Category: 2. Values & principles of the European Union

AMERICAN MASS SURVEILLANCE OF EU CITIZENS: IS THE END NIGH?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON EU LAW ANALYSIS  (Wednesday, 23 September 2015)

by Steve PEERS

*This blog post is dedicated to the memory of the great privacy campaigner Caspar Bowden, who passed away recently. What a tragedy he did not leave to see the developments in this case. To continue his work, you can donate to the Caspar Bowden Legacy Fund here.

 

A brilliant university student takes on the hidebound establishment – and ultimately wins spectacularly. That was Mark Zuckerberg, founding Facebook, in 2002. But it could be Max Schrems, taking on Zuckerberg and Facebook, in the near future – if the Court of Justice decides to follow the Advocate-General’s opinion in the Schrems case, released today.

In fact, Facebook is only a conduit in this case: Schrems’ real targets are the US government (for requiring Facebook and other Internet companies to hand over personal data to intelligence agencies), as well as the EU Commission and the Irish data protection authority for going along with this. In the Advocate-General’s opinion, the Commission’s decision to allow EU citizens’ data to be subject to mass surveillance in the US is invalid, and the national data protection authorities in the EU must investigate these flows of data and prohibit them if necessary. The case has the potential to change much of the way that American Internet giants operate, and to complicate relations between the US and the EU in this field.

Background

There’s more about the background to this litigation here, and Simon McGarr has summarised the CJEU hearing in this case here. But I’ll summarise the basics of the case again here briefly.

Max Schrems is an Austrian Facebook user who was disturbed by Edward Snowden’s revelations about mass surveillance by US intelligence agencies. Since such mass surveillance is put into effect by imposing obligations to cooperate upon Internet companies, he wanted to complain about Facebook’s transfers of his personal data to the USA. Since Facebook’s European operations are registered in Ireland, he had to bring his complaints to the Irish data protection authority.

The legal regime applicable to such transfers of personal data is the ‘Safe Harbour’ agreement between the EU and the USA, agreed in 2000 – before the creation of Facebook and some other modern Internet giants, and indeed before the 9/11 terrorist attacks which prompted the mass surveillance. This agreement was put into effect in the EU by a decision of the Commission, which used the power conferred by the EU’s current data protection Directive to declare that transfers of personal data to the USA received an ‘adequate level of protection’ there.

The primary means of enforcing the arrangement was self-certification of the companies concerned (not all transfers to the USA fall within the scope of the Safe Harbour decision), enforced by the US authorities.  But it was also possible (not mandatory) for the national data protection authorities which enforce EU data protection law to suspend transfers of personal data, if the US authorities or enforcement system have found a breach of the rules, or on the following further list of limited grounds set out in the decision:

there is a substantial likelihood that the Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not take adequate and timely steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to data subjects; and the competent authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to provide the organisation with notice and an opportunity to respond.

In fact, Irish law prevents the national authorities from taking up this option. So the national data protection authority effectively refused to consider Schrems’ complaint. He challenged that decision before the Irish High Court, which doubted that this system was compatible with EU law (or indeed the Irish constitution). So that court asked the CJEU to rule on whether national data protection authorities (DPAs) should have the power to prevent data transfers in cases like these.

The Opinion

The Advocate-General first of all answers the question which the Irish court asks, and then goes on to examine whether the Safe Harbour decision is in fact valid. I’ll address those two issues in turn.

In the Advocate-General’s view, national data protection authorities have to be able to consider claims that flows of personal data to third countries are not compatible with EU data protection laws, even if the Commission has adopted a decision declaring that they are. This stems from the powers and independence of those authorities, read in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which expressly refers to DPAs’ role and independence. (On the recent CJEU case law on DPA independence, see discussion here). It’s worth noting that the new EU data protection law under negotiation, the data protection Regulation, will likely confirm and even enhance the powers and independence of DPAs. (More on that aspect of the proposed Regulation here).

On the second point, the opinion assesses whether the Safe Harbour Decision correctly decided that there was an ‘adequate level of protection’ for personal data in the USA. Crucially, it argues that this assessment is dynamic: it must take account of the protection of personal data now, not just when the Decision was adopted back in 2000.

As for the meaning of an ‘adequate level of protection’, the opinion argues that this means that third countries must ensure standards ‘essentially equivalent to that afforded by the Directive, even though the manner in which that protection is implemented may differ from that’ within the EU, due to the importance of protecting human rights within the EU. The assessment of third-country standards must examine both the content of those standards and their enforcement, which entailed ‘adequate guarantees and a sufficient control mechanism’, so there was no ‘lower level of protection than processing within the European Union’. Within the EU, the essential method of guaranteeing data protection rights was independent DPAs.

Applying these principles, the opinion accepts that personal data transferred to the USA by Facebook is subject to ‘mass and indiscriminate surveillance and interception’ by intelligence agencies, and that EU citizens have ‘no effective right to be heard’ in such cases. These findings necessarily mean that the Safe Harbour decision was invalid for breach of the Charter and the data protection Directive.

More particularly, the derogation for the national security rules of US law set out in the Safe Harbour principles was too general, and so the implementation of this derogation was ‘not limited to what is strictly necessary’. EU citizens had no remedy against breaches of the ‘purpose limitation’ principle in the US either, and there should be an ‘independent control mechanism suitable for preventing the breaches of the right to privacy’.

The opinion then assesses the dispute from the perspective of the EU Charter of Rights. It first concludes that the transfer of the personal data in question constitutes interference with the right to private life. As in last year’s Digital Rights Ireland judgment (discussed here), on the validity of the EU’s data retention directive, the interference with rights was ‘particularly serious, given the large numbers of users concerned and the quantities of data transferred’. In fact, due to the secret nature of access to the data, the interference was ‘extremely serious’. The Advocate-General was also concerned about the lack of information about the surveillance for EU citizens, and the lack of an effective remedy, which breaches Article 47 of the Charter.

However, interference with these fundamental rights can be justified according to Article 52(1) of the Charter, as long as the interference is ‘provided for by law’, ‘respect[s] the essence’ of the right, satisfies the ‘principle of proportionality’ and is ‘necessary’ to ‘genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by’ the EU ‘or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.

In the Advocate-General’s view, the US law does not respect the ‘essence’ of the Charter rights, since it extends to the content of the communications. (In contrast, the data collected pursuant to the data retention Directive which the CJEU struck down last year concerned only information on the use of phones and the Internet, not the content of phone calls and Facebook posts et al). On the same basis, he objected to the ‘broad wording’ of the relevant derogations on national security grounds, which did not clearly define the ‘legitimate interests’ at stake. Therefore, the derogation did not comply with the Charter, ‘since it does not pursue an objective of general interest defined with sufficient precision’. Moreover, it was too easy under the rules to escape the limitation that the derogation should only apply when ‘strictly necessary’.

Only the ‘national security’ exception was sufficiently precise to be regarded as an objective of general interest under the Charter, but it is still necessary to examine the ‘proportionality’ of the interference. This was a case (like Digital Rights Ireland) where the EU legislature’s discretion was limited, due to the importance of the rights concerned and the extent of interference with them. The opinion then focusses on whether the transfer of data is ‘strictly necessary’, and concludes that it is not: the US agencies have access to the personal data of ‘all persons using electronic communications services, without any requirement that the persons concerned represent a threat to national security’.

Crucially, the opinion concludes that ‘[s]uch mass, indiscriminate surveillance is inherently disproportionate and constitutes an unwarranted interference’ with Charter rights. The Advocate-General agreed that since the EU and the Member States cannot adopt legislation allowing for mass surveillance, non-EU countries ‘cannot in any circumstances’ be considered to ensure an ‘adequate level of protection’ of personal data if they permit it either.

