoked because the new EU-level general declaration ([7]) declaring India as safe takes precedence over national declarations. However, a number of questions may arise, such as: which of the two declarations more accurately reflects the reality on the ground in India? On what facts was the Netherlands’ decision based, and on what other elements the European legislator has decided that certain safeguards intended for specific categories of people and specific regions of India can no longer be invoked?

This may explain why a representative of the Sikhs for Justice association has recently submitted a request of access to documents to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union.

Both the EP and the Council have, at least as a first reaction, refused to disclose the EUAA information.

How EU legislative transparency may be granted by invoking “classified” information?

On one side it has been evoked the risk for EU external relations even though what is at stake is the autonomy of EU “internal” legislation and not international negotiations.

On the other side both the institutions have declared that the Asylum Agency has ‘classified’ these information as ‘RESTREINT’ and that the EP and the Council have retained that classification.

This is quite disturbing because first the only institutions which may “classify” EU information according to art.9 of Regulation 1049/01 are at very large extent the Commission, the EP and the Council which were the only institutions covered by art.255 TCE on which Regulation 1049/01 was founded. Moreover it emerges very clearly from the legislative preparatory work of Regulation 1049/01 that art.9 was as an exceptional regime for information covering only EU and MS defence policies ([8]) and clearly not information dealing with a Country general condition of “safety” as in the this case.

It is at least unfortunate that the this EUAA ‘classification’ has been  subsequently endorsed by the Commission when the legislative proposal and, later, by the Parliament and the Council in their capacity as legislators. However even if endorsed by the EP and the Council this choice  appears open to criticism, at the very least, in terms of both form and content. It is open to criticism in terms of form, insofar as the ‘RESTREINT’ level is not provided for in Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/01, the only European legislation dealing with ‘sensitive information’ that may be shared only with authorised persons (‘need to know’). But it is open to criticism above all on the merits, as two scenarios could be envisaged:

  1.  either this information proves that India is a safe country, in which case it is difficult to see what negative consequences a possible disclosure might have,
  2. or, conversely, it proves the opposite, in which case its ‘classification’ would violate European law on two counts.

Indeed, by declaring a country to be safe, despite independent information to the contrary, the European legislator would be exercising its remit in an arbitrary manner (which should instead be based on independent and objective information, precisely because it affects the exercise of a fundamental right such as the right to asylum and compliance with the prohibition on refoulement, as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights).

Above all, however, the ‘classification’ of the information used to justify the concept of a ‘safe country’ meant that its contents could not be debated publicly during the legislative negotiations, particularly in the European Parliament which denounced this situation in its resolution on access to documents.[9]  

Conclusion

Invoking classified information to justify the non disclosure of legislative preparatory documents seems to me a clear breach of the principle of legislative transparency laid down in Article 15(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and risks, unfortunately, of bringing the European legislator closer to that of North Korea[10] .

The procedure for access to documents, initiated by the Sikhs for Justice Association, is still ongoing, so it is not yet clear whether the European Court will be called upon to settle the matter, but in the meantime, the Sikhs for Justice association has taken steps to limit the damage caused by the new European regulations, including through ‘participatory’ channels, by publishing an open letter and by submitting a petition to the European Parliament calling for the suspension and amendment of India’s designation as a ‘safe country’ (as foreseen by Article 63 of the ‘Procedures’ Regulation)

It now remains to be seen whether the legality of designating India as a ‘safe’ country will be reviewed through the courts or following a legislative review process. Whatever the future of the European legislation may be, it is certainly commendable and noteworthy that representatives of civil society, such as the organisation Sikhs for Justice, are fighting so resolutely not only for the respect of their own fundamental rights, but also for better quality legislation and European democracy, in accordance with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of minorities, solidarity and non-discrimination, upon which the European Union is founded.


[1] Article 41(1)(e) and Article 3(a) concerning accelerated procedures

[2] see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600464

[3]  As required by see art 14 and 16 TEU.

[4] SEE: “(86 ) However, the effectiveness of judicial review regarding compliance with the substantive conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 2013/32 presupposes that the court before which the case is brought has access to the sources of information on the basis of which the competent national authority designated the third country in question as a safe country of origin. That requirement of effectiveness also implies that the court in question must be able to verify whether that designation complies with the substantive conditions set out in Annex I to that directive, taking into account any other information it may have gathered itself, whether from public sources or from sources which it has requested one of the parties to the proceedings before it to produce, provided that, on the one hand, the reliability of that information has been established and, on the other hand, in accordance with the principle of the right to be heard, those parties have the opportunity to submit their observations on that information. (87 ) It follows that Member States are required, under Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, to adapt their national law in such a way as to ensure sufficient and adequate access to the sources of information on which they have relied in designating safe countries of origin. Such access must enable an applicant for international protection originating from such a country, and the national court hearing an appeal against a decision concerning the application for international protection, to familiarise themselves effectively with those sources of information in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 78 of this judgment.”

[5] Even though the main issue at stake in this case is the fact that I have submitted my confirmatory application with two days delay that EUAA has considered mandatory and I consider only of ordinatory nature.  

[6] See Council document WK 8158/2025, pp. 23–24

[7]  According to Regulation (EU) “With regard to India, according to information from the Asylum Agency, nine Member States currently designate it as a safe country of origin at national level, and in 2024 the recognition rate at Union level for applicants from that country was 2 per cent. The country has ratified the main international human rights instruments. India is a constitutional republic with a parliamentary democracy. There is no evidence of expulsion, removal or extradition of Indian nationals to countries where they would be at risk of being subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment. In general, there is no real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347. Although India retains the death penalty in its criminal law and has not signed the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which aims to abolish the death penalty, in practice the death penalty has not been carried out since 2020. India has signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. There are no armed conflicts in India and, consequently, there are no threats arising from indiscriminate violence in situations of internal or international armed conflict. In general, there is no persecution in the country within the meaning of Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347.”

[8] Following the adoption of art.9 the European parliament accepted to withdraw a Court Case dealing with an agreement between the Council and NATO (so called “Solana agreement”)

[9] “..calls, in particular, on the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to grant the European Parliament timely access to its documents, in particular information and analysis on safe countries of origin and safe non-EU countries..” Par 16 of  European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2026 on public access to documents – report covering the years 2022 – 2024 (2025/2137(INI)) (C/2026/4005)

[10] As stated in plenary by Graham Watson, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, on May 2nd,2000 when voting on the Access to documents last compromise.

Transforming the EU in a freedom security and justice area: first Council ideas for a Strategic Agenda (2019-2024)

This is a joint discussion paper for both justice and home affairs submitted by the Croatian Presidency to the other delegations and to be debated at the Informal JHA Council in Zagreb on January 23rd-24th

Working  Session  I.

Looking ahead to the area of freedom, security and justice

In June 2019, the European Council adopted the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 to guide the European Union’s work in the next five years. Its first priority, ‘protecting citizens and freedoms’, is particularly relevant for Justice and Home Affairs, as is its second priority on the ‘economic base’ and the ‘European model for the future’.

As indicated in the concluding section of the Strategic Agenda, the Council is to integrate these priorities into its work.

The first step in the implementation of the Strategic Agenda in the field of JHA was a reflection process initiated by the Romanian Presidency and further developed by the Finnish Presidency.

Several important debates have taken place at preparatory and ministerial level on the basis of reflection papers covering a wide range of JHA topics.

The Finnish Presidency wrapped up this important work in December 2019.

The outcome of this extensive process and the numerous projects that emerged from it are reflected in various documents addressed to all Member States and the Commission by our Finnish colleagues.

The Croatian Presidency has inherited the results of this reflection process and considers it essential to continue looking ahead and start preparing the ground for strategic guidelines under Article 68 TFEU2 which will take forward the Strategic Agenda and facilitate its implementation.

The first topic mentioned in the Strategic Agenda refers to fundamental rights, the protection of our democratic and societal models and the rule of law. Hence, a priority for our future work should be values and the rule of law.