Furthermore, there were not sufficient guarantees for protection of the data. Following the Digital Rights Ireland judgment, which stressed the crucial importance of such guarantees, the US system was not sufficient. The Federal Trade Commission could not examine breach of data protection laws for non-commercial purposes by government security agencies, and nor could specialist dispute resolution bodies. In general, the US lacks an independent supervisory authority, which is essential from the EU’s perspective, and the Safe Harbour decision was deficient for not requiring one to be set up. A third country cannot be considered to have ‘an adequate level of protection’ without it. Furthermore, only US citizens and residents had access to the judicial system for challenging US surveillance, and EU citizens cannot obtain remedies for access to or correction of data (among other things).

So the Commission should have suspended the Safe Harbour decision. Its own reports suggested that the national security derogation was being breached, without sufficient safeguards for EU citizens. While the Commission is negotiating revisions to that agreement with the USA, that is not sufficient: it must be possible for the national supervisory authority to stop data transfers in the meantime.

Comments

The Advocate-General’s analysis of the first point (the requirement that DPAs must be able to stop data flows if there is a breach of EU data protection laws) is self-evidently correct. In the absence of a mechanism to hear complaints on this issue and to provide for an effective remedy, the standards set out in the Directive could too easily be breached. Having insisted that the DPAs must be fiercely independent of national governments, the CJEU should not now accept that they can be turned into the tame poodles of the Commission.

On the other hand, his analysis of the second point (the validity of the Safe Harbour Decision) is more problematic – although he clearly arrives at the correct conclusion. With respect, there are several flaws in his reasoning. Although EU law requires strong and independent DPAs within the EU to ensure data protection rights, there is more than one way to skin this particular cat. The data protection Directive notably does not expressly require that third countries have independent DPAs. While effective remedies are of course essential to ensure that data protection law (likely any other law) is actually enforced in practice, those remedies do not necessarily have to entail an independent DPA. They could also be ensured by an independent judiciary. After all, Americans are a litigious bunch; Europeans could join them in the courts. But having said that, it is clear that in national security cases like this one, EU citizens have neither an administrative nor a judicial remedy worth the name in the USA. So the right to an effective remedy in the Charter has been breached; and it is self-evident that processing information from Facebook interferes with privacy rights.

Is that limitation of rights justified, however? Here the Advocate-General has muddled up several different aspects of the limitation rules. For one thing, the precision of the law limiting rights and the public interest which it seeks to protect are too separate things. In other words, the public interest does not have to be defined precisely; but the law which limits rights in order to protect the public interest has to be. So the opinion is right to say that national security is a public interest which can justify limitation of rights in principle, but it fails to undertake an examination of the precision of the rules limiting those rights. As such, it omits to examine some key questions: should the precision of the law limiting rights be assessed as regards the EU law, the US law, or both?  Should the US law be held to the same standards of clarity, foreseeability and accessibility as European states’ laws must be, according to the ECHR jurisprudence?

Next, it’s quite unconvincing to say that processing the content of communications interferes with the ‘essence’ of the privacy and data protection rights. The ECHR case law and the EU’s e-privacy directive expressly allow for interception of the content of communications in specific cases, subject to strict safeguards. So it’s those two aspects of the US law which are problematic: its nature as mass surveillance, plus the inadequate safeguards.

On these vital points, the analysis in the opinion is correct. The CJEU’s ruling inDigital Rights Ireland suggests, in my view, that mass surveillance is inherently a problem, regardless of the safeguards in place to limit its abuse. This is manifestly the Advocate-General’s approach in this case; and the USA obviously has in place mass surveillance well in excess of the EU’s data retention law. The opinion is also right to argue that EU rules banning mass surveillance apply to the Member States too, as I discuss here. But even if this interpretation is incorrect, and mass surveillance is only a problem if there are weak safeguards, then the Safe Harbour decision still violates the Charter, due to the lack of accessible safeguards for EU citizens as discussed above. Hopefully, the Court of Justice will confirm whether mass surveillance is intrinsically problematic or not: it is a key issue for Member States retaining data by way of derogation from the e-privacy Directive, for the validity of EU treaties (and EU legislation) on specific issues such as retaining passenger data (see discussion here of a pending case), and for the renegotiation of the Safe Harbour agreement itself.

This brings us neatly to the consequences of the CJEU’s forthcoming judgment (if it follows the opinion) for EU/US relations. Since the opinion is based in large part upon the EU Charter of Rights, which is primary EU law, it can’t be circumvented simply by amending the data protection Directive (on the proposed new rules on external transfers under the planned Regulation, see discussion here). Instead, the USA must, at the very least, ensure that adequate remedies for EU citizens and residents are in place in national security cases, and that either a judicial or administrative system is in place to enforce in practice all rights which are supposed to be guaranteed by the Safe Harbour certification. Facebook and others might consider moving the data processing of EU residents to the EU, but it’s hard to see how this could work for any EU resident with (for instance) Facebook friends living in the USA. Surely in such cases processing of the EU data in the USA is unavoidable.

Moreover, arguably it would not be sufficient for the forthcoming EU/US trade and investment agreement (known as ‘TTIP’) to provide for a qualified exemption for EU data protection law, along the lines of the WTO’s GATS. Only a complete immunity of EU data protection law from the TTIP – and any other EU trade and investment agreements – would be compatible with the Charter. Otherwise, companies like Facebook and Google might try to invoke the controversial investor dispute settlement system (ISDS) every time a judgment like Google Spain or (possibly) Schrems cost them money.

EP Study : Big Data and smart devices and their impact on privacy

FULL STUDY ACCESSIBLE HERE
AUTHORS : Dr  Gloria  González Fuster, (Research  Professor  at  the Vrije Universiteit  Brussel  (VUB), Dr Amandine Scherrer, (European Studies Coordinator and Associate Researcher at the Centre d’Etudes sur les  Conflits,  Liberté  et  Sécurité -CCLS)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EU citizens and residents and, more generally, all individuals deserving protection as ‘data subjects’ by EU law, are directly impacted by EU strategies in the field of Big Data. Indeed, the data-driven economy poses significant challenges to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, notably  in  the fields of  privacy and  personal data protection.

Big Data refers to the exponential growth both in the availability and automated use of information. Big Data comes from gigantic digital datasets held by corporations, governments and other large organisations; these are extensively analysed (hence the name ‘data analytics’) through computer algorithms. There are numerous applications of Big Data in various sectors, including healthcare, mobile communications, smart grids, traffic management, fraud detection, or marketing and retail (both on- and offline). The notion, primarily driven by economic concerns, has been largely promoted through market-led strategies and policies. Presented as an enabler of powerful analytical and predictive tools, the concept of Big Data has also raised numerous criticisms emphasising such risks as biased information, spurious correlations (associations that are statistically robust but happen only by chance), and statistical discrimination. Moreover, the promotion of Big Data as an economic driver raises significant challenges for privacy and digital rights in general. These challenges are even greater in a digital ecosystem with a proliferation of cheap sensors, numerous apps on mobile devices and an increasingly connected world that sometimes does not even require human intervention (as shown in the increasing development of the Internet of Things [IoT]). The flows of information on- and off line, shared and multiplied across computers, mobile devices, watches, SmartBands, glasses, etc., have dramatically increased the availability, storage, extraction and processing of data on a large scale. It has become increasingly difficult to track what is made of our data. This situation is complicated further by the wide variety of actors  engaged  in  data  collection  and  processing.

The numerous debates triggered by the increased collection and processing of personal data for various – and often unaccountable – purposes are particularly vivid at the EU level. Two interlinked, and to some extent conflicting, initiatives are relevant here: the development of EU strategies promoting a data-driven economy and the current reform of the EU personal data protection legal framework, in the context of the adoption of a General   Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR).