The Strategic Agenda also mentions our common values as ‘the foundation of European freedom, security and prosperity’. Debates within the Council have demonstrated a growing   concern that respect for these values is being challenged.

This hampers the proper application of EU law and instruments that are based on mutual recognition.

The second priority could therefore be to find ways of restoring mutual trust.

The third topic developed in the Strategic Agenda relates to the integrity of our territory, understood to mean control of our borders, the development of a functioning migration policy, and the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime.

A third area for consideration could thus be protecting the integrity of our common European space.

Finally, the first part of the Strategic Agenda mentions the need to protect our societies from malicious cyber activities and acknowledges the critical importance of more cooperation, more coordination, more resources and more technological capacities.

In addition, the second part, related to economic development, refers to the digital transformation and the need to shape our policy in a way that embodies our societal values, promotes inclusiveness and remains compatible with our way of life. We would therefore suggest that the fourth priority should be to find ways of mastering artificial intelligence and new technologies.

To inform our discussion, you will find attached a thematic annex which covers, for ease of reference, most of the policy areas explored in the reflection process conducted by previous presidencies.

As we try to identify possible ways forward in our policy field, the Croatian Presidency suggests organising our discussions around these four cross-cutting issues and focusing our attention on how to organise our work, tools and structures to achieve our common objectives.

Ministers are invited to discuss how these four cross-cutting issues (values and rule of law, mutual trust, protecting our common European space, and new technologies) can be best addressed in order to deliver on the Strategic Agenda and the priorities developed in the thematic annex.

ANNEX

Developments in the area of freedom, security and justice for the period 2019-2024

Introduction

Following the Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992), justice and home affairs became one of the three pillars of the European Union.

The Schengen Agreement (1995) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) emphasised the importance of cooperation and exchange of information among Member States’ justice and law enforcement authorities with the aim of creating an area of freedom, security and justice.

Moreover, the Tampere Programme (European Council conclusions of 1999) and the Hague Programme laid the foundations of the common European Justice and Home Affairs policy, including the cornerstones of cooperation with third countries and the future European judicial area.

Following the institutional changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Member States adopted the Stockholm Programme (2009-2014), which highlighted the significance of European policies for European citizens, particularly in the following areas: rights of citizens, rule of law and justice, internal security (combating terrorism, law enforcement and disaster management, management of the external border and visa policy, migration and asylum (including integration) and the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice).

In its conclusions of June 2014, the European Council established, on the basis of the values defined in the Stockholm Programme, the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (for the period 2014-2019).

On 20 June 2019, the European Council adopted the new Strategic Agenda 2019-2024, which, among other goals, emphasises the importance of protecting citizens and freedoms and promoting European interests and values on the global stage.

Accordingly, the Croatian Presidency recognises the importance of the prompt adoption of the strategic guidelines through which the Member States will pave the way to the implementation of further policies in the field of justice and home affairs, with the aim of creating an environment of the European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice.

Looking ahead to the area of freedom, security and justice

Criminal justice

The Strategic Plan for the Union (2019-2024) clearly confirms the aim of strengthening the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime, as well as improving cooperation.

The emphasis in this area will be on improving the implementation of existing instruments and filling gaps in the legislative framework where they exist.

Also, in the coming period it will be necessary to work on strengthening mutual trust between the Member States, which is key to successful judicial cooperation, as well as on developing networks and fostering coordination and synergies between them.

In the coming period, it is important to work on improving the existing acquis in the area of substantive criminal law, and to develop it cautiously, where necessary.

The EU’s ability to develop new acquis in this area must enable common solutions to common challenges, based on the real needs of the EU.

This is relevant to the extension of the competence of the EPPO as well.

Further development of victims’ rights should be approached in a systematic and holistic manner, taking into account the need to secure and/or strengthen all aspects of their protection.

Civil justice

In the coming period, it is necessary to continue with development of judicial cooperation in civil matters, with a focus on citizens, enabling faster and cheaper justice for citizens and businesses in the EU. The implementation of European Union instruments needs to be strengthened to this end.