In order to address the issues at stake, the present Study provides an overview of Big Data and smart devices, outlining their technical components and uses (section 2). This section shows that many contemporary data processing activities are characterised by a high degree of opacity. This opacity directly affects the ability of individuals to know how data collected about them is used; it also hinders their capacity to assess and trust the manner in which choices are (automatically) made – whether, in other words, these choices are appropriate or fair. As regards smart devices, cheap sensors or the IoT, the pervasiveness of sensors and extensive routine data production might not be fully understood by individuals, who may be unaware of the presence of sensors and of the full spectrum of data they produce, as well as the data processing operations treating this diverse data. If Big Data, smart devices and IoT are often promoted as key enablers of market predictions and economic/social dynamics, data processing raises the question of who  controls one’s  data.

In this perspective, Section 3 presents the different EU approaches on the digital economy and the questions raised in terms of privacy and personal data protection (Section 3). This section argues that in the current context of the development of a Digital Single Market for Europe (DSM), the European Commission’s perspective is very much commercially and economically driven, with little attention to the key legal and social challenges regarding privacy and personal data protection. Even though the European Commission points out some of the key challenges of processing data for economic and market purposes (i.e., anonymisation, compatibility, minimisation), the complexity of these challenges is somehow under-estimated. These challenges can be grouped around the following questions any digital citizen may ask her/himself under EU law: which data about me are collected and for what purposes? Are data protected from unauthorised access and to  what  extent  is  control  exercised  upon  the processing  of my  personal   data?

Section 4 then considers these questions in the specific context of the Data Protection Reform package. Arguing that the digital citizen’s rights should be the main focus of the current debates around the GDPR, this Section underlines that Big Data, smart devices and the IoT reveal a series of potential gaps in the EU legal framework, in the following areas in particular: transparency and information obligations of data controllers; consent (including consent in case of repurposing); the need to balance public interest and the interests of data subjects for legitimising personal data processing; the regulation of profiling; and proper safeguarding of digital rights in case of data transfers to  third  parties and  third  countries.

In light of these findings, the Study concludes with key recommendations for the European Parliament and, in particular, the LIBE Committee responsible for the protection of natural persons with regards to the processing of personal data. These recommendations aim at ensuring that negotiations around the GDPR promote a strong and sustainable framework  of  transparency  and  responsibility  in which  the data  subject’s rights  are  central.

In particular, the guiding principle of any exploitation of personal data should be driven by the requirement of guaranteeing respect for the Fundamental Rights (privacy  and  personal  data protection) laid  down  in EU primary  and secondary  law (recommendations 1 & 2).

The role of data controllers in this perspective is central as they are legally required to observe a number of principles when they process personal data, compliance of which must be reinforced. The degree of information and awareness of data subjects must be of prime concern whenever personal data processing takes places, and the responsibility for protecting Fundamental Rights should be promoted along the data production chain and gather various stakeholders. Furthermore, the GDPR should ensure that individuals are granted complete and effective protection in the face of current   and   upcoming   technological   developments   of   Big   Data   and   smart   devices (recommendation 3).

The GDPR currently under discussion should in any case not offer less protection and guarantees than the 1995 Data Protection Directive, and users should remain in complete control of their personal data throughout the data lifecycle.

Finally, effective protection of individuals cannot be guaranteed solely by the adoption of a sound GDPR. It will also require a consistent review of the e-Privacy Directive (recommendation 4), an instrument that not only pursues the safeguarding of personal data protection but, more generally, aims to ensure this right and the right to respect for private life.

A quest for accountability? EU and Member State inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programme

EXCERPTS FROM A STUDY FOR THE EP LIBE COMMITTEE 

Authors: Prof. Didier Bigo, Dr Sergio Carrera, Prof. Elspeth Guild, and Dr Raluca Radescu.

At the request of the LIBE Committee, this study assesses the extent to which EU Member States have delivered accountability for their complicity in the US CIA-led extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme and its serious human rights violations. It offers a scoreboard of political inquiries and judicial investigations in supranational and national arenas in relation to Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. The study takes as a starting point two recent and far-reaching developments in delivering accountability and establishing the truth: the publication of the executive summary of the US Senate Intelligence Committee (Feinstein) Report and new European Court of Human Rights judgments regarding EU Member States’ complicity with the CIA. The study identifies significant obstacles to further accountability in the five EU Member States under investigation: notably the lack of independent and effective official investigations and the use of the ‘state secrets doctrine’ to prevent disclosure of the facts, evade responsibility and hinder redress to the victims. The study puts forward a set of policy recommendations for the European Parliament to address these obstacles to effective accountability.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although much has been done over the last ten years to overcome major obstacles to ensuring democratic and judicial accountability in respect of EU Member States’ complicity in the unlawful US CIA-led extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, much remains to be done to uncover the truth and hold those responsible accountable for their actions.

This study takes as a starting point two recent and highly significant developments that have helped to shed light on, and establish accountability for, the actions of EU Member States engaged in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition and detention programme. The first is the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee “Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program” (also known as the Feinstein Report) published in December 2014, which provided further evidence of the nature of the relationship between the CIA and several European state authorities and their wrongdoing. The second is the collection of recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), particularly in the Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases, which have helped to provide substantive rule of law standards against which to measure national political inquiries and judicial investigations.

Through the prism of these two important recent developments, this study builds on the 2012 European Parliament study on “The results of inquiries into the CIA’s programme of extraordinary rendition and secret prisons in European states in light of the new legal framework following the Lisbon treaty”. First (section 2), it pinpoints the critical findings of the Feinstein Report and their relevance for EU Member State inquiries, in particular the new revelations that: the CIA was isolated both nationally and internationally; European states that collaborated with the CIA were quick to withdraw assistance when scrutiny increased, leaving the CIA on the run; the UK failed to refute unfounded CIA claims about the intelligence value of information extracted by torture; and the CIA paid large sums of money to cooperative Member States. The study also examines the media controversy provoked by the release of the Feinstein Report and the efforts made by certain actors to undermine its findings.

The study then (section 3) offers an up-to-date account of political inquiries and judicial investigations in five Member States (Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom). It argues that, while political inquiries and domestic judicial investigations have been or are being conducted in all five Member States and there have been ECtHR cases regarding all but the UK, they have all been beset by obstacles to accountability. The response of the EU institutions is also analysed. While it is acknowledged that the European Commission has taken tentative steps to encouraging accountability (notably in sending letters to Member States in 2013 to request information on investigations underway), it is found that neither the Commission nor the Council have properly followed up on the European Parliament’s recommendations.

After providing a detailed analysis of the recent ECtHR judgments in the Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases (section 4) and detailing the rule of law benchmarks against which the effectiveness of national investigations can be tested, the study then measures the national political inquiries and judicial investigations and finds them wanting, either because of a lack of independence or because national security or state secrets have been invoked to prevent disclosure of the facts (section 5).

Finally, the study examines what has prevented EU institutions from taking effective action in response to the CIA programme (section 6). It finds a general lack of political will exacerbated by an absence of a clear enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the rule of law as laid down in Article 2 TEU, meaning that the important step taken by the Commission to send letters to Member States is bereft of a clear legal framework.

In light of the above considerations, the Study formulates the following policy recommendations to the European Parliament:

Recommendation 1: The Parliament, particularly the LIBE Committee, should establish regular structured dialogue with relevant counterparts in the U.S. Congress and Senate, which would provide a new framework for sharing information and cooperating more closely on interrelated inquiries in the expanding policy field of Justice and Home Affairs.

Recommendation 2: The Parliament should use the recent LIBE Committee decision to draw up a Legislative Own-Initiative Report on an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights to develop and bring further legal certainty to the activation phases preceding the use of Article 7 TEU. Parliament should also insist that the Commission periodically evaluate Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights and the rule of law under a new ‘Copenhagen Mechanism’ to feed into a new EU Policy Cycle on fundamental rights and rule of law in the Union.

Recommendation 3: The Parliament should adopt a Professional Code for the transnational management and accountability of data in the EU. The Code would outline where ‘national security’ and ‘state secrets’ cannot be invoked (i.e. define what national security is not). It would additionally lay down clear rules aimed at preventing the use and processing of information originating from torture or any related human rights violations.

Recommendation 4: The Parliament should demand that the Commission properly follow up on its resolutions and recommendations.

Recommendation 5: The Parliament should call on the President of the European Council to issue an official statement on the rendition programme to the Plenary, stating clearly the degree of Member States’ complicity and detailing obstacles to proper accountability and justice for the victims.

Recommendation 6: The Parliament should call for effective judicial investigations into the Feinstein Report’s findings that the CIA paid large sums of money to Member States for their complicity in the rendition programme, which amount to allegations of corruption.

The EU-US Umbrella agreement on Data Protection just presented to the European Parliament. All people apparently happy, but….

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED BY EU-LOGOS

by Paola Tavola (EU LOGOS Trainee)

“For the first time ever, the EU citizens will be able to know, by looking at one single set of rules, which minimum rights and protection they are entitled to, with regards to data share with the US in the law enforcement sector”. These are the words of P. Michou, chief negotiator in charge of the negotiation process of the so called EU-US “Umbrella Agreement”, who gave a public overview on the lately finalized transatlantic data protection framework in the field of law enforcement cooperation. The speech, delivered during the last meeting of the LIBE committee of the European Parliament, has met a warm welcome by the MEPs. Great congratulations have been expressed by all the political groups, for the work done by the negotiating team of the Commission that, from its side, has thanked the LIBE committee for its strong support and pressures. As Mrs. Michou said, they “helped us to be stronger in our negotiations”. Negotiations that were dealt with a partner that is far from being an easy one. The words of Michou, however, have not completely reassured all the MEPs, who have called for a legal opinion on the text of the agreement to be delivered by the legal department of the European Parliament. Legal certainties about the potential benefits or detrimental effects that this agreement could have on the existing EU data protection rules, as well as on past and future agreements, have been asked by the majority of the deputies, as a necessary precondition for the vote.

Historical context

An EU-US agreement in the field of protection of personal data was already called by the European Parliament in the year 2009. At that time, in a resolution on the state of transatlantic relation, the Parliament underlined the necessity of a “proper legal framework, ensuring adequate protection of civil liberties, including the right to privacy”, to be agreed on the base of a binding international agreement. The Commission then, on the invitation of the European Council, proposed a draft mandate for starting the negotiations with the United States, on a high standard system of data protection. The final mandate, being adopted by the Council in December 2010, opened the negotiation procedure among the two partners, that formally started on March 2011.

The negotiations have been though, mainly because of a great cultural difference existing among the two partners in terms of data protection, but after four years of work, the agreement has been initialed in Luxembourg, last September 8th. The final text, that can be signed only with the authorization of the Council and the consent of the Parliament, represents a huge step forward: “if we look back to some years ago, it was clear that some of the issues that have been now achieved in the text, couldn’t even have been theoretically possible”, Jan Philippe Albrecht (Greens/EFA) said, by opening the debate after Mrs. Michou speech.

The european Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Věra Juorová, by declaring full satisfaction for the conclusion of the discussions, affirmed: “robust cooperation between the EU and the US to fight crime and terrorism is crucial to keep Europeans safe. But all exchanges of personal data, such as criminal records, names or address, need to be governed by strong data protection rules. This is what the Umbrella Agreement will ensure.”

Terrorism or organized crime are phenomena that definitely constitute serious threats to security. However, leaving aside the narrow concept of security, as many theories and authors consider nowadays, a threat to security can be identified as any threat to the “cherished values” of our society: thus also to those values such as the right of privacy and the data protection.

The issue concerns how security and law enforcement are able to positively and constructively interact with new technology, but also to clash with it.

On one side, the information and data sharing is now a fundamental and crucial aspect of policy and judicial inter-state cooperation, since major threats and criminal phenomena have assumed a transnational connotation. On the other side however, it is necessary to ensure the protection and the fair and limited treatment of information, that is transferred as part of the transatlantic cooperation in criminal matters, in order to avoid abuses and the setting up of mass surveillance systems.

The two transatlantic partner, have already settled a substantial framework of data transfer rules. In 2010 they signed an agreement on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data from the EU to the US, for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP); while in 2012 they concluded a bilateral agreement for the exchange of PNR (Passenger Name Records) data.

“Data protection is a fundamental right of particular importance in the digital age. In addition to swiftly finalizing the legislative work on common data protection rules within the European Union, we also need to uphold this right in our external relations.” This principle was included by Jean-Claude Juncker in the political priorities of the European Commission agenda, presented in July 2014.

A look inside the “Umbrella Agreement” Continue reading “The EU-US Umbrella agreement on Data Protection just presented to the European Parliament. All people apparently happy, but….”

EU-USA “UMBRELLA” AGREEMENT ON DATA PROTECTION: A …LEAKY UMBRELLA ?

Posted HERE on 18. September 2015

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On 8 September 2015, the European Commission announced the successful completion of the negotiations with the US on a framework agreement („Umbrella Agreement“), that shall apply to the co-operation between law enforcement authorities. „Once in force, this agreement will guarantee a high level of protection of all personal data when transferred between law enforcement authorities across the Atlantic. It will in particular guarantee that all EU citizens have the right to enforce their data protection rights in US courts“, said the competent EU Commissioner Věra Jourová. Prerequisite for the signing of the agreement will be, however, that the US Congress will have approved the necessary legislative changes („Judicial Redress Bill“).

Although the Commission initially did not want to publish the agreement, the text – however – has found it’s way into the Internet, enabling the assessment.

First the good news: The agreement contains, in fact, substantial concessions from the US side. It has to be highlighted, that the US shall even provide EU citizens with a right to seek judicial redress if they are of the opinion that their privacy rights have been violated in the context of processing information the respective US authorities have received from the EU. Over years, the US government insisted on granting EU citizens only administrative redress. For Europe such limited redress – ultimately depending on the goodwill of the US administration – would not have provided an adequate level of data protection.

Another positive aspect is that both sides have agreed to commit to the principles of proportionality, necessity and purpose limitation and that they have to determine the use and duration of storage of personal information in accordance with these principles. The concrete purposes of data processing and the retention periods have to be determined by the specific legal acts.

However, although the agreement improves the legal status of EU citizens whose data are transferred to the US, it would be a misperception that the agreement provides EU citizens with the same privacy rights as US persons. If this would have been intended, the rights provided by US Privacy Act of 1974 and other laws, currently limited to US citizens and residents, could have been extended to EU citizens. Instead, the agreement text contains complicated rules, which do not ensure equality in the result. EU citizens have first to seek administrative redress. They may call a US court only after administrative redress definitely was exhausted. In addition, administrative and judicial redress are limited to those privacy rights explicitly specified in the Agreement, as the right to access and correction of the personal information. The agreement will not grant EU citizens – unlike US citizens – further rights to challenge the lawfulness of the entire process of data processing before a US court.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the agreement shall apply only to judicial and police authorities, but not to authorities with the task to guarantee the „national security“. US intelligence agencies like the NSA and the CIA share personal data with law enforcement agencies, even if they have received these information from their European partners. The provisions of the umbrella agreement would not apply in these cases. Last but not least the agreement does not cover data US and European authorities collect on the basis of national laws, i.e. the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or similar European legislation.

Another limitation of the umbrella: While according to the European data protection law, all personal data will be protected regardless of the nationality of the persons concerned, the agreement should apply only to data on EU citizens which have been transferred to the US by European authorities or companies based on bilateral or multilateral agreements. So data relating to citizens of third countries remain unprotected.

Finally, the agreement (Art. 21) falls short, however, with regard to the data protection oversight. It lacks an explicit commitment of both parties to ensure an independent data protection supervision. While the European Union commits that the independent data protection authorities shall be competent to check the provisions, the agreement refers with respect to the United States on a variety of oversight institutions, some of them not independent, which are to exercise the supervision of data protection „cumulatively“.