Legal certainty and prosperity of citizens and businesses must be a guiding principle for future legislative initiatives in civil and commercial law at EU level.

In this sense, effective access to justice is a precondition for economic growth and development, and thus the development of society in general.

Accordingly, all new legislative developments must be based on the practical needs of citizens and businesses, and on evidence of clear added value.

Work needs to be done to strengthen the single market, whose backbone is formed by    SMEs, and it is necessary to secure fair competition and promote fairness and legal certainty in business relations.

It is also necessary for the EU to continue to protect citizens and families in cross-border situations.

One of the aspects of modernisation of the judiciary, which must respond to the needs and trends of modern times, is the further development and application of alternative dispute resolution, including online, bearing in mind its effectiveness, speed and acceptability to the parties.

Judicial training

Judicial training was recognised as an important prerequisite for establishing a unified European judicial culture and for the proper application of EU law.

Therefore, in the forthcoming period, it will be necessary to continue to invest effort both in expanding the content of training and in improving the quality of learning about EU law through sustainable funding, consistent programmes, an enlarged scope to include all judicial professions as well as, for example, familiarisation with the practice of European courts through internships, and further use of modern learning techniques and further linguistic training.

A modern judiciary

The progress and modernisation of the judiciary must, in the coming period, be a particular focus of our activities and be in line with the progress of the European Union as a whole.

The modernisation of the judiciary will make it more effective and also facilitate access to justice for both natural and legal persons. Therefore, the modernisation of the judiciary should continue to be developed through the additional improvement of IT tools/systems, and the introduction of the use of digital technologies into the acquis as a shared standard in its application and thus a key component of efficient digitalised justice systems in the EU.

It will also be necessary to work on interconnection and interoperability between Member States’ systems. Particular emphasis in this respect should be placed on the development of artificial intelligence.

Protection and promotion of common values, including fundamental rights, the rule of law and democratic values

Ensuring continuity in protecting the fundamental values of the European Union – respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law – will continue to be crucial to the democratic functioning of the European Union and the protection of all its citizens, as well as the reputation and acknowledgement of the European Union in the world.

In this context, the European Union, with the ongoing task of upholding and promoting these values, must be capable and respond to threats to them within the European Union, always in an effort to maintain the unity of the European Union and its Member States.

In addition, the phenomenon of hate speech and large-scale disinformation will have to be addressed, and further efforts should be made to protect vulnerable groups.

The external dimension of the judiciary

Co-operation with third countries and international organisations is important for a number of reasons. Namely, the European Union can, through the external dimension of the judiciary, contribute to a more uniform legal framework in the international setting, which contributes to the overall economic progress of the European Union, the successful fight against crime and terrorism, and also the protection of human rights.

Furthermore, the European Union can be an ‘exporter’ of its own values, many of which are reflected in the judiciary – for example, the independence of the judiciary. The latter is particularly important in relations with candidate countries for EU membership.

Efficient control of external borders and a return to the proper functioning of the Schengen area

Strong and reliable external border protection, efficient return of irregular migrants and strict implementation of other relevant tools contributing to successful and comprehensive migration management are the key prerequisites for a return to a properly functioning Schengen area and for the overall security of the European Union.

With the aim of meeting these goals, the Member States need to invest further efforts to establish a fully operational European Border and Coast Guard, which should reach its target capacity of 10 000 border guards as soon as possible, and at the latest by 2024.

In parallel, more determination is required in order to implement the status agreements in the countries of south-east Europe, which will enable the exercise of the Agencies’ external competences in this region.

Together with the full operationalisation of the European Border and Coast Guard and  efficient returns, Member States need to continue work on efficient and timely implementation of the interoperability legislative framework, ensuring that the synergy of all these measures will lead to well-protected external borders and subsequent restoration of a genuine Schengen area. In doing so, the Member States should strive to improve their cooperation with third countries and invest greater effort in restoring mutual trust.