Given these shortcomings, to me the exultation of the agreement seem premature. The European legal bodies which need to approve the ratification of the agreement, in particular the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States are called upon to thoroughly examine the agreement, in particular, its compatibility with the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Depending on the results of such assessment it might be necessary to renegotiating and caulking the umbrella.

 

HUMANITARIAN VISAS : AN EU TOOL FOR A SAFE ACCESS TO THE EU TERRITORY ?

The Civil Liberties Committee is currently examining a Commission proposal on the revision of the VISA Code. The EP Rapporteur, Lopez Aguilar has just submitted a draft report proposing several amendments some of which covering also the issue of the so-called Humanitarian visas as a possible complementary measure to overcome the current emergency situation for the EU migration policy. The deadline for amendments in view of the future LIBE vote is September 25 and between the external contributions the letter of several representatives of Churches of different confessions is worth reading. EDC

To Members of the European Parliament  LIBE Committee

Brussels, 15 September 2015

Humanitarian visa within the EU Visa Code (recast)

Dear Members of the EP LIBE Committee,

Our organizations represent Churches throughout Europe – Anglican, Orthodox, Protestant and Roman Catholic – as well as Christian agencies particularly concerned with migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Our position on humanitarian visas has been developed in close cooperation with the Brussels’ office of the Protestant Church of Germany EKD. Today, we are writing to you regarding the Commission’s proposal for a new EU Visa Code – COM(2014) 164 final.

In our policy paper released in November 2014 we urgently called for the development of a ‘toolbox’ of safe  and  legal   ways  to   protection   in   Europe.

Among the proposed ‘tools’ was the issuing of humanitarian visas. Recently, the European Union has taken several encouraging steps regarding asylum policy. Now, the recast of the EU Visa Code represents a unique opportunity to introduce humanitarian visas throughout the EU which would be an important way to allow for safe access to EU territory and could help save thousands of lives and contribute to putting      people     smugglers     out     of     business.

The European Commission’s communication on the EU Agenda on Migration May 2015 mentions that safe and legal ways need to be available for the most vulnerable groups of people reaching our borders. Moreover, in its resolution on the latest tragedies in the Mediterranean, adopted on 29 April 2015, the European Parliament has, inter alia, called on Member States in point 7: “to make full use of the existing possibilities for issuing humanitarian visas at their embassies and consular offices”.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mr António Guterres called in a speech on 9 July 2015 for developing ways for legal migration giving the example of humanitarian visas. Additionally,  in its recent recommendations   for the Luxembourg  and Netherlands’  EU Presidencies, UNHCR underlined the need for other  legal and safe ways to Europe,  in addition to increasing refugee resettlement from first countries of asylum.

We welcome the recent adoption of an EU wide resettlement plan, allowing 22.504 Syrians refugees to be resettled by EU Member States. However, complementary legal avenues must be made available, to prevent further tragedies of refugees perishing at sea in their attempts to seek protection. As we have explained in our ‘toolbox’ the humanitarian visas are one among many solutions which could help some of the most vulnerable asylum seekers.

The purpose of this letter is threefold. Firstly, to explain what humanitarian visas are; secondly, to explore the experience of states in issuing humanitarian visas; and thirdly, to demonstrate how humanitarian visa fit within the EU Visa Code.

  1. What are humanitarian visas?

Continue reading “HUMANITARIAN VISAS : AN EU TOOL FOR A SAFE ACCESS TO THE EU TERRITORY ?”

EU CITIZENS’ ACCESS TO BENEFITS: THE CJEU CLARIFIES THE POSITION OF FORMER WORKERS

Published on EU LAW ANALYSIS on Tuesday, 15 September 2015

by Steve Peers

Today’s CJEU judgment in Alimanovic clarifies again the meaning of the EU law rules on the thorny issue of EU citizens’ access to benefits in another Member State. Like last year’s judgment in Dano (discussed here), it takes a more restrictive approach than suggested by the Court’s prior case law. However, like that prior judgment, today’s ruling leaves some issues open. I will discuss in turn the judgment itself, the impact on EU citizens’ access to benefits, and the UK government’s plans to renegotiate the country’s EU membership.

As a starting point, on the issue of EU citizens’ access to benefits, it is important to make distinctions as regards three issues: (a) the status of the person applying for the benefit ((i) not economically active; (ii) first-time job-seeker in the host State; (iii) previously employed in the host State; (iv) currently in work; (v) permanent resident); (b) the type of benefit at issue (social assistance, or concerning access to the labour market); and (c) whether the dispute concerns access to benefits or expulsion of the person concerned.

The judgment

The Alimanovic case concerns a Swedish woman and her daughter who had worked in Germany briefly, then lost their jobs. They sought a particular benefit in Germany, and the national court asked the CJEU if they were entitled to it.

First of all, the Court reiterated and expanded on what it had said in Dano: the benefit in question was a ‘social assistance’ benefit, not a benefit relating to labour market access. This distinction is important because the EU citizens’ Directivestates that access to ‘social assistance’ benefits can be denied to first-time job-seekers, for as long as they are seeking work, and to all EU citizens during their first three months of residence. Furthermore, the Court’s previous case law (interpreting the Treaty rules on free movement of workers) states that first time job-seekers were entitled to benefits relating to labour market access, but not to social assistance benefits. The Court references that case law obliquely in the Alimanovicjudgment, but does not either reaffirm or denounce it; it should be noted that a case about job-seekers’ access to this same benefit is pending (Garcia-Nieto: see the Advocate-General’s opinion in that case here).

Secondly, the Court then turned to the question of whether EU citizens who were previously briefly employed in the host State could be denied social assistance benefits. The previously employed are not one of the two categories of people specifically excluded from equal treatment to social assistance benefits by the citizens’ Directive; but that does not necessarily mean that they have access to those benefits.

To determine whether they had access to those benefits, the Court interpreted the equal treatment rule in the Directive, which states that equal treatment applies to all those EU citizens ‘residing on the basis of this Directive’ and their family members (leaving aside the exclusions which were already mentioned, as well as other exclusions in the Treaties or other EU legislation). So were the two benefit claimants residing on the basis of the Directive?

The Court ruled that they were not still covered by the Directive as former workers, since the Directive says that those who work in the host State for less than one year (as in their case) retain ‘worker’ status for at least six months after becoming unemployed. After that point, a Member State can (as Germany did) terminate their worker status, which means (unless they have another basis to stay, which was not relevant in this case) they are no longer covered by the equal treatment rule, and lose access to social assistance benefits. The national court also took the view that they could be classified as first-time job-seekers, although the Court pointed out that in that case, the Directive expressly permits Germany to refuse access to social assistance benefits.

Next, the Court distinguished prior case law which requires an individual assessment of whether an EU citizen could be expelled or is an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social assistance system of the host State. In this case, no such assessment was needed, because the citizens’ Directive already took account of the individual position of workers. The specific period of retaining worker status set out in the Directive and national law ensured legal certainty, while ‘while complying with the principle of proportionality’. Finally, when considering whether there was an ‘unreasonable burden’ on national systems, the individual claim did not count: rather the total of all claims would be ‘bound to’ constitute such a burden.

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La politique européenne d’asile : Strange fruit ? (I)

 ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON CDRE  HERE (9 SEPTEMBRE 2015)
par Henri Labayle, 
Les arbres de la chanson de Billie Holiday se reconnaissaient aux corps des pendus qu’ils supportaient. Comme eux, la politique d’asile de l’Union européenne a désormais un visage. Celui d’Aylan, un enfant syrien noyé sur une plage de Méditerranée. Donnant une réalité au macabre décompte des milliers de morts qui l’ont précédé, son impact marque un tournant dans la crise existentielle de la politique commune d’asile, enfin entraînée sur le seul terrain qui vaille : celui des valeurs de l’Union.

La chancelière allemande, Angela Merkel, aura eu le mérite solitaire d’y placer le débat, obligeant ainsi ses partenaires à se situer de part et d’autre de cette ligne rouge : l’indifférence de l’Union peut-elle encore durer ?

Pour y répondre en examinant les dossiers posés sur la table de l’Union, force est de savoir, enfin, de quoi on parle (I). A la lumière de cette clarification préalable, il faut ensuite mesurer l’ampleur de la crise traversée (II) et les réponses que l’Union prétend apporter (III).

I – Etat des lieux

L’emballement médiatique traitant l’exode des demandeurs de protection dans l’Union sidère. Depuis des mois, sinon des années, ce chemin de croix s’est entamé dans l’indifférence des opinions publiques nationales, soigneusement entretenue par des dirigeants peu désireux d’afficher leur indétermination et exploitée par des partis extrémistes oublieux de l’Histoire.

D’où la nécessité de rappeler certaines évidences juridiques (b) et de décrypter les chiffres disponibles (a), analyse indispensable dans un débat public de cette nature.

1. les faits

Les chiffres sont cruels. Il est curieux de les voir si peu analysés pour mesurer le défi posé à la société européenne. Partout, depuis quelques semaines et leur publication dans l’Agenda européen pour la migration, infographies et tableaux des demandes de protection fleurissent, souvent d’ailleurs pour accréditer l’idée d’une vague sans pareille. On ne peut s’arrêter à ce jugement sommaire, sans remise en perspective.

Une première distinction s’impose : il existe une tendance lourde, avérée par les chiffres à la date de la fin 2014, dans les grilles d’Eurostat, les rapports du Bureau européen d’asile (EASO), du HCR ou du Réseau européen des migrations (EMN). Les rapports nationaux la recoupent, comme en France avec celui de l’OFPRA. Sur ces bases, des enseignements sérieux peuvent être dégagés, comme le verra.

S’y ajoute une autre tendance, liée à l’emballement de la crise qui couvait et que l’on refusait de voir en face. Elle est plus difficile à cerner parce que mesurée approximativement chaque mois par Frontex et EASO depuis le mois de janvier 2015. En tout état de cause, elle plonge l’Union dans une situation d’ores et déjà plus grave que celle provoquée par les guerres de l’ex-Yougoslavie et du Kosovo. Plusieurs centaines de milliers de réfugiés avaient alors franchi les frontières, notamment allemandes, pour séjourner durablement dans l’Union, avant un retour.

Ce premier tri ne suffit pas. Analyser la demande actuelle d’asile n’est rationnel qu’en la mettant en perspective avec l’existant. Dit dans les termes technocratiques qu’affectionnent ceux qui nous dirigent, raisonner en termes de flux oblige à se pencher sur le stock.

A l’instant des comptes, un constat est anormal : l’Union ne dispose pas des instruments de mesure et de comparaison qui lui permettrait de faire la vérité sur les comportements des uns et des autres et de fonder ses décisions sur une réalité objective. La faiblesse des outils statistiques mis à disposition des décideurs publics est tout fait surprenante malgré la qualité des travaux d’Eurostat. Si le règlement862/2007 a tardivement imposé aux Etats membres de fournir des informations nécessaires, l’instrument statistique n’est toujours pas à la hauteur des attentes, quoi qu’en pense la Commission (COM 2015 374). Le tableau joint plus bas en fournit la démonstration, à propos pourtant d’une donnée élémentaire qui devrait être maîtrisée : celle du nombre des personnes bénéficiant d’une protection internationale dans l’Union. Rapports nationaux, HCR, Eurostat, Bureau Européen d’asile, Frontex et monde des ONG ne parviennent pas au même résultat, avec des variables considérables. Il n’est d’ailleurs pas possible aujourd’hui d’extraire d’Eurostat le chiffre exact des réfugiés séjournant en 2014 dans l’Union, malgré la grande qualité des informations fournies …

Les raisons en sont multiples : complexité du phénomène, systèmes nationaux et européens développés différemment, sur la base de définitions parfois contradictoires, mauvaise volonté des Etats à révéler leurs turpitudes … Il n’en reste pas moins que, face à une crise politique d’une telle gravité, disposer d’un état des lieux fiable devrait être un préalable à l’action publique, sous peine de fausser les appréciations et la présentation du dossier aux opinions publiques. Faute de l’avoir à disposition et au prix de quelques additions, mieux vaut donc raisonner en termes « d’estimations » qui ont au moins le mérite de traduire des tendances.

A titre d’exemple, la France compte ainsi en 2014 selon le rapport d’activité de l’OFPRA (dont on peut penser qu’il est la source la plus fiable) 192.264 personnes protégées : 178.968 personnes sous statut de réfugié et 18.296 protections subsidiaires. Eurostat en dénombre seulement 144.451 (133.316 et 11.135) parce que les mineurs n’y sont pas comptabilisés tandis que le HCR est plus généreux en déclarant 252.264 personnes protégées en France.

Cependant, même en utilisant la mire la plus haute, celle du HCR, la réalité chiffrée de l’asile est loin de justifier les indignations feintes et les promesses de générosité en trompe l’œil. Qu’on en juge.

Là encore, le cas français est révélateur des enjeux de la crise actuelle. La France compte un peu plus de 66 millions d’habitants, dont, environ, 4 millions d’étrangers. Au sein de cette population, moins de 200 000 personnes bénéficiaient en 2014 d’une protection internationale, selon l’OFPRA. L’opinion publique gagnerait d’ailleurs à connaître leur provenance géographique pour forger son jugement : 38% en provenance du continent asiatique, 30 % du continent africain, 28 % du continent européen. Au sein de ces réfugiés, le Sri Lanka (13%), le Congo (7,6 %), la Russie (7,2%) et le Cambodge (6,9 %) sont les plus représentés. La France « terre d’asile » est donc loin d’être fidèle à la réputation dont elle se flatte, comme en témoigne une comparaison avec les efforts suédois. Pour la seule année 2014, les 20 640 décisions positives contrastent avec les 33 000 décisions suédoises et les 47 555 décisions allemandes …

Un tableau récapitulatif des principales tendances observées dans le monde occidental confirme ces disparités, en particulier entre l’Union européenne et le restant du monde occidental.

La demande d’asile actuelle doit être examinée à la lumière de ces chiffres, même approximatifs. En 2014, la France a reçu 68 500 demandes de protection, soit une baisse de 2,2 % par rapport à 2013. Elle y a donc répondu positivement dans 20 640 cas. Accepter les propositions actuelles de la Commission la conduirait à accueillir 12.000 réfugiés supplémentaires par an, pendant 2 ans. L’équation est simple : 66 millions d’habitants en France / 4 millions d’étrangers / 192.000 réfugiés permanents / 12.000 syriens supplémentaires en un an …

En quoi cette augmentation traduirait-elle soit une invasion, soit un effort hors de portée ? Qui se souvient encore des 130 000 vietnamiens et cambodgiens accueillis en France par Valéry Giscard d’Estaing à la fin des années 70, dans l’empathie générale du monde intellectuel et politique ? Accepter en 2014 dix fois moins de personnes, elles aussi en danger de mort, suscite aujourd’hui la réserve sinon l’hostilité envers ces boat people d’une autre mer, pourtant si proche de nous …

Du point de vue de l’Union, la situation est plus complexe comme nous l’avions déjà exposée ici, àplusieurs reprises. La situation s’est brutalement dégradée en 2014, au plus fort de la crise syrienne, passant de 336 000 demandes en 2012 à 626 715 demandes en 2014. Sachant que le premier semestre 2015 à lui seul équivaut pratiquement au total des demandes de 2013 (432 060), on devine l’extrême gravité de la situation : plus de 100 000 personnes arrivées en Grèce pour le mois de juillet. Les chiffres et projections diverses, du Bureau européen d’asile à Frontex ou au cri d’alarme du Haut Commissaire aux réfugiés, confirment l’urgence absolue d’une réaction.