A comprehensive and functional migration policy

Proactive migration management calls for comprehensive action-taking on all levels and a truly European approach based on responsibility and solidarity. The focus must be on all   migratory routes, particularly land routes, which directly influence the security of the EU external border.

Establishment of a functional, humane and resilient asylum system, as an inevitable part of a comprehensive migration policy, should be based on joint obligations and fair burden-sharing among the Member States. Such an approach is the only way for the Member States to fulfil their obligations towards those who are truly in need of international protection.

It is also crucial in this context to establish a system for the quick return of those who have no right to stay in the European Union. Thus, the list of safe third countries and the list of safe countries of origin should be urgently adopted.

Along with these measures, establishing pathways for legal migration to the European Union is becoming increasingly important. Legal manners of arrival, including resettlement, reduce the incentive to use smuggling routes to Europe, protect human life and dignity and have multiple benefits for our societies and economies.

Therefore, our cooperation with partner countries should be the main tool for tackling the root causes of illegal migration, providing assistance to refugees, managing mixed migration flows, combating smuggling and document fraud, ensuring efficient readmissions and providing tailor-made legal pathways.

A Europe that protects – a safe Union

The security environment of the European Union has changed drastically in the past few years. Therefore, we need to aim to build an efficient and genuine Security Union, capable of responding to the threats of the new age and protecting our children, citizens and societies.

The main challenges we need to deal with are those of a cross-border nature, such as terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime, but also other forms of unacceptable behaviour that could undermine our common security and the values of our societies – child sexual abuse, hate speech, radicalisation leading to violent extremism and intolerance.

In the years to come, no efforts should be spared in tackling the dissemination of terrorist content and child sexual abuse material online, protecting public spaces and addressing the proliferating challenge of hybrid threats that attack the heart of our democracies and endanger our critical infrastructure.

Thus, along with the swift implementation of legislative acts in the field of border protection, exchange of data among law enforcement bodies, firearms, explosives, financing of terrorism and interoperability, we have to strive for adequate legal and technological solutions for the use of artificial intelligence and other new technologies that take into account the protection of personal data and privacy, meet the highest standards of security of information systems, and are defined by ethical boundaries.

Finding the right answers to such a wide spectrum of security challenges should also be complemented by efforts to increase the EU’s resillience against both natural and man-made disasters. Unfortunately, the European Union is facing a great number of frequent and complex disasters which cause loss of human lives and other adverse consequences for our citizens, economies, communities and environment.

It is therefore crucial to keep on building capacities at both national and EU level in order to prevent or to decrease the possibility of disasters. However, being aware that not all disasters can be prevented, we need to continue to work on strengthening our national and common EU reactive capacities in order to be able to save as many lives as possible and to recover from the consequences of various disasters in the shortest possible period.

Investing in our capacities to face the security challenges of the digital age

Responding properly and in a timely manner to such diverse and complex security challenges requires that our police, border, asylum and customs services are well-equipped, and that the legal framework in place provides for their successful mutual cooperation, as well as for cooperation with the relevant EU agencies.

Therefore, in the next five years, Member States will work hand in hand in order to successfully implement the adopted legal acts in a timely manner and to fill legal gaps where they exist. To this end, the swift adoption and implementation of the proposed Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online is a key priority.

Furthermore, Member States will insist that sufficient EU funds within the next multiannual financial framework will be allocated to upgrading the technical capabilities, human resources and expertise of all relevant actors whom we expect to play a vital role in ensuring our security in the digital age. It is necessary to ensure practical uptake of the outcomes of research and innovation, and thus coordination between Horizon Europe and other European financial programmes. Due to the economies of scale and the need to provide all EU Member States with the same level playing field, it is advisable to opt for concentrated investments related to the innovation and development of artificial intelligence in the domain of security and migration to make the outcome accessible and available to all Member States.

Therefore, the JHA Agencies, in particular the European Innovation Lab within Europol, should play a central role, taking into account the concentrated knowledge, expertise and secure environment at their disposal. Furthermore, private business should be involved throughout the process, and public-private partnerships should be promoted.