Au sein des Etats membres, tous ne sont pas soumis à la même pression, qu’ils soient ou non situés sur la route de l’exode, qu’ils constituent ou non des pays de premier accueil et c’est bien là le nœud du problème. Dans l’épicentre du séisme, incontestablement l’Allemagne joue un rôle déterminant, à la fois parce qu’elle est la destination privilégiée par les demandeurs et aussi en raison de sa place dans l’Union. Sans que l’on sache exactement jusqu’à quel point l’évaluation est exacte, le chiffre de 800 000 arrivées en Allemagne a, en effet, été évoqué pour l’année 2015.

Sa position contraste avec celle des autres, pour ce que l’on sait, malgré la vision euphorisante développée par le ministre de l’Intérieur français dans le quotidien Libération et l’autisme du Royaume Uni. Elle consiste tout simplement à appliquer le droit et les traités et à respecter les valeurs du monde occidental.

2. le droit

On ne peut que regretter d’avoir à le rappeler, une fois encore. La protection internationale est un droit de nature autant constitutionnelle que conventionnelle. Présenter l’accueil éventuel des demandeurs de protection comme un choix d’opportunité, en particulier en les assimilant à des « migrants » est une erreur fondamentale. Cet accueil est une obligation légale, sanctionnée par le juge. Pour avoir provoqué cet amalgame lors de la publication de l’Agenda européen, comme nous l’avions souligné, la Commission doit en gérer le prix aujourd’hui.

Outre le droit constitutionnel d’asile, et pour n’en rester qu’à la dimension internationale et européenne, les Etats membres de l’Union sont individuellement et collectivement contraints de faire face à la demande de protection qui leur est faite. D’une part parce que la Convention de Genève de 1951 relative aux réfugiés leur interdit d’agir autrement, notamment en les renvoyant vers des frontières où ils seraient en danger, d’autre part parce que la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme formule le même interdit, sanctionné par sa Cour, enfin parce que l’Union européenne garantit le droit d’asile dans l’article 18 de sa Charte des droits fondamentaux et proclame dans l’article 19 que « les expulsions collectives sont interdites » et que « nul ne peut être éloigné, expulsé ou extradé vers un État où il existe un risque sérieux qu’il soit 
soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants ».

A l’opposé de ce qui peut se concevoir à propos de l’immigration classique, le pouvoir souverain des Etats en matière de refuge et d’asile est donc singulièrement entamé par l’étendue des obligations qui pèsent sur eux, notamment en raison de l’interdiction qui pèse sur eux de se défausser sur d’autres Etats, notamment extérieurs. Interdit qui relativise les découvertes de solutions miracles consistant à externaliser le problème…

Outre l’assurance de ne pas être renvoyés, les demandeurs d’asile ont ainsi droit à accéder à des procédures d’asile justes et efficaces et à une assistance leur permettant de vivre. Forts de ces obligations communes, les Etats membres ont donc adopté un régime d’asile commun, dont la seconde génération de textes régit les procédures, les conditions d’accueil et les règles de qualification. Il constitue, pour l’essentiel, l’objet de la loi 2015-925 du 29 juillet 2015 procédant à la transposition de ces directives. Appeler dans ces conditions à une véritable politique « unifiée » de l’asile comme ce fut le cas au mois d’août à l’Elysée est donc une incongruité.

Le décalage existant entre les faits et le droit est frappant en cette fin d’été. Il est mortel pour ceux qui en sont victimes. Il mérite alors une explication, même sommaire. L’incapacité de l’un des chapitres législatifs les plus poussés du droit de l’Union à répondre au défi de la réalité est en effet surprenante.

En premier lieu, la stratégie de défausse des Etats membres dans leur gestion des demandeurs d’asile semble avoir fait long feu. Le système de Dublin, improprement nommé alors qu’il inspirait déjà la convention d’application de Schengen, établit un traitement unique des demandes d’asile, pour l’essentiel assuré par l’Etat d’entrée dans l’Union. Ce choix a donc fait peser l’essentiel des responsabilités sur les Etats membres situés sur la frontière extérieure de l’espace Schengen, pour le plus grand confort de leurs partenaires continentaux.

Démunis, comme la Grèce, ou pas, comme l’Italie, ils ont assumé tant bien que mal ce rôle, en temps normal. Quitte à prendre quelques libertés avec le respect des valeurs de l’Union, comme la Grèce à propos de l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile ou comme l’Italie de Silvio Berlusconi dans ses pratiques de réadmission vers la Libye de Kadhafi. Condamnées par la CEDH, les pratiques nourrissant cette solution bancale ont volé en éclat dans l’implosion géopolitique qui a frappé le bassin méditerranéen. La guerre en Irak et en Syrie a définitivement interdit de s’accommoder de cette situation et le non paper de Mme Mogherini sur lequel on revient plus loin a, au moins, pour mérite d’exprimer : « Europe must protect refugees in need of protection in a humane way – regardless of which EU country they arrive in« .

Sans doute est-ce implicitement ce que traduit la décision allemande d’ouvrir ses frontières intérieures aux demandeurs en provenance d’autres Etats membres. L’acceptation sereine par l’Allemagne, pour ne pas dire la revendication, de la prise en charge de demandeurs de protection ayant transité par d’autres Etats membres de l’espace Schengen est un désaveu cinglant de la logique Dublin et de son incapacité à faire face à une crise d’une telle ampleur.

Quelques mois auparavant, l’attitude française à l’égard de son voisin à Vintimille était radicalement différente et relativise le discours pharisien tenu par ses autorités actuellement. Face à une population identique, le couple franco-allemand n’aura pas eu la même logique. Là où les valeurs et le droit l’ont ouvertement emporté outre-Rhin, calculs politiciens, absence de courage et discours contradictoires demeurent la règle de conduite, à droite comme à gauche à Paris, le tout sans profit puisqu’à la fin, comme en football, c’est toujours l’Allemagne qui l’emporte …

Sans qu’il soit ici question d’inventorier les failles du droit européen de l’asile, deux carences majeures méritent cependant le rappel.

La première est générale et tient à l’absence de prise en compte sérieuse de la dimension externe de la politique commune d’asile. Celle-ci est « politique » au sens premier du terme, depuis l’Antiquité et les Eglises où l’asile se délivrait, et elle implique une prise de position vis à vis de celui qui persécute. Celle-ci fait défaut dans les actes sinon les paroles, tant vis à vis du régime syrien que de ceux qui le combattent. Silences allemands, changements de pied français, prudences britanniques, lâcheté des autres, par exemple lorsque certains Etats membres récusent toute compréhension parce qu’ils n’ont déstabilisé ni l’Afghanistan ni l’Irak, telle est l’impasse actuelle de l’Union.

La faillite de la politique extérieure de l’Union et de ses membres est donc un véritable problème. La qualité de personne protégée est en effet, a priori, une qualité précaire. Que disparaisse la menace qui pèse sur son bénéficiaire et la protection cède, ipso facto, ce qu’il est surprenant de ne voir mis en relief par personne. Si la guerre au Proche Orient, et en Syrie en particulier, est la principale cause de l’exode, sa cessation est susceptible de renverser la tendance et de permettre le retour. Focaliser l’attention sur le retour des immigrés en situation irrégulière et ne dire mot de celui des personnes déplacées n’est pas de bonne politique, sauf à considérer qu’une nouvelle Palestine est en train de se constituer, en Irak (250 000 réfugiés), au Liban (1 113 000 réfugiés), en Jordanie (630 000 réfugiés), en Turquie (2 millions de réfugiés).

Dès lors, agir sur les causes, comme le souhaitent les partisans d’une intervention, et sur l’environnement de la zone de conflit, de la Turquie aux pays arabes, est une condition de l’efficacité. Le silence assourdissant de l’Union comme de ses membres sur ce point est troublant, notamment et y compris à Berlin. La timidité avec laquelle le « non-paper » de la Haute représentante en traite explique le silence poli avec lequel les ministres allemand, italien et français en prennent acte.

La seconde carence est ponctuelle, propre à l’asile et à la crise actuelle. Les milliers de morts en Méditerranée, plus de 3 000 selon le HCR, et ceux de la route des Balkans posent une question centrale, remettant en cause l’architecture de la politique d’asile actuelle : l’absence de voie légale ouverte aux demandeurs de protection. Celle-ci leur permettrait de ne pas risquer leur vie pour exercer ce qui est, rappelons-le, un droit, celui de voir examiner leur demande. Comment comprendre ainsi que des candidats à l’asile demeurant en Syrie, désireux de demander protection à la France, se voient opposer par les services français une preuve de leur capacité à retourner dans leur pays en vertu de l’article 21 du Code des visas ?

En d’autres termes, l’Union est ici au bout d’un processus où elle prétendu construire une politique commune dont elle laissait en fait la gestion aux Etats membres, particulier aux frontières extérieures de l’Union. Ici, la crise la conduit à clairement poser le débat en termes de repli national et intergouvernemental, sonnant le glas de l’Espace de liberté, ou bien d’avancée de type pré-fédéral mutualisant les charges et les responsabilités, notamment et y compris au moyen d’agences exécutives en charge des demandeurs d’asile.

C’est l’effet révélateur d’une crise interne profonde.

L’ordre juridique de Santi Romano et l’Espace de Liberte’ Securite’ et Justice (ELSJ)

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED HERE

par Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, EDIEC   (7 SEPTEMBRE 2015)

Un travail sur le pluralisme juridique ne saurait être mené aujourd’hui sans l’œuvre léguée par Santi Romano sur il ordinamento giuridico (1918, rééd. 1945). L’existence d’une pluralité de systèmes juridiques et la définition des rapports qui se nouent entre eux demeurent en effet, omniprésentes.

Un récent travail de commentaire de cette œuvre (Santi Romano : les ordres Juridiques, Dalloz, coll. Tiré à part, à paraître) est l’occasion de s’interroger sur l’apport de Santi Romano à la compréhension de l’Espace de liberté sécurité justice.

Faire entrer dans le droit une réalité qui n’y figure pas, telle est la grande ambition – réussie – de cette œuvre laissée par Santi Romano, « l’ordinamento giuridico », qui a été traduit dans la version française par « l’ordre juridique » dans le titre et, parfois, par « l’ordonnancement juridique » dans le texte. Cette réalité est celle d’ordres sociaux non exclusivement étatiques – telles que la communauté internationale, les organisations infra-étatiques, religieuses, professionnelles, mafieuses, marchandes, sportives – qui entretiennent entre elles et avec les institutions juridiques étatiques un potentiel rapport de « relevance ».

La question que l’on peut se poser est celle de l’utilité de cette doctrine pour considérer les constructions du droit de l’ELSJ. Différents points de remarques permettent rapidement de saisir que la réponse est assurément affirmative.

Pour cela je considérerai trois développements de l’ELSJ (choisis parmi d’autres) : le rapport au droit étranger qu’organise le droit européen de la coopération judiciaire civile, la construction européenne saisie dans son ensemble qui embrasse le droit de l’ELSJ et, enfin, le phénomène social de circulation qui caractérise bon nombre des développements de l’ELSJ. Continue reading “L’ordre juridique de Santi Romano et l’Espace de Liberte’ Securite’ et Justice (ELSJ)”

Schipani v Italy: When does the ECHR require national courts to refer questions to the CJEU?

ORIGINAL PUBLISHED ON BLOG “DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES”

By Daniel Sarmiento, Professor of EU Law at the University Complutense of Madrid

The ECHR’s judgment in Schipani vs. Italy, of 21 July 2015, has reopened a subject that is close to the heart of many EU lawyers: the breach of the ECHR by a national court for failing to make a preliminary reference. The ECHR made this judgment public shortly before the summer holidays, so it might have come a bit unnoticed.

In fact, Schipani vs. Italy is not revolutionary at all, because it confirms a line of reasoning that the ECHR started in In Dhahbi vs. Italy, not too long ago.

In Dhahbi vs Italy, the ECHR stated that a refusal by a national court of last instance to make a reference to the Court of Justice, providing no reasoning at all when justifying its decision, entails a breach of Article 6 ECHR (the right to a fair trial). So if a supreme court refuses to make use of Article 267 TFEU (the provision on references to the CJEU) for no reason whatsoever, despite the fact that the appellant has raised it in the appeal, such refusal will breach Article 6 ECHR.

Schipani vs. Italy follows the same track (regarding the same national court, by the way). In this case the Corte de Cassazione had considered the arguments of EU law, but it omitted all reference to whether the issue was an acte clair or an acte éclairé. According to the ECHR, and after considering the contents of the contested national judgment, “it is therefore not clear from the reasoning of the impugned judgment whether that question was considered not to be relevant or to relate to a provision which was clear or had already been interpreted by the CJEU, or whether it was simply ignored”. It therefore came to the conclusion that there had been a breach of Article 6 ECHR.

The interesting point in the case of Schipani is that, in contrast with Dhahbi, the judgment is not unanimous. The dissenting opinion of judge Wojtyczek is very thought-provoking and merits some attention.

According to Judge Wojtyczek, the decision on the breach of Article 6 ECHR for failure to make a reference should not rely on an objective and “automatic” criterion. On the contrary, the breach should be based on the gravity of the interference of the contested decision with the right of the applicant. In other words: not every unmotivated refusal to make a reference should automatically be considered to breach Article 6 ECHR, particularly when the lack of a reference might not necessarily entail a significant loss for the applicant.

The question of the gravity of the interference makes some sense, particularly for a court exclusively entrusted with the protection of human rights. Of course, the Court of Justice might have other policy considerations when interpreting the counterpart of article 6 ECHR under EU Law: Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. After all, the Court of Justice must interpret Article 47 in the broader context of the EU legal order, which the Luxembourg court needs to ensure. The broader context of EU Law might demand the Court of Justice to pay due attention to its relation of cooperation with national courts, in light of the duty of sincere cooperation. However, it is clear that the duty of guaranteeing the uniform interpretation and application of EU Law rests on the authority of the Court of Justice.

Surprisingly, and when it comes to Article 267 TFEU, it seems as if things might be developing the other way around. The Strasbourg court is introducing a rather “objective” and strict system of review of national judgments from supreme courts subject to the duty to refer to the CJEU set out in Article 267.3 TFEU, whilst the Court of Justice seems quite happy to live with the Cilfitcriteria, which in fact grant national supreme courts a very wide margin of action.

This leads us to a rather paradoxical situation, in which the Strasbourg court, entrusted with interpreting Article 6 ECHR, does so in a way that reinforces a strict interpretation of the duty enshrined in Article 267.3 TFEU, whilst the Court of Justice seems rather more deferent with its national counterparts when the time comes to make a reference, thus introducing in the said provision a peculiar variable of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine so close to Strasbourg’s heart.

The Court of Justice has been asked several times in the past by its Advocates General to interpret Article 267 TFEU in light of article 47 of the Charter. So far, to no avail. The developments in Strasbourg might prove that such way forward might not be a bad idea at all. Otherwise the Court of Justice might find itself having to reinterpret Article 267 in light of article 6 ECHR, pushed by the increasing pressure of the Strasbourg case-law in cases like Dhahbi, Schipaniand others to come.

Seen in this light, I am not completely sure if judge Wojtyczek is correct in his interpretation of Article 6 ECHR, but I am quite certain that his argument deserves serious consideration.